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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an empirical study of a conflict within U.S. 
labour during the 1980s over U.S. Government and trade union policy 
towards Nicaragua and El Salvador. It demonstrates how the
American Federation of Labor - Congress of Industrial Organization 
(AFL-CIO) actively supported U.S. Government objectives in these 
two countries by providing political and financial support for 
anti-Sandinista unions in Nicaragua and moderate unions in El 
Salvador. It shows how this type of trade union intervention 
(which some commentators have termed "labour imperialism") has had 
a serious impact in Central America and in numerous other locations 
historically.
As the 1980s progressed, trade union opposition to U.S.
foreign policy increased. With it came a challenge to the AFL-
CIO' s "democratic internationalism." This thesis pays particular 
attention to the form, method and ideology (or, rather, ideologies) 
of this challenge and how it was spearheaded by activists and
lower-level union officials, many of whom had been part of the 
1960s anti-war movement. It shows how an alternative 
internationalism emerged from a network of "anti-intervention" 
committees and caucuses who forged links with the pro-Sandinista
v
unions and the left unions in El Salvador.
This thesis argues that the serious proportions of this 
conflict can be attributed to the collapse of the Keynesian '*social 
pact" between U.S. business, government, and organised labour which 
had hitherto sustained the AFL-CIO1s active "Cold War unionism." 
The political and economic attacks on U.S. unions, and the changed 
structural relationship of U.S. workers to the world economy, has 
altered the perceptions of many in the U.S. labour movement 
regarding the role of the U.S. Government, the multinational 
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INTRODUCTION
This thesis examines the controversy within the trade 
unions of the United States concerning the crises in Nicaragua 
and El Salvador during the period 1981-89. During this time 
the conflict in Central America and U.S. labour's policy in 
the region emerged as a key source of tension within the 
American Federation of Labour - Congress of Industrial 
Organizations (AFL-CIO). These issues frequently provoked 
discussion and activity (at local, state, and national levels) 
that was more contentious than was the case with any other 
trade union concern. At the AFL-CIO's full convention in 
1985, more resolutions were submitted on Central America than 
on any other issue. Particularly striking is the fact that 
this struggle gathered momentum at a time when the U.S. labour 
movement faced a degree of political marginalisation, 
membership shrinkage, and general disorientation not seen 
since the 1920s. At first glance, then, the concern with 
international issues might be interpreted as the fiddling of 
trade union leaders while the "House of Labor" burned. I will 
argue below that this is not the case - although an element 
of this is, in one sense, true. The struggle in U.S. labour 
over Central America was, I will argue, indicative of growing 
dissatisfaction of a layer of trade unionists with the general
direction (or lack of it) of the labour movement. Moreover, 
it reflected the impact of revolutionary challenges to U.S. 
hegemony in places like Central America has had on U.S. labour 
and political life in general.
The account below also unveils how the official bodies 
of the AFL-CIO, particularly the American Institute for Free 
Labor Development (AIFLD), have played a highly significant 
role in El Salvador and Nicaragua since the insurrectionary 
period of 1979-1980. This thesis demonstrates how the 
AFL-CIO's intervention broadly (and often specifically) served 
the objectives of the Reagan Administration regarding both of 
these countries. Indeed, these interventions were largely 
financed by the U.S. Government through the U.S. Department
of State and, after 1984, also through the
Congressionally-funded National Endowment for Democracy (NED) .
In the case of Nicaragua, the AFL-CIO consciously and
unswervingly pursued a course of active and frequently
vociferous opposition to the left-wing Sandinista government. 
This opposition involved a concerted campaign of vilification 
of the Sandinistas within the U.S. labour movement as well as 
active intervention in Nicaragua itself. Furthermore, the 
AFL-CIO's official position on Nicaragua facilitated the 
transfer of large sums of U.S. Government money to trade union 
entities in Nicaragua who opposed the revolutionary government 
from the right, as well as active collusion between U.S. 
labour functionaries with Oliver North's project to secure a 
steady flow of arms to the armed counter-revolution (contras).
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Regarding El Salvador, the AFL-CIO actively assisted 
trade unions who supported the Christian Democrats and opposed 
the Left. During the 1980s, thousands of trade unionists were 
assassinated in El Salvador by the U.S.- funded and trained 
armed forces and the so-called "death squads." In accordance 
with Administration policy, the AFL-CIO resisted efforts to 
reduce or terminate U.S. aid to the Salvadoran armed forces, 
arguing that El Salvador under the Christian Democrats 
constituted a fledgling democracy struggling to survive 
Marxist-Leninist guerilla violence from the Left and right- 
wing "death squad" violence from the right. In order to 
counter forces in and beyond Congress and in the labour 
movement who challenged this view, the AFL-CIO downplayed and 
sometimes denied the fact that the Salvadoran military had 
been involved in a routine extermination of its trade union 
and other opponents.
The AFL-CIO's active role in these two countries broadly 
conforms to the pattern established by the Federation 
throughout the postwar period. As is explained in greater 
detail below, this policy rested on collaboration with U.S. 
Government agencies and a strict adherence to Cold War 
priorities. Since 1949, U.S. labour has implacably opposed 
the Soviet Union in international affairs. Equally if not 
more significant, the AFL-CIO has actively obstructed any 
trade union or working class political activity that promoted 
a class-struggle ideology, ostensibly because such activity 
inevitably led to manipulation by "communists." The other
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important feature of AFL-CIO postwar foreign policy, however, 
involved a largely uncritical approach to the international 
role of U.S. capital. Indeed, U.S. business1 overseas 
investments were viewed to be beneficial to both U.S. workers 
in that they stimulated demand for U.S.-made products and 
helped maintain the overall health of the U.S. economy, and 
to overseas (especially Third World) workers in that the 
penetration of U.S. investment and the expansion of 
international trade also stimulated economic growth and 
development. The latter was expected to derail any movement 
to the left in the recipient countries.
Not surprisingly, the "Cold War unionism" of the AFL-CIO 
has been controversial, although its critics have mainly been 
located outside the U.S. labour movement. In the 1960s, 
however, the Federation's support for the Vietnam war did 
eventually generate a degree of anti-war activity from rank 
and file trade unionists and a layer of union officials. In 
1967, the powerful United Auto Workers (UAW) left the AFL-CIO 
following disagreements between UAW President Walter Reuther 
and AFL-CIO President George Meany over the latter's support 
for the escalation of the conflict in Indochina by the U.S. 
Aside from the belated and limited resistance to Vietnam, 
there has been no sustained challenge to Cold War unionism 
since the onset of the Cold War itself.
Set against this historical background, the conflict 
within U.S. labour over Central America during the 1980s 
constitutes something of a break with the past. In the
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account below I demonstrate how and why this struggle 
developed and why it has broader implications for the future 
of both the U.S. and the international labour movement.
Broader Issues and Implications: The Crisis of U.S. Labour 
and the Future of Trade Union Internationalism.
The considerable impact the AFL-CIO has had on Nicaragua 
and El Salvador is, I would argue, itself sufficient reason 
to warrant a serious investigation and analysis of the foreign 
policy conflict in U.S. labour. There are, however, broader 
issues raised by this conflict which also require attention? 
indeed the conflict itself can not be fully understood unless 
one has some grasp of the wider context. These broader issues 
generally fall within the scope of two distinct but 
nevertheless connected academic and political discussions. 
The first discussion revolves around the crisis of the U.S. 
labour movement; the second concerns the future direction of 
international trade unionism. In my view, this thesis makes 
a significant contribution to both of these areas of concern.
1. The Crisis of U.S. Labour.
Few if any observers of U.S. labour can fail to note and 
reflect upon the profound character of the crisis of U.S. 
trade unionism. In common with labour movements in other 
advanced capitalist countries, U.S. labour has suffered a
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series of setbacks in recent years. In most cases these 
setbacks have been due to changes in the political and 
economic balance of forces set in motion by the end of the 
postwar economic expansion. Traditional centres of trade 
unionism have atrophied in conjunction with the industrial 
restructuring of the recession and post-recession period.
It is widely accepted that the U.S. labour movement was 
perhaps less prepared than any other to deal with the changed 
political and economic climate of the 1980s. With no mass 
labour or social democratic party to offset the various 
incursions of capital, and politically isolated from other 
social movements and forces that might have combined with it 
to resist the broad offensive of the right, the defeats 
suffered by U.S. labour in the 1980s were deeper and more 
significant than was perhaps the case in any other advanced 
capitalist country. [1] (See Chapter Four) Most observers 
agree that the more aggressive posture of capital in the 1970s 
was later reflected in a rightward shift in both the 
Democratic and Republican parties in the 1980s, the 
unravelling of the postwar Keynesian consensus between labour, 
capital, and the state, and a serious reduction in the 
political power of U.S. trade unions. [2]
A widely discussed feature of the economic restructuring 
of this period has been the increasing levels of transnational 
investments and the constraints this has imposed on modern 
collective bargaining in particular. [3] Whether to defend 
their market shares from overseas competition, or to take full
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advantage of business opportunities made available by the 
expansion of world trade in the 1980s, a section of U.S. 
capital reduced its domestic manufacturing operations and 
relocated in countries where labour was cheap and 
disorganised. Some large U.S. companies became involved in 
"joint ventures" with corporations from other countries. [4] 
More generally, the U.S. economy became increasingly exposed 
to competitive pressures from the world market. As the 1980s 
progressed, left observers of the U.S. and world economy were 
fairly clear that these changes had exposed workers in the 
advanced economies, as Gordon expressed it, "to increasingly 
relentless pressure on their wages, benefits, and working 
conditions." [5] Equally if not more serious, the Keynesian 
economic and social policies normally favoured by the U.S. and 
other labour movements were now widely considered to be 
increasingly unworkable as nation states saw their options and 
power reduced by increased international competition. [6 ]
For these and other reasons, changes in the world economy 
became identified as an important component of the crisis 
facing U.S. labour - even though considerable disagreement 
still exists regarding the extent, character and consequences 
of these changes. [7] The era of the "global assembly line" 
was, nevertheless, thought to have arrived.
U.S. labour movement commentators have only recently 
begun to address these issues, and have, so far, merely echoed 
the conclusion that the implications for organised labour are 
indeed serious and far reaching. A wide array of specific and
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general policy suggestions have been put forth or endorsed by 
these commentators which have been directed at the AFL-CIO, 
individual unions and the Democratic Party. [8 ] Little has 
been said to date, however, on the issue of an appropriate 
international policy for U.S. labour. Moreover, only minimal 
attention has been paid to the role the AFL-CIO is presently 
performing in its international work.
This particularly applies to writers in the liberal 
"labor relations" tradition who have mainly focussed on the 
form and content of labour-management relations, especially 
the complex legal framework within which these relations 
operate in the U.S. This tradition has largely ignored the 
international economic and political dimension. For example, 
a relatively recent and widely discussed book in this genre, 
Freeman and Medoff*s What do Unions Do?. made only one 
in-passing reference to "foreign competition" and made no 
mention at all of the AFL-CIO*s extensive and well-funded 
international operations. [9] True, the growing literature 
on global economic change, compounded by the disintegration 
of the postwar consensus, has, in one or two instances, 
prompted a certain belated recognition that changes in the 
global economy might indeed deliver a serious jolt to the 
practice of U.S. industrial relations. So far this 
realisation has produced little more than general statements 
of concern. As one writer expressed it, "unions everywhere 
can learn from eachother...protecting the rights and interests 
of workers is a universal goal which transcends geographic
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boundaries and ideological differences. 11 [10] The value of 
such statements are, I would argue, limited to say the least.
Not surprisingly, the conclusions reached by left 
observers of the U.S. and the world economy have resonated 
more clearly in radical discussions on U.S. labour. Moreover, 
this tradition is generally more cognizant of the postwar 
international role of the AFL-CIO, which it regards as a 
logical extension of the conservative domestic politics of the 
U.S. labour movement. One might have expected, then, that 
left observers would have given urgent and concerted attention 
to a serious investigation of U.S. trade union international 
policy, attention which carried with it the objective of 
formulating proposals that reflected new economic and 
political realities.
This has not occurred. With the partial exception of 
Cantor and Schor's contribution (discussed below), efforts 
that have leaned in this direction have almost invariably been 
"tacked-on" to discussions which attempt to deal with U.S. 
labour in an all-encompassing and comprehensive manner. This 
has led to an underattention both to existing international 
activities and possible alternatives to them. Greenfield, for 
example, notes how "radicals...have cringed at the 
conservative nature of AFL-CIO foreign policy, often critical 
of Ronald Reagan from the right. Union internationalism often 
is displayed only in support of right-wing 'patriots'." [1 1 ] 
However, even this statement seriously understates the extent 
and significance of the AFL-CIO1s international involvement.
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The AFL-CIO, as is conveyed below, has been much more than a 
mere cheerleader for the right in international affairs? 
rather, the Federation has been an important auxiliary to the 
U.S. Government in the Cold War struggle throughout the 
postwar period, registering a measurable impact on the 
development of labour movements in a host of countries.
Other left commentators are, however, more aware of this. 
Since 1945, notes Aronowitz, !'U.S. labor representatives have 
worked to strengthen anti-communist unions in Europe and Third 
World countries..(.)11 [12] Aronowitz and other left
commentators have exhorted U.S. trade unions to seek links 
with unions in other countries as a means of responding to the 
greater integration of the world economy and the actual or 
perceived growing power of the multinationals. U.S. labour 
must recognise, says Aronowitz, that 11 it has been forced by 
historical conditions into opposition to the multinational 
corporations..(.)" [13] Regarding an appropriate
international policy to reflect and advance this opposition, 
however, Aronowitz is vague. "American labor foreign policy," 
he suggests, should "encourage the formation of democratic 
labor movements in every country, including the absolute right 
of workers to strike and to control their own organizations." 
[14] Using similarly vague or general language, Greenfield 
concludes that "broad international coordination (and) 
multinational and multiracial solidarity must of practical 
necessity be an even more central feature of current trade 
union practice than was true of certain of the struggles that
10
built the CIO." [15]
It appears, then, that left as well as liberal 
commentators often have a seriously underdeveloped 
understanding of the significance of U.S. labour's existing 
international policy and can offer only the most vague 
prescriptions for developing a trade union internationalism 
that responds more effectively to the economic changes 
referred to above. It is not accidental, I believe, that 
perhaps the leading left authority on AFL-CIO foreign policy 
in Latin America, Hobart A. Spalding, is not a recognised U.S. 
labour movement scholar, but a historian primarily concerned 
with the development of Latin American workers organisations. 
[16]
It is possible that U.S. labour movement commentators 
have not embarked on a thorough investigation of AFL-CIO 
foreign policy because they do not anticipate that the results 
of such an investigation will have a significant bearing on 
their evaluation of the crisis in which U.S. labour presently 
finds itself. The Cold War stance of U.S. labour is seen to 
be symptomatic of a more general conservatism rooted in past 
and present social, political and economic relationships in 
the U.S.; therefore, it is implied, the primary source (or 
sources) of this conservatism should be the principle focus 
of analysis. [17]
The problem with this approach is that its 
deterministic bias is such that it is unable to accommodate 
the possibility that U.S. labour's foreign policy might have
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some independent bearing on the crisis of U.S. labour. Yes, 
the AFL-CIO*s international activities may have largely been 
the product of "domestic" factors, but the consequences of 
these activities, I would argue, are such that they have made 
their own independent contribution to the development of U.S. 
labour and its present crisis - a contribution that has been 
largely overlooked.
Moody gives implicit recognition to this when he posits 
that the AFL-CIO*s international policy has "become a 
debilitating feature of its ability to respond to the 
realities of an altered world economy." [18] Exactly how 
debilitating, and in precisely what way, is, unfortunately, 
not developed. Cantor and Schor take a similar view, although 
their account pays more attention to the inadequacies of Cold 
War unionism and less to the task of formulating an 
alternative. They do, however, suggest a number of principles 
upon which new policies might be based. The AFL-CIO, they 
argue, should discontinue its Cold War "shunning" of left 
unions and begin to recognise that "anti-corporate or even 
pro-socialist sentiments among Third World workers are 
legitimate." [19] They also suggest that U.S. labour should 
be more critical of free-market development formulas, abandon 
protectionism, and "unmask the competitiveness mania currently 
sweeping Congress..(.)" [20] These suggestions broke the
silence around this question, but they amount to what is, I 
would argue, a contradictory and confusing manifesto of 
principles that pays little attention to how these principles
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might be put into practice.
The Contribution of this Thesis to the Debate on U.S. Labour.
The starting point of this thesis is located where other 
writers normally leave off. It recognises that existing 
accounts of U.S. labour, because they focus on what are widely 
viewed as the most central and pivotal trade union issues and 
practices, invariably leave too little space to deal 
adequately with the issue of trade union foreign policy and 
the interrelationships between different labour movements. 
This virtually universal neglect has left discussions on U.S. 
labour with significant defects or blind spots. These 
deficiencies fall into two categories. Firstly, the failure 
to seriously study the impact of Cold War unionism on overseas 
labour movements encourages the view that these activities 
have no independent bearing on the present crisis of U.S. 
labour. Secondly, this neglect has removed these commentators 
from any intellectual or political effort to formulate and 
facilitate an alternative international policy for U.S. 
labour.
In terms of the first claim, I would argue that Cold War 
unionism has more than simply debilitated the AFL-CIOfs 
potential to respond to the challenges of the 1980s. More 
accurately - and more importantly - the AFL-CIO has actively 
advanced the Reagan Administration's foreign policy in Central 
America (and elsewhere) and defended this policy before the
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wider union membership. By actively supporting the economic 
and political objectives of the Reagan Administration in 
Central America and elsewhere, one section of the AFL-CIO 
strengthened the position of a right-wing President while 
other sections were pulling in the opposite direction. 
Consequently, while U.S. labour was opposing (albeit weakly) 
the Reagan Administration^ neo-liberal economic agenda on the 
domestic front, it was, in the name of the Cold War, actively 
supporting the political as well as economic dimensions of 
that same neo-liberal policy in the international arena. The 
consequences of this have been harmful to the interests of 
union members at home and therefore made a distinct 
contribution to the overall crisis of the labour movement.
The neglect of this question also leads to an inordinate 
stress on the problems of U.S. labour, with the implicit 
corollary that these are "home grown" and can only be resolved 
by U.S. labour itself. As I argue in Chapter One, the fortunes 
of the U.S. labour and the Left in particular has often been 
shaped by the twists and turns of international events, and 
international issues have frequently been a source of 
ideological conflict and reformulation in U.S. labour. Davis 
has perhaps recently gone furthest in expressing, in general 
terms, the potential impact international changes can have on 
U.S. working class politics. [21] He speculates that 
political turbulence in Latin America during the 1990s could 
do much to change the political profile and behaviour of 
sections of the U.S. working class. He anticipates an
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"inevitable day of reckoning for the imperial hegemony of the 
U.S. economy" ushered in by a combination of political and 
economic determinants associated with the collapse of the 
postwar system of Fordist accumulation in the U.S. and the 
poor prospects for liberal capitalist development in Latin 
America and elsewhere. [22] If a "popular left" is to be 
rebuilt in the U.S. an important feature, suggests Davis, it 
will involve "increasing solidarity between the liberation 
movements in Southern Africa and Latin America and movements 
of the Black and Hispanic communities in the USA." [23]
This thesis offers evidence which goes some way toward 
validating Davis's view. But it also identifies more 
specifically how the processes leading towards this end have 
been set in motion, the actors involved, and how and in what 
way such cross-national political relationships might alter 
the profile of U.S. working class politics.
If Left political movements in regions such as Latin 
America can indeed strengthen the U.S. Left (and, therefore, 
sections of the labour movement) , then the extent to which 
U.S. labour assists or (as is presently the case) obstructs 
these movements must also be viewed as a factor that shapes 
working class politics in the U.S. It is in this manner, 
again, that the AFL-CIO's international policy can have an 
independent or relatively independent bearing on the present 
and future condition of U.S. labour.
Related to this is the indeterminate issue of morale. 
As is demonstrated in the chapters that follow, the Sandinista
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revolution and the struggle of the Salvadoran Left were a 
source of inspiration for a section of U.S. Left otherwise 
demoralised by the dawn of the Reagan period. It is therefore 
pertinent to consider what might have been the effects of 
concerted and officially endorsed AFL-CIO activity in support 
of the Nicaraguan revolution and the Salvadoran Left in the 
1980s, particularly in terms of its impact oh the degree and 
intensity of U.S. Left activism. The same question can be 
asked concerning the Popular Unity government in Chile during 
1970-73, which the AFL-CIO also actively opposed. Clearly, 
it is unwise to venture too far with such speculations, or to 
imply that the AFL-CIO's actions have been in any way decisive 
in determining the fate of these struggles. However, to 
ignore the actual or potential impact of U.S. labour's 
international activities, both in terms of the disempowerment 
of the U.S. Left or in terms of the actual impact of the 
AFL-CIO's interventions have had on the profile of labour 
movements and national politics in other countries, must 
appreciably distort any evaluation of the crisis of U.S. 
labour. In short, the international actions of the AFL-CIO 
impact upon the crisis of U.S. labour in two ways: firstly, 
in terms of what they have done and continue to do, and, 
secondly, in terms of what they might have done if a different 
international policy was in place.
Regarding the former, AFL-CIO foreign policy has played 
a significant role in shaping the postwar world according to 
the broad designs of the U.S. Department of State and U.S.
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foreign policy more generally. It has opposed not just the 
Stalinist left throughout the world, but all shades of Leftism 
which are perceived to threaten the geopolitical or economic 
hegemony of the U.S. and its allies. During the postwar 
period, when the U.S. economy served as the leading locomotive 
of world capitalist growth, this policy either had little 
impact on the conditions of U.S. workers or (as the AFL-CIO 
itself once posited) actually contributed to the high living 
standards of unionised labour in the U.S. to some extent. [24] 
The 1974-75 recession saw Keynesian recipes fall from favour 
and marked an important juncture in the ideological ascendancy 
of radical neo-liberalism. By 1980, this had altered not just 
the U.S. Government's domestic economic policy, but it has 
also altered the U.S. Government's approach to the 
international economy. In the Americas, programs such as, for 
examples, the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) and the 
maquiladoras export processing project in Mexico were designed 
to encourage U.S. manufacturers to leave the U.S. and to play 
their part in assisting the economic growth of Latin America 
and the Caribbean according to "free market" - and thus "free 
trade" - formulas for capitalist development. These programs 
have impacted negatively on U.S. workers, as AFL-CIO 
economists and lobbyists have been swift to indicate. [25] 
However, the international affairs apparatus of the AFL-CIO 
has assisted this extension of Reaganite neo-liberalism 
because it perceived the Cold War thrust of U.S. foreign 
policy to be basically on target and necessary. [26] While
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it is true that the AFL-CIO has registered some formal 
criticisms of these programmes, it has actively opposed or 
refused to support labour movement and other political forces 
in these areas who show militant resistance to this model of 
development. Put more directly, the international affairs 
apparatus of the AFL-CIO viewed fighting the Cold War to be 
a higher priority than defending the interests of union 
members in the U.S. This is clearly demonstrated throughout 
the course of this work.
Identifying these various defects or blind spots in the 
existing literature on U.S. labour opens the way for an 
analysis which is more attuned to the impact political and 
economic change at an international level has had and will 
continue to have on U.S. working class politics, and how 
cross-national links between unions can reinforce or hinder 
political movements.
This conceptual or theoretical contribution does not, 
however, address the specific issue of a new and more 
effective internationalism for U.S. labour. And neither is 
that issue addressed adequately here. However the empirical 
character of this thesis permits a close-range examination of 
the impact of Cold War unionism on three labour movements, and 
how a nascent alternative internationalism has emerged. This 
thesis demonstrates how the struggle over Central America 
triggered discussions and controversy in the U.S. labour 
movement that went far beyond the particular features of the 
conflict in the region. It shows how the issue of Central
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America and foreign policy in general served as a lightening 
rod for discussions and activism pertaining to the 
international economy, cross-national union solidarity, 
ideological disputes, human and trade union rights, and other 
issues. The conflict generated more grass-roots trade union 
activism, more coalition building between labour and other 
social movements, and more discussion on economic changes than 
perhaps any other single issue. Solidarity, coalition 
building, and internationalism - the clarion calls of the weak 
U.S. Left - actually began to take on the flesh of reality as 
a result of this struggle. [27] In other words, the struggle 
over international policy served as something of a catalyst 
for what might be the development of an alternative program 
for U.S. labour Left in later years.
By documenting the foreign policy struggle in U.S. 
labour, this thesis goes considerably further than most Left 
writers who appear content to exhort the U.S. labour movement 
to be internationalist and then leave it at that. It shows 
that a layer of union activists, officials and leaders have 
already taken preliminary steps toward a new internationalism 
for U.S. labour, and how these steps have been resisted at 
every turn by the international affairs apparatus of the 
AFL-CIO and their sympathisers. In the course of the
struggle, the potential for a more thoroughgoing shift in the 
direction of U.S. labour becomes more clearly visible, as do 
the serious pitfalls and problems that will need to be 
negotiated. Indeed, I would argue that the lack of a full
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discussion of this question among radical observers of 
U.S.labour simultaneously reflects and reinforces the general 
absence of a clear program or set of guiding theoretical 
principles upon which an alternative U.S. labour 
internationalism might be constructed. The political 
consequences of this absence is spelled out more clearly 
during the course of this work.
Clearly, the formulation of a new internationalism for 
U.S. labour requires more than the general statements and 
exhortations available in the existing Left literature. This 
thesis shows the impact of the existing policies and reveals 
the potential for change. Thus I see its role as a bridge 
between a state of silence on the question and the beginning 
of a period when this subject will receive more thorough 
attention - attention that will lead to informed and 
realisable policy suggestions.
2. The Future Direction of International Trade Unionism.
The second debate or discussion to which this thesis is 
directed is that which has unfolded in recent years around 
the issue of trade union internationalism. As I argued above, 
left labour movement commentators in the U.S. have not 
seriously investigated this question, and have, in my view, 
relied too heavily on prescriptive or general statements. 
Beyond the U.S., however, this question has received 
considerably more attention and this will be discussed below.
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This next section also serves two additional purposes. 
Firstly, the 1980s foreign policy conflict in U.S. labour can 
not be fully understood without some knowledge of the Cold War 
rivalries and other ideological divisions in the international 
labour movement. Indeed, Central America became a key theatre 
for these rivalries to be played out in a way that had a 
significant political bearing on the overall crisis in the 
region. This section also shows the distinct importance of 
the AFL-CIO in international trade union politics, although 
this is discussed more thoroughly in Chapter One. Secondly, 
because of the AFL-CIO's importance, any shift in the 
international policy positions of U.S. labour will have 
significant implications. In the advanced capitalist 
countries, labour movement foreign policy is for the most part 
articulated by the political parties with whom the national 
federations are affiliated. The absence of a mass working 
class party in the U.S. has meant that this task falls 
squarely on the shoulders of the AFL-CIO leadership. In turn, 
the AFL-CIO leadership has for the most part left the 
formulation and implementation of foreign policy to the AFL- 
CIO 's Department of International Affairs (DIA), which 
receives approximately 95% of its funds from the U.S. 
Government and is staffed by unelected functionaries. These 
facts alone have forced a growing number of activists to 
conclude that U.S. labour movement foreign policy is either 
influenced, dominated or, perhaps, even controlled by the U.S. 
Government. Because of its Government-provided resources and
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its established working relationship with U.S. Embassies and 
other international agencies, AFL-CIO foreign policy has had 
an extensive reach, so much so that the Federation has made 
a distinct imprint on working class politics in all five 
continents throughout the postwar period. As Zbigniew 
Brzezinski commented in 1974, U.S. labour had been "very much 
in the forefront of shoring up an alliance against Soviet 
expansionism." [28] Any serious challenge to this labour- 
government alliance is, to repeat, likely to have a
significant impact on the political profile of the
international labour movement.
International Labour and "Cold War Unionism".
The actual or perceived changes in the world economy, 
and particularly the belief that the multinationals have 
become more politically and economically powerful, has 
generated new interest (mainly outside the U.S.) in the role 
of the existing structures of international trade unionism. 
Organisations which formally connect national union 
federations, such as the International Confederation of Free 
Trade Unions (ICFTU), hitherto largely ignored, have come 
under increasing scrutiny. This scrutiny has produced
conclusions which reflect negatively on the international 
trade union bodies who, it is alleged, have not responded to 
the new challenges posed by international capitalism.
22
One explanation for this lack of an effective response 
maintains that international union structures for the most 
part assumed their present methods and objectives during the 
height of the Cold War. Union federations with Communist 
leaderships, such as the CGT in France and the CGIL in Italy, 
aligned themselves with the pro-Soviet World Federation of 
Trade Unions (WFTU) which criticised the U.S. The British TUC 
joined with other social democratic and politically moderate 
trade union federations to form the ICFTU in 1949. This body 
generally supported the Marshall Plan and what was to become 
the NATO alliance, and criticised the Soviet Union In other 
words, during this period the principal international union 
structures generally reflected the rivalry of the superpowers. 
[29]
The phenomenon sometimes referred to as "Cold War 
unionism" continues to pervade international trade union 
politics. It refers to the divisions at global, continental, 
and national level within the labour movement which reflect 
the East-West split. The ICFTU majority has traditionally 
regarded the WFTU not as an authentic trade union formation, 
but as a front for Soviet foreign policy. It is alleged that 
Eastern bloc trade unions are politically subservient to the 
ruling communist parties of their respective countries and are 
not bona fide workers' organisations with an independent 
voice. Fraternal relationships with such organisations, who 
constitute the bulk of the WFTU's membership would, it is 
argued, be tantamount to embracing a political system which
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(recent developments in the East bloc countries aside) 
repressed independent trade union organisations such as 
Solidarnosc in Poland. [30] For its part the WFTU has 
historically regarded the ICFTU as an obstacle to 
international trade union unity and a conscious or de facto 
servant of imperialism, particularly U.S. imperialism. The 
WFTU's stated mission is to restore that unity and to develop 
relations with any ICFTU affiliate of similar sentiment. [31] 
When these divisions are reflected at national level they 
have the effect of dividing labour movements in any given 
country along Cold War lines. Critics of the WFTU and the 
ICFTU point out that divisions are disabling under any 
circumstances. However, in areas of the world where trade 
unionists struggle to survive indiscriminate repression such 
divisions are considered to be even more illogical and 
debilitating.
Cold War divisions, I would argue, do not wholly explain 
the present weakness of trade union internationalism. The 
cessation of these hostilities would not in and of itself 
necessarily facilitate an effective response to the challenges 
of the current era, East, West, or in the Third World. 
Indeed, the international labour and trade union movement has 
been profoundly split since the end of World War One and even 
in its heyday the Second International was itself hardly a 
model of ideological unity. Divisions within international 
labour did not begin with the Cold War and are not likely to 
end with its passing. It is necessary, therefore, to view
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Cold War unionism through a wider historical lens. It is 
widely acknowledged that the 1947-1974 expansion facilitated 
a relatively protracted period of mutual accommodation on the 
part of labour, capital and the state in the advanced 
capitalist countries. This is not to say that, for examples, 
the events in France 1968, Italy in 1969-70 and Britain 
1971-74 did not rupture the general pattern of stability? 
however, the most enduring arrangements of this period were 
by and large peaceful. In the East the consolidation of 
Stalinist regimes began a period of state-directed economic 
and social development (again, not without periods of turmoil, 
such as Germany 1953, Hungary 1956, Czechoslovakia 1968, and 
Poland intermittently). Eastern bloc trade unions conformed 
to party-determined priorities which, stripped to basics, 
maintained that the construction of socialism required 
non-adversarial relations between the ruling Communist party 
and the broader working class. "Free collective bargaining" 
was perceived inappropriate now that capitalism had been 
overthrown, and independent workers' organisations were 
considered to be anti-socialist and counter-revolutionary. 
[32]
During this period trade unions in the West displayed 
a general commitment to gradual advances within a liberal 
capitalist framework while in the East trade unions were to 
a large extent constructed by the respective regimes and 
operated within the space accorded to them. The policies, 
activities and objectives of international trade unionism were
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therefore by and large molded by the fact that, in the case 
of the ICFTU affiliates, trade unions had a vested interest 
in continued capitalist expansion and the maintenance of 
conflict-free relations with their respective governments. 
Meanwhile, for the WFTU affiliates situated in Communist 
countries, their presence on the international scene 
necessitated they adhere to party-determined foreign policy 
positions.
The trade union internationalism of the ICFTU and the 
WFTU amounted to an effort to perpetuate and extend the 
dominant social and political arrangements of the period. 
Therefore Cold War unionism, while itself a peculiar 
phenomenon, nevertheless reflected the social, political and 
economic arrangements which prevailed during the postwar 
expansion in the West and the industrial development (and 
repair) under Stalinist leadership in the East. The 
significance of this broader interpretation of Cold War 
unionism will be discussed below.
International Trade Union Structures and the Third World
A perusal of the trade union situation in a random 
number of Third World countries is very likely to detect the 
presence of international trade union structures. Indeed, 
these structures have had a noticeable and, as will be
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conveyed below, often profound effect on labour movements in 
the former colonial world.
In the early postwar period trade unions outside of 
Europe and North America were under considerable pressure to 
support one side or the other in the East-West schism. In 
Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, the vast 
majority of trade unions followed the example of the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), the British TUC, and other union 
federations and distanced themselves from the Soviet Union and 
the WFTU. [33] Genuine ideological considerations aside, 
support for the West in the Cold War could be offered in 
return for financial assistance from the U.S. Government (via 
sections of the U.S. trade union movement). Furthermore, a 
friendly relationship with the labour attache in the U.S. 
Embassy frequently provided some protection from right-wing 
domestic repression. Open anti-Americanism not only severed 
this external line of support but exposed trade unions to 
charges of being sympathetic to communism, accusations which 
were all too frequently followed by repression of a most 
brutal character. Where trade unions enjoyed government 
patronage, such as Mexico and Argentina, the impact of 
international trade union bodies has been considerably less 
significant. [34]
It was suggested above that Cold War unionism reflected 
the consolidation of postwar political and economic relations 
in the East and in the advanced capitalist West. However, in 
the Third World, anti-colonial and class struggle in numerous
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countries meant that the relative stability of the core 
countries did not always extend to the periphery. Of course, 
many countries achieved independence from the colonial powers 
with relatively little conflict, and trade union federations 
in several cases entered into their own brand of consensus 
arrangements with capital and the state, arrangements that 
were usually cemented by shared objectives pertaining to 
national economic development. [35] For ICFTU affiliates in 
Europe and North America, trade union internationalism 
vis-a'-vis the Third World often amounted to helping this 
process along. The British TUC, for example, desired to help 
the Labour government of 1945-51 administer a peaceful 
de-colonisation of Asian and African territories. The TUC 
believed that "if there can be developed an effective trade 
union movement, the principles of democracy can be practiced 
and learnt in order to serve the purposes of self government." 
[36] One writer referred to an "alliance between metropolitan 
labour and colonial administration," in the pursuit of 
"enlightened paternalistic ends." [37]
The WFTU's role in the Third World since 1949 has been 
to advance the Moscow-encouraged view that labour movements 
in the so-called developing capitalist countries should lend 
support to the purportedly anti-imperialist and democratic 
project of the "progressive" indigenous bourgeoisie. The 
general and specific consequences of this policy, and its 
precise historical and political origins, can not be discussed 
here. However, it reflected an acceptance of the capitalist
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development model encouraged by the core capitalist 
governments. Once the national democratic revolution and 
industrialisation had been consolidated, then, and only then, 
was it possible to consider moving towards socialism. In 
essence, the Third World must first pass through a "stage” of 
capitalist development before reaching the conditions ripe for 
socialism. [38] This meant that both the ICFTU and the WFTU 
advocated reforms within a capitalist developmentalist 
framework.
The Role of the AFL-CIO.
The AFL and later the AFL-CIO (the two federations merged 
in 1955) adopted a relatively militant anti-colonial position 
within the ICFTU which brought them into conflict with the 
TUC, with the Americans accusing their British counterparts 
of being accomplices in colonial domination. [39] The centre 
of this conflict was Africa during the 1950s and early 60s. 
While the AFL-CIO also envisaged and unequivocally supported 
capitalist development objectives, its guiding principle was 
the pursuit of the Cold War. Several writers have suggested 
that the AFL-CIO1s anti-colonial posture was a conscious step 
to win the confidence of Third World labour leaders in order 
to promote its own Cold War objectives. [40] The AFL-CIO 
considered the TUC in particular to be too half-hearted in its 
opposition to the Soviet Union and the WFTU, and saw itself 
as the only true guardians of free and democratic trade
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unionism in the international labour movement. [41] Moreover, 
as one observer of African trade union affairs recorded in 
1966, "It was difficult to avoid the conclusion that the 
AFL-CIO, the American Department of State and the Central 
Intelligence Agency were working together closely in a common 
(Cold War) offensive. Any such suspicions were more than 
justified by the evidence." [42]
In Latin America and the Caribbean the AFL-CIO exerted 
considerable influence over the labour movement of the 
subcontinent, and supported U.S.-backed military coups and 
other destabilisation efforts launched against radical 
reformist regimes such as Allende's Chile and Jagan's Guyana. 
Cold War unionism became a highly visible feature of trade 
union politics in many parts of the region in the postwar 
period. (See Chapter One)
The AFL and later the AFL-CIO (the two Federations 
merged in 1955) exerted great influence over the early ICFTU 
by virtue of its superior resources, an aggressive 
international profile shaped by virulent anti-Communism, and 
a close (ideological as well as institutional) relationship 
to the U.S. Government. However, the Vietnam War, Chile, and 
other episodes intensified criticism of the global role of the 
U.S. within the international labour movement and weakened the 
Cold War thrust of the ICFTU. In the late 1970s, leaders of 
the Socialist International (S.I.) shifted considerable 
attention to the Third World. The Brandt report of 1980
recommended radical changes in the global balance of economic
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power in the direction of the poorer countries based on a 
fairer management and distribution of global resources - a New 
International Economic Order (NIEO). [45] Throughout the
1980s the AFL-CIO maintained its Cold War stance, and faced 
mounting criticism from within the ICFTU for its active 
support for U.S. foreign policy. [44]
Despite the change in S.I. Third World policy, the 
economic and political realities of vast sections of the Third 
World have not been conducive to social democracy as 
conceptualised and practiced in Europe. Therefore the Si's 
and the ICFTU's gradual retreat from the trenches of the Cold 
War and their call for changes in the management of the global 
economy have not been able to overcome the limitations of the 
capitalist Third World development model it once accepted or 
advocated. In Latin America and the Caribbean, for example, 
the effects of the economic downturn of 1980-81 and the 
extremely weak recovery thereafter has severely constrained 
the reform agendas of social democratic governments in several 
instances (e.g. Jamaica, Peru, and Venezuela). [45]
In sum, the ideological splits in international labour 
consolidated during the Cold War have been pivotal in shaping 
the practice of postwar trade union internationalism, and that 
the AFL-CIO has been a major player throughout this period. 
In the Chapters that follow, all the main actors referred to 
above - the AFL-CIO, ICFTU, SI and WFTU - play their part in 
the theatre of the Central America conflict.
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The "New Internationalism.1
In the 1960s some observers posited that the growth of 
the multinationals had created both the objective conditions 
and the need for unions to overcome national boundaries and 
forge firm international links that might open up an era of 
cross-national collective bargaining. [46] Writers later 
associated with the New International Labour Studies (NILS) 
challenged the simplicity of this notion, pointing out that 
it ignored the unevenness of wages and conditions, political 
peculiarities, ideological differences, and so on. [47] 
Indeed, by the end of the 1980s efforts to build cross­
national links between workers employed by any given 
multinational had produced only modest results and were 
confined to a few industries and unions. [48]
Thomson and Larson argued that the international labour 
structures (particularly the AFL-CIO), far from being simply 
unable to promote an effective trade union internationalism, 
had actually fomented deeper divisions in international 
labour. In the Third World in particular, the TUC, AFL-CIO 
and others were accused of "trade union imperialism" because 
of their loyalty to the policies of their own governments who 
had, they argued, exploited the Third World and its workers. 
[49] The Cold War unionism of TUC and the AFL-CIO embodied 
a clear imperialist objective. A new internationalism, they 
argued, was necessary and possible once these calcified 
structures had been revamped and democratised by rank and file
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intervention.
The NILS writers have since advanced the discussion of 
trade union and working class internationalism beyond the 
"trade union imperialism" approach, and have theorised and 
developed new concepts and strategies which might advance the 
objective of a new internationalism. Waterman in particular 
has encouraged a more catholic or inclusionary vision of 
internationalism, pointing to the need for unions to connect 
with and support "a growth of internationalism within the 
peace, environmental, human rights, women*s and other 
movements." [50]
The Contribution of this Thesis to Discussions on 
International Labour and the "New Internationalism."
This thesis makes two distinct contributions to the 
debate outlined above. Firstly, it demonstrates how 
"political restructuring" can have equal and perhaps more 
impact on the development of a new internationalism than 
global economic changes. Secondly, as suggested above, the 
empirical character of this thesis permits a close-range 
exploration of the process of constructing a new trade union 
internationalism in a contemporary context. Given the extreme 
rarity of empirical works that have focussed on the 
interrelationships between different national labour 
movements, this study will hopefully advance understanding of 
this neglected area.
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Regarding the question of "political restructuring", it 
is somewhat surprising that the discussion on trade union 
internationalism that has unfolded apace in recent years has 
accorded little attention to the political ruptures which 
accompanied both global economic change and the end of the 
1947-74 expansion. Howarth and Ramsay have argued that the 
period of economic "contraction" has exposed the "union 
parochialism" characteristic of the postwar Keynesian 
accommodation, which explains, they feel, why unions were 
ill-equipped to deal with the mobility of the multinationals. 
[51] Waterman has warned against "exclusive concentration on 
multinationals and internationalisation," and has advanced the 
view that more attention be paid to "the re-structuring of 
capital more generally." [52]
These comments aside, by far the most compelling image 
evoked by the NILS writers is that of capital becoming more 
international, more conscious of its power over workers, and 
more determined to press home its advantage. Their starting 
point or basic premise is that, as Cohen argues, "the 
conditions under which a genuine international labour movement 
can arise depend both on the changes wrought by capital itself 
in its drive to globalization, and on the capacity for the 
workers to respond effectively to such changes." [53] The 
search for a new internationalism, therefore, is for the most 
part located around the restructuring of capital as it 
pertains to the activity of the multinationals and the 
increasing internationalisation of the capitalist economy.
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The End of the "Social Pact11 in the U.S. and its Significance.
The evidence presented in this thesis suggests that 
global economic change and particularly the behaviour of the 
multinationals is only one factor in the process of building 
a new internationalism. In the case of the U.S., global 
economic change helped generate a changed world view among 
sections of organised labour which later developed into a 
nascent alternative to Cold War unionism. Important as this 
is, the political context in which the restructuring of 
capital took place was in this instance a more significant 
element in this process.
In the U.S., for example, business has pursued several 
strategies simultaneously, only one of which can be 
interpreted as a drift towards greater globalization. [54] 
The loss of U.S. trade union power has been as much a result 
of political attacks as it has been due to economic change 
(See Chapter Four) Importantly, the success of these attacks 
has largely rested on the open complicity of the U.S. 
Government in advancing the anti-union agenda of U.S. capital. 
During the 1980s the U.S. Government broke unions (e.g. the 
air traffic controllers), packed arbitration bodies such as 
the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) with pro-business 
conservatives, and, just as important, allowed capital a much 
freer reign to do what was perceived to be required to 
restructure and reinvigorate the U.S. economy. [55]
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Waterman is correct to assert that the re-structuring 
of capital more generally demands attention. However the 
"political restructuring" which facilitated economic 
restructuring - including government or government-inspired 
aggressiveness towards trade unions - is also extremely 
important, especially when assessing the prospects for a new 
internationalism. Unions in the advanced capitalist countries 
have been accustomed to directing their concerns towards the 
state and have secured certain reforms. As a consequence, 
unions invested considerable effort and interest in the 
economic performance of their own countries. Logue maintains 
that this type of labour-state accommodation reduced the 
apparent need for working class internationalism and this 
partly explains why such activity has been so peripheral and 
stunted. [56] It is therefore somewhat surprising that the 
prospects for a new internationalism triggered by the 
deterioration of postwar consensus arrangements have for the 
most part not been considered in depth.
This thesis demonstrates how the impulse towards a new 
internationalism can, in the case of core countries like the 
U.S., be generated by the collapse of consensus arrangements 
between labour, capital and the state. During this postwar 
expansion (indeed, since the New Deal), the state was seen to 
be an (albeit inconsistent) co-defender of workers' political 
and economic rights. Indeed, the political rift between 
labour and the state affects most if not all of organised 
labour and not just sections employed by multinationals or
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"trade-impacted" industries. For workers this political rift 
is therefore more visible, more comprehensible, and more 
disconcerting than the increased globalization of capital.
In the U.S., the increased globalization of capital has 
certainly contributed to an alteration in working class 
perceptions about the multinationals and the workings of the 
world capitalist economy, and not just among the many 
thousands of U.S. workers who in the 1980s lost their jobs 
because their companies moved abroad to take advantage of 
abundant cheap labour. [57] However, because of the role of 
the state in recent decades, unions have directed their 
concerns regarding the multinationals and global economic 
change towards Congress and the President. In the U.S., AFL- 
CIO lobbyists have exhorted Congress to "save American jobs" 
by restricting imports. These efforts have largely failed. 
While it is generally true that protectionist tensions have 
increased and the level of restrictive practices has risen, 
the AFL-CIO has urged a far greater degree of trade protection 
than the levels so far accomplished. The AFL-CIO, pointing 
to a seemingly ever widening U.S. trade deficit, has 
complained incessantly that the Reagan-Bush Administrations 
have allowed foreign competition to ravage domestic industries 
to the detriment of the U.S. economy and the American worker.
[58] Moreover, these Administrations approved (reluctantly) 
only minimal restrictions on factory closures (such as a 
required period of advance notice) and cut social programs 
that hitherto might have protected displaced workers from the
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worst consequences of unemployment and social dislocation.
[59] Therefore, many trade unionists now regard the 
government as an accomplice of the multinationals in their 
exploitation of the global labour market. [60]
The U.S. Government's adversarial posture towards the 
unions has weakened the labour-government partnership in the 
international arena. AFL-CIO support for the Cold War, the 
penetration of the multinationals into Third World economies, 
and encouraging collaboration between labour and capital in 
every continent, became increasingly viewed as out of step 
with the new adversarial relations in the domestic sphere. 
As this thesis demonstrates, the process of labour disengaging 
itself from the state in the area of foreign policy is not 
straightforward. The institutional and ideological roots of 
labour's active collaboration in U.S. Government foreign 
policy formation and implementation dates back to World War 
One. The Central America conflict did become a serious issue 
inside the labour movement, but (as of 1989) it did not become 
significant enough to decisively resolve the foreign policy 
conflict in one way or another. However, the conflict did 
advance the decomposition of Cold War unionism and generate 
a distinct impulse towards an alternative internationalism.
This thesis demonstrates how political as well as 
economic change can seriously advance the search for a trade 
union internationalism appropriate to the post-pact 
conditions. It also explores, at close-range, the processes 
that have been triggered and the main actors involved.
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Summary
The empirical and theoretical objectives of this thesis 
can now be summarized. There are three main empirical tasks: 
Firstly, to elucidate the internal and external challenges to 
the AFL-CIO1s Cold War unionism and how a nascent alternative 
internationalism began to take shape during the 1980s. 
Secondly, to show the impact of AFL-CIO international policy 
on Nicaragua and El Salvador and, thirdly, to demonstrate how 
the practice of Cold War unionism advanced the neo-liberal 
economic agenda of the U.S. Government and the multinationals 
and worked against the interests of unionised workers in the 
U.S.
The main theoretical objective with regard to the 
discussion on U.S. labour is to establish that U.S. labour's 
international activities can have an independent bearing on 
the crisis of U.S. trade unionism, and that future discussions 
on U.S. labour should weigh the implications of this. Related 
to this, it is shown how challenges to U.S. hegemony can 
measurably alter the political profile of U.S. working class 
politics - especially when capital and the state adopt an 
adversarial posture towards labour in the domestic sphere. 
In terms on the debate on trade union internationalism, this 
thesis shows how the "political restructuring" of the post­
pact period can contribute to the construction (in theory and 
in practice) of a new trade union internationalism.
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Methodology; U.S. Trade Unions and the Salvadoran and
Nicaraguan Revolutions.
This thesis is essentially a piece of contemporary 
history which focuses on the political interrelationships of 
trade union organisations in three countries, the U.S., 
Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Pertaining to the methodology 
employed in this work, several points need to be made 
regarding the national labour movements or countries selected 
for investigation. It is perhaps more useful to begin by 
stating why other labour movements and countries were not 
selected. If the primary objective of this thesis was to 
explore U.S. trade union responses to the increases in 
international trade and the apparent growth in power of the 
multinationals, then countries like Canada and Mexico would 
have clearly been more appropriate choices. Indeed, while the 
activity of U.S. multinationals in El Salvador and Nicaragua 
has been considerable, such activity has been far greater in 
the case of a whole host of other countries. [61] However, 
in terms of Administration development objectives, El Salvador 
was expected to be transformed into the "Taiwan of the 
Americas" and was presented as a showcase for other less 
developed regions of the subcontinent. Such an outcome would 
have quite profound economic and political implications for 
organised labour in the U.S. This point aside, it is 
nonetheless the case that El Salvador and Nicaragua were
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selected because they best demonstrated the impact of the AFL- 
CIO's Cold War unionism or, as others prefer to call it, trade 
union imperialism, in a contemporary context. Moreover, the 
AFL-CIO, reflecting the priorities of the Reagan 
Administration, made Nicaragua and El Salvador its main 
foreign policy concern during the 1980s. [62] However, the
AFL-CIO was also seriously involved in, to name only a few, 
South Africa, South Korea and the Philippines. [63]
Also from a methodological standpoint, El Salvador and 
Nicaragua provide two contrasting manifestations of the AFL- 
CIO 1 s intervention. The international role of the AFL-CIO 
has historically been twofold. On the one hand, it has 
attempted to promote class harmony, a liberal model of 
capitalist development which accorded a leading role to U.S. 
multinationals, social and political reforms, and support for 
the U.S. in the Cold War. This role is clearly observable in 
the case of El Salvador during the last two decades. (See 
Chapters 2, 4, 5, 9 and 10.) On the other hand, the AFL-CIO 
has actively assisted U. S .-supported or sponsored 
destabilization efforts against left reformist regimes, 
particularly in Latin America. The AFL-CIO has helped build 
trade union opposition to governments of this nature (See 
Chapter 1), opposition which is widely believed to have on 
several occasions contributed to their eventual downfall. 
This thesis therefore presents an opportunity to compare and 
contrast the AFL-CIO's trade union intervention in two quite 
different political contexts. Whatever economic similarities
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may exist between the two countries, El Salvador was ruled by 
a right-wing government backed by an extreme right-wing 
military, and Nicaragua was a revolutionary state that 
declared Marxism-Leninism as its guiding doctrine. (See 
Chapters 2 & 3)
Importantly, the left trade unions in El Salvador, and 
the pro-Sandinista labour organisations in Nicaragua, have 
also been engaged in a political conflict with the Cold War 
leadership of the AFL-CIO and the unions sponsored and 
sustained by the federation. They have accused the AFL-CIO 
of dividing the labour movement in those countries in order 
to advance the objectives of the U.S. Government and the CIA. 
The challenge to the AFL-CIO*s Cold War unionism is, 
therefore, not merely a question internal to the AFL-CIO, but 
has an external dimension also.
It must also be remembered that while the external 
challenge is advanced by revolutionary opportunities and 
change, these are in turn rooted in the failure of the 
capitalist industrialization model to raise or even maintain 
the living standards of the working class and peasantry. An 
integral aspect of the Cold War unionism of the AFL-CIO has 
been active identification with the capitalist 
industrialization development model, and it was the exhaustion 
of this model which provided the basic fuel to the external 
challenge. Taking the American continent as a whole, Central 
America is the region that reflects this exhaustion more than 
any other.
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In focusing on Nicaragua and El Salvador, this thesis 
explores some of the particulars of this "external” challenge 
to the AFL-CIO's international presence, as well as the 
connection between the "external" and "internal" challenges. 
This connection was facilitated by that fact that a 
considerable number of U.S. union activists and lower 
officials, as well as several union leaders, viewed the 
Nicaraguan revolution and the Salvadoran left as worthy of 
either critical or uncritical support. To many these 
movements constituted something of a political breakthrough 
in the struggle against the power of the multinationals. In 
other words, the relatively insignificant economic importance 
of El Salvador and Nicaragua is put in sharp relief by their 
political significance. Finally, the left unions in El 
Salvador and the Sandinista unions in Nicaragua provided two 
clearly defined international partners for the dissidents in 
the U.S. labour movement. Internationalism, after all, 
implies a bi-lateral or multi-lateral relationship between 
consenting partners; unilateral declarations of solidarity, 
it seems reasonable to suggest, pale somewhat by comparison. 
The Nicaraguan and Salvadoran revolutions opened up the 
potential space for a new inter-American trade union 
internationalism to develop which rested on quite different 
ideological premises than the already existing 
internationalism of the AFL-CIO and its Latin American 
affiliates.
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These considerations are clearly pivotal to the debates 
on U.S. labour and international trade unionism discussed 
above. The Central America controversy reveals much about 
the present ideological landscape of contemporary U.S. trade 
unionism and how this landscape might change in future. The 
ideological differences that became visible in this conflict 
have every chance of being deepened and carried over to other 
issues that pertain to political alliances and industrial 
strategies. Therefore Nicaragua and El Salvador are 
particularly appropriate sites for investigation.
The Structure of this thesis.
This thesis is divided into eleven chapters.
Chapter 1 discusses the historical foundations of U.S. 
labour's international policies and activities and how the 
AFL-CIO helped consolidate Cold War unionism in the 
international labour movement.
Chapter 2 describes how the AFL-CIO, through the 
activities of AIFLD, played an important role in El Salvador 
before, during, and after the failed insurrection of 1980. 
Two AIFLD representatives were murdered during a genocidal 
repression unleashed by right-wing death squads and Government 
forces.
Chapter 3 describes how the Sandinista revolution in 
Nicaragua derailed AIFLD-supported moderate trade unionism.
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AIFLD and its affiliate unions in Nicaragua then stood in 
opposition to the Sandinistas and generally in line with the 
Reagan Administration's policy of support for the armed 
counterrevolution.
Chapter 4 demonstrates how the situation in Central 
America and growing opposition to U.S. foreign policy impacted 
on U.S. trade unions, and how the collapse of the postwar 
consensus fueled this opposition. The AFL-CIO's contribution 
to the Kissinger Commission in late 1983 is also discussed in 
some depth.
Chapter 5 examines the role of AIFLD in El Salvador in 
1984 and how this concurred with U.S. Government objectives. 
It also examines the limited revival of the left trade unions 
during this period, the part played by dissident forces in U.S 
labour in their re-emergence.
Chapter 6 focuses on AIFLD's efforts to spread an
unfavourable view of the Sandinistas throughout the U.S.
labour movement and in Congressional circles. It also
describes how AIFLD's view of the Sandinistas was challenged 
during this period by trade union visitors to Nicaragua.
Chapter 7 focuses on the growing degree of confrontation 
in U.S. labour regarding Nicaragua and El Salvador,
culminating in a clash between Cold War and anti-intervention 
forces at the AFL-CIO national convention in late 1985.
Chapter 8 explains how AIFLD's reform proposals adopted 
(in part) by the Kissinger Commission were quietly ignored by 
the Reagan Administration. Despite this, AIFLD and the DIA
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continue to actively campaign for contra aid. Meanwhile, in 
Nicaragua the economic plight of workers continues to worsen.
Chapter 9 documents the increasing level of U.S. trade 
union involvement with the left trade unions in El Salvador. 
AIFLD*s unrelenting propaganda war against these unions is 
also described, including the formation of parallel unions.
Chapter 10 examines the developments which led to a 
major labour-religious demonstration against U.S. foreign 
policy in Washington D.C. in April 1987. The second section 
of this chapter examines the role of labour movement figures 
in the Iran-contra scandal.
Chapter 11 provides a condensed account of events in 
the U.S., Salvadoran and Nicaraguan labour movements during 
the period of 1988 to mid 1989. It then attempts to develop 
some general points and conclusions pertaining to the 
political struggle described in earlier chapters.
A Note on the Research.
The research for this thesis was mainly conducted in 
New York City with the helpful assistance of the political 
action department of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile 
Workers Union (ACTWU). The director of the department, David 
Dyson, was and remains the coordinator of the National Labor 
Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El 
Salvador (NLC). Access to the department allowed me to stay 
abreast of the day to day developments which took place inside
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the U.S. trade unions around the issue of Central America and 
to develop and discuss with a network of trade union and other 
contacts across the U.S. I developed my knowledge of the 
period discussed in this thesis which precedes the field work 
and writing up stages (1981 to mid-1986) by studying hundreds 
of letters and memoranda filed in Dyson's office. These 
mainly consisted of correspondences between union leaders on 
both sides of this conflict. These are cited directly where 
appropriate.
During this period I also observed and collaborated with 
Daniel Cantor, an ACTWU staff member who joined Dyson as a 
coordinator of the NLC in early 1986 when the work load 
expanded. Cantor later became the trade union coordinator 
for the Presidential campaign of Jesse Jackson in 1988 
following the publication of a book he co-authored with 
Harvard economist Juliet Schor entitled Tunnel Vision: Labor. 
The World Economy and Central America (Boston: PACCA Series, 
South End Press, 1987). Cantor's subject area clearly 
paralleled my own and this presented an opportunity to share 
ideas and discuss material in the preparation of his early 
drafts. Full credit for the book, I should add, belongs to 
him and his co-author.
Other trade union officials and activists across the 
U.S. provided letters, memoranda, newspaper articles, clips 
from local union journals, etc. which could not realistically 
be acquired in any other way. I conducted standard 
face-to-face and telephone interviews with many of these
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individuals over a two-year period.
An important source of written primary material were 
AIFLD and the DIA itself. Transcripts of Congressional 
testimonies, replies to critics, bulletins, reports, newspaper 
articles, etc. were (and continue to be) circulated to trade 
union officials for propaganda purposes. By virtue of my 
presence at ACTWU, these documents invariably came into my 
possession. Moreover, AIFLD made available to me additional 
material and information such as conference reports, articles 
from foreign policy journals, etc. which were much less 
accessible. Trade union newspapers and magazines,
particularly AFL-CIO News. Free Trade Union News. AIFLD Report 
and others produced by major U.S. unions were also widely 
utilised.
Primary material from Nicaragua and El Salvador, such 
as letters, press releases, policy statements, resolutions 
and declarations were acquired directly from the headquarters 
of union federations in Managua and San Salvador during an 
August 1986 tour of Nicaragua and El Salvador with the 
Washington Area Labor Committee. In Nicaragua, such material 
was provided by the Sandinista federations CST and ATC and the 
AIFLD-sponsored federation CUS. In El Salvador, I collected 
material from the headquarters of the AIFLD-sponsored 
federation UNOC and their more left-wing rival the UNTS and 
several of its affiliate unions. As a participant of the 
Washington Area Labor Committee's tour, I taped and later 
transcribed more than thirty hours of interviews with
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Salvadoran and Nicaraguan trade unionists on both sides of the 
conflict. Representatives of the UNTS in Washington D.C. 
subsequently provided further material generated by the UNTS 
in San Salvador. New York representatives of the FDR, the 
political wing of the Salvadoran guerilla organisation FMLN, 
also provided transcripts of speeches, copies of resolutions, 
and other materials.
Other organisations and individuals in New York City 
made it possible to stay abreast of developments in Nicaragua 
and El Salvador. A valuable resource in this regard was the 
North American Congress on Latin America (NACLA) whose close 
connections to Central America and extraordinary library 
furnished this thesis with considerable material.
The field work and writing-up period of this thesis was 
preceded by nine months (September 1985 until June 1986) of 
reading at libraries in London, particularly the Trades Union 
Congress' library for current and historical material 
pertaining to U.S. trade unions and the international labour 
movement, and the London School of Economics and the Institute 
of Latin American Studies for material on the Central America 
conflict.
A Note to the Reader.
One of the most difficult aspects of this research was 
trying to stay abreast of events in three different countries 
and the related problem of geographical distances. Another
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serious problem, however, was the sheer number of trade union 
organisations which came into the historical and contemporary 
picture. Not only are there scores of different
organisations, in several instances organisations split in 
half and both claim the original name, or periodically change 
names but are, in reality, the same as before. There is 
probably no way of completely overcoming the problem this
presents to the reader. However, I have taken reasonable
measures to make reading this thesis a little easier.
Firstly, I have inserted an Table of Acronyms at the 
end of this Introduction which is divided into five sections: 
the U.S., Nicaragua, El Salvador, international, and
miscellaneous. This table is also inserted as an appendix, 
only in this instance the acronyms (almost 200 in all) are 
presented in alphabetical order. Secondly, the reader should 
know that the name of Spanish-language organisations will, for 
convenience, appear first in English followed by its Spanish 
name and acronym which will both appear in parenthesis. For 
example:
Council for Union Unification (Consejo de Unificacion
Sindical -CUS)
Thereafter only the acronym will be used. To prevent 
excessive reference to the Table of Acronyms, I have attempted 
to remind the reader of key points of information regarding 
any given organisation. For example:
50
FESINCONSTRANS, the politically moderate construction 
workers' federation, declared its support for the new 
pro-Government union coalition, the CTD.
A further challenge to the reader is the irregular 
chronological pattern of the chapters. The scene skips back 
and forth from the U.S., Nicaragua and El Salvador, which can 
be confusing. However, because a principal theme of this 
thesis concerns the interrelationships between the U.S. labour 
movements and those of El Salvador and Nicaragua, it was not 
possible to deal with one country at a time in a 
self-contained fashion.
Finally, considerations pertaining to time, space and 
clarity dictate that some secondary organisations and actors 
have been excluded. Furthermore, because this study covers 
quite recent developments it should not be viewed as a 
complete historical account. However, I have attempted to 
bring this account up to date as new material became 
available.
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and USWA have lobbied Congress for trade protection.
59. AFL-CIO, The Polarization of America: The Loss of 
Good Jobs. Falling Incomes and Rising Inequality. (Washington, 
D.C.: 1986).
60. See Kamel op. cit. New York State Governor Mario 
Cuomo, reflecting on the 1988 Presidential campaign of Jesse 
Jackson, observed how Jackson "had the single most 
identifiable and attractive message: When he talks about big 
corporations going to Taiwan and paying low wages and then 
selling the goods back to us, people nod their heads in 
agreement." Wall St. Journal. March 15, 1988. Cited by Kevin 
Phillips, The Politics of Rich and Poor in America. (New York: 
Random House, 1990) p.49.
61. While it is true that Central America is a 
relatively small trading partner of the U.S., it is also true 
that U.S. investments in the region have had an enormous 
economic and political impact on the countries of the region. 
See Tom Barry, Beth Wood, and Deb Preusch, Dollars and 
Dictators: A Guide to Central America The Resource Center (New 
York: Grove Press, Inc., 1983) For an overview of the New 
International Labour Studies research areas, see Robin Cohen, 
"Theorising International Labour" in International Labour and 
the Third World: the Making of a New Working Class eds. 
Rosalind E. Boyd, Robin Cohen, Peter C.W. Gutkind (Aldershot, 
Gower Publishing: 1987) pp. 3-25.
62. Cantor and Schor, op. cit.
63. In the countries cited above, the AFL-CIO has 
extended its support to the formerly pro-Marcos Trades Union 
Congress of the Philippines (TUCP) and has remained severely
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critical of the left labour coalition, the Kilusang Mayo Uno 
(KMU). It has also supported the hitherto placid unions in 
the Federation of Korean Trade Unions (FKTU) which presently 
(late 1989) face a challenge from a broad left within the 
Federation. In South Africa, the AFL-CIO supports the unions 
of Inkatha, the anti-ANC rival of the left federation COSATU. 
In another important case, Brazil, the AFL-CIO opposes the 
presently ascendent militant unions who support the Workers* 
Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores), preferring the moderate 
Central General dos Trabalhadores (CGT).
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General Association of Treasury Ministry 
Employees (Asociacion General de 
Empleados del Ministerio de Hacienda)
National Association of Salvadoran 
Teachers (Asociacion Nacional de 
Educadores Salvadorenos)
National Association of Salvadoran Indians 
(Asociacion Nacional Indigena Salvadorena) 
Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza 
Republicana Nacionalista)
Association of Salvadoran Workers of ANTEL 
(Associacion Salvadorena Trabajadores de 
ANTEL)
Salvadoran Telecommunications Workers 
Association (Asociacion Salvadorena de 
Trabajadores de Telecomunicaciones)
ANTEL Workers National Association 
(Asociacion Nacional de Trabajadores de ANTEL) 
Santa Ana Municipal Workers Association 
(Asociacion de Trabajadores Municipales de Santa 
Ana)
Popular Revolutionary Bloc (Bloque 
Revolucionario Popular)
Coordinating Council of State & Municipal 
Workers (Consejo Coordinador de Trabajadores 
Estata las y Municipales)
Confederation of Cooperative Associations of El 
Salvador (Confederacion de Asociaciones 
Cooperativas de El Salvador)
Workers Solidarity Coordinating Council 
(Coordinadora de Solidaridad de Trabajadores) 
Confederation of Democratic Workers 
(Confederacion de Trabajadores Democatica) 
Salvadoran Workers Central (Central de 
Trabajadores de Salvadorneno)
Committee for Trade Union Unity (Comite de 
Unidad Sindical Salvadorenos)
United Confederation of Workers (Confederacion 
Unitaria de Trabajadores Salvadorenos)
Popular Revolutionary Army (Ejercito 
Revolucionario del Pueblo)

























Revolutionary Democratic Front (Frente 
Democratico Revolucionario)
National Federation of Salvadoran Workers 
(Federacion Nacional de Trabajadores 
Salvadorenos)
Federation of Construction, Transportation & 
Related Industries (Federacion de Sindicatos de la 
Industria de la Construccion, Transporte y 
Similares)
Salvadoran National Trade Union Federation of 
Workers of the Food, Clothing, Textile, & Related 
Industries (Federacion Nacional de Sindicatos de 
Trabajadores de la Industria del Alimento,
Vestido, Textil, Similares y Conexos de El 
Salvador)
Federation of Health Workers (Federacion de 
Trabajadores de la Salud)
Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation 
(Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional)
Popular Liberation Forces (Fuerzas Populares de 
Liberacion)
Revolutionary Trade Union Federation 
(Federacion Sindical Revolucionario)
Unifying Federation of Salvadoran Trade Union 
(Federacion Unitaria de Sindicatos 
Salvadorenos)
Salvadorena Institute of Agrarian 
Transformation (Instituto Slavadoreno de 
Transformacion Agraria)
National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento 
Nacional Revolucionario)
Labour Unity Movement of El Salvador 
(Movimiento Unitario Sindicalista y Gremail de 
El Salvador)
Nationalist Democratic Organization 
(Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista)
Communist Party of El Salvador (Partido 
Comunista de El Salvador)
National Conciliation Party (Partido 
Conciliacion de Nacional) El Salvador 
Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democratico 
Cristiano) El Salvador
Central America Revolutionary Workers Party 
(Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores 
Centroamerica)
National Resistence (Resistencia Nacional)
Trade Union of ANDA (Water Authority) Workers 
(Sindicato Empresa de Trabajadores de ANDA) 
Electrical Industry Workers Union (Sindicato de 
la Industria Electrica de El Salvador)
Banking & Savings & Loan General Industry 
Employees Union (Sindicato de la Industria 
General de Empleados Bancarios y Asociaciones de 
Ahorro y Prestamo)












Salvador (Sindicato de Trabajadores Agricultura, 
Simitares y Conexos Salvadorenos)
Union of Electrical Workers of the Lempa River 
(Sindical de Trabajadores de la Comision 
Ejecutivo Electrico de Rio Lempa)
Hospital Workers Union (Sinicato de Trabajadores 
de I.S.S)
Salvadoran Union of Workers of the Textile & 
Cotton Industry (Sindicato de Empleados y 
Trabajadores de la Industria Textil y Algodon 
Salvadorena)
Union of University Workers (Sindicato de 
Trabajadores de Universitarios)
Letter Carrier & Postal Employees Union Society 
of El Salvador (Sociedad Union de Carteros y 
Empleados Postales de El Salvador)
Construction Workers Union (Sindicato Union de 
Trabajadores de Constuccion)
Salvadoran Communal Union (Union Comunal 
Salvadorena)
National Worker Peasant Union (Unidad Nacional 
Obreros y Campesinos)
National Union of Salvadoran Workers (Unidad 
Nacional de Trabajadores Salvadorenos)
Popular Democratic Unity (Unidad Popular 
Democratica)
-NICARAGUA-
ANDEN National Association of Nicaraguan Educators
(Asociacion Nacional de la Educadores 
Nicaraguenses)
ATC Association of Rural Workers (Asociacion de
Trabajadores del Campo)
CAUS Confederation of Action and Labor Union
Unification (Central de Accion y Unidad 
Sindical)
CDN Nicaraguan Democratic Coordinator (Coordinadora
Democratica de Nicaragua)
CGT (Nica.) General Confederation of Workers (Confederacion
General de Trabajadores)
General Confederation of Workers (Confederacion 
General de Trabajadores - Independiente) 
Permanent Commission on Human Rights (Comision 
Permanente de Derechos Humanos)
Nicaraguan Trade Union Coordinating Council 
(Coordinadora Sindical de Nicaragua)
CST (Nica.) Sandinista Workers Central (Central Sandinista
de Trabajadores)
CTN Workers' Central of Nicaragua (Central de
Trabajadores de Nicaragua)











































Broad Opposition Front (Frente Amplio)
Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democratica 
Nicaraguense)
Workers* Front (Frente Obrero)
Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente 
Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional)
Nicaraguan Socialist Party (Partido Socialista 
de Nicaragua)
Democratic Union of Liberation (Union 
Democratica de Liberacion)
National Union of Farmers and Cattlemen (Union 
Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos)
National Union of (Public) Employees (Union 
Nacional Empleados)
United Nicaraguan Opposition (Unidad Nicaraguense 
de Opositora)
Nicaraguan Press Union (Union de Periodistas 
Nicaraguenses)
-UNITED STATES-
American Alliance for Labor & Democracy 
Association of Catholic Trade Unions 
Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union 
American Federation of Government Employees 
American Federation of Labor 
American Federation of Labor - Congress of 
Industrial Organizations
American Federation of State, County & Municipal 
Employees
American Federation of Teachers 
American Institute For Free Labor Development 
International Union of Bricklayers & Allied 
Craftsmen
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship 
Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station 
Employees
Central America/Anti-Intervention Movement 
Central America Development Organization 
California Federation of Teachers (CFT)
Congress of Industrial Organizations 
Information Center for Salvadoran Trade 
Unionists (Chicago)
Committee in Support of Trade Union Rights 
Committee on Political Education, AFL-CIO 
Communist Party of the United States of America 
Communication Workers of America 
Department of International Affairs (AFL-CIO) 
Democratic Socialists of America 
Executive Council (AFL-CIO)
Emergency National Council 
Free Trade Union Committee 
Free Trade Union Institute
Graphic Communications International Union
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HERE Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees
IAM International Association of Machinists
ICWU International Chemical Workers Union
I LA International Longshoremen's Association
ILGWU International Ladle's & Garment Workers' Union
ILWU International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's
Union
IMAWU International Molders & Allied Workers Union
IRD Institute for Religion & Democracy
IUD Industrial Union Dept. (AFL-CIO)
IUE International Union of Electrical Workers
IWA International Woodworkers of America
IWW Industrial Workers of the World
NUHHCE National Union of Hospital & Health Care
Employees (National 1199)
OCAW Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers
PATCO Professional Air Traffic Controllers
Organization
PRODEMCA Friends of the Democratic Center in Central
America
SAG Screen Actors Guild
SDUSA Social Democrats of the United States of America
SEIU Service Employees International Union
SIUNA Seafarers International Union of North America
SLDN Salvadoran Labor Defense Network
TUSES Trade Unionists in Support of El Salvador
UAW United Auto Workers
UE United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers
of America
UFCW United Food & Commercial Workers
UFWA United Farm Workers of America
UFWA United Furniture Workers of America
UMWA United Mine Workers of America
USWA United Steel Workers of America
-INTERNATIONAL-
All Russian Central Council of Trade Unions 
Canadian Congress of Labor 
Genral Confederation of Italian Workers 
(Confederazione Generale Italiane del 
lanoro)
CGT (Brazil) General Workers Central (Central General dos
Trabalhadores)
CGT (France) General Workers Central (Central General du
Travail)
CLAT Latin American Workers Federation
(Confederacion Latinamericana de Trabajo)
CNUS (Guat'a) Central Nacional Unidad de Sindicatos
COLPROSUMAH Colegio Profesional Superior Magisterial
Hondureno
CONATRAL National Federation of Free Workers









































Confederation of South African Trade Unions 
Civil & Public Services Association (UK) 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of 
Latin America (Congreso Permanente de Unidad 
Sindical de los Trabajadores de America Latina) 
Latin American Workers Federation (Confederacion 
de Trabajadores de America Latina)
Cuban Workers* Federation (Confederacion de 
Trabajadores Cubanos)
Republic of Panama Workers' Federation 
(Confederacion de Trabajadores de Republika de 
Panama)
Confederation of Venezuelan Workers 
(Confederacion de Trabajadores Venezuela) 
Confederation of Chilean Professions 
"Unica" Workers Central (Central Unica dos 
Trabalhadores)
United Workers' Central (Central Unidad 
de Trabajadores) Chile 
Federation of Korean Trade Unions 
Force Ouvriere
Federation of Central American Teachers 
(Federacion de Obreros Magisteriales de 
Centroamerica)
United Federation of Honduran Workers 
(Federacion Unidad de Trabajadores Hondorencs) 
International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions
International Federation of Trade Unions
International Trade Secretariat/s
May First Movement (Kilusang de Mayo Uno)
Democratic Workers' Movement (Movimiento
Democratico Sindical) Brazil
National Association of Local Governement
Officers (UK)
Inter-American Regional Organization of Labor 
(Organizacion Regionales Inter-americana da 
Trabajado)
Pan American Federation of Labor 
Communist Party of France 
Communist Party of Italy
International Federation of Postal, Telephony & 
Telegraph Workers
Red International of Labor Unions
Socialist International
South West Africa Peoples Association
Seamen & Waterfront Workers Union (Grenada]
Trades Union Congress
Trades Union Council (Guiana)
Trades Union Congress of the Philippines 
Trade Union Education League 
World Confederation of Labor 
World Confederation of Organizations of the 
Teaching Profession
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WFTU World Federation of Trade Unions
-MISCELLANIOUS-
AI Amnesty International
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIPE Center for International Private Enterprise
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
GAO Government Accounting Office
ILO International Labour Organization
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCC National Council of Churches
NED National Endowment for Democracy
NLRB National Labor Relations Board
NIEO New International Economic Order
NSC National Security Council
OPD Office for Public Diplomacy for Latin America
and the Caribbean (U.S. Dept, of State.)
OPIC Overseas Private Investment Corporation
RCC Roman Catholic Church




THE CONTROVERSY OF AFL-CIO FOREIGN POLICY: DEMOCRATIC 
INTERNATIONALISM OR TRADE UNION IMPERIALISM?
It has already been stated that a principal concern of 
this thesis is the challenge, both internal and external, to 
the international policy of the AFL-CIO which developed as a 
result of the changed political and economic situation in the 
U.S. and the revolutionary turbulence in Central America. The 
objective of this opening chapter is to provide the reader 
with the historical context and background to the formation, 
implementation, and consequences of this policy.
The bulk of the available material on the subject 
polarizes between two essentially politically divided 
categories, either entirely supportive of the AFL-CIO*s 
international activity, or entirely critical. Academic 
attention has been scant, probably because the AFL-CIO*s 
support for U.S. foreign policy is considered to be a 
reflection of "American exceptional ism" and therefore warrants 
no special attention. Beyond the exceptionalism debate 
Marxists have traditionally been concerned with the purported 
appeal of nationalism over class solidarity, the material, 
political and even psychological effects of imperialism on the
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working class in capitalist society, the nature of "dominant" 
ideology, and other related questions. They too are likely 
to consider the AFL-CIO1s support for U.S. foreign policy to 
be merely a reflection of the ideological grip capitalism and 
nationalism has on the working class in advanced capitalist 
countries. It seems appropriate, therefore, to comment 
briefly on the on the question of ideology and imperialism as 
developed by Marxists, and particularly how they penetrate 
commentaries on working class organisations such as trade 
unions.
Marxist Discussions on Ideology and Imperialism.
Marxist discussions on ideology have understandably been 
pre-occupied with explaining why the working class 
(particularly in the advanced capitalist world) has not 
fulfilled the historical task Marx claimed it would, that is, 
the abolition of capitalism. In view of the nature of this 
thesis, it is perhaps worth remembering that the genealogical 
shoots of these discussions emerged from political events of 
enormous magnitude. Lenin authored Imperialism; The Highest 
Stage of Capitalism in large part to provide an explanation 
for the qualitative degeneration of the Second International, 
the trade union and working class leaders' inability or 
unwillingness to prevent inter-imperialist war, and to locate 
a strata of privileged workers upon which these leaders rested 
politically. Lenin described the income made by the very rich
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countries from capital exports to be "superprofits”, a portion 
of which might be used to "bribe the Labour leaders and the 
upper stratum of the Labour Aristocracy." [1] In the "epoch 
of imperialism", wrote Lenin, "the proletariat has been split 
into two international camps, one of which has been corrupted 
by the crumbs that fall from the table of the dominant-nation 
bourgeoisie.." [2] The international labour movement, Lenin 
observed, was also characterised by "two trends" 
-revolutionary Social Democracy and opportunism. [3]
Gramsci, in his attempt to come to terms with the rise 
of fascism in Italy, asserted that the hegemony of the 
dominant class required deep ideological penetration of all 
major social institutions. Gramsci identified trade unions as 
part of "civil society" where the hegemonic class transmits 
its dominance over the subordinate class. The perpetuation 
of this class dominance, Gramsci observed, was in one sense 
facilitated by the nature of trade unions themselves. For him 
unions were comparable to merchant capitalists because they, 
too, sold a commodity for the highest possible price - the 
commodity of labour power. In so doing, trade unions granted 
ideological hegemony to capitalist relations of production. 
[4]
More recent Marxist writers have stamped their own mark 
on this discussion. Althusser, for example, included trade 
unions among his "ideological state apparatuses" (ISA*a) which 
help maintain the relations of capitalist production. Unlike 
Gramsci, who maintained that trade unions could be won to
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socialism by means of an ideological struggle waged by 
revolutionary militants, Althusser's model suggested that the 
ideological predominance of the ruling class was such that all 
resistance becomes strangled by ISA tentacles before it had 
a chance to develop. Stanley Aronowitz, one of the most 
visible and renowned contemporary commentators on the U.S. 
labour movement, has claimed that Althusser's theory of 
ideology has the potential .of overcoming what has been 
described as "the central inadequacies of Marxist theory 
concerning issues of working class complacency" [5] and "is 
the most advanced point historical materialism has been able 
to arrive at in the search for a theory adequate to its 
object: late capitalist society." [6] Aronowitz's tribute to 
Althusser testifies to the profound lack of confidence among 
contemporary left intellectuals in the capacity of the working 
class in the U.S. to seriously challenge capitalism, to 
develop as a counter-hegemonic force.
It is perhaps only partially correct to depict Lenin's 
Imperialism as the progenitor of all the subsequent works in 
Marxism which have sought to account, at least in part, for 
the persistence of capitalism through an examination of 
workers' organisations. However, it is worth noting that the 
trajectory of subsequent works, beginning with Gramsci, the 
Frankfurt School, through to Althusser, Poulantzas, Urry, and 
others, has seen a movement away from Lenin's concern with 
the international capitalist economy as a critical factor in 
shaping the political choices and ideology of workers and
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their leaders. In an effort to correct perceived rigidities 
in the base-superstructure metaphor in Marxism, which reduced 
ideology to an epipheromenal reflection of elemental economic 
processes, these writers emphasised the materiality of 
ideology and, with Althusser in particular, established 
ideology as a central aoncept in Marxism. [7] Lenin's central 
argument, that a strata of workers and their leaders benefit 
from imperialism and therefore to reject revolutionary 
options, is considered to be, in Aronowitz's words, "a crude 
sociological doctrine" which "completely ignores the strength 
of ideology over the working class, not just its leaders." 
[8] By insisting on the moral perfidy of the workers'
leaders, m a i n t a i n s  Aronowitz, Lenin sought to avoid the
conclusion that the working class as a whole had come under 
the sway of the ideology of capitalism. Furthermore, in the 
case of the U.S., "ideologically, chauvinism, racism and other 
doctrines that accompany patriotic efforts have had a strong 
and negative effect on working class conciousness throughout
American history.” [9]
Aronowitz's criticism of Lenin is suspect in the sense
that he appears to completely separate ideology from economy:
it is one thing to be alert to the rigidities of economic
determinism, but quite another to discount the impact of
economy on ideology completely. All consideration of the
impact of economic conditions on ideological profile of the
working class and its leaders - and attempts to understand the
relationship of capitalism and imperialism to "other
70
doctrines” such as chauvenism and racism - appear to be 
rejected as crude economism. Aronowitz makes two errors here. 
Firstly, he vulgarizes Lenin's theory of labour aristocracy 
and distorts Lenin's understanding regarding "superprofits.” 
According to Lenin, superprofits were not simply repatriated 
earnings from overseas investments, as Aronowitz believes, but 
were generated by monopoly capital more generally - including 
those capitalist monopolies operating in the strategic centres 
of a national economy. Secondly, to say that Lenin observed 
a revolutionary working class being held back by their 
corrupted leaders is itself a crude caricature of Lenin's 
position. While Lenin failed to precisely identify the labour 
aristocracy, it is quite clear that he was referring to a 
whole strata of privileged workers and not merely a few 
traitorious labour leaders. [10]
Marx stated in The German Ideology that "The ideas of 
the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas." [11] 
Modern academic Marxism clearly owes a greater debt to the so- 
named "dominant ideology thesis" than it does to Lenin's 
labour aristocracy explanations of working class opportunism. 
However, as Abercrombie, Hill and Turner explain, this body 
of Marxist opinion itself adopts an excessively rigid 
interpretation of Marx's dominant ideology notion. They point 
out that Marx and Engels were aware that the working class 
developed its own vibrant subordinate culture which differed 
strikingly from the ideas and values of the ruling class - 
something Marcuse et. al. appear reluctant to acknowledge.
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[12] Empirical studies in the more recent period also 
provide evidence to support the view that the working class 
has not been ideologically incorporated. However, as Mann 
concludes, "it is not value-consensus which keeps the working 
class compliant, but rather the lack of consensus.." [13] In 
other words, it is often the case that, within the working 
class, and within the conciousness of any working class 
individual, both dominant and deviant values are embraced. 
Therefore a kind of "dual" or contradictory conciousness can 
frequently be detected which mitigates against the development 
of a radical working class politics. [14] These empirical 
studies, accompanied by a reassessment of Marx and Engels's 
understanding of dominant ideology, compelled Abercrombie et. 
al. to conclude that it is erronious to argue that the 
"stability of late capitalism is mainly produced by any form 
of ideological or value coherance" and that recent academic 
Marxism has greatly exaggerated the social role of dominant 
ideology. [15]
These are valid criticisms. However, it is significant 
that Abercrombie et. al.. in what constitutes a major study 
of the dominant ideology thesis, make no reference, critical 
or otherwise, to Lenin's labour aristocracy argument. Neither 
do they accommodate theoretically the possibility that 
international economic relationships impact on the ideological 
profile of the working class. The empirical studies of Mann, 
Nichols and Armstrong, etc, successfully argue that among the 
working class there exists a duality of conciousness and
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culture. However, the factors which shape this conciousness, 
and precisely how this happens, remains for the most part 
inadequately explained.
Interestingly, writers who have challenged the 
explanatory value of Lenin's Imperialism from the standpoint 
of economic analysis may ultimately have more to say about 
ideology than those academic Marxists who have made ideology 
their central concern. Several writers have questioned the 
usefulness of Imperialism in understanding (past or present) 
international capitalism, and have suggested that imperialism 
has impacted negatively on workers in the colonial and 
neocolonial countries and on workers in the imperialist 
countries themselves. For example, in 1971 Barratt Brown 
argued that, after the initial stages of industrial 
development, "the maintenance of imperialist political and 
economic relations..did not benefit the working people of the 
developed lands." The cost of human lives and military 
expenditures, aside from other factors, perhaps more than 
negated any benefits from imperialism that might have existed, 
and the writer presents strong evidence that, in the 
contemporary world, workers of the developed countries benefit 
little by cheap food and raw materials extracted from the 
underdeveloped countries. [16]
Barratt Brown stands among a group of left writers who 
maintain that the wealth of the developed countries derives 
more from advanced technology, higher productivity, and trade 
between themselves than it is does from plundering the
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underdeveloped countries. Moreover, the developed economies 
are much less dependent on exploitation of the underdeveloped 
world than the accepted radical wisdom suggests. This has been 
argued forcefully in the case of the U.S.: a country rich in 
natural resources, trading largely within its own borders, 
whose overseas investments amount to a relatively small 
percentage of GNP. [17] Barratt Brown and others nevertheless 
agree that the effects of capitalist penetration of the 
underdeveloped economies are profoundly negative. In terms 
of working class interests in both locations, each, therefore, 
have a vested interest in opposing imperialism. From this it 
might be concluded that a material basis for working class and 
trade union internationalism presently exists, and may have 
existed for some time. This is precisely the reasoning which 
has begun to penetrate U.S. trade unions in the last decade.
Marxist and radical scholarship on the question of 
imperialism and international political economy has travelled 
through several phases since Lenin's analysis. It remains a 
highly complex and contentious area of inquiry, which, in a 
limited space, can not even be usefully summarised, let alone 
adequately discussed. The point being made here is that 
Marxist discussions on imperialism and ideology have largely 
trodden divergent paths since the writings of Marx, Engels, 
and Lenin. In one sense a chasm has developed between the two 
discussions which needs to be bridged, a development which may 
substantially alter the character of both.
Substantial progress towards this end has been made by
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writers who have made class struggle an important element in 
understanding imperialism (and anti-imperialism). As Cardoso 
and Faletto express it, "The history of capital accumulation 
is the history of class struggles, of political movements, of 
the affirmation of ideologies, and of the establishment of 
forms of domination and reactions against them." [18] And 
yet, the trajectory of the discussion on ideology has meant 
that comparatively little has been written of late which seeks 
to explain how and why workers do, in fact, struggle against 
capitalism or the effects of capitalism, or that this struggle 
is, even in routine "trade union" form, often profoundly 
worrying for capitalists. A consequence of this neglect 
appears to be a noticeable disregard for the effects ordinary 
industrial conflict as well as revolutionary turbulence and 
change in one place or time can have on situations in another 
place or time. Portes and Walton allude to this when they 
say, "(T)he emphasis on material interests and processes of 
political domination has relegated the circulation of ideas 
to a secondary and fairly obscure place." [19] In the 
socialist tradition alone, the Paris Commune, the Bolshevik 
revolution, the Spanish republic, and countless secondary 
historical happenings invariably induced new struggles and 
strategies elsewhere which, in turn, led to ideological 
reformulations. [20]
It seems, then, that a considerable vacuum exists as far 
as developing an interactive perspective as a way of 
understanding ideology, international political economy, and
75
their combined impact on politics. This thesis focuses on a 
specific political struggle and its impact on trade union 
strategy in the present period. However, its contents may be 
useful to Marxist scholars who are interested in advancing, 
or even integrating (or re-integrating) theories of ideology 
and imperialism.
This thesis demonstrates how political struggle in two 
small countries, Nicaragua and El Salvador, has had a 
significant effect on working class politics in a country
where the ideology of capitalism is widely perceived to be
most firmly entrenched, that is, the United States. U.S. 
capitalism is not about to be toppled as a result? however, 
an imperialist power which finds itself restrained by broad 
domestic opposition to military intervention may at some stage 
find itself in considerable difficulty. [21] Lenin discerned 
that capitalism became imperialistic by virtue of its need to 
export capital in order to find fresh opportunities for 
profitable investment. [22] Direct colonial rule was 
therefore unnecessary, indeed often undesirable. However,
according to Baran and Sweezy, the emergence of the world
socialist system (their term) changed the equation. 
Imperialism now had a "rival and alternative", and this 
challenge coincided with the eclipse of the nation state by 
the multinational companies as the new empires of capitalism. 
These twin developments simultaneously reduced competitive 
tensions between the major capitalist powers, and erected the 
Soviet Union and its allies as the principal threat facing all
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capitalists. [23]
Military intervention by an imperialist power may 
therefore not be necessary to the specific function of capital 
accumulation, but is frequently employed to repel a 
revolutionary insurgency or even a left reformism which poses 
a clear or potential threat to political relations which 
favour capitalism, or to capitalist economic relations 
themselves. Failure to grasp this point has compelled some 
writers to explain U.S. intervention as essentially irrational 
and contrary to the interests of U.S. capitalism. Stephen 
Krasner, for example, maintains that U.S. foreign policymakers 
"persistently exaggerated the importance of communist elements 
in foreign countries" and pursued ideological goals without 
means-end calculations, goals which actually weakened 
capitalism by tearing at the internal fabric of U.S. society. 
Krasner's analysis can be extended to include the AFL-CIO's 
international policymakers. Such a conclusion derives from 
the (accurate) assessment that countries like Vietnam and 
Nicaragua pose no national security threat to the U.S. and are 
insignificant in terms of capital accumulation. According to 
this view, U.S. intervention must therefore be the product of 
a self-defeating ideology. As Philip Brenner expressed it, 
"Anti-communism has slowly become an end in itself" devoid of 
any system-sustaining rationale. [24] This argument is flawed 
because it limits the challenge to capitalism to "communist 
elements" when any reform movement serious in its objectives 
constitutes a threat to capitalism in that it may seek to
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redistribute wealth and power in society. Moreover, the 
success of any single reform movement inspires other such 
movements, thus increasing the overall challenge to capital. 
Therefore Central America (like Indochina before it) may seem 
insignificant in terms of capital accumulation, but it may in 
fact be pivotal in terms of the global political struggle 
between capitalism and its (diverse) opponents. Moreover, 
military intervention has taken place because of the aggregate 
failure of all other forms of (including trade union) 
intervention to offset the political challenge to capitalism, 
a challenge that is on view internationally. The fact that 
the U.S. is being restrained from implementing a more 
aggressive military "solution" by "public opinion" is, then, 
to repeat, profoundly significant.
Here again an interactive perspective of ideology and 
international political economy is useful. As Perry Anderson 
has expressed it, "If the immediate framework of any given 
class struggle is national, it is not just its wider economic 
constraints that are international -but also certain of its 
political and ideological coordinates, which at times can 
prove just as inescapable. The dialectic between these 
determinants is visible for all to see in Central America 
today." [25] Nicaraguan sociologist Xavier Gorostiaga has 
referred to "More advanced and progressive proposals which 
coincide fundamentally with our (revolutionary) analysis are 
ever more frequent in academic, church..and trade union 
circles (in the U.S.)" [26] Burbach and Flynn posit that, in
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the U.S., "The opposition to intervention in the third world 
countries now has a substantial social base, particularly 
within the Black and Latin communities, churches, the women's 
movement, the intellectual community, some trade unions, and 
peace, environmental, and third world solidarity activists." 
[27] In Gramscian language, political change in Central 
America has generated or reinforced a counter-hegemonic 
impulse in the civil society of the U.S.
The question of ideology, although not treated in a 
theoretical way during the course of this thesis, is 
constantly present throughout. As Brecher has commented, 
"Economic conditions are creating the basis for labor 
internationalism, and for a far more progressive attitude on 
the part of the American labor movement." [28] The 
ideological content of this "progressive attitude" is explored 
below. An important ingredient in this change of attitude is 
shifting working class perceptions of self interest which are 
themselves linked to actual or perceived changes in the global 
economy. Anti-communism as an ideology is also a feature of 
this thesis. U.S. labour is still darkened by the shadow of 
McCarthyism. The "red-baiting" of trade unionists (which 
actually dates back to the middle of the nineteenth century) 
not only still occurs, but seriously hampers the challenge to 
existing AFL-CIO policies and practices. Those who challenge 
the Cold War unionism of the AFL-CIO have been accused of 
Communist sympathies or castigated for being fooled into 
supporting pro-Soviet positions.
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AFL-CIO International Activity; Two Perspectives.
These points made, it is now necessary to return to the 
subject of this chapter. To repeat: two politically opposed 
perspectives have developed around the issue of the AFL-CIO1s 
international activities, one critical, the other supportive. 
In the case of the former, Ronald Radosh [29] and Jack Scott 
[30] have provided detailed historical treatments of the 
international policy of the AFL, and later the AFL-CIO, each 
from their own critical left perspective. Both represent what 
has been described as the "trade union imperialism school" of 
commentators, that is, those who view AFL-CIO international 
policy as a logical and implicitly inevitable extension of 
U.S. labour's support for U.S. capitalism. [31]
Defenders of AFL-CIO international policy, principally 
Federation spokesmen and a few sympathetic intellectuals, 
claim that the AFL-CIO follows a policy of democratic 
internationalism. The AFL-CIO's agenda is determined not by 
the needs of U.S. capital, nor by the priorities of U.S. 
Government foreign policy, but is shaped, they argue, by an 
implacable opposition to left totalitarianism and right 
authoritarianism -a "single standard on dictatorships." [32] 
Thus the AFL-CIO opposed U.S. business' involvement with the 
Soviet Union and Franco's regime in Spain even though the U.S. 
Government took a different approach. The AFL-CIO spokesmen 
claim to reject the expedient and selective approach of the 
U.S. Government and business to democratic principles, and
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consider themselves dedicated to a policy of democratic 
workers' internationalism. [33]
It remains necessary to sketch the history of U.S. 
labour's international activities in order to evaluate these 
conflicting perspectives. Fortunately, this task is 
facilitated by the fact that both sides agree that the AFL-CIO 
has been an important international actor, but disagree 
regarding the motives behind, the AFL-CIO's actions. The 
AFL-CIO's critics argue that the Federation closed ranks 
behind U.S. imperialism in order to share the spoils of global 
economic conquest. The AFL-CIO's defenders rebut this charge, 
maintaining instead that the principal motive behind 
Federation foreign policy has been a desire to assist 
democratic trade unionism. This assistance, they acknowledge, 
contains an ingredient of self-interest. By building healthy 
and democratic unions in other countries the AFL-CIO is 
helping to dissuade U.S. companies from relocating outside the 
U.S. In short, the AFL-CIO is for democratic internationalism 
as a means of constructing an international high-wage economy.
The History of the International Policies 
of U.S. Trade Unions.
The history of the international policies of U.S. trade 
unions is largely a reflection of the twists and turns of U.S. 
trade union history in the traditional sense. Trade union 
("labor") historians basically agree that since the formation
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of the AFL in 1886 the U.S. labour movement has been an arena 
of ideological and political struggle between two largely 
distinct traditions. The dominant tradition, ably represented 
for several decades by AFL President Samuel Gompers, emerged 
from craft and then business unionism. This tradition is 
ideologically opposed to socialism and broadly accepts 
capitalism. The minority tradition is much more radical. In 
this century it has evolved through the anarcho-syndicalist 
leanings of the Industrial Workers of the World, re-emerging 
in the 1930's with the communist and socialist components of 
the early CIO, only to bo almost completely submerged in the 
postwar period.
Numerous writers, including Scott and Radosh, have 
characterised the conservatism of the AFL in Leninist terms? 
Gompers' rejection of militant class struggle and socialist 
objectives merely reflected an opportunistic desire of a 
skilled strata of workers to share the imminent spoils 
generated by a U.S. capitalism's commercial domination of the 
world. Indeed, there is certainly no shortage of statements 
from past trade union leaders which indicated an acceptance 
of capitalism bordering on enthusiasm for its accomplishments 
both domestically and abroad. [34] This accommodation with 
capitalism is believed to have derived from the adoption of 
an economistic "pure and simple" trade unionism, or "business 
unionism", which rejected the manipulation or neglect of 
workers' day to day demands according to the requirements of 
idealistic revolutionary doctrines.
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Historians have often referred to the AFL*s adoption of 
business unionism as having "developed in the course of an 
ideological dispute" with Marxism. [35] This view usually 
combines with an emphasis on the personal contributions of 
Adolph Strasser and Gompers to the adoption of business 
unionism's methods and principles. They assert that the 
period of business unionism or pure and simple unionism began 
when these leaders finally rejected Marxism, the logic of this 
rejection required an accommodation with the state, and, by 
extension, its imperialistic ambitions.
This view appears to accord insufficient importance to 
the sharply adversarial character of class relations in the 
U.S. during the period of its economic ascendancy (and 
beyond), and the difficulties this posed for workers' 
organisations. In some respects, the carnal nature U.S. 
capitalism during the post-Civil War "Gilded Age" accounts for 
the immense ideological space between the two traditions in 
U.S. trade unionism. The crushing defeats suffered by the 
unions in the major strikes of the 1890's, at Homestead, 
Pullman, and Coeur d'Alene, appeared to support Gompers' view 
that the "trusts" had already grown too powerful to justify 
head-on collisions, and such power was sure to increase. [36] 
The AFL, representing mainly skilled white workers, reassured 
capital and the state that it could be a trusted social 
partner. This step having been taken, the international arena 
presented considerable opportunities for the AFL to prove the 
pedigree of its patriotism. Trade union imperialism, it is
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therefore plausible to suggest, was, at least in its early 
stages, reflective of the one-sided and violent character of 
the class struggle in the U.S. Put differently, there is 
arguably a significant political difference between class 
collaboration as a means of survival and class collaboration 
according to a straightforward Leninist conception, that is, 
one motivated by pure and simple opportunism.
It is also worth noting that for a whole period the AFL 
was itself an arena of conflict between socialists and 
non-socialists, which further invalidates the notion that 
Gompers and Strasser "chose” the direction of the AFL. Until 
the end of World War 1, socialists posed a formidable 
opposition to Gompers. In 1893, socialists succeeded in 
getting the AFL convention to adopt its program, which 
included a call for the collectivisation of industry and 
during World War 1 itself AFL socialists opposed the Gompers- 
Wilson war policy. During the war support for the Socialist 
Party grew and in the AFL Gompers1 pro-war policy was opposed 
in many regions. [37] The radical tradition in U.S. working 
class history, reflected through the personal histories of 
Eugene Debs, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, Mother Jones, William 
Haywood, etc., constituted perhaps the only remaining response 
to the clubs and rifles of "robber barons". The same defeats 
which pushed Gompers in one direction threw Debs and his 
comrades in another. Debs had earlier endorsed industrial 
peace and class harmony; however, the 1890s taught Debs and 
thousands others that socialist revolution was the only really
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progressive option open to the working class. [38] Therefore 
it seems fair to argue that the divergent ideologies 
underlying U.S. labour history were at least partly framed by 
the belligerence of capital towards workers' organisations.
Be this as it may, the two traditions of U.S. labour
were reflected in sharp tensions over international as well 
as domestic policy. The IWW and the Socialist Party, for 
example, opposed the U.S. involving itself in the European 
conflict of 1914-18, while the AFL leadership supported
President Woodrow Wilson's war policy. [39] Significantly, 
the internationalism of the IWW during this period extended 
the organisation to Canada, Mexico, and as far as Australia 
and New Zealand. [40] In the case of Mexico, the IWW forged 
an active relationship with the Mexican Liberal party from 
1911 to 1920. According to Levenstein, "IWW locals were born 
and died in many parts of Mexico" a development which prompted 
the AFL to initiate its own "internationalism" in Mexico for 
the purpose of protecting "their (the AFL's) back door against 
revolutionary unionism." [41]
World War One: The AFL shows its patriotism.
The European conflict of 1914-18 marks a critical
juncture in the history of U.S. trade union foreign policy. 
Gompers supported Wilson's war policy in the hope that the 
AFL's "patriotism" might win it a greater degree of acceptance 
from both capital and the state. [42] Furthermore, the AFL's
85
Executive Council successfully urged Wilson to grant AFL 
officials positions on all defence boards. This period also 
marked the formation of the American Alliance for Labor and 
Democracy (AALD) which was subsidised by Wilson. [43] Larson 
notes how the AFL's pro-war propaganda also attracted 
financial backing from U.S. business interests: 
"Significantly, it was the issue of foreign policy that 
brought about such cooperation. To use today's (1975) 
terminology, this may have marked the bare beginnings of the 
military-industrial-labor complex." [44] Scott makes another 
important observation, namely that the formation of the AALD 
paved the way for the AFL to play an active role overseas. 
" (T)he AFL," notes Scott, "sent labour missions to Europe to 
assist in combatting a rising tide of anti-war sentiment in 
the European..trade union movement." [45]
World War One, therefore, marked the period when U.S. 
union officials became integrated into the affairs of state 
as junior partners to government and business, and became 
supporters of U.S. foreign policy both at home (fighting 
against socialist and anti-war sentiment in the unions) and 
abroad (as union diplomats travelling with U.S. government 
and business representatives) . It was also a period when the 
AFL leaders' anti-socialism took an important turn. During 
September 1917 the AALD, in collaboration with the Department 
of State, expressed support for Kerensky's provisional 
government, claiming that American workers urged Russia to 
continue the war with Germany. [46] Following the October
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revolution Gompers noted how Russia "was transformed from an 
ally to a menace." [47] The majority of leaders of the 
Second International also opposed the Bolsheviks, accusing 
them of anti-democratic practices. The AFL's opposition, 
however, went further. Gompers urged an Allied invasion of 
Soviet Russia to defeat the Bolsheviks who had created "the 
greatest autocracy existing in any civilized country on the 
face of the globe." [48] "America," on the other hand, was 
"an ideal, America is the apotheosis of all that is right." 
[49] The AFL was also contemptuous of the Second 
International's who, despite its anti-Bolshevism, was 
nominally still socialist and therefore not a true ally in 
the struggle for freedom and democracy. [50]
By the end of the war the AFL's international policy 
therefore consisted of several ingredients. Firstly, Gompers 
and the AFL leadership majority pursued a tactical "patriotism 
for favours" orientation towards the U.S. government. 
Secondly, Gompers sought to politically contain opposition 
among sections of the AFL membership to the war, and also 
approved of U.S. Government repression of the IWW and 
Socialist Party members for their anti-war activities. [51] 
Thirdly, Gompers encouraged active opposition to radical trade 
unionism in the international arena. AFL officials served as 
"labour statesmen" alongside representatives from government 
and business. Fourthly, the AFL, in fighting IWW influence 
in Mexico, unilaterally launched an "internationalism" to 
protect its hegemony over the domestic labour movement and to
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further advance its "patriotism for favours" strategy. 
Fifthly, the AFL leaders opposed the Soviet Union to the point 
of advocating Allied military intervention against Bolshevism. 
Finally, Gompers opposed all strains of socialism, however 
moderate, and expressed an ideological identification with 
American liberalism.
An examination of the period to WW1 suggests the notion 
that the AFL*s choice of business unionism lies at the root 
of trade union imperialism remains only partially correct. 
AFL trade union imperialism was also partly a product of the 
peculiarly sharp character of U.S. class relations in the 
post-Civil War period which contributed to the marked 
ideological polarisation of the U.S. labour movement. More 
important, the active character of AFL internationalism can 
be partly explained by the conflict between the AFL and its 
domestic and international socialist opponents. The AFL's 
international activity therefore reflected both its 
determination to win the protection of the state from the 
attacks of U.S. capital and its mission to defeat the rival 
internationalism of the IWW and the Socialist Party. These 
points do not acquit the AFL leaders from the charge that they 
sought material advantages from U.S. economic and political 
expansion; they do, however, suggest that the distinctly 
active character of AFL labour imperialism arose in part from 
the ideological tensions in the U.S. labour movement.
It is also important to understand that the AFL's 
leaders openly identified with the ideology of American
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liberalism. It is difficult to say, of course, how much the 
language of American liberalism was used to legitimise 
essentially opportunistic behaviour or became a tactic for 
survival. Labour organisations had been dubbed part of "a 
foreign and un-American conspiracy?” the AFL leaders were 
therefore intent on proving their American pedigree. [52] 
Gompers' hostility to Bolshevism and (albeit to a lesser 
degree) the reconstructed Second International nevertheless 
reflected an identification with "American” (essentially 
Lockian) ideals of individual liberty, freedom of association, 
and dispersed political power. Indeed, as is well known, 
these ideals became associated with U.S. commercial and 
political expansion which, it was argued, "extended the area 
of freedom" to the "semi-barbarous peoples of the earth." [53] 
The AFL leaders displayed no fundamental disagreement with 
U.S. expansionism or the ideals with which it was associated. 
All opposition was reserved for its socialist opponents both 
domestically and internationally. [54] Liberal historians 
such as Hartz frequently refer to the "truly bourgeois" 
character of the American working class. "The lament of every 
Marxist," Hartz noted, was the U.S. labour movement's decision 
to remain "stuck to the concepts of property and 
individualism." [55] Hartz and other writers in the liberal 
tradition have stressed the marginal impact socialists had on 
the "magical alchemy of American life." [56] This view has 
its adherants in the historiography of U.S. trade unionism. 
Selig Perlman, a renowned liberal trade union commentator,
89
long ago encouraged the view that socialist ideas were 
perpetrated by intellectuals who viewed the labour movement 
as an instrument of social transformation. American trade 
unionists, he argued, soundly rejected their exhortations. 
[57]
It is not possible here to adequately explain the 
anti-socialism of the AFL leadership majority, which at first 
glance evokes the much discussed "exceptionalism" of the 
"American" working class which, in turn, has its roots in a 
complex arrangement of historical factors. [58] The U.S. 
labour movement (or rather its leadership majority), however, 
is not exceptional in the sense that it has displayed a 
historical tendency to support the foreign policy of its own 
Government. What is quite exceptional, however, is its 
ideological hostility to all forms of socialism and its open 
identification with liberal ideals.
The Challenge of the C.I.O.
For U.S. labour, the period from 1918 to the Depression 
was one of stagnation and defeat. The AFL leaders* loyalty 
to the U.S. war effort was rewarded with political and 
economic attacks by Government and big business, and not the 
permanent partnership status to which they aspired. [59] 
According to Weinstein, this situation opened up considerable 
opportunities for the Left. However several factors intervened 
during this period which severely retarded the development of
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a mass socialist or social democratic party in the U.S. In 
particular, the U.S. Government took measures - including the 
infamous Palmer raids - to repress of both the IWW and the 
Socialist Party that were considerably more severe than those 
of the McCarthy era following World War Two. [60] 
Furthermore, ideological disputes that revolved around the 
Bolshevik revolution and the authority of the Third 
International split the Left into several fragments during the 
early 1920s. In Weinstein*s view, these splits did not 
reflect irreconcilable ideological differences and could have 
been avoided. [61] Had this occurred socialists would have 
continued to influence the AFL and the prospects of a more 
radical labour movement internationalism would have perhaps 
been more favourable than they proved to be throughout the 
1920s.
By the early 1930s, following the decline of the 
Socialist Party and the IWW, the Communist Party became the 
principal organised challenge to the AFL's conservatism. In 
the international arena the Third International established 
the Red International of Labor Unions (RILU), to which the 
Trade Union Education League (TUEL) became the U.S. affiliate. 
[62] Several national federations linked to the reconstructed 
Second International (such as the TUC) formed the 
International Federation of Trade Unions (IFTU). [63] The
AFL, however, remained independent and proceeded to develop 
its own international network when it moved to establish the 
Pan American Federation of Labor (PAFL) which formally
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connected trade union organisations throughout the American 
continent. [64]
Like the AALD, the PAFL received U.S. Government 
funding. [65] Historians largely agree that the PAFL was 
thoroughly dominated by an AFL concerned to prevent 
anarcho-syndicalist or pro-Bolshevik sentiment dominating 
Latin American trade unionism, a concern shared by the U.S. 
Government. Several large radical federations shunned the 
PAFL, and considered it to be merely an instrument of the U.S. 
Department of State. Even within the PAFL the AFL was 
criticised for, among other things, its failure to condemn 
the U.S.'s military occupation of Nicaragua, and the 
organisation lost momentum by the end of the 1920's. [66]
The meteoric rise of the CIO in the mid-1930s split the 
AFL and threw it into crisis. The industrial unions of the 
new CIO organised at such a pace that in just a few years 
their numbers temporarily surpassed the membership of the AFL 
which had been organising for half a century. The challenge 
of industrial unionism in the U.S. coincided with a turn to 
the Left by several labour movements in Latin America. In 
1938 several large national federations formed the Latin 
American Workers' Federation (Confederacion de Trabajadores 
de America Latina -CTAL) which the CIO supported. The AFL, 
however, considered the CTAL to be an outpost of Communism. 
With 40% of CIO unions, 18 in all, led by the CPUSA, and many 
other CIO leaders such as the Reuther brothers declaring 
themselves socialist, the U.S. labour movement now seemed
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poised to develop an internationalism to rival the AFL*s 
government-supported efforts. [67] The AFL*s representational 
monopoly of U.S. trade unions in the international arena had 
now ceased.
However, the CIO leaders' (including those supporting 
the CPUSA) acceptance of New Deal reformism prevented any 
qualitative change in U.S. trade union attitudes toward the 
U.S. government. [68] The tradition of the IWW inspired the 
early CIO militants, but the leaders of the CIO did not 
replicate the revolutionary internationalism of the Wobblies. 
Propelled by the combativity of the workers in the mass 
production industries, the CIO won important concessions from 
the state, particularly regarding the right to organise. The 
U.S. Government now appeared as a genuine co-defender of 
workers' rights. [69]
The political and class dynamics of the New Deal is 
still a subject of discussion among Marxist and other left 
academics. [70] Did Roosevelt "save capitalism" by co-opting 
the CIO leadership? Did the state in this instance better 
represent the long term interests of capital than the 
capitalists themselves? Whatever the answers, the end result 
saw the state appear as an arbiter between the classes, and 
one not indisposed to ruling in favour of organised labour and 
"against" capital or certain sections of capital. This had 
the effect of arresting the potential of the CIO's rival 
internationalism. [71]
World War Two further cut across the potential for the
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CIO's internationalism to become the principal expression of 
U.S. labour abroad. The CPUSA, following the lead of Stalin 
after the Nazi-Soviet pact of 1939, moved from a position of 
popular frontism and anti-Nazism to all-out opposition to 
imperialist war. Then, following the Nazi invasion of the 
Soviet Union in 1941, the CPUSA was ordered by Moscow to aid, 
at all costs, the war effort of the U.S. Government in order 
to defeat Nazism. This stunning about-turn saw the party 
leaders become ultrapatriotic, and to actively intervene to 
restrain and discourage worker militancy during the war 
period. [72]
The anti-Nazi alliance and the characterisation of the 
Soviet Union as a trusted ally of the United States 
facilitated a similar anti-Nazi unity in the international 
trade union movement, opposed only by the AFL. In 1945, the 
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) was formed with CIO, 
TUC, CTAL, and Soviet trade union (AUCCTU) participation. The 
IFTU disintegrated. CPUSA writers have referred to this 
period as a rare and cherished moment of international trade 
union unity, a position which has also penetrated many of the 
present day commentaries on international trade union 
politics. [73] In fact, the RILU had by 1936 ceased to exist, 
and in 1943 Stalin dissolved the Third International. The 
revolutionary premises and early record of the outgoing 
International contrasted markedly with the cautious trade 
union diplomacy of the incoming WFTU. The dissolution of the 
Third International, however, was merely a surgical
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confirmation of the Stalinization of international Communism 
since the death of Lenin and the subsequent defeat of the Left 
Opposition within the Bolshevik party in the 1920s.
CIO leaders spoke favourably of their new Soviet trade 
union allies, playing down the issue of Soviet state-labour 
relations which obsessed the AFL. [74] The AFL refused to 
participate in the trade union version of Allied unity, and 
continued, reportedly against Roosevelt's expressed wishes, 
to criticise Soviet oppression of political opponents in 
Eastern Europe. In 1944 the AFL organised the Free Trade 
Union Committee (FTUC) to provide assistance to non-communist 
trade unionists in European countries formerly under Nazi 
occupation. The AFL leaders feared that "Soviet-backed 
communist trade union leaders might emerge from their well 
organized underground resistance movements to fill a political 
leadership vacuum in European labor before democratic elements 
could reorganize." [75] Defenders of the AFL and AFL-CIO 
foreign policies have argued that their "trade union 
imperialism" critics fail to adequately account for the "great 
significance of this (Roosevelt-AFL) disagreement on the 
single most important issue of the immediate post-war era" 
which, they maintain, proves that the AFL pursued its own 
principled (as opposed to opportunistic) international agenda. 
In other words, the AFL had its own international policy and 
perspective based on a commitment to democracy and an 
authentic ideological opposition to Communism. [76]
The evidence that the AFL has maintained a consistent
95
opposition to Communism is incontrovertible. Indeed, the AFL 
opposed the U.S. Government’s recognition the Soviet Union in 
1933. For Robert Cox, the differences between the AFL and the 
U.S. Government on this and other occasions are, however, far 
from fundamental. They are no more significant than the 
perennial tensions between the CIA and the Department of 
State, and none of them reflect deep ideological divisions. 
Cox, marrying Lenin’s notion of labour aristocracy and 
Gramsci's understanding of hegemony, concludes that a 
hegemonic corporatist model, where there exists ”a high degree 
of interpenetration of trade union, government, and business, 
accompanied by a division of labor in the pursuit of common 
goals” offers the best means of understanding AFL and AFL-CIO 
foreign policy. Conflict within the corporatist coalition 
"will be subordinated to the maintenance of cohesion vis a' 
vis the rest of domestic society... and foreigners whose 
actions are perceived as challenging the international 
extensions of this hegemony.” [77] Cox's view that the AFL's 
international policy merely constituted one of several 
viewpoints within the corporatist coalition sounds convincing. 
However, the AFL's anti-Communism survived the period from the 
end of WW1 to the New Deal when the labour movement was 
politically and economically marginalised by the combined 
efforts of capital and the state. This reinforces the view 
that the AFL’s ideology maintained a certain consistency no 
matter what the status of domestic labour-capital-state 
relations. Furthermore, Cox appears reluctant to acknowledge
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that the anti-Communism of the AFL was anything more than a 
prejudice developed by a handful of union functionaries such 
as AFL vice-president Matthew Woll, David Dubinsky of the 
ILGWU, and Jay Lovestone, the former Secretary General of 
CPUSA who was expelled because he clashed with Stalin over the 
expulsion from the CPSU of Nikolai Bukharin. Lovestone, 
according to one CPUSA writer, was compelled by 11 a hunger for 
revenge" for decades following his expulsion. [78] This 
axe-grinding, it is implied, re-commissioned the services of 
the AFL and the AFL-CIO to U.S. capitalism overseas. As will 
be discussed below, the impact of Stalinism and the position 
of the U.S. in the postwar world provided firm foundations for 
Cold War unionism, even if the articulation and execution of 
such a policy rested on the shoulders of a few individuals.
U.S. Trade Unions. Post War Europe and the Cold War.
The AFL played an active role in fighting the influence 
of pro-Moscow trade unionism in early post-war Europe. In 
discussing this period, both critics and defenders of the 
AFL's international activity again lay special emphasis on the 
role of a few key individuals. FTUC functionaries Jay 
Lovestone and Irving Brown are two important figures. The 
significance of the ideological tension in U.S. labour in 
shaping the AFL's international policy is again in evidence: 
both Lovestone and Brown had worked as consultants to UAW 
leader Homer Martin in his unsuccessful struggle against the
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Reuther brothers, who he tried to depict as Communist. [79] 
The trade union imperialism writers tend to depict the 
intervention of the AFL in early post-war Europe as an 
exercise in splitting healthy and militant trade unions with 
the use of U.S. Government and CIA money. One source 
describes how, "In a matter of a few years (the AFL's) 
European representative, Irving Brown, helped in breaking up 
and substantially weakening the labor movements of Western 
Europe. This he did by aiding the formation of new labour 
federations to undercut the strength of progressive unions." 
[80] Another attributed the divisions in the French labour 
movement to the AFL which encouraged and financed the Force 
Ouvriere (FO), a conservative union federation which split 
from the CGT in 1947 and still functions. [81] Galvin also 
acknowledges the AFL's impact, pointing to Brown's claim that 
it was the AFL's actions which reduced the 7 million 
membership of the communist CGT to just 2 million. [82] It 
is also claimed that Brown hired thugs to break a 1949 strike 
of French dockers who refused to unload U.S. arms shipments. 
Brown allegedly "selected candidates for leadership of the 
French trade unions. Then he reported back to the U.S. 
Government and various multinational corporations, which put 
up the money for these men to run for union office." Similar 
charges have been made in the case of Italy. [83]
Defenders of the AFL's policy in Europe also stress the 
enormous significance of the Lovestone-Brown operations. 
Gershman, for example, clearly regards them as a critical
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factor in defeating the "Soviet trade union strategy in 
Europe" [84] Heaps, writing in 1955, referred to the AFL's 
intervention as one of "outstanding strategic importance" [85] 
Former CIA agent Thomas Braden has expressed a similar view, 
"..in 1947 the communist CGT led a strike in Paris which came 
near to paralyzing the French economy. A takeover of the 
government was feared. Into this crisis stepped Lovestone 
and..Brown. With funds from Dubinsky's union (ILGWU), they 
organized Force Ouvriere, a non-communist union. When they 
ran out of money they appealed to the CIA. Thus began the 
secret subsidy of free trade unions..Without the subsidy 
postwar history might have gone very differently." [86] 
Lorwin also points to the significance of the AFL's financial 
assistance, commenting that the "FO as a new organization 
battling a well-provided and entrenched CGT would hardly have 
started on dues payments alone." [87]
It cannot be denied that the AFL helped split the 
European trade unions in the early postwar period. However, 
the allusion that Lovestone and Brown, with a suitcase of CIA 
dollars, must take responsibility (or credit) for this 
requires serious scrutiny. Both pro and anti-AFL writers 
neglect important features which make up the broader picture, 
such as the economic power of the U.S. and its influence on 
European labour, the role of the Communist Parties as well as 
their social democratic opponents internationally, and the 
significance of perennial ideological divisions within 
European labour which reasserted themselves following the fall
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of Nazism.
The strength of the U.S. economy during this period 
requires little elaboration. The U.S. was the only major 
capitalist power to emerge from WW2 economically strengthened. 
The economic and human resourses of the Soviet Union, in 
contrast, had been exhausted by the war. [88] Both
supporters and critics of the AFL refer to the Marshall Plan 
as the "issue" which led to the demise of the WFTU and 
projected the AFL into a position of leadership of the 
non-Communist international labour movement. However, the 
"issue" essentially embodied what was qualitatively different 
about Soviet and U.S. strategies and capabilities during this 
period.
The Plan contributed huge sums of capital towards the 
resurrection of European capitalism. Moreover, support for 
the Plan among trade unions in the U.S. was solid with the 
notable exception of the CPUSA-led unions, such as UE, ILWU 
and the National Maritime Union. European workers celebrated 
openly as industrial and consumer goods, raw materials, etc, 
poured across the Atlantic and provided a boost in employment 
and spending power. The Italian general election of 1947 was 
fought around the Plan; supporters of the Christian Democrats 
made it clear that U.S. aid would cease if Italy voted 
Communist. The Italian CP (PCI) opposed the Plan and were 
heavily defeated. [89]
The actions of the French and Italian CPs must also be 
central to any understanding of European labour during this
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period. Radosh's account stands alone among the trade union 
imperialism writers in that it describes how, in particular, 
the French CP (PCF) "played into the hands" of Brown and the 
AFL. The PCF supported the post-war government and acted, as 
Brown himself observed, "as a brake on the economic demands 
of the workers", and encouraged labour restraint and 
discipline. [90] Carew makes a similar point in the case of 
the CGIL, the trade union federation linked to the Italian CP 
(PCI) . The CGIL in 1946 and early 1947 "was palpably failing 
to protect the economic interests of its members" largely as 
a result of the PCI "presenting itself as a non-revolutionary 
party of reconstruction, content to collaborate with bourgeois 
parties in coalition government." [91]
The real options available to the PCF and the PCI 
between 1945-47 is, of course, a contentious subject. What 
is clear, however, is that mass support for both parties 
declined. By 1947, following Moscow's orders, the PCI and the 
PCF launched an all-out campaign against the Marshall Plan, 
which, in part because of their earlier actions, led to major 
splits in the French and Italian labour movements. [92]
The splits which did eventually occur in many cases 
mirrored the divisions in European labour before the period 
of Nazi expansion. The forces of social democracy, despite 
disagreements with the U.S., resumed their opposition to the 
CP's. So too did Christian democracy and other centre-right 
and right political formations. The war had seriously damaged 
the economies of France, Italy and Germany and in doing so
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eroded the material underpinnings of working class reformism. 
Now a "new opportunism" emerged with the Marshall Plan. 
European trade union leaders were grateful for the crumbs 
falling not from the table of their own bourgeoisie, but from 
the table of another capitalist power, the United States. 
After 1948 the post-war economic expansion moved into top gear 
and thus further reinforced reformist trade union ideas and 
practices.
In neglecting these factors both critics and supporters 
of the AFL tend to distort and exaggerate the impact of the 
Lovestone-Brown operations. However, it would be mistaken to 
conclude that the AFL's intervention was unimportant. It is 
not possible to predict with any degree of certainty the 
extent to which the political landscape of Europe might have 
been different if the AFL had not chosen to intervene in the 
way that it did. Yet the evidence suggests that the policies 
pursued by the major actors of the period left considerable 
space for moderate trade unionism to eventually develop 
without AFL assistance. Carew records that the CIA did not 
provide cash for labour projects until 1948? before then 
Lovestone and Brown relied on donations from AFL affiliates 
and other trade union supporters which totalled around 
$200,000. Despite limited funding, "Brown was having no 
difficulty finding sympathetic contacts," and in France during 
194 6-47 these funds were "sufficient to grease the wheels of 
anti-communist labour group activity.." [93]
The AFL can safely be regarded as a significant actor
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in the shaping of post-war European labour, but the 
implication that they were the principal force behind the 
severe divisions which emerged is not supported by the 
evidence. At this point the ingredients which combined to 
create the U.S. labour movement's international policy were 
somewhat different than those following World War One. 
Firstly, Gompers' "patriotism for favours" strategy had been 
rendered relatively redundant by the explosive growth of 
organised labour in the 1930s and Roosevelt's accommodation 
of trade union leaders. The U.S. labour movement was far 
weaker in 1914 than was the case in 1940.
Secondly, while the AFL's opposition to all shades of 
socialism was apparent even before 1917, the CIO's eventual 
opposition to Communism evolved by degrees. The domestic 
tactics of the CPUSA hardened the opposition of the CIO's 
social democratic wing. While anti-Communism provided the 
moral and ideological basis for U.S. capitalist expansionism, 
it had also penetrated the consciousness of entire layers of 
U.S. workers. Khrushchev's revelations of Stalin's
atrocities, and the events in, for examples, Czechoslovakia 
(1947 and 1968), East Germany (1953), Hungary (1956), and, 
more recently Poland and Afghanistan ensured that 
anti-Communism retained its potent ideological pull on workers 
in the U.S. and beyond. Davis has highlighted the "alarming 
impact" the USSR's postwar actions in Eastern Europe had on 
the ethnic communities of the U.S. which made up half of the 
CIO membership, and how this has been frequently overlooked
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in analyses of the U.S. working class since 1945. [94]
Moreover, these events also helped decimate the CPUSA as a 
political force. The hostile climate created by the Cold War 
and McCarthy ism purged the CPUSA from key areas of U.S. 
political and cultural life. The bulk of its membership, 
however, stayed with the party. Importantly, it was the 
period following the death of Stalin, coinciding with the East 
German and Hungarian uprisings, which caused major defections. 
Between 1956-58 the CPUSA lost 80% of its membership. [95]
In 1949-50 eleven CPUSA-led unions were expelled from 
the CIO which, in turn, withdrew from the WFTU in May 1949 
alongside the TUC and other major national federations. The 
formation of the International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU) , urged by the AFL, completed the Cold War 
division in the international labour movement. The new Cold 
War consensus of the AFL and the CIO in international policy 
paved the way for the merger of the two formations in 1955. 
The shared Cold War perspective of the two further undermines 
the thesis that business unionism is, in and of itself, the 
source of the U.S. labour movement's support for U.S. foreign 
policy. The CIO was born from militant industrial unionism 
and class confrontation, in the teeth of opposition from the 
bulk of the AFL. Despite these contrasting traditions, both 
now broadly shared the same world view. The Truman doctrine 
became the rhetoric of the AFL and CIO leaders, although the 
latter ensured a social democratic colouration of U.S. trade 
union international policy. While it can be argued that the
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CIO had, by the 1955 merger, had lost its early radicalism and 
adopted the methods and outlook of business unionism, it is 
too simplistic to state that these were indistinguishable from 
the methods and outlook of business unionism during the 
Gompers*-era AFL. The labour movement of the post-WW2 period 
rested on the achievements of the 1930s, saw the U.S. lead an 
enourmous global economic expansion, and had observed the 
international rise of Stalinism. At this point, the U.S. 
labour movement had been propelled into a position of 
political leadership of non-Communist trade unionism 
internationally.
The Cuban Revolution and AIFLD.
The success of the Marshall Plan in Europe inspired talk 
of a similar approach to assist the economic development of 
Latin America. The AFL-CIO openly supported investment by 
U.S. companies throughout the subcontinent to stimulate jobs 
at home, bring prosperity to Latin American workers, and to 
prevent Communism taking hold in the region. [98] As a 
necessary corollary to the development of liberal capitalism 
in Latin America, the AFL-CIO openly endorsed its own ''model” 
of trade unionism, "which corresponds to American labor's own 
conception of the proper role of trade unions in a free 
society." [97]
Following World War Two the left-wing Latin American 
union confederation CTAL went into a decline which paralleled
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the fragmentation of the WFTU. The formation of the ICFTU in 
1949 led to the creation of the Inter-American Regional 
Organization of Labour (Organizacion Regionales 
Inter-americana de Trabajado -ORIT) in 1951. By 1962 every 
Latin American country had an ORIT affiliate, and by 1966 the 
organisation claimed to represent 28 million workers in the 
Americas. [98] While ORIT was officially the American 
continent's section of the ICFTU, the AFL made efforts to 
insulate ORIT from European social democrats who were 
perceived to be susceptible to a more cooperative arrangement 
with Communism and the WFTU. [99]
The AFL-CIO's political domination of ORIT is frequently 
presented as another manifestation of trade union imperialism. 
The writers of this genre describe how the AFL-CIO created 
unions and union leaders in its own image, and, in collusion 
with the U.S. Embassies and the Department of State, 
facilitated splits in the labour movements along left-right 
and/or Cold War lines. The ORIT affiliates generally 
displayed consistent loyalty to the capitalist 
industrialization model, and explicitly rejected class 
struggle methods in favour of gradualism and collaboration 
with capital and the state. [100] The AFL-CIO's hegemony in 
ORIT is mainly attributed to its financial resources which 
effectively purchased the loyalty of a whole strata of trade 
union leaders throughout the subcontinent. [101]
The Cuban revolution in 1959 prompted the U.S. to 
instigate measures to reaffirm its hegemony in the region.
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U.S. policymakers accepted that Latin America was fertile 
territory for revolution. The Kennedy Administration launched 
the Alliance For Progress in 1961, offering $20 billion in aid 
for the decade to 1971, and urging Latin American heads of 
state to pursue political and social reform. The U.S.'s 
Agency For International Development (AID) helped implement 
the Alliance by providing, inter alia, long-term, low-interest 
loans to Latin American entrepreneurs. [102]
From the outset, the twin themes of "free trade unions” 
and "free enterprise" were stressed in the language U.S. 
legislation pertaining to the Alliance. The Foreign Assistance 
Act of 1961, as amended, states that the Congress recognises 
the "vital role of free enterprise in achieving rising levels 
of production standards of living essential to economic 
progress and development." Section 601 of the Act states that 
it is U.S. Government policy to "strengthen free labor 
unions." The Latin American Development Act stated that 
Congress "supports the strengthening of free democratic trade 
unions to raise standards of living through improved 
labor-management relations." A Brookings Institute study of 
1963 commented that the "free and independent trade unionism" 
became the "policy beacon for both government and organized 
labor assistance to labor movements abroad." The study 
surmised that "in general terms it (the legislation) seems to 
imply a model of unionism that 1) is primarily, if not 
exclusively, concerned with the economic function of
collective bargaining to win benefits for the worker, 2) is
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not linked with or/and controlled by a government or political 
party, 3) has no Communist connections..The only labor 
movement whose operations accord with all three of these 
specifications is that of the United States.” [103]
In 1962 the AFL-CIO, U.S. corporations, and the U.S. 
Government created the American Institute For Free Labor 
Development (AIFLD). AIFLD developed the Communication 
Workers of America's (CWA) program of training Latin American 
trade unionists. In that year AIFLD received $350,000 from 
the AID as part of the Alliance For Progress, and AIFLD's 
board of directors was composed of business as well as trade 
union leaders. As Weinrub and Bollinger express it, "Among 
the 95 U.S. corporations that pledged support and funding for 
AIFLD were some of the most powerful companies in Latin 
America, including Anaconda Copper, Coca Cola, and ITT.." 
[104]
The formation of AIFLD consummated the AFL-CIO's foreign 
policy relationship with the U.S. Government and the U.S. 
multinationals. All agreed that Communism had to be contained 
in Latin Americas, that "free" labour could play an important 
role. Moreover, AIFLD reflected the domestic institutional 
relationships of the postwar social pact. It projected the 
liberal industrial relations model that had grown out of the 
pact and accepted without question its universal applicability 
in Latin America. [105] AIFLD's first director, Serafino 
Romualdi, expressed it in classical liberal-pluralist terms:
"The concept of the various economic power elements in a 
free society working together..became the most
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fundamental credo of the Institute. .And it was in tribute 
to this concept that business representatives were asked 
to join with labor in the management and support of the 
Institute. Furthermore, labor in the U.S. does not 
subscribe to class struggle. It believes in the free 
enterprise system, subject to limitations and controls 
designed to prevent dangerous monopolies and abuses, but 
a free enterprise system nevertheless.11 [106]
In addition, however, AIFLD also reflected the concerns 
of the moment; there were those in ORIT who initially 
expressed a certain support for Castro who they believed to 
be a liberal democrat leading a legitimate struggle to rid 
Cuba of a hated dictatorship. [107] Castro, however, was 
accused of purging ORIT's Cuban affiliate, the Cuban Workers 
Federation (Confederacion de Trabajadores Cubanos -CTC) of its 
non-Communist leadership soon after the insurrection, which 
resulted in a hardening of ORIT attitudes against the new 
government. [108] All of ORIT's affiliates, with the 
exception of the Canadian Congress of Labor (CCL), registered 
support for the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961. [109]
Despite its eventual rejection of Castro, ORIT, like the 
PAFL before it, had shown itself to be susceptible to 
counter-hegemonic impulses, and was therefore viewed to be an 
unreliable weapon in the struggle against Communism. Even 
before the Cuban revolution Romualdi detected the source of 
tension, remarking that "North American labor was a firm 
believer in free enterprise" which clashed with those who 
called for "economic planning..socialistic methods and 
criticising the 'imperialistic manifestations of U.S. economic 
policy in Latin America.'" [110] AIFLD's function was to
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ensure that U.S. labour, capital, and the state had a vehicle 
which would it could control unilaterally, even though ORIT 
would continue to operate. The AFL-CIO now had two 
"internationalisms" in Latin America. AIFLD reflected the 
corporatist arrangements at the top of U.S. society, promoting 
the interests of U.S. capital and the state within a liberal 
developmentalist ideology. To complement this, the weight of 
the AFL-CIO in ORIT bore down upon any tendency to lean 
towards European social democracy which might weaken ORIT's 
anti-communist programme.
To its many critics AIFLD is the epitome of trade union 
imperialism. The very fact that approximately 95% of AIFLD's 
budget comes from the U.S. Government and that representatives 
of U.S. capital with major interests in Latin America 
supported AIFLD is enough to accord the Institute pariah 
status in certain trade union and political circles. AIFLD's 
source of funding is not a subject of dispute, although top 
AFL-CIO officials have frequently denied allegations of CIA 
involvement in its activites. Godson and other defenders of 
AIFLD and AFL-CIO foreign policy do not deny that a working 
relationship between AIFLD and the CIA was established and 
continues to operate either on an occasional or consistent 
basis. Indeed, the AFL-CIO has never indicated that 
cooperation with the CIA conflicts with its understanding of 
trade unionism, nor has it criticised the CIA for its methods.
The disclosures of former CIA agents (such as Philip 
Agee who referred to AIFLD as a "CIA controlled labor center")
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and trade union leaders (such as Victor Reuther) make it 
virtually certain that the CIA and the AFL-CIO1 s international 
affairs personnel have actively and consciously supported each 
others objectives on numerous occasions. [Ill] AIFLD's 
activities in Latin America (discussed below) also point to 
this conclusion. This thesis offers no hard evidence of a 
CIA-AIFLD connection, but it does demonstrate AIFLD*s support 
of CIA objectives in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Radosh's 
conclusion of two decades ago that, "In reality, a close 
working relationship exists between the State Department.. the 
CIA and the AFL-CIO" appears equally appropriate in terms of 
AIFLD's activities in Central America during the 1980s. [112]
De-Stabilization of Foreign Governments.
Accounts of AIFLDfs activities are frequently scathing. 
Scott, Radosh and Spalding have pioneered studies of AIFLD, 
and its role in Latin America has been the subject of 
innumerable articles and pamphlets. Many of Scott et. al.'s 
findings and formulations about AIFLD have penetrated the mass 
of books that have been written on Central America in recent 
years. [113]
Again, lack of space prevents a review all of the 
material on AIFLD or to provide the reader with anything like 
a comprehensive account of the activities of the Institute. 
The principal routine activity of AIFLD, however, is training 
of trade unionists from Latin America and the Caribbean.
Ill
According to its own records the total number of trade 
unionists participating in AIFLD's courses from 1962 until 
1985 is a staggering 503,000. [114] Most were trained as part 
of AIFLD's in-country programs, although 4,300 received 
training in the U.S. at the AFL-CIOfs George Meany Institute 
in Maryland. In Nicaragua and El Salvador during this same 
period, AIFLD claims to have trained a total of 26,807 trade 
unionists. [115]
Former CIA agent Philip Agee has claimed that AIFLD's 
training programs have been an area of considerable CIA 
activity. [116] The training courses themselves have served 
as a transmission belt for the anti-communism and liberal 
developmentalism characteristic of the Truman doctrine. The 
training manuals used by AIFLD articulate this philosophy in 
quite unambiguous terms. [117] In the Institute's view, U.S. 
foreign policy is determined by a legitimate fear of Soviet 
expansion, which can be effectively countered by capitalist 
development: "Preventing the world balance of power from
tipping too much in the USSR's favor thus requires successful, 
non-Communist industrialization in the developing countries." 
U.S. military intervention, it maintains, occurs only if U.S. 
national security is threatened, therefore "Latin American 
countries. . .can follow social reformist development strategies 
without incurring the opposition (of the U.S.) so long as 
they do not climb in bed with the Russians." It is, however, 
acknowledged that economic interest also helps determine U.S. 
foreign policy and U.S. trade unions regard these interests
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as their own. Thus, the AFL-CIO plays a role in "U.S. foreign 
assistance" because the U.S. has an interest in terms of 
markets to help LDC's (Less Developed Countries) 
industrialize, which also means "the humanitarian interests 
of the Europeans and North Americans are advanced." [118] In 
another manual, the objective of social democracy is described 
as "TO GRANT EVERYONE AN EQUAL RIGHT TO RISE AS HIGH AS HIS 
TALENTS PERMIT" (blocks in original). Furthermore, Locke, 
Jefferson, and Montesquieu are offered as the champions of 
democratic thinking, and Marx, Engels and Lenin are depicted 
as the fathers of totalitarian communism. [119] In sum, 
AIFLD's training material openly and uncritically identifies 
with the economic, ideological, political, and military 
aspects of U.S. foreign policy in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.
AIFLD's critics maintain that the extensive resources 
of the Institute have been used to contaminate a whole layer 
of Latin American and Caribbean trade unionists with pro-U.S., 
pro-capitalist, and anti-communist opinions. Moreover, 
William Doherty, AIFLD's Executive Director since 1965, 
claimed in 1983 that Institute graduates occupied at least 70% 
of the executive board positions of "free trade unions" in 
Central America. [120] Perhaps the most serious charge to be 
levelled against AIFLD is that the Institute and its graduates 
contributed significantly to the de-stabilization and 
overthrow of left-wing governments such as the Popular Unity 
in Chile in 1973. According to one source, "The total extent
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of AIFLD's work in preparing the ground for the Chilean coup 
has not yet been uncovered, but there is no doubt that as in 
earlier adventures in Brazil, Bolivia, the Dominican Republic, 
and other countries, AIFLD was a key factor." [121] Precisely 
how key the AIFLD factor was in the fall of left governments 
is, predictably, a subject of some controversy. What is 
clear, however, is that AIFLD and its trainees did actively 
intervene at several critical junctures in the postwar history 
of Latin America, and either instigated or supported 
activities against left reformist governments.
In the early 1960s AIFLD actively opposed the Jagan 
regime in Guyana. According to Spalding, as well as Jagan 
himself, "CIA agents worked as labor people, AIFLD maintained 
anti-Jagan trade union leaders on its full-time payroll" [122] 
The U.S. Department of State suspected that Jagan*s reformist 
government might embrace Cuba and the Soviet Union, noting 
that, while "perhaps not a disciplined communist, (Jagan) had 
the kind of pro-communist emotion which only sustained 
experience with communism could cure." [123] As Barnett 
records, "The major U.S. sponsored anti-Jagan campaign in 
Guiana was conducted through the labor unions. A CIA agent, 
Gerald O'Keefe, posing as an official of the Retail Clerks 
International Association? William McCabe, inter-American 
representative of the AFL-CIO; and a host of or other U.S. 
labor officials flocked to the British colony in 1962 and 
1963..They established contact with the Trade Union Council 
(TUC) an anti-Jagan union, headed by Richard Ishmael, who had
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been trained in the U.S. by AIFLD." [124]
Jagan's fall came in 1964 following British intervention 
which changed Guyana's electoral laws which preventing Jagan, 
who acquired a plurality of the votes in the election, 
continuing in power. However, perhaps the real damage was 
inflicted during an 80-day general strike called by the TUC 
to protest the government's labour relations bill which 
intended to abolish company unions and strengthen the more 
combative unions. [125] The U.S. public sector union, the 
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees' 
(AFSCME) has admitted that its international affairs office 
channelled cash relief to the strikers provided by the CIA. 
This relief, according to Jagan, totalled $1.2 million. [126] 
As George Meany commented at the time, "in British 
Guiana..Institute graduates are participating in the fight 
against the Cuba-oriented government of Prime Minister Cheddi 
Jagan." [127]
Meanwhile the reformist government of Joao Goulart in 
Brazil became a focus of U.S. concern. Goulart had been 
elected in 1960 by a large margin and the government's 
proposals for land reform and limited nationalizations 
inspired a working class and campesino movement which met 
enormous opposition from the Brazilian middle class and 
bourgeoisie. In 1964 Goulart was overthrown by a military 
coup, supported by a section of the Brazilian Congress and the 
U.S. Government. The coup began a period of severe political 
repression in Brazil; hundreds of trade unions were closed
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down. AIFLD's William Doherty exclaimed before the U.S. 
Congress in 1968 that "What happened in Brazil did not just 
happen..it was planned..Many of the trade union leaders— some 
of whom were actually trained by our Institute— were 
involved..in the overthrow of the Goulart regime." [128] Or 
as Romualdi expressed it, "I feel justified in saying that 
democratic labor played a decisive role on that fateful day 
in Brazil's history." [129] The moderate unions in the 
Democratic Workers' Movement (Movimiento Democratico Sindical 
-MDR) opposed a general strike planned by the left unions to 
protest the coup, and reportedly used their strategic 
occupational positions to keep open the military's lines of 
communication. [130]
In the Dominican Republic during the same period, 
several accounts have described how AIFLD helped create a 
split in the labour movement when it helped form the National 
Federation of Free Workers (Confederacion Nacional de 
Trabaj adores Libres -CONATRAL) . CONATRAL opposed the reformist 
government of President Juan Bosch, and openly called for the 
military to save the country from Communism. The military 
obliged, and a U.S.-supported coup overthrew Bosch in 1963. 
A broad-based movement to restore civilian rule was quashed 
when the U.S. invaded the Dominican Republic in 1965, an act 
which installed the right-wing regime of Joaquin Balaguer. 
ORIT and the AFL-CIO endorsed the new government. [131]
AIFLD's alleged part in the coup in Chile in 1973 is 
particularly controversial. The Institute has been accused
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of working to weaken union support for the Allende government. 
The Professional Employees union, maritime workers, and 
communications workers reportedly fell under AIFLD's 
influence. In May 1971 AIFLD helped form the Confederation 
of Chilean Professions, (CUPROCH) which supported the truck 
owners' strike which preceded the coup. Even this strike was 
led by a recent graduate of AIFLD. Union leaders associated 
with AIFLD and ORIT have been.accused of aiding the military 
in its execution of the coup. [132] Allende himself, in a 
broadcast made minutes before his death, spoke of "those 
patriots who a few days ago were continuing to struggle 
against the revolution led by the professional unions. That 
is the class unions who were trying to hold on to the 
advantages granted to them by a capitalist society." [133]
The fall of Jagan, Bosch, Goulart, and Allende was 
openly welcomed by the AFL-CIO. Pertaining to Chile, the 
Executive Council passed a resolution which declared that "a 
majority of the Chilean people..accepted the coup as a 
necessary act." [134]
AIFLD's Interventions: A Perspective.
Neither the AFL-CIO or AIFLD have denied that they 
played a role in the demise of the governments in the manner 
described above. Godson and Gershman, however, have refused 
to discuss in any detail AIFLD's role in Chile and elsewhere. 
At a general level, Godson has attempted to justify trade
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union intervention in this way: "the AFL-CIO maintains that 
democratic governments and trade unions must sometimes involve 
themselves in the affairs of other states when the latter are 
seriously threatened by foreign intervention or by domestic 
totalitarian forces aided by foreign powers. As a result, 
American labor has occasionally been put in the position of 
supporting Western efforts to prevent what it believes to be 
Soviet..inspired attempts to gain control of noncommunist 
governments." [135] In other words, the AFL-CIO adopts the 
same criteria for intervention as the U.S. Government, and 
therefore acts as an auxiliary to that intervention.
Godson and others' refusal to counter the specific 
accusations of the trade union imperialism writers, however, 
perhaps reflects the fact that none of the cases referred to 
above sits comfortably with the criteria for intervention he 
(or the U.S. Government) expresses. Firstly, these cases 
contradict AIFLD's claims that a Latin American country has 
the right to determine its own economic methods and destiny 
("so long as they don't jump in bed with the Russians"). 
Consider the example of Brazil. In Romualdi's own words, 
Goulart was attempting "land expropriation and the 
nationalization of all private petroleum refineries. These 
measures, if carried out, would have pushed Brazil further 
down the road to a socialist state." [136] Romualdi makes no 
allusion that Goulart's program constituted a threat to U.S. 
national security or that it was, in Godson's words, a "Soviet 
inspired attempt to gain control of a noncommunist
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government." Such a suggestion would be preposterous.
Secondly, the slipperiness of State Department 
definitions of communist and communism (Jagan's perceived 
"pro-communist emotion" substitutes for any formal party 
affiliation) is shared by AIFLD and the AFL-CIO Executive 
Council majority. Therefore in reality any left challenge to 
U.S. hegemony is depicted as communist, thus potentially 
pro-Soviet or Soviet inspired and a potential threat to U.S. 
national security which must be dealt with in the appropriate 
manner.
Thirdly, the consequences of intervention in these cases 
have invariably been disastrous. Indeed, it is necessary to 
note that all of the de-stabilized governments referred to 
above were democratically elected, and that the AFL-CIO, 
having welcomed their demise, then moved to condemn the 
successor regimes which its actions had actually helped bring 
to power. For examples, in 1965 the AFL-CIO criticised the
post-coup Branco government in Brazil for having "recently
become an authoritarian regime. It has curtailed civic
political rights and liberties, and the Brazilian labor
movement has been forced back to its original status -an 
integral part of the state." [137] In the case of Chile, 
Pinochet's blanket repression of the labour movement incurred 
the opposition of the AFL-CIO three years after the fall of 
Allende. [138]
Fourthly, as Galvin notes, the AFL-CIO has not shown 
anything like the same determination to disrupt the political
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rule of the dictatorial right. AIFLD's refusal to work with 
the left, its belief that gradual reforms are possible under 
dictatorship conditions, that the pursuit of these reforms 
constitute the only acceptable political option for the labour 
movement, leads the "democratic unions" into a symbiotic 
relationship with right-wing dictatorships. This has the 
effect of partially legitimising those regimes (Godson refers 
to such regimes as "less than democratic") and the repressive 
measures the regime may employ against "subversives" who are 
perceived to be sabotaging the only opportunity to achieve 
reforms, that is, long term collaboration with the 
dictatorship itself. [139]
It is for these reasons that the specific charges of the 
trade union imperialism writers have passed without visible 
challenge from defenders of AFL-CIO foreign policy? to do so 
would lay bare all the inconsistencies and contradictions 
which lie between the theory and practice of the AFL-CIO's 
"democratic internationalism."
The principal objective of the trade union imperialism 
writers has been to expose the actions of the AFL-CIO in the 
hope that this might generate opposition to its international 
operations both inside and beyond the labour movement. Cox, 
Galvin, and Levenstein are among the few writers who, while 
apparently sharing this basic objective, have tried to 
penetrate the surface of the AFL-CIO's international policy 
and offer more theoretically developed explanations. However, 
the trade union imperialism approach to Latin America appears
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to suffer from the same inadequacies that emerged in its 
account of the AFL*s role in postwar Europe. Attention has 
again focussed on a formal conflict-free history of the 
AFL-CIO, and particularly the attitudes and predilections of 
its leaders. On one level, this seems quite appropriate: the 
U.S. labour movement has a notorious record of support for 
U.S. intervention and U.S. foreign policy generally. 
Moreover, it is a widely accepted fact that the broader 
membership of U.S. unions have had no say whatsoever in the 
formulation and execution of trade union foreign policy, 
certainly since the consolidation of the postwar pact. [140] 
On another level, however, this approach again neglects the 
broader picture and particularly the part played by other 
actors.
In Latin America since the 1960s ORIT affiliates have 
been numerically dominant in most countries. Of the estimated 
20% of Latin American workers organised in unions, the ORIT 
represents a clear majority. The extent of this majority, 
however, is uncertain. ORIT's largest affiliates are to be 
found in Mexico (approximately 6.5 million members) ; Argentina 
(5 million) and Venezuela (1 million). Add to this the 
Brazilian CGT (6 million) which is supported by AIFLD and ORIT 
but, for jurisdictional reasons, is not affiliated, and the 
picture of ORIT's dominance nevertheless becomes clear. [141]
There can be little doubt that the AFL-CIO's enormous 
resources have played a significant role in keeping the ORIT 
generally friendly to the U.S. Furthermore, AIFLD graduates
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frequently occupy positions of leadership in ORIT's 
affiliates. However, AIFLD's training programs, 
notwithstanding their scope and ideological character, or any 
other Institute activity, do not sufficiently explain the 
moderate political orientation of many trade union federations 
in Latin America.
The charge that AIFLD "brainwashed" hundreds of 
thousands of trade unionists only serves to deflect attention 
away from possibility that the model of trade unionism 
promoted by the AFL-CIO was, at certain junctures, genuinely 
attractive to certain sections of trade unionists. Harrod 
records how in Jamaica, "The coming of the American model in 
the early 1950s..intensified the debate about political 
unionism, and brought new organizations and individuals as 
advocates of foreign models." Certain Jamaican unions "used 
North American practices as example (sic) of what should be 
done in Jamaica," in full knowledge that "the growing number 
of employers in Jamaica from the USA expressed a desire for 
the trade union practices current in their own country." [142] 
In other words, some trade unionists advocated the so-called 
American model fully cognizant of the fact that it conformed 
to the expressed wishes of U.S. multinationals. This is 
hardly surprising. The U.S. labour movement could point to 
some clear material achievements in wages, benefits and 
conditions during a period of unprecedented economic growth 
in the U.S. Furthermore, during the 1950s and 1960s Latin 
America and the Caribbean also witnessed a period of sustained
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economic expansion. The Executive Council of the AFL-CIO 
noted in 1964 that Brazil's growth rate was second only to 
that of Japan, and that the national growth rates for all 
Latin American countries ranged from 4.4% to 10.3% per annum.
[143] Capitalism was creating the wealth, all that remained 
was for labour to win its share - as seemed to be the case in 
the U.S. In Argentina, as Carlos Diaz notes, "AIFLD acquired 
significant influence within the labor bureaucracy and 
established an extensive network?" however, "AIFLD's task was 
facilitated by the existence of an incipient labor 
bureaucracy, whose consciousness had its roots in the social 
democratic and syndicalist trends in Argentine labor history 
and the Peronist class alliance of 1945-55." Significantly, 
"monopoly capital provided the material basis for the growth 
of a relatively privileged sector of the working class."
[144]
In the case of Brazil, Harding describes how Goulart's 
reformism during the period leading to the coup resulted in 
a clear polarisation in the working class. "The accelerated 
radicalization of the most politicized workers," he observed, 
"seperated them from those who had not become so radicalized." 
Again, AIFLD's role in Brazil needs to be viewed in the light 
of fairly elemental divisions among Brazilian workers during 
this period. [145]
In Venezuela AIFLD expressed great enthusiasm for the 
government of Romulo Betancourt which came to power in 1958 
following the fall of the Jiminez dictatorship. Betancourt's
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party, the social democratic Accion Democratica, extended 
support to the ORIT affiliate the Confederation of Venezuelan 
Workers (Confederacion de Trabaj adores de Venezuela -CTV) 
which expelled its CP-led unions in 1963. Wages became the 
highest in Latin America, the left was marginalised, and the 
labour movement under CTV hegemony became a social partner of 
the government. The AFL-CIO supported Betancourt, while the 
U.S. Government remained content to support the Jiminez 
dictatorship. The example of Venezuela served as a model for 
AIFLD in the years ahead: liberal democracy, economic growth, 
reforms, and a marginalized left -a perfect combination. 
There can be little doubt that Venezuela's oil wealth and 
overall economic performance provided the material basis for 
a sustained period of reforms and the relative stability of 
Venezuela's political structures. [146]
AIFLD's critics maintain that the Institute's activities 
constituted an act of naked imperialism. However, they 
frequently ignore or downplay the fact that significant 
sections of organised labour in Latin America also accepted 
the liberal capitalist development model, either 
fatalistically in the case of much of the left, or 
enthusiastically in the case of the more conservative trade 
unions. In one way or another, Latin American workers made 
their own choices concerning the political direction of their 
respective countries, a fact that which frequently gets 
submerged in the pile of criticisms levelled against the 
AFL-CIO and AIFLD.
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As with Europe, another major inadequacy or omission on 
the part of the AFL-CIO's critics lies in their reluctance to 
critically evaluate the ideas and method of the Latin American 
left in the post-war period. Thus the story runs: The AFL-CIO 
and the U.S. Government begat ORIT and AIFLD, and both went 
about their task of deflecting Latin American and Caribbean 
trade unionism from a more "progressive" destiny. Virtually 
no discussion, however, occurs regarding the various 
alternatives presented by the left in general to the 
AIFLD-ORIT reformist formula. Again, it is understandable 
that these writers might feel such a discussion complicates 
the task in hand, that is, to expose the trade union 
imperialism of the AFL-CIO. This approach, however, risks 
inflating the significance of the U.S. labour movement's 
political intervention and fails to consider the possibility 
that the left, in this or that instance, or over a longer 
historical period, might have actually enhanced the 
effectiveness of the AFL-CIO's intervention.
The postwar political history of Latin America and the 
Caribbean islands is too diverse to lend itself favourably to 
generalisations pertaining to "the left" and what it did or 
did not do during this period. Indeed, just a cursory glance 
at the post-war history of the left in the region reveals a 
patchwork of ideologies and strategies. In terms of left 
trade unionism, however, two currents of thought (excluding 
Peronism and left Christian Democratic or "socialichrisitian" 
trade unionism) are important because they transcended
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national boundaries and posed some degree of opposition to the 
ORIT.
One of these currents was promoted by the communist 
parties loyal to the Soviet Union. These parties established 
a presence in some Latin American countries, particularly 
Mexico, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, Costa Rica and Panama following 
the Bolshevik revolution and the establishment of the RILU. 
[147] The CPs provided political leadership to certain trade 
union federations who then became identified with them. 
Politically, the CPs in Latin America adhered to popular 
frontism in the 1930's and anti-fascism following the Nazi 
invasion of the Soviet Union. While this required the CPUSA 
support Roosevelt, in Latin America the same policy demanded 
CPs support dictators like Somoza in Nicaragua and Batista in 
Cuba. [148]
In the postwar period the disintegration of the
left-wing CTAL, where CP-influenced union federations had a 
clear voice, ushered in a period of ORIT hegemony over 
organised labour in Latin America. Moreover, after 1950 and 
the withdrawal of the CIO, TUC, and other non-communist 
national federations, the WFTU became numerically and
politically dominated by the Soviet trade unions. The WFTU's 
policy towards Latin America replicated that of Stalin and the 
CPSU; the region was a legitimate "sphere of influence" for
the U.S. In the trade union arena, this entailed the WFTU
effectively surrender the region to ORIT. [149]
The WFTU eventually established a presence in Latin
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America in 1964, when the Chilean United Workers' Central 
(Central Unica de Trabajadores -CUT) initiated the formation 
of the Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of Latin 
America (Congreso Permanente de Unidad Sindical de los 
Trabajadores de America Latina -CPUSTAL). In the period 
1964-1982, CPUSTAL secured 22 national affiliates. [150] 
Although no data is readily available, CPUSTAL's resources 
were probably no more than a fraction of those of AIFLD and 
ORIT. Furthermore, although estimates vary, the CPUSTAL is 
thought to represent between 2 and 4 million workers in Latin 
America compared to 12 million formally affiliated to the 
ORIT. [151]
The motive behind the formation of the CPUSTAL is 
unclear. The organisation was formed in a period when the CPs 
faced the prospect of being out-flanked from the left 
throughout the region in the wake of the Cuban revolution and 
Castro's more combative profile. The platform of CPUSTAL, 
agreed at a 1967 gathering of CPUSTAL and WFTU representatives 
in Prague, was a cautious one which called for "unity of 
action" between Latin American unions at national and regional 
levels around "humanist principles." [152]
The fall of Batista marked the beginnings of Castroism 
as a political current in Latin America, and tensions between 
Castro and the orthodox CPs were openly expressed. At the 
Tricontinental Conference in Havana in 1966, the dominant 
perspective urged the escalation of guerilla warfare 
throughout the region; China, Cuba, and Vietnam had
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demonstrated the validity of armed struggle based on the 
peasantry as a means of achieving state power in the 
underdeveloped world. The trade unions were considered, at 
best, only an auxiliary force in the armed conquest for power. 
At worst, they had degenerated into electoral ism and economism 
to the point of being defenders of existing economic and 
political relationships. [153] It seems plausible to suggest 
that the CPUSTAL was launched as a measure in part to counter 
actual or potential Castroite influence over the Latin 
American labour movements.
The thrust of Castroism, however, was towards the 
peasantry, which reduced its influence over the trade unions. 
However, the failure of guerilla campaigns to ignite rural 
rebellion, and Cuba's growing economic dependency vis a' vis 
the Soviet Union, brought Cuba more in line with Soviet policy 
for the region. The fall of Allende in 1973 (which resulted 
in the decimation of the largest CPUSTAL affiliate, the 
Chilean CUT), completed a generally bleak picture for the left 
during this period: both guerillaism and electoralism had
ended in disaster.
Is it probably no coincidence that ORIT, during this 
same period, had reached the peak of its organisational 
strength. Aside from the relative success of the capitalist 
growth model, the widespread repression of the left, of which 
Chile was just the latest example, enhanced the attractiveness 
of ORIT. [154] A high-profile relationship with the AFL-CIO, 
given the Federation's close contact with the U.S. Embassies,
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served as an insurance policy (with perhaps only limited 
coverage) for trade unionists who feared government reprisals. 
[155]
It is much too simplistic to assert that ORIT's hegemony 
in Latin American trade unionism rested entirely on the policy 
choices of the CPs and Castroite left. The point here is that 
the Left offered no real alternative to the capitalist 
development model in a period of relative economic expansion 
and frequent bouts of state-sponsored repression - a point 
that deserves serious consideration in any evaluation of the 
general state of trade union politics in the region in any 
given period, including an examination of the impact of the 
AFL-CIO. This, however, does not mean that the without such 
an alternative the moderate reformism of ORIT will go 
unchallenged. Indeed, during the profound economic
difficulties faced by Latin American workers during the 1980s 
several ORIT affiliates took up a more militant posture, and 
AIFLD and the AFL-CIO were openly criticised. The contrasting 
realities of the U.S. and many Latin American economies, even 
in a period of mutual growth, frequently created tensions in 
the ideological cohesion of ORIT. [156] A realignment of 
forces within ORIT as much as a resurgence of the traditional 
left union federations may yet prove to be an integral part 




This opening chapter has tried to meet two broad 
objectives. Firstly, it has attempted to provide the reader 
with essential information regarding the basic historical 
features of U.S. labour movement foreign policy and its 
significance. Secondly, it has attempted to convey how 
existing treatments of this subject have been somewhat 
incomplete in one or more respects.
The openly partisan character of the bulk of the 
material on this subject has perhaps obscured as much as it 
has revealed about U.S. labour*s international activities. 
Defenders of U.S. labour*s Cold War policy present the AFL- 
CIO as heroic "spearheads for democracy" in an unrelenting 
struggle against left and right totalitarianism. The weight 
of evidence, and the unwillingness of these writers to address 
the substantive allegations of the AFL-CIO*s critics, 
seriously weakens the argument that the AFL-CIO is a proponent 
of democratic workers' internationalism unless the widely 
accepted definitions of both democracy and internationalism 
are completely re-evaluated. The trade union imperialism 
writers have sought to expose the role of the AFL-CIO's 
international network in supporting U.S. foreign policy. They 
note that for decades the DIA and AIFLD have engaged in a 
perversion of international labour solidarity. While agreeing 
with the main political thrust of these writers, I have argued 
that this approach offers an over-cohesive and monolithic view
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of U.S. labour, and generally rests much too heavily on the 
claim that the business unionism of Gompers and the AFL lies 
at the root of U.S. trade union imperialism. It is at best 
only partially correct to depict the AFL's international 
forays as imperialistic in the sense that the principal 
motivations of the AFL replicated those of U.S. capital and 
the U.S. Government. The AFL leaders, at least from 
1905-1919, became active internationally to counter the rival 
internationalism of the IWW and the domestic challenge posed 
by the Socialist Party, to prove its worth to the U.S. 
Government in the hope of win an ally in the unequal struggle 
against U.S. capital, and to defeat anti-war and socialist 
opposition in its own ranks and in the broader U.S. labour 
movement. This is not to say that the AFL leaders did not 
foresee material advantages for themselves and their members 
in the U.S. becoming the world's foremost economic power. 
However, the ideological polarisation of the U.S. labour 
movement made its own contribution to the distinct character 
of AFL international policy during this period.
The rise of CIO industrial unionism in the 1930s and 
the highly significant role of communists and socialists 
challenged the AFL domestically and to a limited degree 
internationally. The development of a new labour
internationalism, however, was retarded by Roosevelt-CIO 
accomodation, New Deal reformism, and, eventually, World War 
Two. During this period the various policy shifts of the 
CPUSA (against the New Deal, then for it, against the war,
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then in favour) also helped prevent the Left developing a 
clear challenge to the AFL's international policies. The 
CIO's affiliation of the WFTU at a time when the Soviet Union 
was temporarily a military ally of the U.S. meant that the 
AFL's opposition to Communism erected a barrier between it, 
the U.S. Government, and the bulk of the international labour 
movement. In the postwar period the consolidation of Cold War 
unionism coincided with the purge of the CIO left. This and 
the split in the WFTU brought the AFL full circle into a 
position of leadership within the new ICFTU. Domestic 
ideological conflict now receded as an important factor 
shaping U.S. labour's international stance. However, certain 
differences did persist between the more social democratic 
elements of U.S. labour (such as the UAW) and the AFL old 
guard. These differences came to the surface during the 
Vietnam War when the UAW left the AFL-CIO protesting 
Federation support for President Johnson's war policy. (See 
Chapter Four).
The history of U.S. labour's international policy is 
therefore punctuated with important periods of domestic 
conflict. Indeed, the period from the purge of the CIO in the 
late 1940's until the UAW departure in 1967 (less than two 
decades) stands out as the only portion of U.S. labour history 
where such conflict either disappeared or was without real 
significance. The period from 1967-1980 marked a gradual 
strengthening of the liberal and social democratic forces in 
the labour movement. Following 1980 and the beginning of the
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Reagan period, the tension between this wing of labour and its 
more conservative opposite manifested itself in split over 
U.S. policy in Central America. This schism is hardly 
comparable to the AFL-IWW divide or the AFL's rivalry with the 
early CIO, but it is symptomatic of the tensions in the U.S. 
labour movement set in motion by the end of the postwar 
consensus. Underlying these tensions pertaining to foreign 
policy are potential disagreements over domestic policy. This 
was somewhat reflected in the fact that the forces behind the 
internal challenge to Cold War unionism are the same as those 
who urged labour movement support for the Presidential 
campaign of Jesse Jackson in 1988, a position not shared by 
Kirkland and his allies on the AFL-CIO Executive Council. 
Jackson's anti-interventionist U.S. foreign policy position 
accompanied the call for "economic justice" in the U.S. In 
other words, the split over Central America may be a harbinger 
a deeper polarisation in U.S. labour around "domestic" 
questions in the years to come.
In this chapter I have also argued that the trade union 
imperialism accounts have tended to understate or bypass the 
role played by other actors in the international arena. In 
Europe and Latin America the AFL and the AFL-CIO clearly 
reinforced existing tendencies in the labour movements, 
tendencies that opposed Soviet Communism or Stalinism, 
supported the Marshall Plan and the Alliance for Progress, 
and, perhaps similar to the AFL in its first decades, sought 
partnership with capital and the state and the (frequently
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violent) exclusion of their more leftward labour movement 
rivals. Moreover, trade union imperialism writers tend also 
to downplay or ignore the impact of Stalinism on broad 
sections of the working class internationally and how the East 
bloc experience, and the subservience of the Communist Parties 
to Moscow, has seriously harmed the development of a socialist 
alternative to capitalist postwar reconstruction in the case 
of Europe or capitalist industrialization in the case of Latin 
America and other regions of the third world.
All told, a more balanced and flexible view of U.S. 
trade union imperialism is needed which accords sufficient 
weight to role of other actors. This is particularly 
necessary in view of the substance of this thesis: the
internal and external challenge to AFL-CIO Cold War unionism 
and the impulse towards a new internationalism emanates from 
several simultaneous and interrelated developments. These 
include the end of the postwar social pact in the U.S. and 
the return of open conflict between the state and labour, the 
failure of the liberal capitalist development model in vast 
areas of the third world (manifested clearly in the case of 
Central America) , and the revolutionary trajectory of workers' 
and peasants' struggles in a growing number of locations. 
Furthermore, the present trends in social democracy and the 
elemental crisis of Stalinism, in that they have shaped the 
ideological profile of the international labour movement, are 
also enormously significant.
Evaluating the respective significance of these factors,
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as well as important contributions of key individuals, is 
clearly a formidable challenge. However, the value of a more 
balanced and, I believe, a more dialectical approach to this 
question is that, aside from being closer to complex 
realities, it shines greater light on the dynamics of change 
and how such dynamics might be reinforced. As the following 
chapters hopefully make absolutely clear, there are certain 
changes in trade union ideology and methods which are long 
overdue.
Chapter Two of this thesis traces the AFL-CIO * s and 
AIFLD's policy of liberal intervention in El Salvador 
beginning in the mid-1960's. The failure of both political 
and economic reforms sharpened class-conflict during the 
1970's, culminating in the development of a revolutionary 
situation in 1979-80. The turning of the tide against the 
left opened the floodgates of a brutal repression in 1980-83 
which decimated the radical unions and fueled what was to 
become a protracted guerilla struggle against the Salvadoran 
regime. The Salvadoran experience attracted attention to 
AIFLD and its methods, raising before a wide audience 
fundamental questions about AFL-CIO internationalism and its 
consequences.
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THE AFL-CIO IN EL SALVADOR 1965-1983:
REFORMS AMIDST REPRESSION
The AFL-CIO1s involvement in El Salvador began in 
earnest during the mid-1960s. As with several other Latin 
American countries, the objective was to work with the U.S. 
Embassy to establish moderate trade unions that would seek to 
achieve legitimate recognition within the institutional 
constraints imposed by a dictatorial or "bureaucratic- 
authoritarian" regime. In order to achieve even modest 
political and industrial space these unions attempted to 
persuade the regime of the need for gradual reforms to 
facilitate economic development and, above all, to undercut 
the appeal of revolutionary alternatives. As the preceding 
chapter illustrated, this pattern of intervention contrasted 
markedly from that established in the case of 
radical-reformist regimes like that of Allende*s Chile and 
Jagan's Guyana. In the case of regimes of the left, a 
qualitatively different set of methods were employed, 
including successful or attempted mobilisations of key 
sections of workers, making them a force for economic and 
political destabilisation and, without exception, de facto
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vehicles of U.S. foreign policy.
In 1948 Serafino Romualdi (a future director of AIFLD) 
praised the reformist coup in El Salvador conducted by "Young 
military officers (who) set their mind and enthusiasm to make 
El Salvador into a modern, developing, country, with 
constitutional guarantees for all citizens..and a favorable 
climate for the investment of domestic and foreign capital.” 
[1] Romualdi recalled the arrival of U.S. Ambassador Robert 
C. Hill in El Salvador in 1954. Romualdi, Hill, and then 
President of El Salvador, Osorio, met at the Presidential 
Palace. Osorio remarked, "The Ambassador of the workers and 
the Ambassador of the government. Que Bueno!” [2] Thirty-one 
years later, in 1979, AIFLD praised another reformist coup by 
young military officers in El Salvador, viewing the 
development as an opportunity to rally the moderate unions and 
the U.S. Government behind the reformist current in the armed 
forces which supported the Christian Democratic Party.
AIFLDfs Involvement: 1965-1979.
In the period between the two coups, AIFLD played a 
significant role in providing resources and political support 
to campesino organisations. The decision to focus on the 
peasantry and agricultural wage-earners emerged from two 
pivotal considerations. Firstly, power in El Salvador rested 
with the oligarchy and their supporters who exerted hegemony 
within the armed forces. Fewer than 2% of the population
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controlled nearly all fertile soil and some 60% of all the 
land. [3] AIFLD took its brief from the liberal 
interventionist aspects of the Alliance For Progress which 
acknowledged that, in many regions and countries of Latin 
America, land reform was essential to break the preponderant 
political and economic strength of the oligarchy in order to 
politically steer the rural areas away from revolutionary 
solutions to the problem of landlessness. In 1932 the 
Salvadoran military brutally suppressed an attempted rural 
insurrection which claimed the lives of an estimated 30,000 
people, an event which is constantly referred to by the left 
both as a source of inspiration and as a reason for caution. 
The Matanza (massacre) is also remembered affectionately by 
sections of the right, who regard physical extermination as 
the only effective method in dealing with the “subversives." 
[4]
The Cuban revolution revived the spectre of peasant 
uprisings throughout the sub-continent. For U.S. policy 
makers the prospect of several "Cubas" convulsing Latin 
America, aligning themselves with the Soviet Union, and 
leading to the confiscation of U.S.-owned companies and 
operations, required urgent preventative action. Where the 
threat from the left was imminent, defence of the threatened 
regime was essential through military aid or intervention. 
In El Salvador the urban left was relatively weak and, for 
the moment, the trade unions operated under the hegemony of 
a Communist Party (Partido Comunista de El Salvador -PCES)
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schooled in the Popular Front tradition of electoral politics 
and support for a purportedly progressive indigenous 
bourgeoisie. While this policy prevailed the trade unions in 
the urban sector lacked a leadership possessing a clear 
revolutionary objective. Thus AIFLD could concentrate its 
work among the rural workforce and landless peasantry. It is 
perhaps ironic that the cautious tactics of the PCES and the 
urban unions following its lead, based on the belief that the 
working class was too small and weak to lead a revolutionary 
challenge for power, released AIFLD to focus on the rural 
areas in order to steer the peasantry away from "communist" 
alternatives.
The Alliance For Progress*s insistence on land reform 
was resisted by the Salvadoran oligarchy. [5] Nevertheless, 
AIFLD began training campesino leaders in November 1965 and 
in 1967 training seminars were conducted in conjunction with 
the Christian Democratic Party (Partido Cristiana Democratica 
-PDC). In 1968, 4,000 commune members were brought together 
to form the Salvadoran Communal Union (Union Comunal 
Salvadorena -UCS), an organisation that would play a highly 
significant role in the tumultuous period following the 
reformist coup of 1979. In 1970-72 AIFLD signed U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID) contracts worth over 
$400,000. [6] During this period the UCS emerged as a
legitimate campesino union with a social base now large enough 
to be considered threatening to the oligarchy. Despite their 
cautious, non-confrontational methods, the "creeping
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reformism" of the UCS prompted the regime of Colonel Aturo 
Molina to expel AIFLD from El Salvador. [7]
AIFLD continued to provide financial support for the UCS 
during their period of exile. In June 1974 several unions, 
including the UCS (who now had a membership approaching 
70,000) and the Federation of Construction, Transportation, 
and Related Industries (Federacion de Sindicatos de la 
Industria de la Construccion, Transporte y Similares - 
FESINCONSTRANS) called for AIFLD*s readmission to El Salvador. 
[8] Other campesino groups not associated with AIFLD also 
organised during this period, assisted by Catholic priests. 
These organisations reflected a mix of radical ideologies and 
thus suffered violent repression at the hands of a rural 
vigilante group Nationalist Democratic Organisation 
(Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista -ORDEN) which was 
linked to the Ministry of Defence and controlled by retired 
and active military officers. [10]
The Radicalization of the Urban Unions.
The 1970s witnessed the emergence of several sizeable 
left unions in the urban sector which were in part an 
expression of dissatisfaction with the electoral reformism of 
the PCES and the trade unions following its political lead. 
One federation, The National Federation of Salvadoran Workers 
(Federacion Nacional de Trabajadores Salvadorenos -FENASTRAS) , 
was formed in 1972 and by the end of the decade was the
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largest collection of industrial unions with a base among 
textile and hydroelectrical workers in particular. [11] 
FENASTRAS made an alliance with other left unions and 
federations to form the United Confederation of Workers 
(Confederacion Unitaria de Trabajadores Salvadorenos- CUTS). 
The Left in El Salvador had shown serious divisions following 
the collapse of the CPES's electoral strategy, which urged 
support for Guillermo Ungo, a social democrat, and Napoleon 
Duarte, a Christian Democrat, in the elections for president 
and vice-president in February 1972. The Salvadoran General 
Election Board announced Ungo-Duarte the victor over Colonal 
Molina, the candidate of the right-wing National Conciliation 
Party (Partido de Conciliacion Nacional -PCN). Following a 
news blackout lasting three days the Board changed its 
decision and awarded victory to Molina. [12] The blatant 
doctoring of the election results in 1972 led many who sought 
social change to conclude that armed struggle similar to that 
waged in Cuba and Vietnam remained the only realistic option 
in El Salvador. It is uncertain whether the left unions 
dissatisfied with the PCES viewed themselves as auxiliaries 
to the armed struggle - an "urban front" paving the way for 
insurrection - or envisaged themselves in a more central role. 
At this stage it is appears likely that the left unions viewed 
themselves as a key component of the "popular sector", 
especially as the guerilla organisations formed in this period 
were small and ideologically divided. At the height of the 
repression of 1980-83 the situation would change dramatically.
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The urban left unions were crushed, with many of their leaders 
killed. Those who survived frequently decided to take up arms 
in a united guerilla struggle? therefore the gravitational 
centre of the political conflict in El Salvador became the war 
of the guerillas against the military. However, in the 
interim the PCES, despite its loss of influence, remained in 
the electoral alliance with the social democrats until the 
late 1970s. [13]
The PCES lost further influence in the labour movement 
with the emergence of the Christian Democratic left and 
various "new left" currents in the unions. Groups such as the 
United Popular Action Front (Frente de Accion Popular Unida 
-FAPU) established a base in FENASTRAS, and the Popular 
Revolutionary Bloc (Bloque Revolucionario Popular -BPR) 
secured a base in the National Association of Salvadoran 
Teachers (Asociacion Nacional de Educadores Salvadorenos 
-ANDES) and led a rash of strikes in the mid-1970s. [14]
Other significant revolutionary groups were the People’s 
Revolutionary Army (Ejercito Revolucionario del Pueblo -ERP) 
and the National Resistance (Resistencia Nacional -RN) 
Earlier, the PCES itself split when a faction left to form the 
Popular Liberation Forces (Fuerzas Populares de Liberacion 
-FPL) Meanwhile, the reformist alliance fought elections in 
1977, the results of which were also distorted by fraud. 
Victory was again awarded to the PCN's candidate, General 
Romero. [15]
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The 1970s was also a decade when the right grew in 
strength. In 1968 the Salvadoran government formed ORDEN, a 
rural organisation which served as an auxiliary to the armed 
forces. ORDEN's membership, estimated as high as 100,000, 
including 10,000 under arms, involved themselves in 
identifying "subversives" such as those who criticised the 
oligarchy, the military, or the U.S. [16] ORDEN posed a 
constant threat even to the moderate unions in the 
countryside. The 1970s also marked the emergence of the death 
squads linked to the armed forces and the oligarchy, which 
provided a base for the right-wing National Republican 
Alliance (Alianza Republicana Nacionalista -ARENA) party 
formed in 1981.
The Coup of 1979: AIFLD and the Land Reform.
By 1979, nearly two decades after the founding of the 
Alliance For Progress, the oligarchy remained the dominant 
political force in El Salvador and significant land reform 
had still not been achieved despite agrarian reform laws and 
schemes introduced under the Molina regime. [17] Repression 
increased during the Romero period 1977-79? in one incident 
the security forces opened fire on a demonstration called to 
protest the electoral fraud, killing almost 100 people. [18] 
Following pressure from the U.S. Embassy the Salvadoran 
government permitted AIFLD to re-enter El Salvador just prior 
to the reformist coup which ousted Romero and days before the
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fall of Somoza in Nicaragua. [19] The coup was instigated by 
moderate military officers who feared the regime's 
intransigence would lead to its downfall; the Sandinista 
victory had inspired a certain euphoria in El Salvador which 
triggered a wave of left-led strikes and mass demonstrations. 
[20]
The Carter Administration embraced (some say encouraged) 
the coup in order to pre-empt revolutionary change and to 
distance itself from the repressive nature of Romero's 
government. [21] The civilian-military junta, formed October 
18, 1979, contained several reformists, including the leading 
social democrat, Guillermo Ungo, the leader of the centre-left 
National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento Nacional 
Revolucionario -MNR). The cabinet, selected later, was also 
reformist and included Ruben Zamora, a progressive Christian 
Democrat. Ungo and Zamora would emerge as significant figures 
in the impending conflict within U.S. trade unions over El 
Salvador.
Despite the reformist character of the junta the 
repression intensified as the left unions and the broader 
popular movement pressed for land reform, higher wages, and 
price controls. Some 86 people were killed when the armed 
forces fired on one demonstration. Amnesty International 
reported the violent suppression of strikes and occupations 
in the period immediately before and after AIFLD's re-entry 
into El Salvador. "Security forces acted with the same 
brutality as those under Romero," said AI? "Within a week the
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new government was held responsible for more than 100 killings 
of demonstrators and striking workers who had been occupying 
farms and factories.” [22] Civilian members of the first 
junta, including Ungo, resigned January 3, 1980, as the
killings spread. They declared that real power was being 
exercised by several military commanders. Zamora remained in 
the junta until early March when he too resigned. [23]
A second junta was quickly formed, again encouraged by 
the U.S. Embassy, with the participation of mainstream 
Christian Democrats. Meanwhile, the various left currents 
called for a mass demonstration on January 22. The marchers 
were machine gunned and as a result 65 were reported killed 
and 250 wounded. The Carter Administration prepared a major 
package of military aid to the junta, arguing that the aid 
would bolster the reform program. With the repression 
intensifying, leading Christian Democrats resigned, protesting 
they were being used as a cover for military repression. The 
Christian Democrats who remained co-opted Jose Napoleon Duarte 
into the "third" junta, thus sustaining its reformist wing.
[24]
The agrarian reform announced in March 1980 was 
technically assisted by AIFLD, which worked closely with the 
UCS and the government's Agrarian Reform Institute (ISTA).
[25] Their joint objective was to implement a far-reaching 
land reform in three distinct phases. Phase I planned to 
expropriate 238 estates with more than 500 hectares each, 
approximately 15% of all agricultural land. Phase II promised
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to expropriate approximately 1,750 farms between 150 and 500 
hectares, approximately 23% of agricultural land and, 
additionally, two thirds of coffee production which 
constituted the most significant sector of Salvadoran 
agriculture and the power-base of the oligarchy. Phase III 
became known as the Land-to-the-tiller program (LTTT - a 
phrase used by Lenin) allowing land ceded by the large 
landowners to be handed over to medium-sized farmers, tenants 
and sharecroppers. [26] Fifteen years of direct or 
arms-length AIFLD involvement had brought no significant land 
re-distribution, but it had sustained the UCS as a campesino 
organisation with a legitimate mass base. AIFLD and the UCS 
were now poised to pursue a graduated land reform to weaken 
the power of the oligarchy and to dampen the appeal of the 
guerilla groups in a situation of deepening polarization and 
escalating political violence. [27]
The land reform was welcomed by the U.S. Congress as a 
way to dismantle the power of the oligarchy, and thus save El 
Salvador from the increasingly armed left. AIFLD moved into 
two floors of the Sheraton hotel working with Roy Prosterman, 
a law professor at the University of Washington who was 
formerly associated with a parallel agrarian reform program 
in Vietnam designed to "turn the tables on the Vietcong" by 
providing land to the peasantry as a means of preserving the 
existing regime. [28] AIFLD reportedly developed an agrarian 
reform decree which in early 1980 was approved by the 
Salvadoran military and modelled on Prosterman*s LTTT
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"pacification” model. [29]
Several accounts have described the reform as a cover 
for repression in the countryside, in which AIFLD by 
attempting to legitimize and implement the reform, was a de 
facto accomplice. [30] The armed forces, purportedly sent 
into the rural areas to occupy plantations intended for 
expropriation under the reform, unleashed a wave of repression 
against the left campesino unions and their sympathisers. [31] 
In his statement of resignation from the junta in March 1980 
the Assistant Minister of Agriculture, Jorge Alberto 
Villacorta, denounced the Treasury Police, the National Guard, 
and civilians in ORDEN for murdering large numbers of peasants 
who had received land titles under the reform and technicians 
from ISTA and Ministry of Agriculture working with the reform 
program. [32]
On March 24, 1980, Archbishop Oscar Romero was
assassinated while administering a memorial mass. Romero had 
criticised the land reform and, one day earlier, appealed to 
the army to cease its repression of the people. At the 
Archbishop* s funeral 22 were killed. The next day the 
Democratic Revolutionary Front (Frente Democratico 
Revolucionario -FDR) was formed, made up of five left 
organisations, Ungo*s social democratic formation (MNR), and 
Ruben Zamora*s dissident Christian Democrats. The left trade 
unions were in the forefront of the FDR and included 
FENASTRAS, the hospital workers (Sindicato de Trabaj adores del 
ISSS -STISSS), the teachers union (ANDES) and several other
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important labour organisations. [33]
By May political assassinations reached hundreds per 
month in both urban and rural sectors as the death squads 
roamed with impunity. In the cities the leadership of the 
left unions was being exterminated; for example, the teachers 
union ANDES suffered 90 assassinations in the first nine 
months of 1980. [34] In the countryside the AIFLD-supported 
UCS also suffered attacks. On June 5 UCS leaders in eight 
regions of El Salvador withdrew their support for the reform 
following the murders of 12 UCS members by the National Guard. 
This ironically coincided with the publication of an article 
in the AFL-CIO' s Free Trade Union News by Prosterman which 
praised the achievements of the land reform. The AIFLD Report 
of March-April 1980 was quite candid about the role played by 
the UCS: the organization had been "pivotal” to the land
reform process. Moreover, according to AIFLD, "With most of 
the campesino sector in El Salvador unorganized or radicalized 
by leftist extremists, the Junta was desperate to identify a 
moderate, democratic small farmer organization to serve as the 
vehicle for the implementation of the reform- The UCS, with 
strong popular support in the countryside...provided the 
solution." [35]
On June 25 the left-wing groups called a two-day general 
strike which mobilized the whole popular sector, including 
what some observers judged to be 90% of the unions. [36] On 
June 27 troops took over the national university, killing 16 
students. A second general strike, called in August, failed
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in the face of military and legal intimidation from the 
regime. This period constituted a turning point for the left: 
strikes and demonstrations had received enormous support, but, 
unlike in Nicaragua, the leadership was divided or uncertain 
as to how popular mobilization and armed insurrection might 
be coordinated to deliver a decisive blow to the regime. A 
leader of the Salvadoran left later commented that the radical 
trade unions stood in the forefront of an opposition movement 
which, he claimed, carried with it the potential to seize 
power. He declared, "The revolutionary movement at that time 
had the capacity to paralyse the country without any necessity 
of resorting to military action. Ninety per cent of the trade 
union organisations (organismos gremiales) of the working 
class and the employees were following their instructions."
[37] Accurate or not, this statement nevertheless conveys how 
the Salvadoran labour movement was located at the centre of 
a struggle of revolutionary proportions which compelled the 
regime to resort to the most brutal measures to arrest its 
momentum.
The Popular Democratic Unity fUPD).
As the tide turned against the left AIFLD and the 
moderate unions became more visible. In September 1980 AIFLD 
brought together the UCS, the construction and transport 
federation FESINCONSTRANS, and other moderate unions to form 
the Popular Democratic Unity (Unidad Popular Democratica -UPD)
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as a counterweight to unions supporting the FDR. The UPD 
appeared to follow the lead of the Christian Democrats in the 
junta and was firmly established among beneficiaries of the 
agrarian reform, but it had still to develop its urban base.
[38] AIFLD channeled an estimated $2 million per year of 
mainly U.S. State Department funds into the UPD until late 
1984. As argued in Chapter One, resources of such quantity, 
enhanced still further by the political support of the U.S. 
Embassy and the AFL-CIO, assumed considerable political 
importance, especially in an underdeveloped country with a 
climate of union repression. In El Salvador during late 1980 
this importance was in the process of being reaffirmed. [39] 
In November 1980 the various guerilla organisations, 
having overcome factional differences in May, merged to form 
the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN). The 
component groups were the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) , the 
Peoples Revolutionary Army (ERP), the National Resistance 
(RN) , the Communist Party (PCES) - which now acknowledged a 
need for armed struggle - and the Central American 
Revolutionary Workers Party (PRTC). A similar unity was 
achieved among several of the left unions who formed the 
Committee for Trade Union Unity (Comite de Unidad Sindical 
Salvadorena -CUS), which supported the FDR. [40] In the 
coming years the FDR would act as the political wing of an 
FDR-FMLN alliance while the FMLN waged an ongoing guerilla war 
against the Salvadoran armed forces.
164
In late 1980 the leadership of the FDR were being warmly 
received in the international arena, particularly by the 
Socialist International. However, in November following the 
U.S. presidential election victory of Ronald Reagan, five 
leaders of the FDR were abducted in San Salvador and murdered. 
Ungo, then abroad, became president of the FDR and the rest 
of the FDR leadership went into exile. The junta claimed no 
responsibility for the deaths and blamed extremist groups. 
[41] In December the junta reorganised itself with Duarte 
becoming president and Colonal Abdul Gutierrez, 
Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, becoming 
vice-president.
The "third” junta of Duarte and Gutierrez received $25 
million in economic aid from the U.S. in December as the FMLN 
intensified its military campaign. Also in December four 
North American nuns were raped and murdered by the death 
squads, the news of which triggered opposition from within 
U.S. religious circles to U.S. aid to or military intervention 
in El Salvador. The churches in the U.S. had, decades 
earlier, assisted the consolidation of Cold War ideology 
inside the labour movement with their own variant of 
anti-communism. The changing political climate inside the 
churches, reflected in the growth of anti-interventionism, 
would impinge on the struggle over Central America in the U.S. 
labour movement. (See Chapter Ten.)
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The Sheraton Murders.
An additional development important to the impending 
conflict in the U.S. trade unions over Central America 
occurred on January 4, 1981. Two Americans, Mark Hammer and 
Mark Pearlman, were assassinated in the coffee shop of the 
Sheraton International hotel in San Salvador. Both had been 
working on the agrarian reform program with AIFLD. Rodolfo 
Viera, head of the Agrarian Reform Institute (ISTA) and the 
UCS, was also killed. The incident brought the conflict in 
El Salvador to the attention of a wider section of the U.S. 
labour movement. It also brought attention, however, to 
AIFLD. Until this time the activities of the Institute were 
barely known even by union activists. [42]
The Sheraton incident again aroused suspicions that 
AIFLD worked closely with the CIA? AIFLD*s twenty-year history 
had been replete with accusations of this nature. Solicitor 
General Wade McCree, in an appearance before the U.S. Supreme 
Court ten days after the Sheraton assassinations, commented, 
"...just recently two Americans have been killed in El 
Salvador. Apparently they were some kind of undercover persons 
working under the cover of a labor organization." [43]
The murders themselves were widely attributed to a death 
squad working for opponents of the land reform within the 
oligarchy. Viera was one of 92 UCS officials, and 
innumerable land reform beneficiaries, to perish during 1981 
in the oligarchy's resistance to the reform program.
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Furthermore, the UCS reported more than 25,000 reform 
beneficiaries and sharecroppers had suffered eviction from 
their land by December 1981. [44] Phase II of the land reform 
program - the most critical in that it would have 
redistributed a portion of the oligarchy's coffee-growing 
lands - was thus effectively blocked by the oligarchy from the 
beginning. [45]
The repression of the UCS and the murder of Hammer and 
Perlman demonstrated the extent to which the oligarchy would 
resist the land reform. It also confirmed that the UCS 
constituted a threat to the oligarchy in that it aroused the 
hopes of thousands of land-hungry campesinos. If a limited 
reform was designed to pacify the peasantry it had the 
opposite effect on the landowning class. As mentioned above, 
the scarcity of land in El Salvador ensured that, whatever 
AIFLD's intentions, the UCS would at some stage come into 
conflict with the oligarchy. As one writer commented, "for 
all their money and influence, AIFLD, the U.S. Embassy and the 
CIA operatives who collaborated with the two in overseeing the 
affairs of the UCS were unable to avoid friction with the 
regime...it (the UCS) never developed into the large and 
influential 'yellow union' that the AIFLD, USAID and the CIA 
sought to create." [46]
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The AFL-CIO and U.S. Aid to the Junta.
An AFL-CIO Executive Council resolution in February 1981 
refused to offer unconditional support for the right-wing 
government in El Salvador and rejected the notion, attributed 
to key individuals in the Reagan Administration, that such aid 
would prevent a communist takeover. Future aid, said the 
resolution, should be "conditioned on reciprocal actions to 
bring domestic violence under control and to institute 
democratic reforms that improve the conditions of the 
workers." The AFL-CIO also stipulated that the Salvadoran 
authorities must make genuine efforts to bring to justice 
those responsible for the Sheraton murders. [47]
The following month William Doherty recited the 
Executive Council*s position before a Congressional committee. 
Doherty*s numerous appearances before Congressional committees 
deserve attention for at least two reasons. Firstly, as 
Executive Director of AIFLD, Doherty*s statements amounted to 
the official voice of the AFL-CIO on issues pertaining to 
Latin America and the Caribbean before Congressional circles. 
Secondly, Doherty invariably purported to be speaking not just 
for the AFL-CIO but also on behalf of the "democratic" trade 
union movement active in the country under discussion, thus 
according a single AIFLD official a dual representational 
monopoly. Careful scrutiny of Doherty's testimonies reveal 
a formal loyalty both to AFL-CIO Executive Council statements 
and statements made by leaders of the trade union sector in
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the country being discussed. However, these were frequently 
accompanied by comments which arguably depart from both the 
spirit and the letter of those positions.
Doherty*s remarks on the question of aid to El Salvador 
are a case in point. "Since we are not military men," said 
Doherty, "we do not presume to advise this Committee regarding 
the necessity for military aid. However, as Americans, we are 
deeply concerned with the evidence compiled by the State 
Department which indicates that the guerilla movement, 
dedicated to the overthrow of the reform-minded centrist 
junta, is being supplied with arms by enemies of our 
democratic way of life." [48] It does not seem contentious 
to suggest that Doherty's comments were intended to convince 
Congressional representatives that military aid was indeed 
needed to meet the communist threat, and they partially or 
entirely negated the significance of the terms for such aid 
laid down by the AFL-CIO.
Doherty again drifted from his brief when on another 
occasion he discussed the repression of the UCS. Doherty 
described the agrarian reform as under attack from "the 
oligarchy and their allies on the right and the 
Marxist-Leninist left." However, of the 184 deaths of reform 
beneficiaries and personnel documented by the UCS and 
presented to the Congressional sub-committee by Doherty, none 
were attributed to the guerillas or their supporters. AIFLD*s 
leading spokesperson was prepared to depart from the position 
expressed by the AFL-CIO*s Salvadoran affiliates in order to
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depict the FMLN as a force inflicting the same volume of 
terror on the unarmed Salvadoran population as the death 
squads and their supporters inside the military, a departure 
which again effectively illustrated the need for military aid 
to defeat the guerillas. [49]
The March 1982 Elections.
The March 1982 Legislative Assembly elections in El 
Salvador were interpreted as a major public rejection of the 
military strategy of the FMLN. Some 1.5 million people 
reportedly voted from a total of eligible voters believed to 
be around 2.2 million. The University of Central America, 
however, claimed that no more than 1 million voted and that 
the voting figures were inflated to discredit the FMLN. [50] 
The elections and the purportedly high level of participation 
received loud applause from the U.S. Government, the U.S. 
media, the AIFLD-supported UPD and the AFL-CIO who sent a team 
of observers who testified to the honesty of the electoral 
process.
The AFL-CIO was the only foreign union federation to 
send such a delegation; Latin American and European 
federations declined the invitation. [51] The four-person 
team consisted of three AIFLD officials and Eugenia Kemble, 
special assistant to AFT president Albert Shanker, a leading 
supporter of AIFLD. Doherty testified to the Congressional 
Subcommittee on Foreign Operations that 85% of those eligible
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cast their vote, "in a display of bravery and civic pride that 
captured the hearts of true democrats everywhere in the 
world." The AIFLD official, in common with the Reagan 
Administration^ statements concerning the elections, 
neglected to inform the Committee that voting for the 
elections was compulsory. Doherty also commented, "We all 
sought free elections as a sign that El Salvador was moving 
toward a democratic system of government. This was the 
AFL-CIO*s goal, as it was also the goal of U.S. foreign 
policy." [52]
The elections achieved a number of things for the Reagan 
Administration. Firstly, Congress had been reluctant to 
approve military aid to El Salvador - the horrifying nature 
of the repression was now international news. The elections 
helped dispel concern, in Congress and beyond, that the U.S. 
was intervening to maintain a bloody military regime at war 
with its own people. Secondly, the elections helped 
delegitimize the left in El Salvador in the eyes of Congress. 
The Administration claimed that the guerillas, by rejecting 
invitations to participate in the elections, were confirming 
their totalitarian pedigree by refusing to test their degree 
of support in open democratic contest. The fact that the 
social democratic and left Christian democratic political 
formations (now in the FDR) had once pursued the peaceful 
option, for which they were brutally repressed by the armed 
right, was conveniently forgotten. Thirdly, the creation of 
a "democratic opening" and the perceived motives of the
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guerillas for avoiding the elections dissolved Congressional 
resistance to military aid to El Salvador. [53] In September 
1981 the Senate stipulated that the President provide a 
twice-annual certification of El Salvador's progress toward 
political reforms and human rights. [54]
The plans for elections had been a major factor in the 
Presidential certification of aid in late January 1981, 
despite the announcement by the human rights group Americas 
Watch two days prior to the certification that 3,581 political 
assassinations had occurred in El Salvador in the five months 
leading to the date of certification. [55] Moreover, the 
elections virtually ensured certification for the foreseeable 
future. In February 1982 an executive order from President 
Reagan released $55 million in defence equipment for El 
Salvador. From the outbreak of the civil war until 1985 the 
U.S. would provide $1.7 billion to the Government, Central 
Bank and armed forces of El Salvador. This allowed the 
Salvadoran Army and security forces to grow from 12,000 to 
42,000 in the period 1980-84, when the forces of the FMLN also 
grew from 2-3,000 to 9-11,000. [56]
The UPD and the "Democratic Opening".
The election delivered 24 Assembly seats to Duarte's 
Christian Democrats (40% of the vote), 18 to the right-wing 
ARENA party, 14 to the PCN, and 3 to the minor parties. In 
April ARENA and the PCN used their combined majority to take
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control of the Constituent Assembly and almost immediately 
implemented measures to derail the land reform. Phase II, 
which had never actually commenced, was formally abandoned, 
and the land scheduled to be distributed under Phase III of 
the "Land-to-the-tiller" program was made exempt from the 
reform. These measures were followed by the forced eviction 
of recipients from their newly acquired land. The UCS and the 
UPD put the number of evictions at 12,000. [57]
In May UPD leaders came to Washington to consult with 
AFL-CIO officials and urge Congress to insist that military 
and economic aid to El Salvador would be cut if the land 
reform program was not restarted. From that moment the 
Salvadoran army reportedly began to reinstall evicted land 
reform beneficiaries to their assigned plots. In August 
Doherty appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
accompanied by four UPD leaders. The AFL-CIO and AIFLD, said 
Doherty, had concluded that "undeniable progress" had been 
made in all areas upon which U.S. aid was conditional, with 
only the land reform being problematical. Human rights, 
continued Doherty, had improved and efforts had been made to 
bring to justice those responsible for the Sheraton murders. 
The armed forces were pursuing reform and there had been free 
elections. [58] However, in another such appearance five 
months later Doherty acknowledged that the land reform was 
facing a crisis although in late 1982 the UCS had successively 
encouraged an increased number of campesinos to file 
applications for land. By resisting the land reform, Doherty
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warned, "the retrograde right” were serving "the interests of 
the Marxist-Leninist left." Doherty suggested that the U.S. 
Government could improve the situation by providing fiscal 
compensation to landlords whose land was scheduled for 
redistribution. [59]
During the electoral campaign of March 1982 the UPD 
reportedly employed 400 organisers, paid by AIFLD, to 
encourage the rural population to vote for the Christian 
Democrats. The leaders of the moderate unions, having 
rejected armed struggle, in effect had little option but to 
support Duarte in the hope that the right might eventually be 
brought under control. ARENA now held several important 
government ministries, including the agrarian reform 
institute, ISTA. Ideological differences aside, the prospects 
of a temporary or tactical alliance between the centre unions 
around the UPD and the unions associated with the FDR had been 
precluded by the massive repression of the latter. The UPD, 
however, had the political support of the U.S. Embassy and 
considerable resources made available by AIFLD. Perhaps 
because of this support the UPD pressed its own set of demands 
on the new government and called for human rights violators 
to be punished, UPD representation in the government, dialogue 
with the FDR-FMLN and thoroughgoing economic and political 
reforms. [60]
In February and March 1983 the UPD, encouraged by AIFLD, 
mobilized 10,000 on the streets to support reformists in the 
Constituent Assembly in their bid to prevent ARENA*s annulment
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of the LTTT Phase III of the agrarian reform. The Assembly 
had fallen under the control of ARENA-PCN following the March 
1982 elections, but decisions to halt the land reform had been 
reversed by the reformists in the Assembly who argued, inter 
alia, that the reform was a pragmatic move to ensure 
continuing U.S. aid. PCN defectors from the alliance with 
ARENA altered the balance of power in the Assembly towards the 
Christian Democrats. [61] The UCS mobilization demonstrated 
that the UPD and AIFLD*s objective of establishing moderate 
unions as a counterweight to the right (and the unions close 
to the FDR) would be pursued by occasional displays of rank 
and file support for reforms - and not just by way of a union 
leadership clique seeking favours from, or participation in, 
government ministries. [62]
By mid-1982 the level of assassinations had reportedly 
waned although the army and the death squads continued to 
commit fatal atrocities at the rate of 200-300 per month. 
Americas Watch considered the fall in the level of murders 
reflected the finite number of individuals targeted for 
repression in El Salvador: "It would be the height of
cynicism," it noted, "to interpret such a decline (in 
political murders) as an indication that the government of El 
Salvador has become more respectful of human rights." [63] 
The left federation FENASTRAS recorded 8,329 union members had 
been murdered, abducted, disappeared or wounded from 1979 
through 1981. [64] Unselective annihilation of campesinos by 
the armed forces continued into 1983; in one incident 74 were
175
killed in Sonsonate, 18 of whom were members of the UPD- 
affiliated National Association of Salvadoran Indians 
(Asociacion Nacional Indigena Salvadorena -ANIS). Doherty 
told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August that 
such atrocities could not continue? "the Salvadoran army is 
needed to defeat the guerillas...the U.S. Government must 
pressure the army to clean up its act." [65]
In December 1983 U.S. Vice-President Bush obliged 
Doherty and those sharing this view. In El Salvador Bush 
(using the same phraseology) informed leaders of the 
Salvadoran armed forces that the death squads must be 
controlled. Failure to do so would result in the 
Administration withdrawing its support for the regime. [66] 
Trade union activity in El Salvador remained subdued by 
physical repression and legal constraints. The left unions, 
operating in a clandestine or semi-clandestine fashion, were 
largely limited to public pronouncements against repression 
and in support of trade union unity. In late 1982 the left 
unions reformed under the new name of Labour Unity Movement 
of El Salvador (Movimiento Unitario Sindicalista y Gremail de 
El Salvador -MUSYGES) which replaced the decimated CUS 
coalition constructed by the left unions in the 
pre-revolutionary situation that existed in early 1980. [67] 
MUSYGES immediately began its short life with an attempt to 
unify the Salvadoran labour movement, an initiative rejected 




By late 1983 the magnitude of one of the most bloody 
repressions in postwar history, which had decimated the active 
layers of the left unions and seriously harmed the unions of 
the centre, had become clear. As one source expressed it: 
"The statistics are numbing. Between October 1979 and late 
1983...Tutela Legal tabulated more than 38,000 murders of 
civilian noncombatants by government security forces and 
paramilitary groups associated with them. When the violence 
peaked, as in early 1981, 300 to 500 were killed each week? 
during times of relative "quiet”, as in the last three months 
of 1983, the murders continued at a rate of 120 a week." [69] 
The role of the AFL-CIO in El Salvador, in collaboration 
with the U.S. Embassy and the U.S. Department of State, was 
in all probability partially protective of the moderate unions 
in the UPD when the repression was at its height. Moreover, 
AIFLD*s mobilization of the UCS behind the Christian Democrats 
had probably kept the land reform programme alive and helped 
persuade Congress to take a stronger position towards the 
Salvadoran right on the question of military and paramilitary 
atrocities. Furthermore, AIFLD*s direct and indirect 
influence in El Salvador before the coup of 1979 demonstrated 
an active and enduring commitment to the reformist agenda 
advanced by the Alliance For Progress at a time when a similar 
commitment on the part of U.S. policy makers was noticeably 
lacking. Put another way, AIFLD engaged itself in the active
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struggle for reforms during a period when successive U.S. 
Administrations were more inclined to develop the civil 
security forces in El Salvador under a Public Safety Program 
designed by the CIA, the Green Berets, and the Department of 
State. The Public Safety Program, according to the 
testimonies of numerous Salvadoran military officers, was 
instrumental in building the military and paramilitary 
apparatus (including the civilian counter-insurgency group 
ORDEN) to combat "subversion” in El Salvador. This 
counter-insurgency apparatus was intended to complement the 
initiatives taken towards reforms: the armed forces would
guard against the infiltration of the left, thereby creating 
a more hygienic atmosphere for political and economic 
liberalization. [70] U.S. policy in El Salvador, however, had 
the effect of constructing a military and paramilitary 
apparatus which violently obstructed the AIFLD-UPD reform 
objectives. This contradiction in U.S. policy was expressed 
soon after the inception of the Alliance For Progress by 
radical commentators Lynd and Hayden: "While American Peace 
Corpsmen and aid officials apply their Sisphyean labors in the 
villages, other Americans work among the oligarchs and 
generals to prevent a radical force from emerging. The 
reformer falls." [71]
The consequences of this contradiction unfolded 
dramatically in the period following the coup in 1979. The 
challenge posed by the left prompted the U.S. Government to 
abandon Romero in order to encourage and then support the
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reformist coup, while simultaneously providing the armed 
forces with even greater quantities of military hardware and 
training to defeat the left. While AIFLD openly identified 
with the reform juntas, the Institute played down the extent 
and character of the repression against the left and their 
sympathisers before official AFL-CIO and Congressional 
gatherings. True, AIFLD protested the considerable repression 
of the UCS, but falsely directed equal blame to the guerillas 
on the left and the death squads on the right. The death 
squads, furthermore, were considered to be a minority 
"retrograde” faction of the otherwise reform oriented armed 
forces. In characterising the repression of the UCS in this 
way, AIFLD, through its principal representative William C. 
Doherty, both justified arming the Salvadoran military and 
effectively recommended that the policy continue. While the 
AFL-CIO's Executive Council called for military aid to be made 
conditional on the implementation of reforms and an 
improvement in the human rights situation, AIFLD (echoing the 
Department of State) assured the Council that progress was 
indeed being made in all areas under scrutiny, when, in fact, 
the Salvadoran armed forces continued to exterminate its 
opponents.
AIFLD had once again been an important actor in the 
political affairs of a Latin American country. In Doherty's 
words, the AFL-CIO in El Salvador were playing a role "of 
vital importance in the development of democracy and, by 
extention, to the development of pluralistic societies
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throughout Central and South America." [72] AIFLD, while 
openly identifying with the reform objectives of the 
Department of State, complied, albeit less obviously, with the 
broader counter-insurgency agenda of the U.S. Government as 
managed by the U.S. military and the CIA. As the basic 
contradiction in U.S. policy unfolded in the repression of 
1980-83, AIFLD took its political cue from the Department of 
State by shifting responsibility for the carnage to the 
political extremes, therefore justifying a greater role for 
themselves (and the U.S. Government) as supporters of the 
non-violent centre.
However, the period 1979-83 coincided with mounting 
criticism of U.S. foreign policy inside the U.S. trade unions. 
As this criticism became more developed and spawned its own 
dissident organisational network inside the labour movement, 
the challenge to AIFLD and the Institute's supporters also 
intensified. (See Chapter Four) This developing challenge to 
U.S. policy constituted a significant factor in the revival 
of the left trade unions in El Salvador, a process which began 
in early 1984. As U.S. trade union activists and leaders 
developed their own movement against U.S. intervention they 
forged independent links with several unions known to support 
the FDR. The trade union left in El Salvador now began to see 
the AFL-CIO as an arena where contending forces fought a war 
of position, when hitherto the Federation had been viewed as 
a consistent ally of U.S. imperialism.
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This thesis returns to the situation in the Salvadoran 
labour movement in Chapter Five, Meanwhile, Chapter Three 
will discuss the AFL-CIOfs role in Nicaragua in the period 
preceding and immediately following the Sandinista-led 
insurrection in July 1979.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. Serafino Romualdi, Presidents and Peons;
Recollections of a Labor Ambassador in Latin America (New 
York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1967) Ch.16. p.237. Romualdi noted, 
"If the totalitarians, Communists and Peronistas, have failed 
to gain the enduring alliance of the Central American 
campesinos, it is because they underestimated their natural 
attachment to freedom, even if in their lack of sophistication 
the campesinos do not understand or feel freedom’s true 
spiritual values.” ibid.
2. ibid. pp. 253-4.
3. James McCarger, El Salvador and Nicaragua: The
AFL-CIO Views on the Controversy (Washington, D.C.: 
Department of International Affairs, AFL-CIO, 1985) p.3.
4. During the repression of 1980-83, death squads
displayed a certain fondness for marking the bodies of their 
victims with ’’Remember 1932" and similar words and statements 
which evoked memories of the insurrection. Death squads have 
been known to call themselves Hernandez Martinez Brigades, 
after the military leader who led the Matanza. See, Philippe 
Bourgois, "What U.S. Foreign Policy Faces in Rural El
Salvador: An Eyewitness Account," Monthly Review 34 1 (May 
1982) p.14
5. Carolyn Forche and Philip Wheaton, History and 
Motivations of U.S. Involvement in the Control of the Peasant 
Movement in El Salvador: The Role of AIFLD in the Agrarian 
Reform Process. 1970-1980. (Washington D.C.: Ecumenical 
Program for Interamerican Communication and Action [EPICA], 
1980) p.3.
6 . USAID Project Agreement, AID-ES-26, 1970 & 1972, 
cited by Wheaton and Forche, op. cit. p.8.
7. Philip Wheaton, Agrarian Reform in El Salvador: A 
Program of Rural Pacification (Washington, D.C. EPICA Task 
Force, November, 1980) p.17. AIFLD's expulsion in 1973 is not 
always attributed to the threat to the oligarchy inherent in
181
AIFLD-UCS organizing activities, as claimed by the Institute, 
but to the regimes disapproval at AIFLD's choice for 
in-country director. AIFLD frequently refer to their 
expulsion as a means of refuting the allegation made by their 
left critics that they merely serve the interests of the (in 
this case) Salvadoran oligarchy. If this were so, they argue, 
the Molina regime would not have moved to expel them from the 
country. See Wheaton and Forche, op. cit. pp. 5-8.
8 . Tom Barry and Deb Preusch, Agents as Organizers: 
AIFLD in Central America (Albuquerque, N.M.: Resource Center, 
1987) p.23? Wheaton and Forche, op. cit. p.12.
9. William Bollinger, "El Salvador" in Latin American 
Labor Organizations, eds G. Greenfield and S. L. Maram, 
(Westport CT: Greenwood Press, 1987), Chapter 11, p.315. See 
also Bollinger, El Salvador's Trade Unions: Problems and 
Prospects. A Report from San Salvador (Los Angeles: 
Interamerican Research Center, Sept. 1985)
10. Wheaton and Forche, op. cit. p.11.
11. Robert Armstrong and Janet Shenk, El Salvador: The 
Face of Revolution (Boston: South End Press: 1982), p 33; 
Bollinger "El Salvador," op. cit. p.316.
12. Armstrong and Shenk, op. cit. p.38.
13. ibid. pp.64-67; F. Brodhead and Edward S. Herman,
Demonstration Elections: U.S. Staged Elections in the
Dominican Republic. Vietnam, and El Salvador (Boston: South 
End Press, 1984) pp. 99-100.
14. Bollinger "El Salvador," op. cit. pp. 316-317.
15. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report 
on the Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador Organization 
of American States, 1979 pp.153-156, cited by Brodhead and 
Herman, op. cit. p. 102. For a useful account of the 
ascendancy of the left during this period, see James 
Dunkerley, The Long War: Dictatorship and Revolution in El 
Salvador (London: Verso, 1985) Second Edition, Ch. Six, pp. 
87-102.
16. Brodhead and Herman, op. cit. p.103. "Membership
in ORDEN," suggest the authors, "might mean many things: a
means of survival; a source of petty favors and privileges..in 
exchange for identifying subversives; or the power to dominate 
one's neighbours and settle r personal scores by violence 
without the danger of arrest and prosecution." ibid.
17. Robert Armstrong, "El Salvador: Why Revolution?" 
NACLA Report on the Americas. March-April, 1980, p.23.
18. Broadhead and Herman, op. cit. p.102.
182
19. Forche and Wheaton, op. cit. p.19.
20. For a discussion on the impact of the Sandinista
victory on El Salvador during this period, see Dunkerley, op.
cit. Ch. Eight, pp. 119-131.
21. Stewart Klepper, "The United States in El 
Salvador," Covert Action Information Bulletin. April, 1981 pp. 
4-21? Armstrong and Shenk, op. cit. p.116.
22. Amnesty International, "Report on El Salvador,"
Amnesty International Report 1980 (London: Amnesty
International Publications, 1980) p.133. Cited by Armstrong 
& Shenk, op. cit. pp. 120-21.
23. Armstrong & Shenk, op. cit. 130? Kenneth Sharpe and 
Martin Diskin, "Facing Facts in El Salvador: Reconciliation 
or War," World Policy Journal (Spring 1984) pp. 517-547.
24. ibid. pp. 132-142.
25. Wheaton and Forche, op. cit. p.33.
26. Central America Historical Institute, (CAHI) 
"Agrarian Reform in El Salvador and Nicaragua: Pacification 
or Liberation?" Envio, 3 26 (August 1983) p.46.
27. For further discussion on the proposed land reform, 
see Dunkerley, op. cit. pp. 97-99.
28. Roy L. Prosterman, "Land Reform in South Vietnam: 
A Proposal For Turning the Tables on the Vietcong," Cornell 
Law Review 53 1 (November 1967) pp. 26-44. Prosterman 
apparently worked for the Marcos government in the Philippines 
as a land reform consultant. See Covert Action Information 
Bulletin. April 1981, p.12.
29. Lawrence Z. Simon and James C. Stephens, Jr. El 
Salvador's Land Reform 1980-81 Impact Audit, Oxfam America 
Inc., 1981. Oxfam criticized the LTTT program technically as 
well as politically, LTTT "shows an apparent ignorance of El 
Salvador's agricultural practices..LTTT locks peasants onto 
plots that cannot even provide full subsistence...LTTT must 
be seen as a politically expedient measure..an attempt to 
generate popular support for a faltering regime." ibid. 
pp.55-62.
30. Michael J. Sussman, AIFLD: U.S. Troian Horse in 
Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington, D.C.: Epica 
Special Report, July, 1983) p.16. "Under the guise of a 
purported progressive reform, the result has been the 
systematic slaughter of thousands of unarmed peasants 
including women, children and elderly." ibid.
31. Amnesty International 1980, op. cit. p.135?
183
"Salvadoran Army Steps Up Drive Against Leftists," New York 
Times. March 12, 1980.
32. The Assistant Minister declared, "From the very 
first moment of the implementation of the agrarian reform, 
what we saw was a sharp increase in the official violence 
against the very peasants who were supposed to be the 
beneficiaries..In the last three months, a great number of 
peasants belonging to the agrarian reform sector have been 
killed: likewise several technicians of the Ministry of 
Agriculture and ISTA..These bloody acts have been carried out 
by uniformed men of the National Guard and Treasury Police, 
accompanied by civilians of ORDEN." quoted by Covert Action 
Information Bulletin. April 1981, p.8
33. Bollinger "El Salvador," op. cit. p.319.
34. Broadhead and Herman, op. cit. p.111.
35. Both FTUN and UCS cited by Covert Action 
Information Bulletin, op. cit. p.8. See also AIFLD Report 
March-April 1980 p.4.
36. Armstrong & Shenk, op. cit. p.154.
37. Joaquin Villalobos, Le Monde Diplomatique (Mexico), 
June 1983, interviewed by Marta Harnecker. Translation: 
Militant International Review. (London) Autumn, 1983. p. 19.
38. Bollinger "El Salvador," op. cit. p.319.
39. J. Michael Luhan, "AIFLD's Salvadoran Labor Wars,"
Dissent Summer 1986, p.341.
40. Robin Rosenburg, "Labor in El Salvador," Research 
project on Central American trade unions, Institute of 
Interamerican Studies, Graduate Sch. of International Labor 
Studies, Univ. of Miami, directed by Prof. Jaime Suchlicki and 
Prof. Damian J. Fernandez, p.13, 1985. Unpublished.
41. Armstrong & Shenk, op. cit. pp. 167-173.
42. Fred Hirsch, An Analysis of Our AFL-CIO's Role in 
Latin America. San Jose, Ca., 1974. Typescript.
43. Transcript, Supreme Court, Jan 14, 1981. Cited by 
Covert Action Information Bulletin, op. cit. p.7.
44. Letter Salvadoran Communal Union (UCS) to President 
Jose Napoleon Duarte, December 10, 1981. See also Cynthia 
Arnson, El Salvador: A Revolution Confronts the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: Institute For Policy Studies, 1982) p.77
45. Diskin and Sharpe, op. cit. p. 541.
184
46. Dunkerley, op. cit. p.98.
47. Resolution, cited in AIFLD, U.S. Labors single 
Standard on Dictatorships (Washington D.C.: November 1985) 
p.24. This position was endorsed by the AFL-CIO*s full 
convention in November 1981.
48. Doherty's reference to "evidence compiled by the 
State Department" pertains to a White Paper released in 
February 1981 which described how weapons from the Soviet bloc 
countries found their way to the FMLN via Cuba and Nicaragua. 
Statement of William C. Doherty, Jr., Executive Director, 
AIFLD, Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, on the Situation in El Salvador, U.S. House 
of Representatives, Washington, D.C., March 11, 1981. 
Transcript: AIFLD.
49. UCS, Santa Tecla, El Salvador, TL to AIFLD, 
January 25, 1982; William Doherty, Statement to Foreign 
Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate on the Situation in El 
Salvador, February 8, 1982? Doherty, Statement, before the 
Subcommittee of Inter-American Affairs, U.S. House of 
Representatives, February 25, 1982. Transcripts: AIFLD.
50. Department of Social Sciences, University of 
Central America, March-April, 1982, cited by Americas Watch, 
op. cit. 176; Professor Robert Leikin, testimony before 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, April 1, 1982? cited by 
Americas Watch, Labor Rights in El Salvador. Washington, D.C. 
March 1988, pp. 166-167.
51. Free Trade Union News. April 1982? AIFLD Report. 
March-April 1982.
52. W.C. Doherty, Statement to Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations of the Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of 
Representatives, March 17, 1983, Washington, D.C. Transcript: 
AIFLD.
53. Brodhead & Herman op. cit. p.118.
54. Armstrong and Shenk, op.cit. p.199.
55. Americas Watch cited figures calculated by the 
legal aid office of the Archdiocese of San Salvador, Tutela 
Legal. See Americas Watch Committee & the American Civil 
Liberties Union, Supplement to the Report on Human Rights in 
El Salvador July 20, 1982, p.10.
56. Report to the Arms Control and Foreign Policy 
Caucus, U.S. Aid to El Salvador: An Evaluation of the Past. 
A Proposal For the Future. U.S. Congress, February 1985.
57. Brodhead and Herman, op. cit. p.143.
185
58. W.C. Doherty, Statement to Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, August 3, 1982. Transcript: AIFLD.
59. W.C. Doherty, Statement to the Subcommittee on 
Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, 
February 28th, 1983. pp. 1-14. Transcript: AIFLD.
60. T. Barry and D. Preusch, El Salvador:The Other War 
(Alburqurque, N.M.: Resource Center, 1986) Ch.2 p.43.
61. W.C. Doherty, Statement to Committee on Foreign 
Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Feb. 28, 1983. 
Transcript: AIFLD.
62. W.C. Doherty, Statement to Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations of the Committee of Appropriations, U.S. House of 
Representatives, March 17, 1983. Transcript: AIFLD.
63. Americas Watch, op. cit. pp. 12-14.
64. Processo 3 68 (Feb-April 1982), cited by Americas 
Watch, op. cit. p.122.
65. William Doherty, Statement to Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, August 4, 1983. Transcript: AIFLD.
66. Diskin and Sharpe, op. cit. pp. 517-547.
67. Alfonso Martinez, Coordinator, Comite de Unidad 
Sindical (CUS) Mexico City, TL to David Dyson Coordinator of 
the National Labor Committee (See Ch. Four), May 24, 1983.
See also Bollinger, "El Salvador," op. cit. p.380.
68. Rosenburg op. cit. p.41; Bollinger 1987, op. cit.
p. 381.
69. Diskin and Sharpe, op. cit. p.535.
70. Alan Nairn, "Behind the Death Squads," The 
Progressive. May 1984 pp. 20-24
71. St aught on Lynd and Tom Hayden, The Other Side (New 
York: New American Library, 1967)? See also Michael Parent!,
The Anti-Communist Impulse (New York: Random House, 1968)
p.232.
72. William Doherty, Statement to Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, February 8, 1982. Transcript: AIFLD.
186
CHAPTER 3
THE AFL-CIO AND THE RISE OF THE SANDINISTAS
The revolutionary developments which occurred in El
Salvador in 1979-80, and the AFL-CIO1 s role in those
developments, cannot be fully explained without reference to 
the insurrection which occurred in Nicaragua in 1978-79, an 
event which culminated in the collapse of the Somoza dynasty 
after 43 years of dictatorial rule. The successful 
insurrection in Nicaragua accelerated the movement against the 
Romero regime in El Salvador, leading to the reformist coup 
of October 1979 and a period of intense activity on the part 
of AIFLD in the implementation of the land reform and, later, 
in the development of a bloc of unions which rejected
revolutionary alternatives in favour of promised reforms.
The final overthrow of Somoza was accomplished by the 
armed combattants of the Sandinista National Liberation Front 
(Frente Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional -FSLN) supported by 
a mass insurrection and general strike in the major cities. 
The events were only partially coordinated by the FSLN*s 
military command and urban cadre; many of the actions which 
led to the fall of Somoza were of a spontaneous character. 
The mass participation of the Nicaraguan working class,
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peasantry, and urban petit-bourgeois in the physical removal 
of the regime gave the Nicaraguan revolution a peculiar 
vitality, a factor which has contributed to the revolutions 
distinct appeal to left-liberals and radicals in the United 
States and throughout the world. [1]
For the conservative wing of the AFL-CIO leadership, 
however, the only acceptable form of social transformation - 
the gradual liberalization, of the regime leading to 
full-fledged democracy - had manifestly failed to occur? now 
the door was open, it was feared, for the revolutionary left 
to transform the country into a satellite of the Soviet Union. 
It was hoped that the "democratic" trade unions supported by 
AIFLD would now obstruct the radical agenda of the 
Sandinistas, as had been achieved in other Latin American 
countries in the post-war period (See Chapter One).
The AFL-CIO Executive Council and the full Convention 
in 1979, however, openly applauded Somoza's demise. Moreover, 
the AFL-CIO declared it was "ready to assist..the rebuilding 
of that nation (Nicaragua) and of the trade unions through a 
crash program that will contribute to the development of 
strong workers and campesino unions." [2] The AFL-CIO's offer 
indicated that, in its own view, the Federation's State 
Department-financed intervention in Nicaragua was of pivotal 
political significance to the entire continent: "The
assistance of the AFL-CIO is essential to the maintenance and 
further development of a free, democratic, labor movement in 
the Americas." [3]
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U.S. Intervention and the Somoza Era.
The history of Nicaragua in the twentieth century is a 
history of U.S. intervention. In 1909, the U.S. sent troops 
in support of a successful attempt to remove Jose Santos 
Zelaya whose Liberal government had engaged in talks with 
various European countries over the possible construction of 
a inter-oceanic canal. This challenged the perceived right 
of the U.S. to determine events on the American continent - 
the Monroe Doctrine - thus prompting a show of U.S. military 
force in favour of the Conservative opposition in Nicaragua. 
From 1912 to 1925, and from 1926 to 1933, Nicaragua was 
occupied by U.S. Marines, a measure which secured U.S. control 
over the nation's banks, custom houses, foreign investment, 
and canal options. [4]
U.S. intervention sustained Conservative governments in 
Nicaragua throughout this period, but it also inspired 
resistance. An armed nationalist, anti-imperialist guerilla 
force emerged under the leadership of Augusto Cesar Sandino, 
which caused the Marines to withdraw from the country in 1933. 
Before their departure, the Marines established the National 
Guard under the leadership of Anastasio Somoza Garcia. The 
Guard assassinated Sandino, routed the guerillas, and seized 
power in 193 6 - the first year of the Somoza dynasty which 
would be toppled by the latter-day followers of Sandino in 
1979. [5]
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This historical sketch is essential if the AFL-CIO's 
role in Nicaragua - and Nicaraguans impact on the AFL-CIO - 
is to be fully understood. The legacy of U.S. military and 
political intervention in Nicaragua, especially given the 
recorded brutality of the Marines and the U.S.- supported 
Somoza dictatorship, provided a deep seedbed for anti- 
Americanism in Nicaragua and therefore seriously undermined 
the reform objectives of AIFLD and the Alliance For Progress.
AIFLD in Nicaragua.
By the time AIFLD entered Nicaragua in 1965, Luis Somoza 
Debayle - son of Anastasio - had developed his own method of 
dealing with the trade unions. In the Somoza tradition, 
important sections of the small trade union body were co-opted 
with promises of limited reform. [6] The unions which 
supported the pro-Soviet Nicaraguan Socialist Party (Partido 
Socialista de Nicaragua -PSN) registered their support for 
Somoza as a measure of commitment to Moscow*s policy of 
anti-fascist unity during World War Two. With the onset of 
the Cold War, Somoza repressed the PSN and its supporters in 
the unions. Towards the end of the 1950s only 4% of the 
economically active workforce was unionised. [7] By the early 
1960s, using a combination of co-option and repression, Somoza 
seemed to be well in control of the trade unions. The General 
Confederation of Workers (Confederacion General de 
Trabajadores -CGT) had been co-opted and corrupted, and the
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remainder of the labour movement was repressed. [8]
In 1959 the AFL-CIO Executive Council made clear its
*
%
belief that the Somoza regime was incubating revolution and 
urged the trade unions in Nicaragua to support "democratic 
forces inside and outside the country to solve peacefully the 
political crisis caused by the continued existence of 
Somoza...If they continue to passively support the status quo, 
the democratic unions of Nicaragua will leave the field open 
to the manoeuvering of Communists.” [9]
At the following Convention in 1961 the Executive 
Council applauded the support registered by the non-communist 
unions in Nicaragua for the Alliance For Progress. The EC 
expressed an unqualified belief in the remedial powers of the 
Alliance, which, it predicted, would bring about nothing less 
than "a peaceful transition from a dictatorship to a 
democracy, thus avoiding violent upheavals which might be 
exploited by communists and other anti-democratic elements to 
seize power.” [10] Approximately two decades later, the 
AFL-CIO would express anguish that the scenario they believed 
had been averted - violent revolution leading to a seizure of 
power by the left - was indeed being played out.
The arrival of AIFLD, however, coincided with a period 
of limited industrialisation in Nicaragua, bringing with it 
a significant upturn in trade union organizing. The level of 
the economically active population in unions reached 10%. [10]
The Council of Union Unification (Consejo de Unificacion 
Sindical -CUS) became the union formation supported by AIFLD
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and affiliated to the ICFTU's regional organ, the ORIT 
(Organizacion Regional Interamericana de Trabajadores - See 
Chapter One) . Indeed, with CUS's affiliation in 1962 ORIT now 
had an affiliate federation in every country in Latin America, 
a fact which testified to the institutional hegemony of the 
unions who maintained formal links with the AFL-CIO and 
espoused an unambiguous opposition to communism.
The Confederation of Union Unification (CUS).
The record of the CUS from the time of its formation 
until the fall of Somoza conforms to the pattern preferred by 
the AFL-CIO and AIFLD, that is, it pursued policies which 
avoided open confrontation with the regime and was fervently 
anti-communist. This moderate stance towards the state 
authorities and the employers was motivated by a belief that 
political and economic reforms were possible, even imminent, 
when capitalist development in Nicaragua was fully 
consolidated. In the interim, the CUS sought recognition from 
the regime as a legitimate and unthreatening entity clearly 
different from other workers' organisations who espoused and 
pursued class-struggle doctrines.
While this overall orientation determined that a certain 
similarity existed between, say, the CUS and the Salvadoran 
campesino union UCS established by AIFLD in 1967, there are 
also important differences reflecting the peculiar character 
of the respective regimes and the sectors of the workforce
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organised. As discussed in Chapter Two, the high level of 
population density and the concomitant scarcity of land in El 
Salvador ensured that the UCS's project to win land reform 
reflected the genuine (and urgent) needs of the campesino 
population, notwithstanding the non-confrontational stance of 
the UCS. This fact alone made it extremely likely that the 
UCS would develop into a vibrant organisation which was 
eventually attacked by the landowning oligarchy and their 
supporters. In the case of the CUS in Nicaragua, which 
organised mainly service economy workers such as waiters, 
taxi-drivers, airline workers, (although banana workers and 
longshoremen were also organised by the CUS) a relatively 
stable and comfortable relationship between the CUS and the 
regime became established. Indeed, the CUS has been accused 
of holding one of its conventions in a Somoza family mansion 
and of inviting Somoza's labour minister to the event. [12] 
The apparent lack of conflict between CUS and Somoza, 
compounded by the moderate reformist ideology both of the CUS 
leadership and that of its U.S. sponsors, helped ensure that, 
when other groups of workers moved into action against the 
dictatorship in the 1970s, the CUS continued to espouse 
"non-political" trade unionism. AIFLD, as late as 1977, 
expressed an undaunted faith in its gradualist perspective for 
the CUS, and therefore looked upon its work in Nicaragua with 
some satisfaction. The Institute reported, "AIFLD's role 
during this period (1964-76) has...been responsible for the 
fact that a majority of organized workers are now represented
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by democratic trade unions.” [13] The Institute had "trained 
a great number of trade unionists who are now holding 
positions of responsibility in the democratic trade union 
movement." [14] Collective bargaining agreements at this 
point numbered 118, compared to only three that existed in 
1964. AIFLD was confident of a gradual improvement in the 
performance and size of the democratic trade unions. AIFLD's 
accounting budget for Nicaragua between 1976-81 was projected 
to be $149,000, a figure that would be radically adjusted 
upward following the unanticipated fall of Somoza in 1979. 
While some mild criticisms of the regime and its puppet 
federation the CGT were registered, AIFLD was satisfied with 
the steady progress of the CUS and the "democratic" unions 
within the established political framework. It is both 
significant and revealing that AIFLD considered that the 
principal problem for the CUS came not from the dictatorship 
but from its challengers. As AIFLD expressed it, "The united 
and militant actions of he leftist (union) confederations is 
a continuous threat to the survival of free and democratic 
trade unionism." [15]
The Left Unions.
In the 1960s the left in Nicaragua was divided over the 
question of armed struggle in much the same way as the left 
in El Salvador, and, indeed, throughout many areas of Latin 
America and the neocolonial world. [16] Several Nicaraguan
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unions and political formations rejected the economism of the 
pro-Soviet PSN (Nicaragua’s CP) in favour of Castroite 
positions which promoted guerilla war. Unlike the Salvadoran 
Communist Party (PCES), which eventually joined the armed 
struggle (the first Communist Party in Latin America to 
clearly depart from the popular front electoralism preferred 
by Moscow) , the PSN withheld its support for the guerilla 
strategy employed by the FSLN against Somoza, preferring a 
"national unity" option under the leadership of the so-called 
patriotic bourgeoisie. [17] This separation of the 
Moscow-line PSN from the FSLN persisted after 1979, a division 
to which opponents of U.S. intervention frequently made 
reference as a way of illustrating the indigenous, 
nationalistic, and nonaligned character of the Sandinista 
revolution. The opponents of the FSLN within the U.S., 
however, depicted the PSN-FSLN separation as nothing but a 
tactic preferred by Moscow to create precisely that 
impression. [17]
The organisation which later became the FSLN was formed 
in 1959, but it, too, became divided over the question of 
armed struggle. Three tendencies emerged, one of which was 
the Proletarian Tendency which rejected both the economism of 
the PSN and the guerillaist program of the other FSLN 
factions, preferring instead to develop a revolutionary 
strategy among the organisations of the urban working class, 
particularly the trade unions. The Proletarian Tendency's 
work in the unions is frequently regarded as an important
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factor in securing the FSLN's support among urban workers 
during and following the insurrection of 1978-79, and in 
ensuring the hegemony of the FSLN over the labour movement 
thereafter. [19]
The devastating earthquake of 1972 was followed by 
serious political aftershocks. The redirection of
international relief aid into the bank accounts of the 
regime's officials was one is.sue which helped trigger a wave 
of industrial militancy by the left unions. In 1973 the 
Democratic Union of Liberation (Union Democratica de 
Liberacion -UDEL) was formed by leaders of the anti-Somoza 
bourgeoisie, winning the support of the trade unions close to 
the Moscow-line PSN. These unions formed a federation known 
as the General Confederation of Workers-Independent 
(Confederacion General de Trabajadores-Independiente -CGT-i), 
that is, "independent" of the Somoza-controlled CGT. The 
"social Christian" Workers Central of Nicaragua (Central de 
Trabajadores de Nicaragua -CTN) was also part of UDEL during 
this period but became opponents of the FSLN following the 
consolidation of the revolution under Sandinista direction. 
The CUS, alone with Somoza's CGT, were the only union 
federations not included in the UDEL. [20]
At this stage, then, the FSLN was only a component part 
of the broad opposition to Somoza, which included political 
parties and trade unions of the centre, centre-right, and 
business organisations. The latter opposed Somoza's 
preponderant political and economic position in Nicaragua (the
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Somoza family owned roughly one quarter of the country's 
cultivated land) which, compounded by the regime's corruption, 
they believed retarded national development within a 
capitalist framework.
In the mid-1970s the FSLN increased its armed 
operations, with the Proletarian Tendency securing 
organisational gains in the urban areas. By 1978 the 
Nicaraguan revolution had reached a critical stage.
Trade Unions and the Insurrection.
The dramatic events during the weeks and months leading 
to the fall of Somoza cannot be fully conveyed or discussed 
here. However, it is necessary to stress the degree of 
popular participation, much of it spontaneous, which, 
complemented by the guerilla actions of the FSLN, overthrew 
Somoza. It is also necessary to remark on the enormous loss 
of life - an estimated 55,000 - that was incurred during the 
insurrectionary period. As Somoza fled Nicaragua, he ordered 
his airforce to dispatch its bombs on the working class 
districts of Managua, thus inflating the number of dead and 
injured, and inflicting enormous infrastructural damage on 
the capital city.
As the trade unions in Nicaragua entered the 
insurrectionary year of 1979, the UDEL had become part of a 
larger Broad Opposition Front (Frente Amplio -FAO). The FAO 
had called two general strikes in August and September 1978
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and a third in June 1979. [21] Meanwhile, in July 1978 the 
FSLN formed the United People's Movement (Movimiento Pueblo 
Unido -MPU) which was supported by some left trade unions. 
The FAO, and thus the anti-Somoza bourgeoisie, continued to 
influence the direction of the movement against the
dictatorship. In August 1978 the FAO called a general strike 
which was supported by the CGT-I, CTN, and the CUS. [22] 
Towards the end of 1978, however, the FAO supported a proposal 
for the U.S. to mediate between Somoza and the opposition 
movement to help secure a transfer of power.
Clearly, the anti-Somoza bourgeoisie viewed with 
trepidation the increasing militancy of the movement and the 
emerging power of the FSLN. The proposal to involve the U.S. 
as a mediator instigated a decisive realignment of the
anti-Somoza forces, effectively handing over leadership to the 
FSLN. The CGT-I and the CTN left the FAO to join the 
FSLN-supported MPU, leaving the CUS, who had been the last of 
the bona fide trade union federations to register opposition 
to the regime, as the only union formation formally aligned
to the bourgeois opposition to Somoza. The alliance with the
Nicaraguan bourgeois and clear opposition to the FSLN marked 
the distinctive features of the CUS's political orientation 
following the fall of Somoza.
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The Transformation of the Nicaraguan Labour Movement:.
The fall of Somoza on 19 July, 1979, transformed 
political relations in Nicaragua. One of the most visible and 
significant consequences of this transformation was the rapid 
growth of trade unions identifying with the FSLN. In the 
period immediately following the insurrection the Sandinista 
Workers Central (Central Sandinista de Trabajadores -CST) 
became the country's principal union federation, with the 
pro-Sandinista Association of Rural Workers (Asociacion de 
Trabajadores del Campo -ATC) becoming the largest union 
formation in the countryside. Other significant union sectors 
identifying with the Sandinistas were the Federation of Health 
Workers (Federacion de Trabajadores de la Salud -FETSALUD), 
the Nicaraguan Press Union (Union de Periodistas Nicaraguenses 
-UPN), the public employees' federation, the National Union 
of Employees (Union Nacional de Empleados -UNE), and the 
National Association of Nicaraguan Educators (Asociacion 
Nacional de Educadores Nicaraguenses -ANDEN). Later, in 1981, 
the National Union of Farmers and Cattlemen (Union Nacional 
de Agricultures y Ganaderos -UNAG) emerged as a pro-Sandinista 
organisation representing small farmers. [23]
Commentators both critical and supportive of the Sandinistas 
agreed that the unions identifying with the FSLN quickly 
established a clear numerical superiority over the combined 
forces of the pre-1979 union federations. [24] By 1983 the 
CST claimed 111,498 members, the ATC claimed 40,000, and the
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other pro-Sandinista federations, UNE, ANDEN, FETSALUD, and 
UPN, claimed 57,299 between them. Excluding the small 
property owners in UNAG, the Sandinista unions claimed a total 
membership of just over 200,000. The overall level of 
unionisation rose ninefold from 27,000 in July 1979 to 233,000 
in December 1983. [25]
The federations which existed under Somoza, with the 
exception of Somoza's CGT (which disintegrated), continued to 
function following the insurrection. The Moscow-line PSN's 
federation, the CGT-I, maintained a significant base in the 
urban sector, claiming 17,000 members in 1983. Two smaller 
federations, the Confederation of Action and Labor Union 
Unification (Central de Accion y Unidad Sindical -CAUS) and 
the Workers Front (Frente Obrero -FO), maintained positions 
to the left of the Sandinista unions. On the right of the 
Nicaraguan labour movement stood the CTN and the CUS. The 
eleven trade union federations, each embracing a distinct 
political ideology, suggested that a genuine pluralism 
prevailed in the Nicaraguan labour movement during the early 
years of the revolution. However, frequently intense 
rivalries developed as the pro-Sandinista federations 
attempted to steer the labour movement behind FSLN positions.
Stripped to basics, the FSLN and the unions which 
supported it set as their objective the unity of the labour 
movement around an agenda which sought trade union 
participation in economic recovery, workplace discipline, and 
the prevention of strikes. Trade unionism which advanced the
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interests of one sector of workers without regard for the 
broader economic and political consequences was opposed. This 
"productionist" perspective provoked opposition from the 
unions to the left of the FSLN which believed that, until the 
economic power of the bourgeoisie had been expropriated, the 
working class should pursue trade unionism appropriate to an 
intense - and unfinished - class struggle situation. Indeed, 
Sandinista union leaders in the CST had themselves questioned 
the wisdom of leaving much of the country's production and 
distribution under private ownership and, particularly during 
the early post-insurrection period, urged the FSLN to move 
decisively against the bourgeoisie as a class. [26] In the 
rural sector, the FSLN discouraged worker militancy as a means 
to appease certain private producers - a policy which caused 
the pro-Sandinista peasants' union, the ATC, to lose some 
popularity. [27] The ATC responded by mobilizing its members 
to secure government confiscation of non-Somoza farms which 
its members had taken over. While agreeing to this demand, 
the FSLN strongly urged that no further takeovers of private 
farms occur. The ruling party remained committed to a mixed 
economy which ensured economic space for the "patriotic" 
bourgeoisie. [28]
The FSLN's productionist perspective also provoked 
opposition from the CUS who felt that the policies of the FSLN 
compromised both their political independence and their 
actions in the workplace. In the period that lay ahead the 
CUS would display a political militancy which stood in
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complete contrast to its accommodation of the Somoza regime. 
One writer close to the situation recorded: "For the other 
(non-Sandinista) trade unions, independent of their left or 
right wing political sympathies, the struggle centred on 
economic demands, confronting the revolutionary state as if 
it were the new boss or owner. This consumed the tremendous 
energies of the labour movement without putting forth any 
solutions to the crucial question of what role workers should 
play in the new society heralded by the revolutionary 
triumph." [29]
The challenge of the non-Sandinista trade unions to the 
new government was quite formidable. The Sandinistas needed 
to intervene in order to contain a wave of land takeovers and 
factory occupations by sections of the urban and rural 
workforce. In as much as the left union federations,
particularly the FO and CAUS, supported these popular actions, 
many of the Sandinistas' early battles were with what they 
described as the "ultra-left". [30] The struggle against the 
left was an integral part of the FSLN's effort to win the 
cooperation of sections of the anti-Somoza bourgeoisie in the 
project of economic recovery and resulted in a government ban 
on factory occupations and strikes introduced in September 
1981. Indeed, key figures in the bourgeois opposition to 
Somoza had been invited to take positions in the new 
"Government of National Reconstruction", including businessman 
Alfonso Robelo who played a leading role in the FAO and would 
later become politically associated with certain trade union
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leaders in the U.S. (See Chapter Six) .
A struggle also ensued between the revolutionary 
government and the sector of the trade union movement standing 
to its right. In this conflict the main Sandinista 
federation, the CST, became the arch rival of the CUS. The 
AIFLD-supported federation, having distinguished itself by 
being the only union federation formally linked the 
anti-Somoza bourgeoisie, quickly became accused of being a 
front for the CIA in Nicaragua. [31] The CUS countered the 
allegations by presenting itself as a legitimate part of the 
anti-Somoza opposition, pointing to their participation in the 
1978 strikes against Somoza and to the fatal shooting of their 
leader, Luis Medrano Flores, in Managua during January 1979.
As early as August 1979 the CUS began to document cases 
of FSLN-inspired disruption of its activities. The CUS 
complained that armed members of the FSLN had harassed their 
leaders and that FSLN commanders in the port town of Corinto 
and Chinandega were accusing the CUS leaders of being 
imperialists and counter-revolutionaries. In November, 
however, the CUS responded positively to the CST's call for 
trade union federations to unite in one national 
confederation. The call for unity resulted in the formation 
of the Nicaraguan Trade Union Coordinating Council 
(Coordinadora Sindical de Nicaragua -CSN). [32] The CUS
joined the CSN, but withdrew after only one month. Of the 
eleven major union federations in Nicaragua only the CUS and 
the CTN distanced themselves from the CST's unity initiative?
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the left federations chose to participate while maintaining
their independent identity and political positions.
Furthermore, the CUS was the only major union federation not
to sign the Pronunciamiento Coniunto (Joint Announcement) ,
which called for a Council of State, a national forum
representing all political parties and trade union, women's,
youth, etc., to be established in May, 1980. [33]
Nevertheless, the trade .union federations accorded
representative status on the Council of State included the
CUS and the CTN with 1 seat each, the Sandinista federations
CST, ATC, FETSALUD, occupied a total of 7 seats, the CGT-I
(Moscow communist) 2 seats, and the left federation CAUS had
2 seats. Trade unions, therefore, occupied a total of 13 of
the Council of State's 51 seats. [34]
By early 1980 the CUS complained that their leaders in
Leon had been subject to arrests. For the AFL-CIO the FSLN's
actions against the CUS provided an explanation for the latter
federation's poor performance in contests with the CST,
resulting in a fall in CUS membership from 12,000 in late 1979
to approximately 2,000 in 1983. [35] In October 1980 the CST
decided, after some debate, to affiliate to the pro-Soviet
World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) based in Prague. [36]
This affiliation, together with the incidents of harassment 
*
reported by the CUS, led the AFL-CIO leadership to shift 
decisively against the Sandinistas. By the AFL-CIO's full 
Convention in 1981 the Executive Council accused the 
Sandinistas of using totalitarian methods in "their efforts
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to silence all democratic opposition.” [37]
At this stage the CUS's links to the AFL-CIO had clearly 
affected its political fortunes. The AFL-CIO's Department of 
International Affairs (DIA) and AIFLD viewed the CUS as a 
rearguard defense against communism and funneled resources to 
the federation that, while in proportion to the political 
tasks ahead, appeared completely disproportionate to the CUS's 
tiny membership. As one source noted, "Immediately after the 
FSLN's triumph, AIFLD dramatically stepped up its funding of 
the CUS. In late 1979, AID (the Agency for International 
Development -a U.S. Government agency) granted AIFLD $500,000 
for projects strengthening free labor and related 
organizations in the Caribbean area and Nicaragua.1" [38] In 
April 1981, "AIFLD's Nicaraguan operations were bolstered by 
another AID grant of $350,000 ‘to establish a 
union-cooperative alliance responsive to the needs of 
unsalaried workers'" [39] This financial support sustained 
the CUS, but it also subjected the federation to constant 
attacks by the Sandinista press and the unions under 
Sandinista leadership. The Sandinista inspired campaign 
against the CUS resulted in the expulsion of AIFLD's 
representative in Managua in 1981 and the closure of AIFLD's 
office in Managua in June 1983. [40]
These events layed down the battle lines between AIFLD 
and the DIA on the one hand and the Sandinista government on 
the other. For a significant section of U.S. trade union 
activists and lower-level leadership, however, the fall of
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Somoza and the social programs and overall pro-labour 
orientation of the Sandinistas were causes for celebration, 
not condemnation. Thus, another set of battle lines was being 
drawn, this time between the labour movement's Cold War 
foreign policy establishment and their supporters on the one 
hand, and those who felt the Nicaraguan revolution deserved 
more support than criticism on the other.
Covert War: The CIA, the Contras. and the International Labour 
Movement.
In the period when the DIA and AIFLD had successfully 
steered the leaders of the AFL-CIO behind a policy hostile to 
Sandinista rule in Nicaragua, the U.S. Government had begun 
its own hostilities against the revolutionary government. The 
shattered remnants of Somoza's National Guard, who fled the 
country in 1979, had now regrouped and were ready to embark 
on a military campaign to overthrow the Sandinistas. The new 
U.S. Administration under the leadership of President Reagan 
immediately implemented measures to assist the military 
capabilities of the former Guardsmen who had established bases 
in Honduras. In March 1981 the President secretly endorsed 
the CIA's plan to extend its activities in Central America, 
which, by the end of the year, had resulted in a $20 million 
programme to arm and train the rebels - now referred to as 
contras inside Nicaragua - culminating in their first major 
military assault inside Nicaraguan territory in December. [41]
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In 1987 former contra leader, Edgar Chammorro, described 
how the early platforms of the disparate rebels focused on 
'•the importance of private property and a return to the 
earlier economic privileges and investment opportunities of 
the old Nicaragua. They emphasised classic capitalist 
principles (.)11 [42] Under CIA direction, claimed Chammorro, 
the contras discontinued espousing a return to Somocism and 
instead characterised themselves as a force fighting the 
sovietization of Nicaragua, an anti-communist army, in order 
to win the support of Congress and to intimidate potential 
supporters of the Sandinistas in the U.S. [43] Indeed, the
CIA, according to Chammorro, restructured the contra
leadership, giving positions to prominent figures in the 
anti-Somoza bourgeoisie. Thus the Directorate of the contras 
included figures like Adolfo Calero, who had led the business 
opposition to Somoza in 1978, and Enrique Bermudez, a National 
Guard Colonel [44]. By late 1982 the CIA was working to win 
broad-based support for the contras. who were now using the 
name Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democratica
Nicaraguense -FDN) in the U.S.
The CIA's promotion of the FDN as a an anti-communist 
group struggling for democracy was clearly designed to appeal 
to a broad segment of political opinion in the U.S. The 
AFL-CIO leadership was already anti-Sandinista; it seems 
highly plausible to suggest that the CIA anticipated a firm 
endorsement of the FDN from the AFL-CIO, especially as AFL-CIO 
foreign policy had in the past concurred and perhaps actively
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cooperated with CIA objectives.
The CIA also directed the FDN towards the Socialist 
International, whose relationship to the social democratic 
national union federations by way of party-union affiliations 
raised the possibility of influencing the ICFTU. This 
initiative was particularly important since the AFL-CIO had 
disaffiliated from the ICFTU in 1969 over the latter*s more 
conciliatory position regarding relationships with trade union 
federations in the Eastern bloc. Thus, the AFL-CIO*s 
formidable conservative presence was now missing from the 
ICFTU and this aided the consolidation of pro-Sandinista 
sentiment. Chammorro, then a member of the FDN Directorate, 
recalled a meeting with the CIA: "In January (1983), the CIA 
brought people from Washington and Miami to brief us on the 
Socialist International...The SI had a meeting coming up in 
Australia, and it was the CIA*s idea that we could approach 
them with the apparently sincere concern that the Sandinistas 
were aligned to the Soviet Union." The S.I. leaders, however, 
refused to meet with the FDN. [43]
The S.I. had been swift to extend support initially to 
the bourgeois opposition to Somoza in the form of UDEL and 
FAO, and later, in November 1978, to the FSLN. Following the 
Sandinista victory the S.I. called for aid to Nicaragua and 
established a Committee for the Defence of the Revolution in 
Nicaragua' under the presidency of Spanish Prime Minister, 
Felipe Gonzales. Other members included Willie Brandt, Olaf 
Palme, Francois Mitterand and Michael Manley. [44] Until the
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CIA-FDN initiative in 1983 only the Venezuelan social 
democratic party, Accion Democratica. and social democratic 
parties in the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica protested the
S.I.'s support for the Sandinistas, who they considered to be 
pro-Soviet. [45] However, other sources cited the opposition 
of Portugal's leading social democrat Mario Soares to the 
Sandinistas in early 1981. [46]
The AFL-CIO1s re-affiliation to the ICFTU in 1982 
introduced another variable in the S . 1. 1 s controversy over the 
Sandinistas. The leading European social democratic parties 
supported the FSLN, but Nicaragua*s affiliate to the ICFTU was 
the CUS, backed wholeheartedly by the AFL-CIO, both of whom 
were strongly anti-Sandinista. As a result the CUS found 
itself, as one writer expressed it, "at the center of a 
profound crisis in the Socialist International over the true 
nature of the Sandinista regime. The Social Democratic union 
organizations remain divided over support for the CUS, 
especially after having embraced the FSLN government as the 
true champions of the workers in Nicaragua." [47]
The fairly deep pro-FSLN sentiment within the S.I. and 
the ICFTU can be explained in several ways. Firstly, the 
anti-Soviet premises upon which the ICFTU was established 
during the Cold War period had become diluted in the era of 
detente. Secondly, the interventionist role of the U.S. in 
Vietnam and in other areas of the neocolonial world and the 
destabilisation of reformist governments like that of 
Allendes Chile and, to a lesser extent, Jamaica under Michael
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Manley (whose own reputation in the S. I. had perhaps been 
enhanced by his struggle with the International Monetary Fund 
during the 1976-80 period) had tilted international social 
democracy into a posture much more critical of U.S. foreign 
policy. [48] Thirdly, as regards Nicaragua, the barbarity of 
the Somoza regime, itself backed by the U.S., inevitably 
accorded great prestige to the force which brought about its 
downfall. Fourthly, the FSLN's program of political 
pluralism, a mixed economy, and a non-aligned foreign policy, 
and their efforts towards promoting health and literacy among 
the Nicaraguan poor somewhat overshadowed the question of the 
FSLN's apparent fondness for the Soviet Union and Cuba. 
Moreover, in the area of trade unionism the credibility of 
the CUS in the eyes of many affiliates to the ICFTU had been 
seriously impaired by its accomodationist stance towards the 
Somoza regime, the growth of the trade union movement since 
the Sandinistas came to power and the political alliance of 
the CUS with Nicaraguan business interests.
Another significant factor pertained to the reputation 
of the AFL-CIO in international social democratic trade union 
politics. During the 1970s the S.I. began promoting a more 
elaborate and distinct policy towards the third world. Some 
of the S.I.'s main formulations were embraced in the Brandt 
Report of 1980, which expressed concern at the striking 
disparity between rich and poor countries - the much discussed 
"north-south" divide. This analysis, derivative of dependency 
theory, marked a significant departure from the orthodox
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developmentalism accepted - and favoured - by AIFLD and the 
DIA. The AFL-CIO*s position, while critical of the 
multinationals for not respecting trade unionism outside the 
U.S., rejected any theory which characterised the U.S. as an 
imperialist power either in an economic or political sense. 
The Brandt analysis bordered on such a conclusion and 
therefore contained an anti-Americanism unacceptable to the 
DIA and the AFL-CIO*s foreign policy establishment.
As Latin America entered an economic downturn in 
1980-81, leading to falling living standards, the debt crisis 
and IMF-imposed austerity measures, the Latin American section 
of the ICFTU, the ORIT, began to talk more in the language of 
Brandt and the S.I. Voices were raised within ORIT which 
urged the AFL-CIO to rejoin the ICFTU so that the 
international labour movement could be better equipped to 
respond to the economic crisis. Furthermore, in 1981, during 
ORIT's 10th Congress in Canada, 0RIT*s relationship to the 
AFL-CIO, and with it the role of AIFLD, became a focus of 
criticism. The statement adopted by the Congress referred to 
the "progressive deterioration...of ORIT's image" because 
workers perceived the organisation to be an accomplice in the 
pursuit of U.S. foreign policy. In a transparent attack on 
AIFLD, ORIT declared that, "Authentic solidarity (came from 
the union movement) without any kind of contribution from 
governments and/or employers and their corporations." [49]
In 1982, perhaps wishing to intercept an even deeper 
crisis in ORIT, the AFL-CIO rejoined the ICFTU. Moreover, the
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challenge in ORIT coincided with the AFL-CIO1s decision to 
remove from AIFLD's board of trustees representatives of U.S. 
capital with interests in Latin America. The break with this 
two-decade practice was itself amicable. J. Peter Grace of 
the W.R. Grace Company remarked that a "friendly and 
supportive" relationship would continue between AIFLD and the 
business sector. [50]
In November 1982 officials from ORIT, the ICFTU and the 
AFL-CIO visited Managua and voiced their concern over the 
welfare of the CUS. [51] Despite this protest, criticism of 
the Sandinistas within the ICFTU remained generally muted. 
As the covert war against Nicaragua intensified, ICFTU 
criticisms began to focus more on the government in Washington 
than the one in Managua. The FDN1 s direct approach to the
S.I. had failed, cordoning off any FDN contact with the ICFTU 
through this means. However, the AFL-CIO remained an 
important arena of struggle as far as support for the FDN 
contras was concerned. If the FDN could win the chief 
representatives of the U.S. labour movement to a pro-contra 
position, this would influence Congress and lead, perhaps, to 
an anti-Sandinista counter-attack within the S.I. and the 
ICFTU. Moreover, AFL-CIO leadership support for the contras 
could also influence millions of U.S. trade unionists, both 
building support for and weakening resistance to U.S. 
Government policy in Central America.
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Conclusion.
The Nicaraguan revolution was achieved and consolidated 
with the active participation of the broad sectors of the 
Nicaraguan working class, peasantry and petit-bourgeois. The 
trade unions were centre-stage actors in the revolutionary 
process set in motion by the Managua earthquake of 1972. The 
FSLN, with its partial base in the unions and the urban 
working class, became the vanguard of the revolution and 
secured hegemony over Nicaraguan political life. Throughout 
this entire period the AIFLD-sponsored CUS had taken 
conservative positions, leading ultimately to outright 
opposition to the Sandinista government and a political 
alliance with the remaining Nicaraguan capitalists. The CUS's 
opposition to the Sandinistas reflected ideological positions 
shared by the more conservative sections of the AFL-CIO 
leadership.
The ability of the CUS and the AFL-CIO to affect the 
course of events in Nicaragua during the 1978-82 period proved 
to be relatively minor. The CUS had not grown quickly enough, 
despite its accommodation with Somoza, to secure a firm base 
in the Nicaraguan working class for its trade union and 
political ideology. The pro-FSLN unions quickly established 
hegemony over the labour movement in the post-insurrection 
period, although the "productionist perspective" of the 
leading party within the context of continuing private 
ownership of more than half of industry and agriculture
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brought with it serious tensions.
The onset of the U.S.-supported contra war against 
Nicaragua changed the character of the CUS*s opposition to 
Sandinistas. The CIA's control of the main contra group, the 
FDN, ensured that their now existed an alternative to the 
Sandinistas, one which was armed and supplied by the world's 
foremost military power. Moreover, the anti-communism and 
anti-sovietism espoused by the FDN largely replicated that of 
the official Cold War approach of the AFL-CIO's foreign policy 
apparatus. If the DIA and AIFLD embraced the FDN and could 
successfully promote this position within the AFL-CIO's 
Executive Council, then one of the world's principal union 
federations in terms of its size and influence might be pulled 
behind a policy of counterrevolution. Furthermore, AFL-CIO 
support for the FDN could be directed towards the U.S. 
Congress to help sustain the flow of arms and logistical 
support for the insurgents. In the context of such a 
scenario, the hitherto minor role of the CUS and the AFL-CIO 
in influencing the direction of the Nicaraguan revolution 
might turn into its opposite, especially if domestic and 
international support for the Sandinistas declined.
Chapters One, Two, and Three have dealt with the 
international policy of the AFL-CIO, the historical 
development and consolidation of Cold War unionism and its 
impact on the postwar international labour movement and global 
politics generally, and the intervention of the AFL-CIO in the 
conflict in Central America. Chapter Four documents the
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development of anti-intervention activity in the U.S. trade 
unions and how this, somewhat paradoxically, coincided with
1
the Reagan Administration according the AFL-CIO an even more 
prominent position in the formulation and implementation of 
U.S. foreign policy.
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CHAPTER 4
INTERVENTION AND ANTI-INTERVENTION: THE FOREIGN POLICY 
CONFLICT IN U.S. TRADE UNIONS
This chapter documents and explains the rise of anti­
intervention sentiment and activity in the U.S. labour 
movement in the early 1980s. This rise, however, coincided 
with the AFL-CIO's international affairs apparatus being 
invited to play a more active and visible role in the 
formation and implementation of U.S. Government foreign 
policy.
The developments described below need to be viewed 
against a background of economic recession and a changed 
political climate in the United States. The Reagan 
Administration came into office in 1980 and soon displayed an 
adversarial approach towards organised labour. The firing of 
striking members of the Professional Air-Traffic Controllers 
Organization (PATCO) in late 1981 marked the beginning of a 
new period of conflict relations between U.S. labour and the 
U.S. Government. [1] Later the National Labor Relations Board 
(NLRB), once a pillar of post-war liberal industrial relations 
machinery, produced a series of decisions which limited the 
power of unions to organise and defend members' jobs. De-
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regulation policies in areas such as trucking and 
transportation constituted another serious setback for unions, 
accelerating the unravelling of "pattern bargaining" - a 
practice whereby one union-company agreement set the norm for 
a series of others in the same industry. The new 
Administration also took measures to cut welfare programs such 
as food stamps and unemployment insurance.
These acts, many concluded, marked the end of the post­
war social contract or social accord between labour, capital 
and the state. [2] Consensus arrangements in collective 
bargaining and industrial relations generally were partially 
or totally dismantled. Social machinery set in place to 
contain or manage industrial conflict was now being utilised 
as a means of weakening the labour movement. Even advocates 
of class-harmony in the labour relations "field" were forced 
to acknowledge that industrial relations in the U.S. had been 
transformed, although some argued that new forms of 
cooperation and compromise would emerge once the U.S. economy 
had been put on a more competitive footing. [3]
The dawn of the Reagan era also coincided with a clear 
shift to the right by the Democratic Party. This shift had 
actually began in the 1970s with the defeat of Democratic 
candidate George McGovern in the presidential contest of 1972. 
The AFL-CIO's considerable influence over party policy began 
to wane and during the Carter Administration as capital began 
to aggressively court the Democrats. The so-called New Deal 
coalition collapsed as Keynesian policy alternatives fell out
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of fashion, surrendering the Party mainstream to business- 
influenced elements who shared many of the objectives being 
pursued by Reagan Republicans.
In the late 1970s the U.S. labour movement 
unsuccessfully attempted to launch a political coalition with 
a section of industrial capital (the National Accord). As the 
1980s got underway a combination of political and economic 
factors resulted in serious reductions in the size and 
strength of U.S. trade unions. Following the UAW-Chrysler 
agreement of 1979, concessionary bargaining - "givebacks” - 
became widespread across all sectors of the economy covered 
by union contracts. Chrysler had argued that concessions were 
necessary to save the company. By the mid-1980s however,
businesses demanding concessions were for the most part 
economically healthy but were clearly determined to take 
advantage of the new industrial relations climate. In
virtually all areas of its activity the U.S. labour movement 
was in a period of retreat comparable to the 1920s.
The precise dimensions of labour movement decline and
the political and economic conditions which undermined the
post war social accord have been well documented and discussed 
elsewhere and will not be dealt with here. [4] The gravity 
of the situation was perhaps best expressed in the fall in the 
percentage of U.S. workers organised in unions. In 1970 
roughly 24.7% of the U.S. workforce were organised; by 1980 
this figure had fallen to 20.9%, and in 1986 it was 17.5%. [5] 
The AFL-CIO criticised government and employers for their
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anti-union policies but failed to alter the general direction 
of events. Union resistance, when it did occur, came from 
isolated units that frequently suffered defeats. U.S. labour 
had entered a period of stagnation and decline that would span 
the entire decade. [6]
The "Central America"/"Anti-Intervention" Movement in the 
United States.
While the labour movement was retreating in the face of 
the political and economic offensive of capital and the state, 
the events in El Salvador and Nicaragua between 1979 and 1983 
spawned a political movement in the United States that was 
distinct in its character but strikingly amorphous in its 
composition. The self-named "Central America Movement" or, 
alternatively, "Anti-Intervention Movement" (CA/AIM) embraced 
two fundamental sentiments. Firstly, many of its leading 
activists regarded the revolutionary forces in Nicaragua and 
El Salvador as legitimate and progressive movements worthy of 
general, and frequently uncritical, political support. 
Secondly, the CA/AIM was concerned that the Vietnam experience 
of the 1960s should not be re-lived in Central America in the 
1980s. Many CA/AIM activists believed that the movement 
against the Vietnam war took too long to gather momentum, 
therefore active opposition to direct U.S. intervention in 
Central America needed to be as forceful at the beginning of 
the conflict as the movement against the war in Vietnam was
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in its latter stages.
The CA/AIM also reflected a deepening opposition to the 
U.S. Government's policy of sustaining repressive right-wing 
regimes in the name of "national security" or anti-communism. 
The Salvadoran military, armed and supplied by the U.S., had 
unleashed a genocidal repression against its opponents who 
had been labelled communist subversives. Towards the end of 
1981 the remnants of Somoza's National Guard, under the 
guidance of the CIA, began a military insurgency against
Nicaragua, purportedly to save the country from sovietization. 
Despite its diversity the CA/AIM unanimously opposed such 
"indirect" U.S. intervention on the grounds that this promoted 
repression and increased the prospects of a repeat of Vietnam.
The exact size and scope of the CA/AIM is difficult to 
assess. In 1985, the Central American Resource Center in
Austin, Texas, compiled its own Directory of Central American
Organizations listing more than 800 anti-interventionist 
groups across the U.S. concerned either specifically with 
Central America or with U.S. policy toward the region. [7] 
Another source estimated that the CA/AIM was "comprised of 
roughly 850 different support groups and organizations
operating in all 50 states." [8]
The number of individual activists who took part in the 
movement is more difficult to establish. The degree and 
character of activity has varied over time. However, during 
the period 1980-88 the number of people in some way 
participating in political work or events around Central
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America is likely to have exceeded one million. [9] 
Innumerable demonstrations, forums and other kinds of 
educational outreach work, in churches, highschools, 
universities, women's organisations and trade unions suggest 
that this number is not an exaggeration. Indeed, it may be 
a serious underestimation. By 1987 it was believed that more 
than 100,000 people in the U.S. had visited Nicaragua on tours 
organised by numerous CA/AIM groups, religious organisations 
and charities. [10] The foreigners in Nicaragua
(internacionalistas) included many who spent time working on 
the harvest and construction brigades. One organisation, 
Tecnica, brought skilled workers to Nicaragua from the U.S. 
during their vacations. [11] Another important CA/AIM 
initiative emerged in 1984 when the Washington based religious 
coalition Inter-Religious Task Force created the Pledge of 
Resistance. By mid-1986 80,000 had publicly committed
themselves to "actively resist the escalating war in Central 
America" in the spirit of protest identified with Mahatma 
Gandhi and Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. [12]
From its earliest moments in 1979-80 the CA/AIM began 
to effect the discussions and activities of trade union 
locals. The argument against military intervention in Central 
America, because of its religious, moral, economic, 
ideological, and other dimensions, precluded the development 
of what might be described as a peculiarly "trade union" 
strain of the broader CA/AIM. However, as will be discussed 
below, the anti-union agenda of the Reagan Administration, and
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actual or perceived changes in the U.S. and world economy, 
provided anti-interventionists in the trade unions with a 
range of arguments which convincingly married traditional and 
topical trade union concerns to the other reasons for opposing 
the Reagan Administration's Central America policy.
The CA/AIM and the U.S. Trade Unions: Changes Since Vietnam.
During the period of the conflict in Indochina union 
opposition to the Johnson-Nixon war policy grew as the war 
itself escalated and became more unpopular. To the wider 
public, however, the AFL-CIO appeared to be firmly behind the 
Commander-in-Chief right up until U.S. military disengagement 
in 1973. Labour movement support for the war was weakened 
when, in 1967, the UAW broke from the Federation after its 
President Walter Reuther clashed with George Meany over the 
AFL-CIO's unrestrained support for the military escalation of 
the conflict. Reuther had pioneered the purge of Communists 
from the CIO and generally advanced the Cold War in the U.S. 
labour movement and believed that U.S. labour needed to 
maintain a firm anti-Soviet global posture. However, Reuther 
was concerned that the social and economic problems which 
incubated Communist ideas should be addressed and, in the case 
of Vietnam, this required a negotiated peace. In this respect 
Reuther was a liberal interventionist in the same vein as 
Joseph Bierne of the CWA who had pioneered AIFLD (see Chapter 
One) .
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It is important to note that foreign policy was not the 
only issue that prompted the Reuther-Meany split. As with the 
more serious foreign policy differences in U.S. trade union 
history, Reuther's disagreement with Meany stemmed from a 
conflict of opinion regarding the overall direction the U.S. 
labour movement. The UAW, with a high proportion of black 
members, had supported Martin Luther King's march on 
Washington in 1963 while Meany and the AFL-CIO had decided not 
to participate. Just prior to the UAW departure Reuther 
claimed that the AFL-CIO "lack(ed) social vision" on questions 
such as civil rights. [13]
After 1967 the AFL-CIO Executive Council continued to 
support the war although lower-level officials and activists 
began to express opposition. Jerry Wurf, President of the then 
400,000-member public sector union AFSCME and an opponent of 
Meany's pro-war stance, joined the Council in late 1969 and 
took up a solitary anti-war position. [14] In 1972 when 
George McGovern won the Democratic nomination for President, 
the Executive Council voted 27-3 not to endorse any of the 
candidates. Not since 1952 had the Federation failed to 
endorse a Democratic presidential nominee- The AFL-CIO 
leadership decided to punish McGovern for his opposition to 
the Vietnam war despite the fact that McGovern had 
consistently voted for union causes in Congress. [15]
In 1980-81 a segment of trade union opinion believed 
that the labour movement should register a clear opposition 
to intervention in Central America from the start. Leading
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activists in this group frequently expressed support for the 
revolutionary project of the FSLN and the FMLN. In a sense, 
this layer of activists marked an area of overlap between the 
trade unions and the solidarity organisations which 
spearheaded the CA/AIM. In the Vietnam war period the AFL- 
CIO leadership and the anti-war movement viewed each other as 
adversaries and even the organised union opposition to the war 
frequently distanced itself from the rest of the anti-war 
protestors because of their perceived anti-Americanism. [16] 
At least two things had changed since the Vietnam 
period. Firstly, the CA/AIM's principal organisations and 
leaders maintained a different disposition toward the unions. 
The labour movement was now considered to be receptive to 
arguments against intervention? resistance to "progressive” 
political positions was thought to have been weakened as a 
result of government or government-inspired attacks on the 
trade unions. Moreover, it was felt that the
anti-intervention movement could both extend and legitimise 
itself by winning union support. Secondly, Central America 
activists, many having been active in the anti-war movement 
of the 1960s, were generally older and more prepared to 
operate within the political mainstream, such as building 
campaigns aimed at Congress or otherwise emulating standard 
pressure group methods. Unlike its predecessor during the 
Vietnam period, the CA/AIM was not a student-based movement 
concerned with promoting an alternative culture. [17] Most 
of the past generational barriers had disappeared, although
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some clear political and social differences still existed 
between CA/AIM activists and the main body of trade union 
officials and activists. It was also true that many 1960s 
anti-war radicals had in their later years joined the labour 
movement as organisers and activists inspired more by the 
example of Saul A1insky than that presented by George Meany. 
By the 1980s some found themselves located, as one of them 
expressed it, "at the periphery of the labor establishment." 
[18] Many changes had taken place since the days of the 1960s 
protests. One result of these changes was that, as one 
commentator observed, "this (CA/AIM) movement is much better 
organized and operates on the basis of much more calculated 
strategies than the highly spontaneous movement against the 
war in Vietnam." [19]
The generally constructive approach of the CA/AIM to the 
trade unions is perhaps best illustrated in the example of the 
Committee in Support of the People of El Salvador (CISPES), 
itself the largest and most active of the CA/AIM 
organisations. CISPES was formed in October of 1980 after two 
founding meetings in Los Angeles and Washington, D.C., and 
thereafter enjoyed a period of quite spectacular growth. By 
1985 the group had established 92 "chapters" across the U.S., 
supported by a network of CISPES "affiliates" which numbered 
300. The cohort of activists who formed CISPES had either 
come out of the anti-war movement of the 1960s, had been peace 
corp volunteers, or part of a small support network for the 
Sandinistas prior to their victory in 1979. [20] From the
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outset CISPES declared itself to be a "solidarity” 
organisation that supported the FDR-FMLN.
CISPES articulated its approach to trade union work in 
an internal document compiled in 1981: "The labor movement has 
great potential power for our work...Work within labor may 
well have a broader appeal than with the alleged 'general* 
groups who actually appeal to a very small progressive 
community.” [21] For CISPES to insist on labour movement 
solidarity with the FDR-FMLN would be self-defeating, said the 
document, especially as the bulk of the AFL-CIO leadership 
supported U.S. intervention. However, CISPES accurately 
predicted that leadership support for U.S. intervention might 
eventually be weakened by "the very serious conflict between 
labor and the Administration on domestic issues." CISPES 
noted leftward movements within the leadership of the United 
Steel Workers of America (USWA), the Oil, Chemical and Atomic 
Workers (OCAW), and the International Association of 
Machinists (IAM), but these were too weak to tilt the AFL-CIO 
into a position that would legitimise or support the CA/AIM. 
The document concluded: "The people of Central America can not 
wait until American labor gets 'straightened out*. For our 
solidarity work to be effective, we must work with labor as 
it presently exists...Labor insurgencies take decades, and the 
FDR-FMLN can not wait while we seek control of a union. Our 
work can contribute to a reformed, democratic unionism, but 
we are not that struggle. Our goal should be to maximise 
support for the Central American revolutionaries in the next
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3-5 years." [22]
Anti-Intervention Committees and the U.S. Trade Unions.
Anti-intervention sentiment in the labour movement first 
manifested itself organisationally with the formation of loose 
city-based committees. During 1980 and 1981 individuals from 
various unions, some of them members of CISPES or other 
solidarity groups, established such committees first in New 
York, Boston, Seattle, and San Francisco as a response to 
repression unleashed in El Salvador following the general 
strike in 1980. The committees grew from a wave of 
demonstrations that were triggered by these events and the 
U.S. Government's decision to provide military aid to the 
Salvadoran regime. Large union forums and benefits were held 
in several major cities in the U.S.? in San Francisco 800 
union members, including 40 local union presidents, signed an 
open letter opposing U.S. military aid and advisers being sent 
to El Salvador. In Boston, Local 2 01 of the International 
Union of Electrical Workers (IUE), representing 10,000 defence 
workers, endorsed a New England Labor Conference Resolution 
against intervention. [23]
Also during this period the California-based 
International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) 
announced that its estimated 25,000 members would not handle 
weapons shipments to El Salvador. [21] One should note that 
the ILWU was expelled from the CIO during the McCarthy period
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and continued thereafter as an independent union with its own 
foreign policy stance. Its leader, Harry Bridges, played an 
important role in the San Francisco general strike of 1934. 
[25] In a sense the ILWU's action stood at the intersection 
between two quite dissimilar left currents in U.S. trade
unionism: the old Communist Party, merely a shadow of the
organisation which played such an important role in the rise 
of the CIO, and the new current with its roots in the
political movements of the 1960s. The New York Labor 
Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El 
Salvador, formed in July 1981, reflected the extent of 
anti-intervention sentiment even among union officials. Many 
of the officials who formed the New York committee had
established a record with the dissident trade union component 
that opposed the war in Vietnam, although several also had 
"old Left" connections which stretched back to the 1940s. 
Others such as Cleveland Robinson, the Jamaican 
Secretary-Treasurer of District 65/UAW, had also played a 
major role in advancing the cause of civil rights in the 
labour movement during the late 1950s and the 1960s. This 
committee, then, also reflected a certain convergence of two 
generations of left politics in the U.S.
Significantly, none of the building trades unions - a 
formidable force in New York City and dominant on the New York 
Central Labor Council of the AFL-CIO - were represented on 
the Committee, although a Local officer of the Teamsters was 
included among the 24 Committee members. The building trades
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unions were widely regarded to be politically conservative, 
in New York and elsewhere, and the Teamsters, outside of the 
AFL-CIO until 1987, frequently endorsed Republican candidates 
in U.S. Presidential elections. It is necessary to add, 
however, that the union leaders on the letterhead of the New 
York Labor Committee played a secondary and sometimes 
peripheral role in the ongoing functioning of the committee. 
These leaders were quite prepared to endorse activities, 
appear at fundraising events, etc., but most of the time- 
consuming work came to rest on the shoulders of a few 
non-leadership activists. Importantly, these activists were 
invariably more knowledgeable regarding the dynamics of the 
events in Central America than the union leaders on the 
Committee. [26]
At the meeting which launched the New York committee, 
held at the headquarters of the Amalgamated Clothing and 
Textile Workers• Union (ACTWU) in Manhattan, AIFLD's Executive 
Director William Doherty warned the gathering that the picture 
in El Salvador was more complex than it appeared. He warned 
that a lack of understanding of the Salvadoran situation might 
lead U.S. trade unionists to endorse Marxist-Leninist 
revolutionaries and thus weaken the democratic trade unions 
supported by AIFLD. [27]
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The National Labor Committee in Support of Democracy and Human 
Rights in El Salvador.
Doherty*s appeal failed to prevent the formation of the 
committee in New York. Moreover, the event prompted three 
nationally known union leaders to pioneer a National Labor 
Committee in Support of Democracy and Human Rights in El 
Salvador (NLC). The leaders were Jacob Sheinkman, then 
Secretary-Treasurer of ACTWU, William Winpisinger of the 
Machinists (IAM), and Douglas Fraser, President of the United 
Auto Workers (UAW). All three had been part of a dissident 
minority of trade union officials who had opposed the war in 
Vietnam.
The coming together of the three union leaders, joined 
later by a second wave of top union officials, was symptomatic 
of an ongoing ideological tension within the labour leadership 
in the U.S. Simply put, the majority of the trade union 
leaders in the U.S. were (and remain) loosely representative 
of two strains of social democracy which, until 1972, could 
be located in the remnants of the Socialist Party of Eugene 
Debs and Norman Thomas. The roots of the antagonism 
pertained, for the most part, to attitudes towards Soviet 
Communism and U.S. foreign policy. On domestic issues the 
differences between these two strains were less obvious for 
reasons which are connected to the marginal position of social 
democracy in the U.S., particularly the absence of a mass 
social democratic or labour party, and numerous other factors.
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The Socialist Party split over Vietnam into two groupings. 
In 1972, the left of the Party around intellectual Michael 
Harrington supported the McGovern candidacy, believing, among 
other things, that U.S. military force was not the best method 
to combat Communism. The right of the Party supported the 
Senators Hubert Humphrey and Edmund Muskie who supported the 
war effort, believing that the overriding priority was to 
support a firm anti-Communist foreign policy. The left 
grouping formed the Democratic Socialist Organizing Committee 
(DSOC) which later became the Democratic Socialists of America 
(DSA). The right formed Social Democrats U.S.A. (SDUSA). [25]
In the early 1970s SDUSA members became key actors in 
the Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) which situated 
itself on the right of the Democratic Party and in opposition 
to the McGovern liberals. Their base of support extended to 
the AFL-CIO, and particularly the international affairs 
apparatus. SDUSA operatives became part of the DIA, AIFLD, 
and the other regional organs of AFL-CIO foreign policy, 
merging comfortably with the old Cold Warriors of the 
Lovestone-Brown tradition.
The somewhat larger DSA retained its base in the liberal 
wing of the Democratic Party. They too had influence in the 
trade unions, particularly the UAW. The founding members of 
the NLC had all identified with DSA, which was more open to 
the positions of the Socialist International. The DSA, 
however, retained a distinct opposition to Stalinism 
characteristic of the Max Shactman and his followers and the
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Socialist Party. [29] They differed, however, in the sense 
that SDUSA saw the U.S. Government as a progressive force in 
international affairs because of its anti-communism, while DSA 
opposed U.S. intervention, primarily because they viewed the 
U.S. Government's international role as imperialistic to the 
extent that it inflamed national liberation struggles which 
later degenerated into Stalinism. [30]
The NLC was formed in September 1981. Its first act was 
to send a letter to Congress announcing its opposition to 
military aid to El Salvador and to the U.S. military presence 
in the country. [31] Unlike many of the city-based committees 
that eventually emerged, the NLC reflected the DSA's manifest 
unwillingness to support the FMLN, the component factions of 
which had openly declared themselves to be Marxist-Leninist. 
However, the NLC's opposition to military aid to El Salvador 
separated them from the official position of the AFL-CIO which 
earlier in 1981 stated that military aid "should be 
conditioned on reciprocal actions to bring domestic violence 
under control and to institute democratic reforms that improve 
the conditions of workers." [32]
In early 1982 the three-person NLC invited other union 
leaders to join them on the Committee. By March 1982 the 
number of top union officials on the NLC had grown to 11. The 
new recruits were Kenneth Brown, President of the Graphic 
Communications International Union (GCIU); Cesar Chavez, 
President, United Farm Workers of America (UFWA); Nicholas 
Gyory, President, United Hatters Cap and Millinary Workers (a
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union which later merged with ACTWU)? Robert Goss, President, 
Oil Chemical and Atomic Workers (OCAW)? Frank Martino, 
President, International Chemical Workers Union (ICWU)? 
Willard McGuire, President, National Education Association 
(NEA)? Charles Perlick, President, The Newspaper Guild and 
Murray Finlay, President of ACTWU. [33] That same month, the 
NLC and the New York Labor Committee took out a paid 
advertisement in the New York Times which declared, "There is 
no democracy in El Salvador. What exists in a government at 
war with its own people. And that war is being supported and 
financed by the United States." [34]
The formation of the eleven-person NLC, supported by a 
handful of city-based trade union committees, constituted the 
organisational embryo of the anti-intervention movement in the 
U.S. trade unions. Supplementary features would develop as 
time progressed, but the 1980-83 period saw the gradual 
expansion of the NLC and the city-based committees from their 
early base. The city-based committees focused on passing 
anti-intervention resolutions at their union locals, district 
councils, and, where feasible, state and national conventions. 
These activities were complemented by educational forums, 
slide-shows, petitions, etc.
From the outset the NLC was devoid of normal committee 
formalities such as regular meeting dates and functioning 
officers. As a result organisational and political impetus 
often came from below, that is, from the city committees. An 
important figure in this arrangement was David Dyson, the head
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of the political action ("Union Label") department at ACTWU1s 
headquarters in New York. Dyson, operating under Sheinkman's 
supervision, became the coordinator of the NLC and its liaison 
to the city committees. Normally the local committees 
communicated to the NLC through Dyson's office, and, in turn, 
Dyson, combining NLC work with other ACTWU duties, advised the 
committees as to the level of political energy among NLC 
members at any given moment. The city committees frequently 
espoused support for the FMLN and the FSLN, a position not 
shared by the union leaders who comprised the NLC. From the 
outset the city committees regarded the anti-intervention 
stance of the union leaders on the NLC as a means of advancing 
and legitimising their own, perhaps stronger, positions. (See 
below, this chapter)
Perhaps the most controversial anti-intervention 
activity during this period was the periodic invitations from 
local activists to unionists in El Salvador and Nicaragua to 
visit the U.S. to address union audiences. AIFLD and the DIA 
alleged that the visiting unionists represented unions or 
federations that were overtly or covertly affiliated to the 
pro-Soviet World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) and had 
links to the armed left in Central America. Therefore, they 
argued, official AFL-CIO opposition to these tours needed to 
be implacable. (See below, this chapter.)
Contingents of anti-intervention unionists also visited 
Central America. By the end of 1983 a number of such tours 
had occurred involving both the NLC and local activists.
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These tours played a highly significant role in deepening 
anti-intervention sentiment in the unions and stimulating 
further activities. More important, perhaps, was the 
relationships forged between the anti-intervention unionists 
and Left trade unions in El Salvador and Nicaragua. By 
1986-87 a clear majority of the hundreds of U.S. union 
activists who prioritised Central America work in their locals 
or their union offices had visited the region. The political 
consequences of these connections is difficult to evaluate in 
any precise fashion. The propaganda effect of first-hand 
experience and of building personal ties with trade unionists 
in Central America are factors which, nonetheless, penetrated 
every aspect of the struggle over Central America inside the 
U.S. trade unions.
Anti-intervention work within individual unions faced 
greater obstacles and generally took a longer time to gather 
momentum. Activists on the city committees were frequently 
isolated within their own unions and this seriously impaired 
their ability to organise internally. On the city committees 
activists usually worked with like-minded activists from other 
unions, not their own. It was likely that
anti-interventionists in the same union were also 
geographically very dispersed, making concerted intra-union 
work logistically difficult. However, certain unions 
progressed more quickly than others, and by the end of 1983 
intra-union anti-intervention caucuses had begun to appear.
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All told, the organisational structures and the 
political activity of the anti-intervention movement in U.S. 
trade unions had become fairly developed by the end of 1983. 
As for the political character of the movement, this would 
assume a constant state of flux. From the start the political 
dynamic most in evidence consisted of a working understanding 
between two quite distinct positions. On the one hand, the 
city committees, with one or two notable exceptions (such as 
New York), adopted positions of solidarity with the 
revolutionary forces of the region, choosing not to be 
publicly critical of the Sandinista Front or the FMLN and 
sympathising with their stated objectives. On the other hand 
were the non-intervention forces comprised of the NLC and a 
minority of activists involved in the city committees. The 
non-interventionists were implacably opposed to U.S. 
intervention but stopped short of endorsing the FMLN and the 
Sandinistas.
Thus the working understanding between the self-named 
"solidarity" and "non-intervention" forces (as they will be 
referred to hereafter) rested on a shared opposition to U.S. 
intervention, and not on unqualified or even critical support 
for the Sandinistas or the FMLN. Amongst the non-intervention 
forces, feelings about the revolutionary movements in Central 
America ranged from mildly supportive to very critical. Thus, 
the NLC had rejected the "conditionality" principle of the 
AFL-CIO and stood out against military aid to El Salvador but 
distanced themselves from the guerillas. However, some
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national union leaders, and Dyson in his role as NLC 
coordinator, had been involved in political discussions with 
leaders of the FDR, namely Guillermo Ungo and Ruben Zamora, 
during their visits to New York City. As radical Christian 
democrats and social democrats the FDR leaders were 
politically more acceptable to the NLC than the Marxist- 
Leninist FMLN.
As Nicaragua and the U.S. backed contra insurgency 
received more attention the NLC's politics became more 
problematical. The NLC was "in Support of Democracy and Human 
Rights in El Salvador"; who, the question would be asked, were 
the defenders of these values in Nicaragua? There was little 
controversy within the AFL-CIO over the Salvadoran right, but 
the Sandinistas were a more contentious subject. AIFLD's 
dossiers on the Sandinistas became more condemnatory as time 
progressed and the NLC for a whole period fell within the 
gravitational pull of AIFLD's argument that the Sandinistas 
were totalitarian communists. NLC support for the 
Sandinistas, so long as AIFLD's view remained unchallenged, 
was therefore even less likely than NLC support for the FMLN. 
At least the left in El Salvador were the targets of 
repression (not even AIFLD could deny this), while the left 
in Nicaragua was, according to AIFLD, its main perpetrators.
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Activity. Controversy, and Self-Analvsis.
During 1982 a highly visible controversy over Central 
America broke out in the Screen Actors Guild (SAG). The 
central character in the controversy was actor and Guild 
President Ed Asner, then star of the popular television 
series, Lou Grant. Asner became an early supporter of the NLC 
(although never a member) but had also served as a director 
of Medical Aid to El Salvador (MAES), an organisation active 
in raising funds for the FDR-FMLN for the construction of 
clinics in the areas of El Salvador under their control 
("zones of control"). For his support of MAES Asner became 
the target of a series of right-wing attacks, including death 
threats. Conservative groups threatened to boycott goods 
advertised during the Lou Grant show? three companies withdrew 
their sponsorship and CBS cancelled the program. [35]
Fellow actor Charlton Heston attacked Asner in a meeting 
of 250 SAG members in Hollywood in February 1982. Asner was 
soon to retire as SAG President and had nominated Patti Duke 
to succeed him. Heston, a conservative opinion leader in 
Hollywood endorsed Ed Nelson who accused the Asner-Duke 
supporters of being "Reagan-haters and neosocialists". David 
Dyson, coordinator of the NLC, wrote to Sheinkman urging that 
the NLC support Asner. "One of the main points that Heston and 
Co. are making," wrote Dyson, "is that Asner's position is out 
of step with American labor...I believe that supporting him 
(Asner) in a tangible way at this time would help to
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underscore our position that American trade union leaders have 
a right and responsibility to speak out on El Salvador.” [36] 
Duke went on to win the SAG presidency. [37]
The SAG controversy might be considered too distant from 
the trade union mainstream to be considered typical. Although 
partially true, it is worth remembering that the SAG has 
historically provided a unique barometer of the political mood 
in the U.S. at certain junctures. Hollywood liberals and 
left-wingers sent ambulances to the Spanish Republic and 
following World War Two John Wayne and Ronald Reagan were 
among those who helped cement a Cold War grip on the film 
industry. During Vietnam, actress Jane Fonda made a 
controversial visit to Hanoi. The Asner episode, therefore, 
had its own place in the peculiar history of Hollywood 
politics as well as the anti-intervention movement itself. 
[38]
A more typical if less widely publicised controversy 
involved Central American unionists on speaking tours of the 
U.S. In April, 1983, a representative of the left Salvadoran 
federation, FENASTRAS, touched some sensitive nerves in the 
AFL-CIO. In March an unsigned letter was circulated to 
numerous union locals which asserted that FENASTRAS only 
represented 3,000 workers, and that the visiting unionist, 
Alejandro Molina Lara, was in a union with only 20 members. 
There were, however, more serious accusations: "Lara is
clever. Touring this country speaking at every labor 
organization he can get in to. Raising money on the pretext
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of helping the workers and peasants. The money is actually 
used for guns." The letter continued, "Lara is an interloper 
- terrorist - commandante of the Resistencia National 
(sic)...He is a known kidnapper and assassin...Lara and his 
group are worse than the PLO." This open attack on the 
FENASTRAS member was circulated by the AFL-CIO's field 
representative for Region 8, Edward Collins. [39] Weeks later 
AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland delivered a more oblique 
attack on Molina Lara. Kirkland informed all Principal 
Officers and Local Central Bodies of the AFL-CIO that Molina 
Lara did "not represent a trade union organization with which 
the AFL-CIO is working with and which is affiliated to the 
International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). I 
believe he has addressed some trade union meetings, presenting 
a position or policy contrary to that of the AFL-CIO 
convention. It is regrettable that this took place." [40]
Several central labour bodies ignored Kirkland's 
objections and six Bay Area councils of the AFL-CIO publicly 
condemned the letter. [38] The newly-formed Labor Committee 
on El Salvador in Santa Clara County responded to Kirkland in 
its broadsheet, Labor Perspective on Central America, which 
commented, "It is instructive to note that this vicious 
red-baiting pre-dated and perhaps prescribed a Lane Kirkland 
response." [42] Charles Dee, Executive Board member of AFT 
Local 212 in Milwaukee registered a written complaint against 
Kirkland which generated a response from DIA Director Irving 
Brown. [43] Brown advised Dee that "unions can become
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instruments for political forces that attempt to overthrow 
dictatorships...but when representatives of these forces come 
to power, they proceed to destroy the very trade union rights 
that they claimed to defend. We have seen this in Cuba, and 
now we see it in Nicaragua.” It was imperative, wrote Brown, 
that the AFL-CIO have no contact with such elements. [44] 
William Doherty responded to a similar written protest from 
the President of the San Jose Federation of Teachers, Forrest 
Nixon. Nixon had been informed that the accusations against 
Molina Lara had originated from the DIA or AIFLD and he 
requested that the claims be supported by solid documentation. 
[45] Brown passed the complaint to AIFLD. [46] Doherty 
informed Nixon that the left federation FENASTRAS was a 
guerilla front and that the federation deserving support was 
the UPD, which was a militant and dedicated supporter of 
peaceful change. [47]
The condemnatory statements made by Doherty, Brown and 
Kirkland in this case and others that were to follow did not 
simply target the visiting trade unionists. Those who 
extended the invitations were also targeted for criticism. 
As Brown described it, "We (the DIA) have been noticing. . .that 
all sorts of committees have been created for diverse 
purposes." These groups, wrote Brown, "raise funds for 
purposes for which we are not certain will be served in the 
spirit in which they claim. It is therefore important that 
the AFL-CIO be extremely careful in the way we develop our 
relationships with other trade union organizations." [48]
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Brown's message was reiterated in the April edition of Fjree 
Trade Union News. A letter from a leading official of the 
AIFLD-supported Salvadoran construction workers' federation 
(FESINCONSTRANS) referred to certain Salvadoran trade 
unionists who, having been persecuted for their trade union 
activities or "possibly because of their bad luck of being 
involved in the indiscriminate campaign of terror that is 
plaguing our country (were now) taking advantage of the 
political freedom offered to them in the United States." 
These unionists, he suggested, had their own Marxist-Leninist 
agenda. [49]
The unfolding challenge to the AFL-CIO's Central America 
policy prompted Brown to organise a one-day conference on 
international affairs in San Francisco at the end of 1982. 
Anti-interventionism had made considerable headway in the 
trade unions of the Bay Area and the objective of the 
DIA-sponsored event was to meet the challenge head on. The 
100 trade unionists in attendance reportedly gave Brown a 
hostile reception. One source quoted Brown as saying, "I 
think some of the people on the other side have been working 
on them. If I were the Communists, that's what I would do." 
[50]
In April 1983 anti-interventionists held their own San 
Francisco conference with 200 attending. The conference, 
hosted by Communications Workers of America (CWA) Local 9410, 
was addressed by I AM President, William Winpisinger. The 
Machinists' leader launched a scathing attack on Reagan and
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the multinationals. "I'll be damned," said Winpisinger, "if 
workers should send their sons to support Texas Instruments 
in El Salvador." [51]
A substantial segment of the West Coast solidarity 
forces met in San Jose, California, in early 1983 to discuss 
and analyse their anti-intervention work. At this point the 
centres of support were still Seattle and San Francisco on the 
West Coast and New York and Boston on the East Coast. 
Progress had been made but the growth in support consisted 
mainly in an increase in statements, endorsements, and 
resolutions made by union officials or official union bodies. 
One written contribution to the discussion noted, "Rarely have 
we penetrated deeply into the membership of these unions, 
generating the kind of support needed to obtain significant 
material help for solidarity campaigns." Some activists, the 
writer observed, were part of the solidarity component of the 
CA/AIM first, and the union movement second. Others were 
principally union activists with only tenuous links to the 
solidarity network. The task, the activists agreed, was to 
develop a genuine internationalist trend in the trade unions 
and, where possible, build support for the FDR-FMLN and the 
FSLN. [52]
The San Jose gathering agreed that the material basis 
for trade union internationalism had clearly emerged in recent 
years. Nearly every resolution opposing intervention in 
Central America had made reference to runaway shops, cuts in 
domestic social spending and government or government-inspired
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attacks on unions both in North an Central America. 
Interestingly, however, it remained obvious that most 
anti-intervention activity in the unions was taking place in 
regions where the 1980-81 recession was proving to be less 
enduring, that is, in the metropolitan areas on the eastern 
and western seaboards. Where the scars of recession had 
remained stubbornly open, such as the industrial midwest, the 
anti-intervention movement in the unions was thin on the 
ground. Worker protests against runaway shops and other plant 
closures, where they had occurred, had sometimes been 
channeled into campaigns for trade protection from cheap 
imports. [53] On other occasions community-labour struggles 
against "shutdowns” had shown a growing awareness of the 
international economic relationships which underscored their 
immediate predicament. [54] The evidence nevertheless 
suggested that an internationalist trend would not 
automatically emerge from workers involved in a direct brush 
with the changing international division of labour. Put 
another way, the anti-intervention movement might express 
internationalist conclusions inspired by the changed or 
changing economic realities facing workers in the U.S., but 
the movement itself did not flow directly from those 
conditions. Trade unionists who had made Central America an 
issue for the labour movement were for the most part not 
themselves victims of the "global assembly line" or its 
negative knock-on effects, although this and similar notions 
were located at the centre of their propaganda.
248
A partial exception to this rule was evident in the case 
of the public sector. Trade unions such as AFSCME and the 
American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) had a clear 
material reason to oppose U.S. intervention because the 
federal governments military budget had already been expanded 
to the detriment of domestic social programs. Anti­
intervention writers Cohen and Rodgers estimated the cost of 
the U.S. military presence in Central America to be $3.2 
billion between 1981 and 1985 and the total "military / 
security" cost to be as high as $9.5 billion annually. They 
calculated that, "If spent otherwise the $9.5 billion...could 
have restored the combined cuts in Aid to Families with 
Dependent Children, food stamps, child nutrition and 
vocational education programs, Low income energy assistance, 
Medicaid, social services block grants and Guaranteed Student 
Loans? or more than matched the $9.2 billion that was cut from 
Social Security? or the $6.8 billion cut from unemployment 
insurance? or the $5.4 billion cut from Medicare. [55] 
Despite this highly palpable connection between the material 
interests of public sector workers (and, of course, 
prospective welfare recipients) and the cost of intervention 
in Central America it remained true that, in the main, the 
activists emphasising this connection were veterans of the 
movement which opposed the war in Vietnam, whose opposition 
to U.S. intervention in Central America was founded on moral 
and political rather than economic concerns. [56]
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It had become clear that anti-interventionists had 
acquired a more substantial base in white-collar unions than 
they had achieved in the recession-hit industrial unions. As 
a general trend it seemed that the anti-intervention movement 
was culturally, geographically, and experientially removed 
from the direct traumas of plant closures and other 
recession-related misfortunes. However, instances did arise 
where negative economic developments fed more directly into 
the arguments against the Central America policy of the 
Administration. For examples, the Santa Clara County 
Committee on El Salvador compiled a list of closures in the 
county and linked this to the broader issue of runaway shops. 
Therefore, "those of us who worked at Ford, Glorietta, or 
Atari have a common interest with the workers of Central 
America in their fight...Our answer is not to compete to win 
a diminishing number of jobs but to build a genuine unity 
worldwide." [57] In June 1983 the midwest regional conference 
of ACTWU in Springfield, Illinois, adopted a resolution which 
attacked "American based business interests" for "funding and 
supporting the conditions that prevailed in El Salvador." 
The resolution called for the withdrawal of U.S. corporations 
from the country. [58]
The steady growth of anti-interventionism in the trade 
unions suggested that, while many activists were primarily 
concerned with supporting the revolutionary struggles in 
Central America, they had successfully broadened their base 
of support by emphasising topical trade union concerns such
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as federal cuts in social programs and the flight of 
manufacturing jobs to low-wage areas.
The West Coast Tour.
In October 1983 a three-person delegation from Central 
America arrived in the U.S. for a five-week tour of the West 
Coast. The delegation consisted of a representative from the 
Salvadoran teachers union (ANDES), a Guatamalan trade 
unionist, and, finally, a high-ranking official from the 
Sandinista Workers Central (CST). The presence of the CST 
representative, Sebastian Castro (who was imprisoned nine 
times by Somoza) , marked the first time that U.S. trade 
unionists had hosted a visit from the main Sandinista 
federation.
The visitors addressed union audiences in all the major 
West Coast cities and made presentations at the California 
AFSCME and Service Employees International Union (SEIU) state 
conventions. According to the tour organisers an aggregate 
audience of 6,000 came into contact with the three re­
presentatives. In addition, hundreds of union locals endorsed 
the tour. [59] The tour constituted a major political and 
organisational advance for the West Coast city-committees, who 
had begun to operate under the title Labor Network on Central 
America. The movement on the West Coast had acquired a higher 
degree of organisational cohesion than had been achieved on 
the East Coast and other regions in the U.S.
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But the tour did not pass without protest. One of its 
endorsers, the Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship 
Clerks Freight Handlers, Express and Station Employees (BRAC) , 
Seattle Cascade Lodge 1380, complained that "some of our 
members were confused and extremely displeased by the speeches 
given by these individuals (who made) purely political 
speeches and anti-U.S. Government statements.” The Lodge 
withdrew its endorsement. [60] After an investigation the 
vice-president of the union, J.F. Otero, informed AIFLD: "We 
found that several of these people operating in the U.S. are 
listed as the U.S. branches of the CPUSTAL, the Latin American 
branch of the WFTU." Referring to the Central Americans, 
Otero remarked, "They pulled no punches. Their presentation 
was like a recording of speeches I've heard before by 
professional operatives of the Communist Party in Latin 
America." Otero was confident the three were "agents of the 
WFTU," and expressed regret that the tour had been given 
legitimacy by BRAC, "due to the ignorance and stupidity of our 
leadership of those locals." [61]
Another criticism of the tour was of a different nature. 
Activist John Hess, the coordinator of the segment of the tour 
covering the Bay Area, referred to "significant differences 
in style, rhetoric, and class background between the 
white/left solidarity movement and the labor movement...very 
few uninitiated union members attended the events; they were 
primarily solidarity rallies." [62]
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The Strength of Union Anti-Interventionism.
At the beginning of 1983 the NLC had eleven national 
union officials on its letterhead with more than a dozen 
city-based committees affiliated to the parent committee. At 
a time when the differences between AIFLD, the DIA, and the 
Reagan Administration over Central America were difficult to 
detect, the NLC's opposition to the Administration was 
becoming more pronounced. The NLC's coordinator David Dyson 
expressed this opposition in a written attack on Assistant 
Secretary of State, Elliot Abrams. On February 9 Abrams had 
praised El Salvador's steps towards democracy and the 
containment of the death squads. On the same day Dyson and 
the New York Labor Committee had met with the FENASTRAS 
representative Molina Lara who described El Salvador in quite 
different terms. Dyson advised Abrams, "Your statistics look 
good only because the (Salvadoran) government is running out 
of people to kill. To assert that El Salvador is becoming more 
democratic is to cynically flaunt the truth." Moreover, wrote 
Dyson, present trade union anti-interventionism had already 
surpassed the level of union opposition to the Vietnam war, 
"both organizationally and in terms of preparedness." [63]
The number of union locals and regional union 
organisations that had registered opposition to U.S. 
intervention in El Salvador had doubled since the height of 
the repression in 1981. In addition, a dozen major unions had 
recorded either partial or total opposition to U.S. policy in
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Central America. The AFL-CIO unions in this category were 
ACTWU, AFSCME, I AM, International Woodworkers of America 
(IWA), Service Employees International Union (SEIU), SAG, 
United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW), and the UAW. Non- 
AFL-CIO unions opposed to U.S. policy included the National 
Education Association (NEA), the United Electrical, Radio, 
and Machine Workers of America (UE), the Newspaper Guild, and 
the ILWU. Furthermore, 12 AFLrCIO Central Labor Councils had 
publicly opposed U.S. intervention in El Salvador, five of 
them in California.
The national unions with a history of CPUSA leadership, 
such as the UE and ILWU, had also opposed the Vietnam War 
(although their size had declined since). Moreover, the UAW's 
opposition to intervention in Central America at first glance 
appeared consistent with its foreign policy orientation 
established under Reuther's leadership, that is, somewhat to 
the left of the AFL-CIO's mainstream. However, the UAW's 
opposition to intervention frequently made reference to the 
plight of the auto industry, the changing international 
division of labour and to the political attacks of the Reagan 
Administration on the labour movement. In other words, UAW 
opposition to intervention in Central America bore a different 
character to its opposition to the war in Vietnam. [64]
Perhaps the real breakthrough for the anti­
interventionists was measured by the stance of the white 
collar and service sector unions whose numbers continued to 
increase in proportion to the old craft and industrial unions.
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By changing the composition of organised labour, it appeared 
that economic recession and restructuring had made its own 
contribution to anti-interventionism. The decline of 
private-sector trade unionism in manufacturing and 
construction had reduced the size, strength, and political 
influence of the more conservative union leaderships and thus 
amplified the voices of frequently more liberal leaderships 
of the service and white collar unions. [65]
June 1983: The NLC tour of El Salvador.
In June 1983 the NLC sent a delegation to El Salvador. 
The significance of the visit should not be missed. Indeed, 
the delegation described itself as the first independent trade 
union fact-finding contingent to visit the country, that is, 
the first tour of union leaders not organised by AIFLD and 
the DIA. The delegation consisted of seven union officials, 
five from AFL-CIO unions. From ACTWU came Sheinkman and 
Dyson, accompanied by the black secretary-treasurer of AFSCME, 
William Lucy and his deputy, John Howard. Two officials from 
the non-Federation NEA and a regional director of the UAW also 
made the trip.
The report of the visit, entitled El Salvador; Labor. 
Terror. and Peace. was unambiguously critical of U.S. 
government policy. U.S. military intervention, it argued, 
threatened to draw the U.S. into a new Vietnam. Furthermore, 
the U.S. Government was criticised for pursuing policies to
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boost private-sector confidence in El Salvador to offset 
economic collapse which, declared the report, was being 
achieved at the expense of human and trade union rights. The 
report cited findings of the legal aid office of the 
Archdiocese of San Salvador, Tutela Legal. which had 
documented 1,500 political assassinations in the first half 
of 1983. It also contrasted the economic hardship facing the 
Salvadoran working class with the "economic free ride" handed 
to U.S. multinationals in the form of tax exemptions and other 
benefits of the free trade zones established in the country 
as an invitation to foreign investors. [66]
Significantly, the report made the U.S. government and 
U.S. corporations the principal targets of criticism. AIFLD 
received only one -inconsequential mention, which indicated 
that the NLC was reluctant to criticise official AFL-CIO 
policy in the region. Nevertheless, the NLC had made a clear 
departure from traditional AIFLD and DIA positions. For 
example, the report dropped the customary distinction between 
"legitimate" AIFLD-sponsored unions and "illegitimate" Left 
formations such as ANDES and FENASTRAS. Both moderate and 
radical wings of Salvadoran labour were accorded equal status 
and attention. Moreover, repression against unionists 
received greater emphasis than was the case with AIFLD, and 
the report echoed none of AIFLD's condemnations of the FMLN. 
The NLC's report focussed on the economic as well as the 
military dimensions of U.S. intervention. The AFL-CIO had for 
most of the postwar period considered the activities of U.S.
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multinationals to be beneficial both to U.S. and host nation 
workers. As discussed in Chapter One, during the late 1950s 
the AFL-CIO called for a Marshall Plan for Latin America and 
greater U.S. investment. Since then the character of U.S. 
foreign investment had taken a clear shift away from selling 
goods to the so-called developing world. U.S. corporations 
were now increasingly servicing the U.S. market from 
facilities abroad. A generally beneficial situation for U.S. 
workers had, therefore, turned into its opposite.
The NLC report represented a synthesised expression of 
several important developments unfolding in and around the 
U.S. trade unions - political, economic, and intellectual - 
culminating into a clear challenge (rhetorical at least) to 
the ideological tenets that had sustained AFL-CIO foreign 
policy for several decades. Reagan's attacks, the role of the 
multinationals, the openness to interaction with the Left 
trade unions in El Salvador amounted to the emergence of a 
fairly distinct left-liberal strain in U.S. trade union 
foreign policy. The appearance of the NLC's report meant that 
the anti-intervention movement had, therefore, reached an 
important juncture in its political development.
Expanding the Foreign Policy Role of the AFL-CIO; The 
Kissinger Commission and the National Endowment for Democracy.
The publication of the NLC's report in July 1983 
coincided with the national convention of the International
257
Longshoreman's Association (ILA) in Miami, Florida. Of the 
major AFL-CIO unions, the ILA had been perhaps the most firm 
supporter of the Vietnam war. Its leader, Thomas Gleason, 
received personal thanks from former President Nixon for his 
part in organising a counter-demonstration to a major anti-war 
protest in New York City in 1970. The anti-war demonstration 
was violently dispersed by contingents of Teamsters, 
construction and maritime workers, and ILA members. [67]
Ronald Reagan addressed the 1983 ILA convention. 
Reagan's appearance itself testified to the prevailing 
conservatism of the ILA leadership and the President quipped 
that the acronym ILA actually stood for "I Love America”. The 
President announced plans to establish a National Bipartisan 
Commission on Central America upon which Lane Kirkland would 
serve as representative of the trade union movement under the 
chairmanship Dr. Henry A. Kissinger. That President Reagan 
chose a union audience to announce an important initiative 
pertaining to U.S. foreign policy indicated, perhaps, that the 
Administration was aware that its Central America policy was 
causing a major controversy in the labour movement, one that 
might irreparably damage the AFL-CIO's international 
participation in the Cold War.
Almost three-quarters of Reagan's 75-minute speech 
consisted of an attack on the Sandinistas. Allegedly with 
Soviet-Cuban support, the Sandinistas were "encouraging a war 
to subjugate another nation to communism? that nation is El 
Salvador." Reagan accused the Sandinistas of harassing trade
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unions? the longshoremen's union at the Port of Corinto had 
reportedly tried to affiliate to the AFL-CIO-supported 
federation, the CUS, but had been prevented from doing so. 
This complaint was taken up by the ICFTU and presented to the 
ILO. [68]
The intensification of the Administration's 
anti-Sandinista rhetoric coincided with a similar 
intensification by the DIA and AIFLD. In April the DIA's Free 
Trade Union News ran a front page article under the headline 
"The Sandinistas: Menace to Democracy" which articulated the 
same accusations made by Reagan before the ILA several weeks 
later. The Sandinistas were accused of attempting to "foment 
revolution" beyond their borders and had turned the Nicaraguan 
people into "enslaved subjects". On the question of Nicaragua 
Reagan, the Department of State and the DIA now spoke with one 
voice. [69]
The status and situation of non-Sandinista unions in 
Nicaragua had also attracted the attention of human rights 
groups and the U.N.'s International Labor Organization (ILO), 
although the latter received its information direct from the 
ICFTU and ORIT within which AIFLD and the AFL-CIO exerted 
great influence. However, Amnesty International (AI) in a 
Congressional statement made in September 1983 indicated that 
15 members of the pro-Soviet federation CAUS had been 
prosecuted in October 1981 under the emergency law for staging 
illegal strikes and factory occupations. (The ban on strikes 
had been introduced one month earlier). In its 1984 report,
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however, AI said it was "unaware of any trade unionists having 
been detained or prosecuted (under the provisions of the 
emergency decree).” [70] AI therefore appeared to accept as 
valid the Sandinista explanation that actions were taken 
against individual trade unionists for counter-revolutionary 
activity, noting that, "Charges were generally reported to be 
based on allegations of collaboration with violent opposition 
groups or involvement in specific acts of sabotage and 
terrorism within the terms of the public order law." [71] 
Americas Watch reached a similar conclusion in its 1984 
report. However, AI, Americas Watch and the ILO all 
identified a pattern of short term arrests of union members 
in Nicaragua during 1982. [72]
The issue of the Sandinista*s treatment of unions made 
the argument against intervention vulnerable in certain 
respects. The behaviour of the Sandinistas, therefore, had 
become an important variable in the struggle over Central 
America in the U.S. trade unions. However, U.S. efforts to 
destabilise Nicaragua, politically, economically, and, as was 
becoming increasingly apparent, militarily, confirmed the 
upward trajectory of U.S. intervention in the region. 
Moreover, for a broad segment of anti-intervention opinion 
the Sandinista's trade union record was by no means the only 
important issue. The FSLN's commendable performance in the 
areas of health, literacy, women's rights, etc., should also 
be taken into account - trade union issues needed to be seen 
in the context of the revolutionary process as a whole. Taken
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as a whole, the Sandinista's record set in sharp relief the 
reactionary character of U.S. intervention. The escalation 
of the attacks on Nicaragua therefore had the effect of 
creating further opportunities for anti-intervention work and 
strengthened the case against U.S. policy.
The participation of Lane Kirkland on the Kissinger 
Commission testified to the significance of the AFL-CIO in 
U.S. foreign policy. However, the importance of the AFL-CIO 
as an active agent in the international arena was conveyed 
somewhat more emphatically with the instigation of another 
Reagan project, the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). 
This initiative was originally announced by President Reagan 
in a speech before the British Parliament in June 1982. 
Reagan urged that new political mechanisms needed to be 
installed to help fight communism in the countries of the 
developing world. In November 1983 the NED formally came into 
existence, describing itself as a "non-partisan, private, 
non-profit organization.11 [73] The initiative, however, would 
be funded entirely by the U.S. Government. The political 
strategy encapsulated by the NED rested on an awareness that 
the social and economic crisis in the developing countries 
created grievances that could not be ventilated through what 
might be understood as liberal democratic means of political 
expression. The absence of democratic institutions and 
traditions fostered beliefs that stable liberal democracy was 
an untenable goal; this led to the development of radical 
movements which later fell under the influence and ultimately
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the control of communists. When this happened the U.S. could 
either intervene with military aid to prop up the old 
authoritarian regime, or it could allow the country to be 
"lost” to totalitarian communists. Given these unsatisfactory 
options the free world should help promote democratic values 
and assist in developing a democratic culture and 
infrastructure to exorcise the spectre of communism.
This "export of democracy" was viewed as an important 
dimension of pre-emptive or liberal intervention by 
Administration foreign policy makers. Such an approach had 
been advocated by the AFL-CIO throughout the postwar period. 
In 1971, for example, Irving Brown had suggested that "The 
U.S. should actively support democratic elements both morally 
and materially. We can counter the Communists' organizational 
and ideological offensive and at the same time improve the 
lives of the people of the third world." [74] Brown and the 
DIA believed that the U.S. Government had routinely tarnished 
the democratic ideals of the American revolution for the sake 
of expediency. Moreover, big business was too often 
interested in their own profits to be concerned with the 
liberty of others. As another AFL-CIO official expressed it, 
"commercial and banking interests. . .care only for the buck and 
don't know whether political democracy is a system worth 
defending." [75] The DIA regarded the labour movement to be 
the only reliable and authentic custodian of democratic 
values, one that was opposed to dictatorships of the left and 
the right.
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In pioneering the NED, the Reagan Administration 
appeared to recognise the need to fight an ideological 
struggle against communism. In order to be successful, the 
political conditions which incubated communism - right wing 
dictatorship - needed to be changed. Revolutionary 
alternatives were only attractive when authoritarian regimes 
precluded any hope for genuine democratic reforms? the fall 
of Somoza and the rise of the Sandinistas was a case in point. 
Therefore U.S. foreign policy should do whatever it could to 
encourage political reforms and democratic practices. The 
U.S.'s uncritical support for right-wing dictatorships, 
therefore, could not continue. NED promised to facilitate 
what Kirkland, Brown, Gershman and others had claimed was 
needed all along, that is, "high-minded democratic forces" to 
develop "field cadres for democracy in the pit, on the shop 
floor, or in the workers' neighbourhoods. " [76]
The NED, therefore, appeared to reflect a significant 
shift on the part of the Reagan Administration away from 
support for "authoritarian" regimes solely on the grounds of 
their anti-communism, a policy that had been defended by the 
Administration's representative to the U.N., Jeane 
Kirkpatrick. The extent to which the Administration actually 
accepted the worth of the "ideological war" strategy, or payed 
lip-service to it for the purposes of making U.S. foreign 
policy appear more progressive in the eyes of Congressional 
and public opinion, remains uncertain. Either way, the NED 
was poised to make the AFL-CIO the U.S. Government's principal
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weapon in the international struggle against communism, A 
statement issued by the MED remarked, "Of the American 
organizations working to promote democracy... only the labor 
movement has an established record in this field." [77]
The AFL-CIO's international network was at this point 
destined to receive more NED (i.e. U.S. Government) money than 
any other recipient. Of the $32 million original NED 
appropriation for 1984-85, 77% was allocated to the AFL-CIO's 
Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI) which was established in 
1978 as an arm of the DIA. [78]
Other organisations earmarked to receive NED funds 
included the Center for International Private Enterprise 
(CIPE). One CIPE project concerned itself with promoting the 
relationship between private enterprise and democracy. 
Solidarnosc in Poland and the Afghan rebels would also be 
indirectly supported by NED funds. Freedom House, an SDUSA- 
influenced human rights group, would itself receive $200,000 
to facilitate an information network "for democratic 
intellectuals and journalists. .. in both the developing and 
developed worlds." [79]
Congressional committees began to question the wisdom 
of Project Democracy when it was first aired in February 1983. 
Foreign governments, it was feared, might dismiss it as an 
interventionist propaganda program. A review of the NED by 
a U.S. Government agency, the General Accounting Office (GAO), 
expressed concern that the "appropriate interface" between NED 
and the State Department had yet to be established. Exactly
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what might be appropriate or inappropriate remained 
unexplained. The GAO report conveyed intentions that the 
"pattern of close cooperation with U.S. agencies that the 
business community has had over the years will continue," but 
a FTUI official reported that "since the AFL-CIO has been 
functioning abroad for years, the Institute (FTUI) will not 
require advice on its operations with the State Department." 
[80]
Indeed, the FTUI had already decided the main item on 
its agenda. NED money would be used to pursue Cold War 
unionism, specifically to counter the influence of the "the 
central organization involved in the global struggle against 
free labor" - the WFTU. [81] In Latin America alone 22 
federations had affiliated to CPUSTAL, the regional arm of the 
Prague-based Federation. [82]
The fact that the AFL-CIO was scheduled to receive the 
bulk of NED funds testified to the relative effectiveness and 
reputation of the AFL-CIO's international activities. The 
Administration's active shift towards the type of pre-emptive 
intervention advocated by the AFL-CIO for several decades was 
further confirmed in the appointment of Carl Gershman as 
President of the Board of NED in April, 1983. In 1975 
Gershman had authored a book on AFL-CIO foreign policy which 
praised the international activities of the AFL-CIO and the 
principles which inspired its involvement. [83] Gershman had 
also been chairman of the AFL-CIO's A.Philip Randolph 
Institute (a stronghold of SDUSA) and served as an aide to the
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Reagan Administration's representative to the U.N., jeane 
Kirkpatrick.
The arrival of the NED highlighted an important paradox. 
At a time when the AFL-CIO's international activity was 
becoming more prominent as the result of new foreign policy 
initiatives on the part of the Administration, criticism 
within the AFL-CIO of Federation and U.S. Government foreign 
policy had never been so sustained and widespread. Moreover, 
if Gershmans's appointment illustrated perfectly the renewed 
significance of the AFL-CIO's international perspective to 
U.S. foreign policy, the presence of Kirkland and AFT 
president Albert Shanker on the NED Board alongside 
right-wingers such as Senator Orrin Hatch testified to the 
distance some union leaders put between the domestic concerns 
of their members and their own international affairs agenda. 
Hatch had been in the forefront of the political offensive 
against U.S. labour referred to above. This offensive, many 
believed, had undermined the four-decade social pact between 
labour and government representatives.
Throughout most of 1984, however, NED and the FTUI's 
main political battles were not to be waged against the 
pernicious influence of international communism. Rather, the 
stiffest resistance to the "export of democracy" came from 
the U.S. Congress. The $31 million appropriation for NED was 
seriously jeopardised when the New York Times disclosed that 
NED funds entrusted to the AFL-CIO had been used to influence 
the result of a March 1984 general election in Panama.
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Furthermore, the funds were reportedly used in the campaign 
of the military-supported candidate, Nicholas Barletta, who 
defeated the populist-nationalist Arnulfo Arias by less than 
2,000 votes in a poll of 700,000. The Times cited a cable 
sent by the U.S. Ambassador in Panama Everett Briggs to the 
State Department, which read, "It would be embarrassing to the 
U.S. if the labor instituted (AIFLD's) use of Endowment funds 
to support one side of Panama's elections became public 
knowledge. The Ambassador requests that this project be 
discontinued before the U.S. Government is further compromised 
in Panama." [84] The FTUI's explanation confirmed that the 
Republic of Panama Workers' Federation (Confederacion de 
Trabajadores de Republica de Panama -CTRP) had asked AIFLD 
for "help in holding pre-election voter education seminars and 
labor rallies that would be independent of those which had 
traditionally included Communist unions." [85]
The incident of alleged interference in the 
closely-fought Panamanian elections clearly affected the tone 
of the House debate on NED funding. Fears were expressed 
regarding the accountability of NED? the whole project 
operated outside the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) because 
NED was technically a non-Government entity which thus 
precluding public access to NED documents normally ensured by 
FOIA. [86] Those who defended NED stressed the pre-emptive 
reform perspective: spending money on non-military aid now 
would help prevent military intervention at some future stage. 
Nevertheless, the House voted to quash the $31 million
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appropriation to the NED. The Senate, however, resurrected 
the NED and allocated $11 million to the AFL-CIO's FTUI in 
1984 and $13.8 million in 1985. Therefore, throughout 1984 
and 1985 AIFLD (effectively the FTUI's vehicle in Central 
America) received a major cash injection for its work in 
Central America which increased its overall impact on the 
political situation in Nicaragua particularly. This impact 
was compounded by other non-union related NED projects which 
were used to intensify the propaganda war against the 
Sandinistas. (See Chapters Six and Eight)
The significance of AIFLD's involvement in the 
Panamanian elections was almost completely overlooked by anti­
interventionists. It was only later revealed that AIFLD had 
helped the CIA to get Barletta elected in order to preserve 
the power base of Manuel Noriega as head of the military. 
When the Boland amendment cut off Congressional aid to the 
contras in December 1982 top Reagan Administration officials 
chose to supply the contras by other means. Noriega 
reportedly became a key player in the contra's "covert war" 
against Nicaragua despite his known connections to the 
infamously brutal Medellin cocaine cartel and his 
assassination of political opponents. AIFLD-NED support for 
Barletta therefore stood in total contradiction to the 
objectives of pre-emptive reform and the "export of 
democracy." According to these stated objectives NED money 
and AIFLD support should have fallen behind Arias, the 
civilian candidate who pledged to reform the military and
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fight drug corruption. However, from the point of view of the 
CIA, NED, and presumably AIFLD, Noriega's part in the war 
against Nicaragua took priority over any progress towards 
democracy in Panama. To cap it all, Barletta*s election 
victory was later in 1984 revealed to be a complete fraud 
engineered by the Noriega-controlled Election Commission. [87] 
Even before the full story of Panama became apparent it 
was clear that NED and AIFLD, in their activities against the 
Sandinistas, were involved not in pre-emptive reform against 
an authoritarian right-wing government but a counter­
revolutionary intervention against what they perceived to be 
a totalitarian or near-totalitarian regime. Furthermore, it 
should be noted that in practice the "export of democracy" 
model of intervention was not intended to replace military 
intervention. The hostility of the U.S. Government to 
revolutionary regimes had elsewhere seen the CIA assist the 
military campaigns of counter-revolutionary groups such as the 
contras in Nicaragua and the FNLA and UNITA in Angola. Thus 
it became difficult, by any objective measure, to view the NED 
project, ergo the international activities of the AFL-CIO, as 
entirely separate from the CIA's policy of armed covert war 
against countries such as Afghanistan, Angola and Nicaragua. 
And yet, AIFLD and the DIA presented themselves as the 
defenders of true democracy in the face of Sandinista 
harassment, frequently evading the charge that Sandinista 
harassment, where it existed, might be in some way connected 
to the U.S. supported contra insurgency.
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The connection between AIFIjD's work and U.S. military 
activity was dramatically confirmed in the autumn of 1983 when 
a U.S. and Caribbean invasion force landed in Grenada. After 
the invasion it was revealed that AIFLD had played an active 
role in opposing the Government of Maurice Bishop. Following 
the fall of the right-wing regime of Eric Gairy in 1979, AIFLD 
reportedly funded the Seamen and Waterfront Workers Union 
(SWWU) which, according to one source, instigated "serious 
disruptions on the waterfront and at the utility companies to 
destabilize and, possibly, to bring down the Peoples 
Revolutionary Government.” After the invasion the Grenadian 
Chamber of Commerce invited AIFLD to help "rebuild” the 
Grenadian trade unions and to turn them into an authentic 
"free and democratic" movement. According to one source, this 
began when SWWU members were payed in cash to erase the 
slogans of the Grenadian revolution from the walls and 
billboards of the island. [88] As this news penetrated the 
anti-intervention trade union circles, many feared that 
AIFLD's designs for the Nicaraguan labour movement, should a 
U.S. invasion result, were being rehearsed on a Caribbean 
island under U.S. military occupation.
The Kissinger Report and the AFL-CIO.
The Kissinger Report was published in early 1984. [89] 
The Kissinger Commission itself was widely perceived to be an 
attempt to re-establish the postwar bipartisan consensus on
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foreign policy which crashed on the rocks of the Vietnam
debacle and the political inquest that followed the fall of
Saigon. Kissinger had already indicated that the Commission's 
imperative was to avoid a repeat of the "bitter debate" of 
that period. [90] Indeed, aspects of the Administration's 
Central America policy had suffered setbacks in Congress
during 1982-83 when so-called Congressional liberals and 
moderates voted to cut by half the Administration's request 
for military aid to El Salvador. Furthermore, the House of 
Representatives had voted on two occasions to discontinue 
funding the Nicaraguan contras. The Boland Amendment of 
December 1982 expressly limited the role of CIA actions
against Nicaragua, although by April 1983 Congressman Boland 
expressed concern that the CIA had been ignoring this 
directive. [91] Many in Congress were uneasy about "covert 
action" and dissatisfied with a policy which contained no 
proposals to deal with the underlying economic and social 
problems of the region, problems that were unlikely to be 
addressed by military intervention alone. The Kissinger 
Commission, therefore, needed to address indigenous factors 
as well as perceived Soviet-Cuban expansion if a genuinely 
bipartisan policy was to be formulated.
Lane Kirkland accepted his invitation to serve on the 
Commission without reservations. The AFL-CIO had always 
advocated bipartisanship in foreign policy; this should be 
preserved no matter how conflictual relations may be between 
labour, capital, and the state in the domestic arena. Of
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course, the political and economic situation which underscored 
the postwar social accord were such that serious conflict in 
the domestic arena did not emerge or, if it did, it was mainly 
managed and regulated by the established industrial relations 
machinery. Whether Kirkland liked it or not, the collapse of 
the pact and the attacks on the labour movement led to 
questions being raised regarding the AFL-CIO's cooperation 
with the Administration in the area of foreign policy.
Kirkland's participation on the Commission sent a 
shudder of concern throughout the active layers of the U.S. 
labour movement. Significantly, it was the anti­
interventionists who registered the most visible disapproval. 
West Coast activists around the Labor Network viewed the 
decision as "a clear signal that he (Kirkland) intended to 
deliver organized labor's support for the defense of U.S. 
corporate interests in Central America." [92] A "Labor 
Campaign For Kirkland's Resignation From the Kissinger 
Commission" was launched. "Sitting on the Commission," argued 
the campaigners, "is like crossing a picket line." [93]
Despite these protests, Kirkland's involvement was never 
in jeopardy. In early September 1983 AIFLD presented to the 
Commission its overall analysis of the situation in Central 
America and recommended the formation of a Central America 
Development Organization (CADO). The thinking behind CADO was 
the substance of another presentation made later the same 
month (discussed below). [94]
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The main conclusions and recommendations of the 
Kissinger Report mirrored aspects of the pre-emptive reform 
perspective. The roots of the crisis in Central America was 
said to be social and economic and governments based on the 
oligarchies, said the report, were undeniably brutal. 
However, the crisis conditions had been inflamed by outside 
influences - revolutionary ideologies imported from the 
Eastern Bloc, Cuba, and now Nicaragua. Therefore massive 
military aid was needed to defeat the armed leftist 
insurgents, complimented by funds targeted towards economic 
development and deepening the democratic process. [95]
The points of convergence between AIFLD*s analysis and 
conclusions and those of the final Report were so numerous 
that the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO, in a DIA-authored 
statement that welcomed the Commission's findings, reproduced 
whole passages of the Report alongside segments of its own 
written subscriptions. Both the Report and the AFL-CIO agreed 
that the crisis amounted to a legitimate national security 
concern for the U.S. and that the principal threat was the 
subversive role of the Soviet Union and Cuba. [96] There was 
agreement, too, on the need to support the political centre 
in Central America and to strengthen democratic institutions, 
essentially the objectives stated by the NED. Furthermore, 
the power of the oligarchy had to be curbed: the U.S.
Government, both agreed, could not tolerate its brutal methods 
and expect to retain the support of the American public for 
any long-term commitment to the region. The Commission's
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Report made specific reference to the role of "free and 
democratic trade unions" which the U.S. should help develop 
as part of a process of nurturing "democratic cultures, 
institutions and practices." [97]
Aspects of AIFLD's CADO proposal were also echoed in the 
Report. [98] AIFLD had recommended that indigenous popular 
democratic organisations should receive U.S. aid directly as 
a means of strengthening a viable democratic centre. [99] The 
normal pattern of government-to-government aid, suggested 
AIFLD, should be seriously reviewed. Previous aid programs 
were known for their "relative ineffectiveness" in "changing 
the well being of the average citizen in Central America." 
[100] Finally, even the amount of U.S. aid suggested by the 
Commission over a five-year period (until 1989) - $8 billion 
- was close to the $7.5 billion suggested by AIFLD. [101]
The degree of similarity, in analysis and
recommendations, between AIFLD's suggestions and the final 
Report can not be solely attributed to the forcefulness of 
Kirkland, or even to the weight of authority and influence of 
AIFLD in Central America. Kissinger was apparently impressed 
by the appearance before the Commission of several leaders of 
union federations linked to the AFL-CIO, including Jose
Espinoza of the CUS in Nicaragua, and Salvadoran leaders 
Samuel Maldonado (UCS), Jorge Camacho of the Cooperatives 
Association (Asociacion de Cooperativas de Produccion
Agropecuaria Integradas -ACOPAI), and Salvador Carazo 
(FESINCONSTANS) , but their contributions were hardly decisive.
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[102] The degree of congruency between AIFLD*s proposals and 
what emerged in the Kissinger Report can best be explained by 
the fact that AIFLD*s relatively sophisticated and elaborate 
proposals for pre-emptive reform provided the "constructive” 
dimension necessary to weaken Congressional resistance to the 
Administration's Central America policy. The Kissinger 
recommendations, therefore, provided a balance of 
counterinsurgency on the one hand and promises of reform on 
the other. "The crisis," declared the Report, "is the product 
of both indigenous and foreign factors...Poverty, repression, 
inequity, were all there, breeding fear and hate...while 
outside forces had intervened to exploit the anguish." [103]
The Soviet Union and Cuba were deemed responsible for 
the revolutionary insurgencies - the triumph of which must be 
prevented at all costs with immediate military aid. However, 
to give democracy a chance, economic help must also be 
forthcoming. [104] Thus, moderate-liberal anxieties were 
eased with the promise of reforms, and the Administration 
could now authorise an immediate increase of military aid.
CADO and the Question of Military Aid.
Before AIFLD had entered into the proceedings of the 
Kissinger Commission, the AFL-CIO had called for the 
suspension of military aid to El Salvador. The Executive 
Council indicated that this position would be changed when 
progress was seen to be made in areas of trade union rights,
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the land reform program, the establishment of a just judicial 
system, and control of the death squads. In its first 
submission to the Commission AIFLD reiterated the AFL-CIO1s 
position: aid should be suspended until there is progress in 
the case of the Sheraton murders. The Commission posited that 
military aid to El Salvador should be granted but made 
contingent upon "demonstrated progress" towards the type of 
objectives listed by the AFL-CIO. By endorsing the Report, 
the AFL-CIO now appeared to be supporting immediate military 
aid to El Salvador to deal with the insurgencies, while 
simultaneously opposing it on the grounds that sufficient 
progress had yet to be made in the other specified areas. 
[105]
Regarding Nicaragua, the Kissinger Report concluded that 
the contras represented "one of the incentives working in 
favor of a negotiated settlement between the U.S. and 
Nicaragua, and that the future role of the U.S. in those 
efforts must therefore be considered in the context of the 
negotiating process." [106] Again, by accepting the Report, 
the AFL-CIO appeared to be supporting what would later be 
known as the "insurance policy" position regarding contra aid, 
the chief proponent of which would be the Reagan 
Administration itself. The "insurance policy" position argued 
that the contras should be sustained as a fallback measure 
pending the refusal of the Sandinistas either to democratise 
Nicaragua or to stop supplying arms to the FMLN. It was later 
revealed that the CIA had considered it valuable to depict the
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contras as a bargaining chip on the side of democracy. As 
former contra Edgar Chammorro expressed it, "Instead of 
admitting that our objective was to overthrow the Nicaraguan 
government we were instructed (by the CIA) to say that it was 
to create conditions for democracy." [107]
Union Opposition to Kissinger.
Within days of the release of the Kissinger Report, 19 
trade union officials in Massachusetts issued a statement 
disassociating themselves from Kirkland's endorsement of the 
document. Part of the statement read, "The section of the 
Report dealing with El Salvador is in clear contradiction with 
AFL-CIO policy, as well as with the Report of the fact-finding 
delegation of the National Labor Committee." Furthermore, the 
Kissinger Report, "promotes bipartisan support for Reagan's 
Central American policy and thus increases his chances of 
re-election." The 19, including four vice presidents of their 
respective unions, also declared that, "The AFL-CIO supported 
labor federation in Nicaragua (CUS) is opposed to aid to the 
contras, as is the U.S. House of Representatives and the 
overwhelming majority of American people." [108] The 
Massachusetts group requested a meeting with Kirkland in early 
February but he informed them that his time was too 
restricted. ACTWU vice president Ed Clark complained that 
"Kirkland always seems to have time to meet with Ronald 
Reagan's foreign policy makers, but not with AFL-CIO members."
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[109] In February, during a debate with a State Department 
official before the Executive Board of the IUE, Sheinkman 
attacked the policy of military aid to El Salvador's death- 
squad government and claimed the FMLN were supported by 
Salvadoran trade unionists, church people and radicals. [110]
The British TUC, once a staunch ally of the AFL-CIO in 
international labour, also criticised the Kissinger 
recommendations. The TUC General Council stated that it 
opposed U.S. intervention in Central America and asked the 
AFL-CIO "whether it considers that there have been 
improvements in the situation in El Salvador as required by 
the Kissinger Report as a condition for U.S. assistance." 
[Ill]
The broadly felt opposition to the Kissinger Report 
among union anti-interventionists, was, however, not to be 
reflected among members of the NLC on the AFL-CIO1s Executive 
Council (E.C.). Ten NLC members participated in an E.C. 
meeting on February 21 when Kirkland was given an opportunity 
to clarify his position. In public statements prior to the 
meeting Kirkland had denied that any difference existed 
between the Commission's Report and AFL-CIO policy. [112] A 
timely statement was issued a few days prior to the E.C. 
meeting by the Secretary-Generals of seven Central American 
trade union confederations which welcomed the Kissinger
Commission's recommendations on social and political
development and praised the contribution to the Commission
made by the AFL-CIO. The statement made no mention of
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military aid. [113] The E.C. unanimously endorsed the 
Kissinger Report, stating that, "The National Bipartisan 
Commission on Central America closely parallels the view 
expressed by the AFL-CIO*s E.C. statements and convention 
resolutions. Its recommendations represent a comprehensive and 
long overdue approach to Central America1s urgent need for 
massive social, economic, and political reform and lay the 
basis for constructive bipartisan action to meet that need." 
However the E.C. stated that the Report, in calling for 
military aid to El Salvador, clearly violated the AFL-CIO*s 
conditionality principle and could not be supported. [114]
A serious confrontation between NLC and Kirkland 
supporters on the E.C. was unlikely from the start. Aside 
from the core members of the NLC such as Sheinkman and perhaps 
Winpisinger, many others had gone along with the NLC 
initiative with an uncertain level of commitment. While still 
disposed towards a critical approach to developments in El 
Salvador, for most NLC members the situation in the country 
had improved at least a little. Furthermore, the AFL-CIO had 
come out against military aid, even though the Kissinger 
Report had somewhat complicated the issue. It was, after all, 
the contributions of the AFL-CIO which secured the 
conditionality principle and provided concrete proposals 
(CADO) to address the social and economic roots of the crisis. 
Perhaps Kirkland's participation on the Commission could be 
justified.
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Kirkland himself was enthusiastic about CADO, describing 
it as "the most innovative part of the Report (that 
represented) a departure from past approaches." [115] The 
CADO proposal captured little attention, critical or 
otherwise, from the anti-interventionists who clearly regarded 
the question of military aid to be more important than the 
economic analysis embodied in CADO. The Kissinger Report made 
two clear recommendations - increased military aid and 
increased economic aid. For the E.C to endorse the Report but 
not the proposal to increase military aid was, in their view, 
farcical.
The CADO embraced a development logic which presupposed 
that economic progress would result from building a democratic 
political infrastructure. First, however, it was necessary 
that basic needs assistance reach non-government groups - 
including unions, cooperatives and small businesses. These 
groups were then expected to exert themselves politically as 
a result of their newfound stake in the system. The greater 
the number of groups touched by the aid, argued AIFLD, the 
more pluralistic and healthy the ensuing political activity 
would be. In contrast to government-to-government assistance, 
aid to the popular sector enhanced possibilities for a genuine 
and structural redistribution of wealth. Finally, in per 
capita terms, the CADO proposal was on a par with the Marshall 
Plan instigated in Europe following World War Two. [116]
The CADO proposal was indeed sewn into the fabric of the 
Kissinger Report - but with significant alterations. The
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Report called for an Emergency Stabilization Program, and the 
establishment of an Emergency Action Committee "of concerned 
private citizens and organizations with a mandate to provide 
advice on the development of new public-private initiatives 
to spur growth and employment in the region.. .We encourage the 
greatest possible involvement of the private sector in the 
stabilization effort." Also proposed was a development 
program which required countries to "encourage private 
enterprise and individual initiative (and) to create favorable 
investment climates" in order to develop new export 
industries. The countries of Central America "would 
eventually become important production centres for low and 
medium technology goods to be exported to the U.S." [117] To 
assist this process the Report recommended the expanded 
availability of Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 
insurance to the region. The OPIC insured prospective U.S. 
companies investing in Central America from inconvertibility 
of currency, expropriation, war, revolution and civil strife.
[118]
The Report spoke favourably of the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative (CBI), a $350 million aid package launched by the 
Administration to encourage the integration of the Caribbean 
Basin countries - which included those of Central America - 
into the international (capitalist) market. The CBI was 
designed to help solve the negative balance of trade between 
the region and other developed countries, particularly the 
U.S. This trade imbalance, in the words of the U.S.
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Department of State, "threatens political and social stability 
throughout the region and creates conditions which Cuba and 
others seek to exploit through terrorism and subversion."
[119] None of the $350 million, of course, would be made 
available to regimes regarded as unfriendly to the U.S., 
namely Nicaragua and Cuba.
The AFL-CIO had suggested a tripartite organisational 
structure for CADO. Commissions would be set up in the U.S. 
and aid recipient countries with representatives drawn from 
government, business, and organised labour. The commissions 
would agree or contract with appropriate operating agencies 
- including AID, recipient governments, and U.S. and local 
Private Voluntary Organizations (PVO's) - to carry out 
programs and to supply essential technical assistance with the 
resources of the fund. [120] The Kissinger Report agreed with 
the principle of tripartite representation but urged that the 
majority representation should come from the private sector. 
[121] The clear weight of importance - organisational and 
economic - attached to the private sector in the Report 
therefore stood in contrast to the balanced tripartism 
suggested by the AFL-CIO. Furthermore, the emphasis on 
export-led development and free market formulae constituted 
an additional rebuff of the AFL-CIO's development proposals 
which leaned towards a basic needs model based on increased 
consumption and support for small private producers. 
Moreover, the CBI and OPIC had earlier been opposed by the 
AFL-CIO due to increased trade union concern over import
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penetration following the 1980-81 recession. The economic 
model advanced by OPIC and the CBI consciously encouraged both 
the relocation of U.S. manufacturing to the Caribbean Basin 
countries and the export to the U.S. of low-cost manufacturing 
goods to the U.S. This, complained the AFL-CIO, would deprive 
workers in the U.S. of jobs and render a serious setback to 
industries that had already lost much of their home market to 
cheaper imports. [122] In early 1982 the Executive Council 
of the AFL-CIO criticised the CBI: "Aid in the development of 
Caribbean nations needs to be enhanced, but proposals for 
"one-way" free trade and additional investment incentives to 
U.S. firms for investing abroad should be rejected." [123]
In the light of these complaints the AFL-CIO's 
endorsement of the Kissinger Report amounted to more than just 
a contradictory departure from the Federation's position on 
military aid to El Salvador or an indirect means of supporting 
the Nicaraguan contras. The endorsement also cut across the 
AFL-CIO's "fair trade" or protectionist policies designed to 
defend the jobs of workers in the U.S. More than this, the 
liberal interventionist and anti-communist ideology of the 
AIFLD, ably represented on the Commission by Kirkland, caused 
the AFL-CIO to support the free-trade developmentalist 
orthodoxy of the Administration, an orthodoxy which Federation 
economists and lobbyists had in other situations strenuously 
opposed. In endorsing the Report the AFL-CIO was endorsing 
both military aid and an extension of the neo-liberal economic 
agenda that had so negatively affected the labour movement at
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home. The Cold War priorities of Kirkland and AIFLD had 
triumphed over the economic interests of the membership as 
defined by the AFL-CIO's own policymakers. The international 
and domestic policies of the Federation now stood in peculiar 
contradiction to each other. [124]
Indeed, once the E.C. had endorsed the Kissinger Report, 
AIFLD, and Kirkland himself, began criticising proposals for 
the implementation of the Report's recommendations. Almost 
immediately Doherty criticised the Administration's proposed 
legislation, arguing that the proposals were "either silent 
or obscure with regard to some elements of the structure of 
CADO." Doherty complained that the Administration had 
committed "a scant three pages" to an initiative which, if 
properly implemented, could be "the most important achievement 
for democracy in this century." [125] The AFL-CIO News was 
more blunt, criticising Reagan for "undermining bipartisan 
efforts of achieving basic social, economic, and political 
reforms in Central America by continuing to provide military 
aid to El Salvador and failing to act on the recommendations 
of the Kissinger Commission." [12 6]
The AFL-CIO had enthusiastically endorsed the Kissinger 
Report even though the Federation officially opposed military 
aid to El Salvador and remained critical of the Report's 
economic aid proposals which departed substantially from its 
own CADO suggestions and conflicted with its position on trade 
and imports. There can be little doubt that AIFLD, the DIA, 
and Kirkland saw the endorsement as a means of remaining
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active participants in the formation and execution of U.S. 
foreign policy. The NED had made the AFL-CIO a central actor 
in the Administration's war against global communism. To have 
not endorsed the Report because its own suggestions were 
effectively ignored or because it conflicted with the 
AFL-CIO's domestic economic policies would have threatened 
this newly acquired place of importance in international 
affairs. More important, the Kissinger Report and NED had 
declared war - military and economic - against 
Marxism-Leninism in Central America. As William Doherty 
himself expressed it, "The key question of our time is the 
future road of their revolution (Latin America) towards 
communist totalitarianism or towards democracy. For the 
American labor movement this is one of the paramount pivotal 
issues; all other questions must remain secondary." [127] 
Albert Shanker, leader of the AFT and a firm supporter of 
AIFLD, went even further; "Next to the conflict between the 
free world and the Soviet Union, all other issues become 
secondary. If that conflict is lost nothing else matters." 
[128]
The quiescent response of the NLC members on the E.C. 
to the Kissinger Report reflected an altogether different set 
of priorities. Few of the NLC members possessed anything like 
the degree of ideological commitment displayed by the staff 
of AIFLD and the DIA. To the latter the endorsement of the 
Report was central to their broader anti-communist objectives. 
The NLC members had never met to discuss the Kissinger
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Commission or its findings, let alone formulate an 
alternative. Kirkland had also been very vocal, and positive, 
about the Report in the press, claiming that the AFL-CIO's 
position and the Report's findings were virtually 
indistinguishable from each other. For the NLC members to 
speak out against the Report would be tantamount to a public 
criticism of Kirkland and a declaration that the AFL-CIO was 
split over international policy. Such a course of action 
would inevitably incur serious political and personal 
repercussions. The E.C.'s endorsement of the Kissinger Report 
was therefore a virtual certainty from the start.
City and State Union Committees on Central America. 1983-84.
The period just before and after the release of the 
Kissinger Report was nevertheless a period of growth for the 
anti-intervention forces. The Washington Area Labor Committee 
was formed in late 1983. In October, activists from AFGE 
Local 41 issued an open letter which urged unionists to come 
to an inaugural meeting in early November. More than 100 
responded. Of the 17 signatories to the letter, virtually 
all were white collar workers, including seven from AFGE 
itself. This reflected the preponderance of the unionised 
government sector workforce in Washington, D.C., as well as 
the relatively deep anti-intervention sentiment in the 
white-collar unions. The open letter emphasised soaring 
military expenditures, cuts in social spending, and criticised
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Kirkland's role on the Kissinger Commission for delivering 
"labor's stamp of approval to the military build-up in the 
region and the Reagan policy of backing-up right-wing military 
dictatorships." [129]
Other committees were formed in early 1984. At state 
level the Massachusetts Labor Committee in Support of 
Democracy and Human Rights and Anti-Intervention in Central 
America came into being? at city level, committees in 
Philadelphia, Wilmington, and Atlanta were established. 
Towards the end of the year state-level committees were formed 
in Minnesota and Maine.
A circulated letter urging the formation of the 
Massachusetts committee bore many of the names of those who 
had formally opposed Kirkland's participation on the Kissinger 
Commission. [13 0] The committee, which was made up of union 
leaders rather than rank and file activists, was politically 
more in line with the NLC than with the other solidarity- 
oriented local committees. In its statement of purpose, 
however, the Massachusetts committee referred to the efforts 
being made to rebuild Nicaraguan society - a sign of sympathy 
for the revolutionary process if not an unconditional 
endorsement of Sandinista leadership. The committee expressed 
support for free elections in both Nicaragua and El Salvador, 
for the right to organise and for the right to strike. [131] 
Unlike the parent NLC, the Massachusetts committee was making 
Central America as a region the focus of its attention and not 
to confine itself to El Salvador. Indeed, a spokesperson for
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the new grouping urged Jack Sheinkman to take the lead in 
opposing U.S. policy in Nicaragua in the same way as he had 
done with El Salvador. [132]
The Philadelphia Labor Committee was launched in a 
December 1983 gathering at ACTWU's South Street Hall where 150 
attended. Bernard Dinkin, the Executive Director of ACTWU 
told the gathering, "The NLC has been organized in order to 
make sure that the trade union movement is not handed over to 
President Reagan on this issue in the way it was handed over 
to President Johnson in the case of Vietnam." The active base 
of the Philadelphia committee consisted of an unusually high 
proportion of blue-collar unionists, many of whom had a 
respectable history of trade union work. Perhaps reflecting 
the enduring nature of the effects of the recession on the 
city, the committee's propaganda focused in particular on 
issues of jobs, runaway shops, etc, and their connection to 
the question of U.S. intervention. [133]
The formation of the Maine committee in July 1984 was 
accompanied by an expression of concern regarding the economic 
situation of the state. Maine AFL-CIO President Charles 
O'Leary wrote to ACTWU vice president Ed Clark, "After hearing 
a first-hand report of a trip to El Salvador by members of 
the NLC, and being particularly mindful of the impact on Maine 
workers of runaway shops...delegates to the Maine AFL-CIO COPE 
convention voted to constitute a Maine branch of the NLC and 
pledged that the Maine AFL-CIO would work to educate its 
membership on conditions in El Salvador." [134] Clark himself
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later focused on the runaways in a September circular urging 
unionists to participate in the Massachusetts Labor Committee. 
Clark wrote, "Average wages of $26 per week have attracted 
such corporations as Kimberley Clark, Manhattan Industries, 
Monsanto Co., Phelps Dodge, Sherwin Williams, Sun Chemical and 
Tektronix. Many companies operating in El Salvador closed 
down facilities in the U.S. and have thrown workers out on the 
street." [134] The actual or perceived changes in the 
international economy were thus still very much in the 
forefront of the argument against intervention. However, the 
formation of a committee in Minnesota in the autumn of 1984 
was accompanied by a warning from an anti-interventionist UAW 
shop steward who informed David Dyson, the NLC's coordinator, 
that the committee was mainly composed of "left orientated 
individuals (which means that) our chance of making Central 
America a mainstream labor issue here is somewhat reduced." 
[136]
The composition of the committees aside, new ones were 
still being formed. By mid-1984 twenty-one committees were 
functioning, although frequently at quite varying levels of 
activity. The El Salvador/Central America committees active 
during this period were: Atlanta; Boston? Chicago? Delaware? 
Maine? Massachusetts? West Massachusetts? Michigan? Milwaukee? 
Minnesota? Maine; New Jersey; New York City? Philadelphia? 
Portland (Oregon); Sacramento? San Diego? San Francisco? San 
Jose? Seattle; Washington, D.C. and West Virginia. On the 
West Coast the various committees met in early 1984 and
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decided to formalise their links with each other, creating the 
Labor Network on Central America. Committees in Seattle, 
Portland and Sacramento constituted the planning body of the 
Network. On the eastern seaboard particularly, Dyson had 
played a highly significant role in launching several new 
committees, both organisationally and as a speaker at 
inaugural meetings and forums. This activity, backed by the 
wider circulation of the NLC's Labor. Terror, and Peace cast 
the NLC and Dyson in a more active role at a local level. His 
role also partly explains the attention accorded the runaways 
question by the East Coast committees. Dyson's union, ACTWU, 
had spearheaded several unsuccessful Congressional campaigns 
to restrict imports and criticised runaway shops and those 
involved in offshore sourcing. At a union forum in 
Wilmington, Delaware, entitled "Labor Speaks Out: Jobs at
Home, Not War in Central America," 70 people heard Dyson link 
the questions of human and trade union rights in Central 
America with the job crisis facing members of unions like 
ACTWU. The meeting itself was organised by a laid-off worker 
of UAW Local 435. A leaflet promoting the meeting read, "Here 
in Delaware, close to 30,000 people are without jobs...union 
busting and pressures for concessions continue. The war in 
Central America is being fought for the same reason we're 
getting the shaft here at home: so corporations and
millionaires can gain greater power and profits." [137]
In the main the more active committees continued to 
stress educational and "outreach" activities such as
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slide-shows and presentations about Nicaragua and El Salvador 
using material produced by the various solidarity and 
religious organisations and other non-trade union sources. 
Inside the individual unions organising consistent 
anti-intervention work had proved to be difficult. One or 
two activists from several unions coming together to form a 
city-based Central America committee appeared to be a workable 
formula. Those same individuals linking up with like-minded 
colleagues in the same union to create, formally or otherwise, 
an internal Central America caucus was an altogether more 
difficult task. Not only were political pressures frequently 
greater, there were logistical problems, the most obvious 
being those pertaining to distance. Effective agitation 
around the question of Central America did, however, 
eventually occur at national conventions where activists came 
together to "network" and decide tactics.
At the annual convention of the SEIU in May the 
Executive Board urged acceptance of a union statement which 
echoed Federation policy on Central America. There should be 
no aid to El Salvador until "compelling evidence" became 
available to indicate that progress had been made in 
harnessing the death squads and enacting reforms. On 
Nicaragua, the Board expressed "grave doubts about the 
development of democratic institutions in Nicaragua and the 
guarantee of individual rights and free trade unions." 
However, the SEIU broke with the silence of the AFL-CIO 
regarding the contras (aside from the endorsement of the
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Kissinger Report which expressed support for the counter­
revolutionaries) to declare opposition to U.S. aid to the 
insurgents. [138] Despite this Executive Board proposal the 
anti-interventionists successfully moved a series of 
amendments. Mild approval of the progress made in El Salvador 
with the election of President Duarte was replaced with a 
reference to the "atmosphere of violence and intimidation" 
which surrounded the elections, (discussed in Chapter Six) and 
to Duarte's inability during 1980-82 to control the 
repression. The statement called for a negotiated peace in 
the country. On Nicaragua, while echoing concern for union 
rights and freedoms, reference was made to the "impressive 
advances" of the revolution, advances that were now being 
threatened by the U.S.-supported war and economic 
destabilization. Rejection of the Kissinger Report was also 
urged on the grounds that it conflicted with established 
AFL-CIO policy positions. It was further resolved that the 
SEIU would participate in the work of the NLC. Here the SEIU 
broke precedent regarding the NLC participation: previously 
national union officers had joined or abstained on the basis 
of their own individual feelings and judgments. SEIU leader 
John Sweeney was now instructed to serve on the NLC through 
a convention decision even though his views on the Central 
America controversy were generally closer to those of Lane 
Kirkland. [139]
Speaking tours by Central American trade unionists 
continued throughout 1984, with the city and state based
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committees playing a central organising role. However, the 
visits were less visible than the West Coast tour of 1983 and 
provoked none of the same controversy. In June 1984 two 
unionists from the pro-Sandinista health workers union 
(FETSALUD) visited Boston. While officially promoted by the 
Boston Committee for Health Rights in Central America, several 
unions in the Boston Area endorsed the tour. The FETSALUD 
representatives emphasised the contrast in U.S. and Nicaraguan 
governmental health provision. In Massachusetts alone, it 
was claimed that $83 million had been transferred from health 
care to military needs since 1976. Ten of 26 federally funded 
community health centres had been closed; 80,000 people had 
lost health care benefits including 4 5,000 children. In 
Nicaragua, a mass immunization against malaria, polio, and 
other diseases had occurred since the Sandinista victory in 
1979. [140]
In addition to one-off events of this nature more 
ongoing activities involving the non-AFL-CIO supported unions 
in Central America were being established. Alejandro Molina 
Lara, the FENASTRAS representative in the U.S., had performed 
pioneering work in the area of building relationships between 
U.S. and Salvadoran unionists. Marta Alicia Rivera had done 
the same on behalf of the Salvadoran teachers union (ANDES) 
and she continued throughout 1984 to speak at union and 
solidarity gatherings. The ANDES representative conducted 
several state-wide union tours - including Arizona and 
Kentucky.
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A number of tours of U.S. trade unionists to Central 
America also occurred during this period. In November 1983 
the first independent national tour to Nicaragua of lower and 
middle level union officials occurred. Office holders and 
staff members of the CWA, SEIU, AFSCME (2 each) and the 
290,000-member Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees (HERE) 
were represented, as were two union educators from the 
Washington-based American Labor Education Center and a 
laid-off member of the IAM from Wisconsin. The report 
produced by the delegation, entitled Face-to-Face: An Inside 
View of Labor in Nicaragua, expressed firm support for the 
Sandinistas in trade union and other policy areas. 
Furthermore, the report was unambiguously critical of the U.S. 
Government who, in the three fiscal years to 1984, had 
provided the contras with $86 million in funds and had 
obstructed loans to Nicaragua cleared by international lending 
agencies. Moreover, the report added its voice to the city 
committees and others that had stressed economic reasons to 
oppose intervention. However, the report went further, 
arguing that economic considerations required trade unionists 
support the Nicaraguan revolution because it had encouraged 
trade unionism and prevented runaway shops. In addition the 
decision of the U.S. Government to discourage (and eventually 
prohibit) U.S. trade with Nicaragua was also presented as 
detrimental to U.S. workers. As the IAM member from Wisconsin 
expressed it, "Reagan has made it hard for them (Nicaraguans) 
to buy agricultural equipment, machine tools, and electrical
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parts. And meanwhile here in Wisconsin there are thousands 
of people laid off from companies that make exactly the kind 
of stuff they need." [141]
Another trade union tour of Central America began in 
Nicaragua on July 22 and involved members of the Philadelphia 
committee. The visit sparked an incident which brought 
considerable media attention. In an auxiliary visit to 
Honduras a six-person delegation from the committee attended 
a union rally in Tegucigalpa, organised by the left-wing 
United Federation of Honduran Workers (Federacion Unidad de 
Trabajadores Hondorenos -FUTH) - a formation not regarded as 
legitimate by the AFL-CIO. At a 2,000-strong rally on June 
27, two of the Philadelphia unionists addressed the crowd. 
President of AFSCME District Council 47, Tom Cronin, and CWA 
activist Mike Finlay (who addressed the rally in Spanish) 
called for a complete military withdrawal of the U.S. from 
Honduras. The UPI reported that Cronin declared, "We cannot 
support the presence of U.S. troops here to repress the people 
of Honduras. We demand immediate withdrawal of those troops." 
The following morning, the unionists were waiting to be met 
by FUTH representatives when plain-clothed police apprehended 
them, supported by six soldiers who trained machine guns on 
the delegates. The North Americans were detained for over 
five hours at Tegucigalpa airport before being allowed to 
travel to Managua where they re-joined the 32-member 
delegation.
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News of the expulsion made headlines in the Philadelphia 
press? the tabloid Philadelphia Daily News reported "HONDURAS 
BOOTS PHILA. SIX". The U.S. Embassy in Honduras called for 
an investigation, a request echoed by two Pennsylvania 
Congressmen. AFL-CIO officials in Washington responded to 
the incident by disowning the delegation despite the fact that 
the six involved in the incident were members of unions 
affiliated to the Federation. .[142]
Conclusion.
By 1984 the conflict within the U.S. trade unions 
concerning U.S. intervention in Central America bore the 
character of a war of position. The level of anti-intervention 
activity had expanded, if measured by the growth in the 
city-based trade union committees formed to pursue Central 
America work. Tours to and from Central America had 
strengthened ties between the left unions of Nicaragua and El 
Salvador (as well as Honduras) and the anti-intervention 
activists in the U.S. labour movement. At the leadership 
level the NLC had expanded to a dozen top union officials, 
several of whom held positions on the Executive Council of the 
AFL-CIO. However, as the E.C.'s endorsement of the Kissinger 
Report gave evidence, the NLC members were not inclined to 
form a distinct faction on the E.C. and thus declare their 
clear opposition to the Administration's policy in Central 
America. The NLC's analysis of events in El Salvador
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indicated that firm opposition to the economic and political 
role of the U.S. in the region did in fact exist among the 
leaders of U.S. trade unions, although this was accompanied 
by a clear reluctance to criticise those in the Federation who 
appeared to be actively supporting Administration policy, 
namely AIFLD and the DIA.
For the AFL-CIO*s international affairs establishment 
the formation of the NED and the release of the Kissinger 
Report had considerably enhanced the status of the AFL-CIO*s 
international work. Despite substantive alterations, AIFLD 
had made an impression on the Kissinger Report and, in the 
case of the NED, the AFL-CIO had become the largest recipient 
of NED funds. It was somewhat paradoxical that the 
international role and reputation of the AFL-CIO had reached 
new heights precisely at a time when the "internal challenge" 
to Cold War unionism had itself reached new organisational, 
political, and (in some respects) ideological dimensions.
It is difficult to evaluate precisely to what extent 
the rise of anti-intervention sentiment was determined by 
Reagan's attacks on the unions or by changes in the behaviour 
and impact of the U.S. multinationals. Nevertheless, 
consistent reference to the anti-union character of the U.S. 
Government, the exploitation of cheap foreign labour by 
"runaway shops", as well as cuts in social programs indicated 
that these issues were striking resonant chords among sections 
of the labour movement rank and file. The challenge to Cold 
War unionism, it seems reasonable to conclude, was directly
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linked to the experience of the U.S. labour movement following 
the unravelling of the postwar social pact. However, these 
economic concerns were frequently accompanied by concern for 
human and trade union rights in El Salvador and by highly 
favourable comment on the role of the Sandinistas in advancing 
a pro-worker revolutionary project in Nicaragua.
Chapter Five discusses the concern of anti-intervention 
trade unionists for trade union rights issues in El Salvador. 
It then describes AIFLD's role in supporting the U.S. 
Government-endorsed candidate, Jose Napoleon Duarte, in the 
1984 Salvadoran elections and the formation and disintegration 
of the Social Pact between Duarte and the AIFLD-supported 
unions. Chapter Five also charts the re-emergence of the left 
federations and their challenge to the new government. This 
challenge resulted in AIFLD, Duarte and the leaders of the 
armed forces depicting the left unions as front organisations 
for the FMLN guerillas.
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CHAPTER 5
EL SALVADOR: TRADE UNIONS AND THE "DEMOCRATIC OPENING"
Chapter 2 discussed the degree and significance of the 
AFL-CIO's intervention in El Salvador from the launching of 
the campesino organisation, UCS, in the 1960's until the time 
of the reformist coup in 1979 and the massive repression that 
followed. This chapter continues the account of AIFLD's 
involvement in El Salvador around the period of U.S.-supported 
elections in early 1984 and the formation of a social pact 
between the governing Christian Democrats and the 
AIFLD-sponsored unions. Furthermore, this chapter presents 
an account of the impact of anti-intervention trade union 
activities on the Salvadoran trade unions during the same 
period.
The Reagan Administration's belligerence towards the 
Nicaragua in 1984 stood in stark contrast to its posture 
towards neighbouring El Salvador. The election of Jose 
Napoleon Duarte as President in March 1984 was hailed as an 
authentic democratic opening, even though the contest did not 
include the FMLN who by then controlled roughly one quarter 
of the Salvadoran countryside. AIFLD and the UCS rallied
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enthusiastically behind Duarte. According to numerous 
observers the active intervention of AIFLD and the UCS in the 
campaign of the Christian Democrats was the decisive factor 
in Duarte's narrow victory over the far-right ARENA party. [1] 
AIFLD's account of the Salvadoran elections generally 
reflected the self-congratulatory statements of Congress and 
the Administration: democracy had triumphed over the extremes 
of left and right. The election of Duarte was a foreign 
policy victory for the Reagan Administration, and AIFLD had 
played a major part in bringing it about. [2]
Anti-interventionists and Trade Union Rights.
Throughout this period the NLC continued to focus 
attention on the human and trade union rights situation. 
Active campaigns were instigated to assist unionist detainees 
or "disappeared". Elections or no elections, the extent of 
the abuse was made clear in the disclosures of Tutela Legal, 
the Church-based legal aid office in San Salvador. In 1983, 
5,143 non-combattants were killed in the country, and as of 
December the same year there were 430 political prisoners in 
Mariona prison and 55 women in Ilopango prison. In January 
1984 the National Police arrested over 100 union leaders and 
kidnapped 16 others. [3]
Incidents such as these prompted a series of telephone 
and telegram campaigns organised by West Coast unionists 
involved in the Committee In Support of Trade Union Rights
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(CISTUR) and the Trade Unionists In Support of El Salvador 
(TUSES) and the city-based union committees in San Jose and 
Sacramento. The urgent need for a rapid response network to 
deal with arrests had been tragically illustrated the previous 
October. Sheinkman at ACTWU's headquarters in New York had 
circulated a request for urgent action to free Santiago 
Hernandez, the General Secretary of the Unifying Federation 
of Salvadoran Trade Unionists (Federacion Unitaria de 
Sindicatos Salvadorena -FUSS). Hernandez had helped form the 
left-wing Unity Movement of Unions and Guilds of El Salvador 
(MUSYGES) in 1982. [4] A letter to Sheinkman from Frank 
Martino, the President of the International Chemical Workers 
Union (ICWU) , conveyed the outcome of the case: "I was
distressed to note that your request for urgent action 
regarding Sr. Hernandez arrived about the same time as word 
of his death at the hands of the death squads. The need to 
move more quickly in such matters was dramatically emphasised 
in this situation." [5]
The murder of Hernandez marked the tragic end of MUSYGES 
as a force for radical unionism in El Salvador and thus became 
an important conjunctural moment in the recent history of the 
Salvadoran union movement. The program of MUSYGES had 
resembled that of the FDR (see Chapter Two) , but, like its 
political partners, MUSYGES had endured severe repression. 
As one author described, "The overwhelming majority of 
political assassinations of unionists (in El Salvador) have 
been borne by the labor federations of the revolutionary
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left." [6] Fear of repression caused other unions to withdraw 
from MUSYGES and by the end of 1983 ten independent trade 
unions had left the federation.
In another case David J. Rathke, International 
Representative of ACTWU, wrote to President Reagan informing 
him that sixteen Salvadoran unionists had been arrested by the 
Salvadoran National Police in January 1984. "Their only 
crime," wrote Rathke, "is that of supporting a free democratic 
labor movement in El Salvador." [7] The U.S. Department of 
State advised Rathke that the arrested unionists were members 
of the Revolutionary Trade Union Federation (Federacion 
Sindical Revolucionaria -FSR), "the widely known labor front 
of the guerilla group Popular Revolutionary Bloc/ Popular 
Liberation Forces (BPR-FPL)." [8] Furthermore, the unionists 
had been "legally arrested" and charged with conspiracy 
against the government. The U.S. Embassy in San Salvador had 
assured the State Department that procedures in the case of 
these arrests were correctly followed. The Department 
reassured Rathke that, "According to the National Police 
Director, Colonel Reynaldo Lopez Nuila, who is also a member 
of the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission, the National Police 
has so far carefully observed all proper respect for the 
physical integrity of the detainees and for their human 
rights." [9] Nine of the sixteen were incarcerated in Mariona.
Amnesty International's investigation into the case did 
not substantiate the claim by the National Police Director 
(and a member of the Salvadoran Human Rights Commission) that
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the physical integrity of the detainees had been respected.
AI disclosed that a Mexican observer who was arrested with 
the sixteen testified after her release that she had been 
psychologically tortured during her three-day detention and 
had heard others being beaten. After international appeals 
the remaining nine unionists were released in July. They 
stated that they had been tortured into confessing membership 
of an armed opposition group. [10]
Further activity over the arrest, detention, and torture 
of trade unionists emerged as a direct consequence of the NLC 
tour of El Salvador in 1983. The urgency in which the 
following case was pursued demonstrates how direct contact 
with trade unionists in El Salvador gave these initiatives a 
personal dimension and thus a higher degree of impetus. The 
NLC tour had facilitated direct contact with unions and 
unionists who had endured serious and continuing repression. 
The case of the Salvadoran teachers union (ANDES) offered a 
graphic and disturbing example of the systematic and long-term 
repression of a single union. This, combined with the fact 
that two leading NEA functionaries were part of the NLC 
delegation, provided the basis for future support of ANDES by 
the anti-interventionists in the U.S. labour movement. 
Militant activity by ANDES dated back to the mid-1960s when 
the union led a march of 20,000 teachers to protest a proposed 
cut in retirement benefits. In 1968 ANDES staged a 58-day 
national strike, one which effectively marked the beginning 
of a new era of union repression in El Salvador. In the wake
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of the strike, ANDES suffered assassinations and their 
demonstrations were broken up by riot police. ANDES was a 
leading force in the rise of the popular movement during the 
1970s, and during the intensified repression of 1979-82 264 
ANDES activists were killed and 44 disappeared. [11]
In 1983 ANDES was still functioning as a union and 
remained, ironically, a certified legal organisation despite 
its need to operate in a semi-clandestine manner. In March 
1984 the National Guard had broken into the union's 
headquarters in San Salvador and seized membership records. 
The continuing presence of Marta Alicia Rivera as the ANDES 
representative in the U.S. ensured that ANDES would continue 
to be a focus of anti-interventionist attention. Herself a 
torture victim, Rivera's testimony and the plight of ANDES 
were heard by thousands of unionists and others in the U.S. 
At an organisational level, the World Confederation of 
Organizations of the Teaching Profession (WCOTP), a 
non-aligned international teachers organisation formed in 
1947, monitored the ongoing difficulties of the union. The 
U.S. affiliate to WCTOP, the 1.7 million National Education 
Association (NEA), began to pay particular attention to ANDES 
following the visit to El Salvador of John De Mars, the NEA's 
International Relations Official who participated in the NLC 
tour in 1983. DeMars had established a relationship with 
Julio Portillo who, also in 1983, was an exiled member of 
ANDES' Executive Council, soon to become President of the 
union. Portillo had fled El Salvador after having been shot
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and wounded by security personnel. The 1983 annual report of 
WCTOP put the number of dead and disappeared ANDES members 
since 1980 at 300. WCTOP itself intervened on behalf of a 
number of teachers in El Salvador and assisted a number of 
Salvadoran educators to flee the country. The NEA helped 
secure political asylum of ANDES members to the U.S. [12]
The NLC's tour and the visit to Mariona prison in 1983 
brought the delegation into contact with eleven imprisoned 
hydro-electrical workers who had been members of the Union of 
Electrical Workers of the Lempa River (Sindical de 
Trajabadores de la Comision Ejecutivo Electrica de Rio Lempa - 
STECEL). [13] The "STECEL eleven” had been arrested in August 
1980 as a result of their involvement in a national strike 
called to protest attacks by the Salvadoran government forces 
against their union. During the two years which preceded the 
strike, death squads had killed eighteen STECEL members and 
dynamited and machine-gunned the union office.
Sheinkman was determined to bring the details of the 
STECEL case to the U.S. labour movement and to build a 
campaign for their release. In May 1984 Sheinkman*s office 
released further information pertaining to the story: the day 
after the arrest of the STECEL leaders the union was dissolved 
by government decree. The prisoners then spent 70 days at the 
headquarters of the National Guard, where they were starved, 
beaten, and told their families would be killed. They were 
then transferred to another prison and five of the unionists 
were released. Eight months later, one of the five, Miguel
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Angel Centeno, was murdered by government security forces.
[14] In September 1980 prison authorities extracted "extra
judicial statements" from the STECEL leaders, who were forced 
to confess to acts of terrorism and to occupying public 
service installations for insurrectionary purposes. On June 
11, 1981, the 17-year old daughter of one of the STECEL
eleven, Jose Valencia, was abducted from her home by armed 
men. Her tortured body was later found in a public garbage
dump in the city of Santa Ana. On August 20, 1982, the wife
and 13-year old daughter of another of the eleven imprisoned, 
Hector Recinos, were arrested. Ironically, Recinos* wife was 
a member of Mothers of Prisoners and the Disappeared, a group 
organised to investigate disappearances and even perform the 
gruesome task of finding and identifying the often severely 
mutilated and unrecognisable remains of death squad victims. 
The truth of her fate would be hidden for two years. [15]
At the beginning of the campaign initiated by Sheinkman 
the STECEL eleven had spent more than three and a half years 
in custody without trial and were among the longest held 
political prisoners in El Salvador. Sheinkman interpreted 
this as clear evidence that the judicial system was not 
working and that the STECEL members had little hope for 
vindication or release. The campaign began with an appeal 
throughout the labour movement to send messages to prominent 
Salvadoran and U.S. Government officials. "From there," said 
the ACTWU leader, "we hope to take whatever steps are 
necessary to see that these men do not become further
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victimized in a conflict which finds trade unionists in the 
front ranks of the victims." [16] Thousands and letters and 
telegrams were written as a response to Sheinkman's appeal. 
The campaign was assisted by Hector Recinos' son, aged 16, who 
was brought into the U.S. illegally and spoke in Boston before 
a union forum at the Park Plaza Hotel. The meeting was 
designed to coincide with the annual convention of the 
Massachusetts State AFL-CIO held at the hotel. During the 
proceedings the younger Recinos met with and received the 
support of the President of the IUE, William Bywater. [17]
On October 15th the STECEL workers were released from 
Mariona. After more than three years of inactivity regarding 
the case, Lane Kirkland also called for their release just 
days before the decision to free them was taken. 
Anti-interventionists involved in the STECEL effort claimed 
that AIFLD, given their years of activity in El Salvador and 
their relationship to the U.S. Embassy, had been fully aware 
of the situation but had deliberately remained silent because 
the STECEL union was associated with the left. [18]
On the eve of the STECEL eleven leaving prison the 
Secretary General of the Bank Workers Union was kidnapped. 
His body was discovered a few days later. The NLC 
coordinator, David Dyson, flew from New York to assist as an 
escort of the released men, who were due to leave for the 
Netherlands the same day. In his diary inserts made at the 
time Dyson describes the airport scene? "Hector (Recinos) told 
a reporter of their happiness about being released, but their
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sadness in leaving behind so many disappeared relatives and 
dead friends. He thanked the workers from the U.S. who worked 
hard for their freedom." Recinos, says Dyson, was then 
questioned regarding the fate of his wife and daughter. 
"Hector.. told the reporter that the army had gotten word to 
him yesterday, his last day in prison, that his wife and 
13-year old daughter were killed sixteen days after their 
capture at the headquarters of the Treasury Police." The 
STECEL leader also told Dyson that, when his daughter's body 
was found, "she had bullet holes everywhere." [19]
The November issue of the IUE's newspaper celebrated the 
release of the STECEL members. In an editorial statement the 
union recognised its own part in the campaign? members had 
petitioned U.S. and Salvadoran officials and convention 
delegates in Pittsburgh had called for their release. The 
statement reflected the increased awareness of the 
relationship between economic issues, human rights, and their 
impact on workers in the U.S. "Without free trade unions in 
El Salvador," stated the IUE, "large American corporations 
build plants there, pay slave wages to Salvadoran workers and 
no wages to American workers. Working both against the 
middle, the corporations are advancing their cause of a 
union-free environment on both sides of the border." [20] 
The paper of AFGE Local 12 in Washington, 12 Now, described 
the STECEL release as "a significant victory for the labor 
movement there as well as the labor movement in this country." 
[21] AFGE's support for the campaign was registered in a
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unanimous decision of the Executive Board in September. [22] 
Sheinkman was also personally congratulated for his role in 
ensuring the release by the President of the ICWU, Frank 
Martino, who declared in a letter to Sheinkman, "There have 
been few battles in labor history that were as just..In many 
ways their release must be seen as your personal triumph as 
well. The battle for STECEL represents a hallmark in 
international labor unity." [23]
Duarte. AIFLD. and the "Social Pact."
While the NLC and its grassroots supporters were giving 
priority to the victims of trade union repression, AIFLD was 
helping to ensure the victory of the Christian Democrat, Jose 
Napoleon Duarte, in the country*s elections. The campaign was 
fought against a background of continuing violence. 
Politically motivated killings were running at 93 per month 
in the period prior to the March 1984 election. The U.S. 
Department of State, in citing the figures, nonetheless 
pointed to the "positive downward trend"? deaths in this 
category - according to U.S. Embassy calculations - had been 
140 per month throughout 1983, 288 per month in 1982, 444 per 
month in 1981, and 800 per month in 1980 when the body count 
first began. [24]
The decision of the moderate unions in the UPD to 
support Duarte can be traced to Honduras in July 1983 when UPD 
leaders met with AIFLD representatives to discuss the terms
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under which the Christian Democrats might be supported. The 
UPD1 s proposals were virtually indistinguishable from those 
unions of the left: human rights must be protected, offenders 
must be punished, and Duarte must deliver promised 
improvements in wages and make reforms to protect workers. 
Furthermore, the UPD wanted representation in the government 
at high-level positions important to the labour movement. 
Finally, the UPD was categorical in its demand for a peaceful 
resolution to the military conflict by means of an open 
dialogue between the government and the FMLN-FDR. [25] The 
UPD's opposition to military aid was reflected in this 
position. Unlike the AFL-CIO, the UPD had never singled out 
the Sheraton victims (Hammer and Pearlman) as a yardstick for 
its policy on military aid. The Christian Democrats agreed 
to the "Social Pact" with the UPD, and from that moment AIFLD 
worked strenuously with the UPD to get Duarte elected. [26] 
AIFLD assigned 3 60 Salvadoran union organisers for, as one 
source expressed it, "the sole purpose of actively campaigning 
for Duarte." [27]
AIFLD's own report of the campaign described how "UPD 
members went door-to-door in the towns, and farm-to-farm in 
the countryside, explaining to the people the importance of 
the elections, the new registration and voting procedures, and 
why the UPD supported the Christian Democratic candidate." 
[28] However, the Duarte campaign before March was not 
actively supported by a number of key unions of the centre, 
namely FESINCONSTRANS, ACOPAI, UCS and ANIS. [29] In the
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March election Duarte received 43% of the vote in a 75% voter 
turnout, thus necessitating a run-off with the notorious 
right-wing candidate Roberto D'Aubuisson in May. In the 
second and decisive battle Duarte won just under 54% of the 
vote and secured the Presidency. In the May 6th election all 
the moderate unions entered the fray behind Duarte, anxious 
to defeat the right-wing challenge of ARENA and D'Aubuisson. 
The left federation FENASTRAS, however, advised its members 
not to vote for either the Christian Democrats or ARENA. [30] 
Duarte's victory meant that significant obstacles which 
had prevented the AFL-CIO from supporting military aid to El 
Salvador were now about to be removed. In August 1984 Isidoro 
Sibrian Lopez, a lieutenant in the Salvadoran armed forces, 
was indicted for the murder of Hammer, Pearlman, and Viera 
at the Sheraton hotel four years earlier. Kirkland was now 
able to put the weight of the AFL-CIO behind Reagan's request 
for a $70 million package of supplemental military aid. In 
a statement to Congress he declared, "The Duarte government 
was elected with the full support of the workers and 
campesinos. Duarte deserves a fair chance to achieve his 
objective since he is committed to meeting the conditions of 
democracy, dialogue for peace, and the prosecution of the 
murders of the AFL-CIO representatives." [31]
The indictment of Sibrian concluded a successful period 
for AIFLD's operations in El Salvador. The land reform 
program, despite NLC complaints, was perceived to be 
advancing, and AIFLD-supported unions now had a preponderant
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position in both the urban and rural sectors of the Salvadoran 
labour movement. Despite some signs of revitalization, the 
left unions had been decimated by the 1980-83 repression, and 
their challenge to the centre unions had been severely 
stunted. AIFLD had successfully shifted attention from the 
countryside and the land reform program to the urban unions 
and had mobilized both behind the political centre. 
Furthermore, AIFLD had stamped its mark both on the Kissinger 
Commission's proceedings and on the final report and in so 
doing won considerable bipartisan recognition for AIFLD's role 
in Central America. Occasional criticisms of the
Administration's implementation of the Commission's proposals 
had not dampened the AFL-CIO's official enthusiasm for the 
Report; in a speech before the Foundation for International 
Relations in Lisbon on June 29th 1984, Kirkland said that the 
Report went "to the heart of the democratic challenge in Latin 
America." [32] Finally, given the consensus between the 
stated objectives of the Administration and AIFLD regarding 
the Salvadoran elections, both were surely gratified by the 
hero's welcome given to Duarte by Congress during his 
post-election visit to Washington.
Once inaugurated, Duarte appointed UPD (and ACOPAI) 
leaders to government posts as was agreed in the Social Pact 
deliberations. [33] However, following the June 1984 
inauguration of the new President the social pact between 
Duarte and the UPD quickly began to unravel. Even before the 
elections the building workers federation, FESINCONSTRANS,
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experienced a period of tense relations with the UPD. The 
federation "temporarily rejected" the Social Pact with the 
arguments that "no political party, so far, represents or 
defends the interests of the people" and that the "best 
guarantee of full respect for labor rights in a country is the 
existence of a strong, independent, and democratic labor 
movement." [34]
Now that Duarte was elected and UPD leaders were in 
government positions, it was anticipated that immediate 
progress would be made to fulfill promises made under the 
Duarte-UPD Social Pact. However, in the post-election period 
weekly meetings occurred between Duarte and UPD leaders 
exposed disagreements between the UPD and the President over 
dialogue with the guerillas - one of the principal planks of 
the Social Pact. [35] Journalists operating in San Salvador 
or observing the situation there reported that AIFLD severely 
rebuked the UPD for applying concerted pressure on Duarte to 
honour the social pact. [36] For AIFLD and the U.S. Embassy 
the situation further deteriorated when, on August 30, UPD 
leaders appeared on Salvadoran television and criticised 
Duarte for not pursuing an FMLN-Government dialogue and for 
presiding over a new military buildup. [37] AIFLD later 
insisted that the largest of the UPD affiliates were not party 
to the protest, which was led by "a minority faction" within 
the UPD claiming to represent the whole organisation. 
Furthermore, declared AIFLD, the AFL-CIO had always supported 
dialogue as "the most promising solution to the wars in both
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El Salvador and Nicaragua." The issue, therefore, was not 
controversial. [38] AIFLD dismissed the protest by 
characterising it as an attempt by lower-level UPD leaders to 
grab the limelight from their more powerful colleagues. [39] 
Later AIFLD declared that "several dissidents were secretly 
collaborating with the Marxist-Leninist guerillas to disrupt 
the UPD." [40]
The action of the UPD leaders was described by several 
commentators as a major setback for AIFLD and U.S. government 
policy, coming just three months after the euphoria of 
Duarte's electoral triumph. Moreover, two journalists, 
Christopher Norton and Michael Luhan, presented damaging 
accounts of AIFLD'S manipulation and underhandedness 
throughout the entire episode. The Institute's considerable 
resources, and its influence within the U.S. Embassy, were 
allegedly employed to penalise unions financially and 
politically if they opposed Duarte. According to one version, 
news of the impending television appearance of UPD leaders 
"horrified AIFLD country director Bernard Packer. For several 
years the Institute had been paying almost 80% of the expenses 
of four of the UPD's five membership organizations; in return, 
it felt it had the right to expect their allegiance. Yet now 
the UPD was attacking the very basis of U.S. policy - military 
aid to defeat the FMLN." [41] Packer and the Embassy's Labor 
Attache, Eduardo Baez, insisted that the television event be 
cancelled and a statement the UPD leaders had drafted be 
amended. Frustrated by their failure to deflect these UPD
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leaders from their intentions, AIFLD's armed agents reportedly 
entered the offices of one of the dissident unions to 
repossess the jeep and two-way radio that had been used during 
the election campaign. [42] The repossession episode "shocked 
UPD leaders and sparked what quickly became a heated issue 
between them and Packer on the freedom to call their own 
political shots." [43]
AIFLD Builds A New Federation.
In early September 1984 AIFLD announced plans to form 
a new union federation in El Salvador. The organisation would 
be called the Confederation of Democratic Workers 
(Confederacion de Trabajadores Democratica -CTD). AIFLD's 
Packer spent the closing months of 1984 trying to persuade UPD 
leaders to affiliate, allegedly threatening a cessation of 
AIFLD funding to unions who refused to comply. [44] The 
Institute claimed that the decision to promote the CTD was 
taken in order to meet the institutional concerns of the 
smaller UPD unions. The UPD was "not a true labor federation" 
but had served as a "coalition for survival" during the period 
of repression. It had no constitution, no regular meetings, 
no dues structure, and no defined set of officers. The lull 
in the repression had resulted in other unions crawling out 
from under the wreckage of the 1980-83 period; these unions, 
claimed AIFLD, had no umbrella organisation which could serve 
as a vehicle to relate to the already established UPD unions.
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Furthermore, leaders of FESINCONSTRANS and the UCS had been 
co-initiators, with AIFLD, of the CTD. [45] The CTD was not,
according to AIFLD, a response to the August 30 press
conference. Rather, plans to create the CTD probably 
encouraged the dissidents to act out of fear of losing the
influence they had exerted in the ad-hoc UPD. [46]
A U.S. Embassy report on the Salvadoran labour movement, 
published in August 1984, validated AIFLD1s claim that the 
decision to form the CTD was taken before the press conference 
of August 30th. However, for anti-interventionists in the 
U.S. unions, the exact seguence of events was not a critical 
factor in their interpretation of the developments in the 
Salvadoran labour movement during this period. AIFLD1s 
decision to promote the CTD, whenever it was taken, amounted 
to an announcement that the services of the UPD were no longer 
required. The UPD had already displayed a certain 
independence. Some unions were reluctant to enter into a pact 
with Duarte; others, once the pact was agreed, had pressured 
Duarte to comply. Now that Duarte was elected, U.S. policy 
objectives must not be threatened by the UPD pressuring Duarte 
from the left. The U.S. Embassy had already declared that the 
principal priority was to get the economy on a sound footing 
through the creation of a favourable investment climate. The 
Kissinger Commission had made it clear that the military 
defeat of the FMLN was needed to make economic revitalization 
a reality. AIFLD had been a significant voice in the 
formulation of those priorities; however, the clauses in the
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Pact, particularly those pertaining to economic improvements 
for workers and to negotiations to end the war, were clearly 
contrary to those objectives. For anti-interventionists the 
formation of the CTD indicated AIFLD*s true loyalties. 
Instead of supporting the UPD in their efforts with regard to 
the Social Pact, AIFLD moved to reign in the UPD and thus 
neutralize its threat to the regime. In a choice between the 
interests of the independent, free, and democratic labour 
movement, and the priorities of U.S. foreign policy, AIFLD 
chose the latter. [47]
During the final weeks of 1984 AIFLD*s policy in El 
Salvador received a further setback which compelled the 
AFL-CIO to register again its opposition to U.S. military aid. 
On November 15 the Salvadoran Supreme Court dismissed the case 
against Lt. Lopez Sibrian in the proceedings investigating the 
Sheraton murders. The AFL-CIO*s Department of Information 
issued a bitter press release: "Because the facts linking
Lopez Sibrian to the heinous murders have been so well 
established, the AFL-CIO is convinced that this decision 
amounts to a whitewash of a murderous army officer by a 
corrupt judicial system...We cannot in good conscience suggest 
to U.S. citizens that they should continue to support military 
aid to a country where the judicial system repeatedly fails 
to punish terrorists. (Progress in the Sheraton case had) 
formed the basis for the support given by the AFL-CIO to the 
National Bipartizan (Kissinger) Commission on Central 
America." [48] The Salvadoran Supreme Court rebuked the
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AFL-CIO for its criticism of its decision in a full-page 
advertisment in a Salvadoran newspaper, as did the National 
Association of Private Enterprise. Finally, the right-wing 
majority in the Legislative Assembly passed a resolution 
condemning the AFL-CIO*s statement as "...violating our 
juridical sovereignty by interfering in purely national 
matters." [49]
To complete an increasingly worrying picture for AIFLD, 
twenty-one left unions came together in November to form the 
Workers Solidarity Coordinating Council (Coordinadora de 
Solidaridad de Trabaj adores -CST) . At the end of 1983 the 
previous left coalition, MUSYGES, had finally buckled under 
the weight of the repression; the CST intended to pursue the 
objectives of MUSYGES without establishing firm links with the 
FDR-FMLN. The CST initiated solidarity efforts in an attempt 
to build authentic union unity at the base level. [50] The CST 
came into existence to support a strike in a sports club in 
San Salvador; its success in this action prompted its 
establishment as an ongoing organisation. [51] Member unions 
of FENASTRAS, FUSS, and the Food, Clothing and Textile 
federation (Federacion Nacional de Sindicatos de Trabajadores 
de la Industria del Alimento, Vestido, Textil, Similares y 
Conexos de El Salvador -FESTIAVTSES) were to play an important 
role in the new formation. The CST immediately established 
the "May 1st Committee" in order to bring El Salvador*s left 
unions back on the streets for May Day, 1985. [52] If the
"democratic opening" in El Salvador had truly been
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established, the scattered remnants of the left unions had 
regrouped and were poised to move into the political space 
that had been created.
The Challenge to Duarte
The early months of 1985 witnessed AIFLD and its 
supporters in the Salvadoran trade union movement work to set 
the new CTD on a firm footing, but things did not go as 
planned. In the country's largest union, the Construction 
Workers' Union (Sindicate Union de Trabajadores de 
Construccion -SUTC) , a controversy broke out over the election 
of incumbent General Secretary, Salvador Carazo, the President 
of the CTD. Dissidents in the union opposed to the formation 
of the CTD accused Carazo of packing a January meeting with 
non-union members and of using AIFLD's money to pay for their 
votes. Carazo's election was critical to the future of the 
CTD. If Carazo had lost the SUTC contest, his presidency of 
the CTD would have lost legitimacy. [53] The Salvadoran Labor 
Ministry endorsed the result in a remarkably fast two hours. 
Dissident pressure, however, caused the Ministry to cancel the 
vote and request a new election. [54]
Also in January UPD leaders complained to William 
Doherty about the top-down method used to create the CTD, and 
of the role of AIFLD's country director Bernard Packer who, 
said the UPD leaders, "promoted the participation of
suspicious persons and mini-organizations which have attempted
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to destroy the unity of the UPD." [55] The UPD later called 
on AIFLD to remove Packer from El Salvador because of his 
allegedly corrupting influence over certain union leaders, a 
request which, as the rift in the UPD appeared to deepen, won 
the support of U.S. Ambassador, Thomas Pickering. [56] Packer 
was moved in March to work with AIFLD's operation in 
Guatamala. The U.S. Embassy's labour attache, Eduardo Baez, 
also made his exit from El Salvador in February following 
threats to his life; the Embassy said the threats had come 
from the FMLN. However, the Boston Globe reported that Baez 
had thought it possible that the threats "...could be coming 
from unionists angered by the bickering over the Institute's 
(AIFLD's) confederation (CTD)." [57]
Tensions had also developed in the crucial rural union, 
the UCS. Ramon Mendoza, one of the instigators of the August 
30, 1984, press conference of UPD dissidents, was ousted from 
the leadership of the UCS. Mendoza called his own UCS 
congress for March 10, and the 467 delegates elected him 
leader. [58] Two men now claimed the leadership of the UCS, 
Mendoza and the AIFLD-supported Samuel Maldonado, who had 
testified before the Kissinger Commission and had been 
accorded a position in the Duarte government. By March 1985 
the UPD was well and truly split, although still supportive 
of Duarte and the Christian Democrats against the forces of 
the right. However, in an internal document sent to Duarte 
in February, UPD leaders accused the party of lacking "the 
consciousness, clarity, and commitment" needed to implement
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the Social Pact. [59]
AIFLD denied it had taken sides in the UCS or SUTC 
disputes. In the case of the former, both Maldonado and 
Mendoza had government positions to protect, and the Institute 
had advised against union leaders becoming part of the 
government. Of the two leaders, Mendoza was castigated by 
AIFLD as the renegade who drew support for his UCS conference 
from cooperatives who had received loans approved by him in 
his role as vice-president of the Agrarian Development Bank. 
Furthermore, Mendoza had used force to take over the UCS 
offices, resulting in the injury of some of its occupants. 
The membership, claimed AIFLD, had put their faith in 
Maldonado which explained why he had acquired the support of 
the Labour Ministry over the maverick Mendoza. [60]
Conflicting accounts of this already complicated 
situation should not be allowed to detract from the importance 
of the factional battles and personality clashes which took 
place during this period. To AIFLD and U.S. policy makers 
the UPD constituted the only authentic base of support for 
Duarte; therefore the factional struggle that occurred inside 
the UPD over the social pact and the formation of the CTD was 
profoundly worrying. The right wing and the reactionary 
elements in the military opposed Duarte but saw him as a 
vehicle that brought military aid from Washington to San 
Salvador. The vehicle had to be maintained if the war was to 
be won. The FMLN, in control of at least a quarter of the 
Salvadoran countryside, saw Duarte as an agent of imperialism
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set in place by Washington in order to legitimize greater U.S. 
intervention. Furthermore, the U.S. President had staked his 
entire foreign policy on the outcome in El Salvador? the 
country would not be "lost to communism" as was clearly the 
danger in Nicaragua.
For AIFLD the shift within the Administration from the 
Kirkpatrick position towards the "democratic" solution had 
legitimized and bolstered the AFL-CIO's status in the 
formulation of U.S. Central America policy. El Salvador, 
therefore, was not only a test-case for the Reagan 
Administration? the weight of AIFLD's involvement in the land 
reform and the elections also made it a test-case for the 
AFL-CIO's foreign policy architects. Congress had heard a 
year earlier that no one had done more for democracy in El 
Salvador than the AFL-CIO. In June 1984 glowing accounts were 
given to Congress of the progress towards democratic change 
amid the challenges of the totalitarian left and the 
dictatorial right. Everything now rested on the unions. If 
Duarte, in the pit of the deepening economic crisis in El 
Salvador, failed to keep the majority of the union movement 
behind him, the government could be on its way to defeat. 
Intense polarisation, deepening civil war, and, ultimately, 
the introduction of U.S. combat troops might well follow. The 
"democratic road" would be transformed into a bloody blind 
alley, and the AFL-CIO's foreign policy would be judged as a 
disaster.
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The story of AIFLD and its difficulties with the UPD was 
transmitted to anti-interventionists in the U.S. via their own 
union and journalistic connections and the solidarity groups 
like CISPES. However, El Salvador's unions also captured the 
attention of the mainstream press. The Washington Post 
suggested that U.S. policy in El Salvador was moving to the 
right of Duarte and that AIFLD was partnering the 
Administration in the process. AIFLD's plans to coax unions 
into the CTD had indeed been resisted by several large UPD 
unions. The Post also suggested that Packer had "withdrawn 
financial and logistical support" to these unions in order to 
"pressure them to join the new confederation." [61]
The Post article prompted a same-day response from the 
AFL-CIO's Department of International Affairs. A press 
release which reaffirmed support for Duarte also declared that 
"The AFL-CIO deeply resents the implication..that a.) AIFLD 
slavishly adheres to the foreign policy of the U.S. Government 
and b.) it would do or say anything supportive of the 
right-wing reactionary political forces in El Salvador and, 
c.) that actions of AIFLD would be deliberately divisive of 
trade union unity." The statement concluded, "The AFL-CIO 
sees no necessary conflict between the CTD recently formed by 
the democratic Salvadoran trade unions, and the continuing 
activity of the UPD." [62]
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Left Unions Rebuild.
The early months of 1985 marked a period of cautious 
rebuilding by the left unions. The previous year had seen a 
growing militancy among public sector workers in particular, 
forefronted by the left Christian Democratic Salvadoran 
Workers' Central (Central de Trabajadores Salvadorenos -CTS). 
The strike activity of the CTS had posed the first major 
problem for Duarte following his election. [63] Many unions, 
however, continued to operate in a semi-clandestine fashion. 
In November 1984 125 FENASTRAS delegates held a secret
conference at the University of San Salvador. Six 
international observers from Canada, Mexico, and the U.S. also 
attended. One U.S. unionist, Jerry Olivera, reported that the 
conference proceeded with delegates taking turns keeping watch 
on the roads approaching the University. Olivera, an aircraft 
mechanic from the Virginia State Council of Machinists wrote, 
"I spent five days in El Salvador. The situation there is 
more desperate than anyone can imagine." [64]
The formation of the left solidarity coalition CST in 
late 1984 triggered further organizational initiatives. In 
the public sector water authority (ANDA) workers (Sindicato 
Empresa de Trabajadores de ANDA -SETA), hospital workers 
(STISSS), teachers (ANDES), bank workers (SIGEBAN), municipal 
workers from Santa Ana (Asociacion de Trabajadores Municipales 
de Santa Ana -ATRAMSA), and others formed the Coordinating 
Council of State and Municipal Workers (Consejo Coordinador
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de Trabajadores Estata las y Municipales -CCTEM). The 
formation of CCTEM gave a clue to the frustration in the 
public sector, which in El Salvador had traditionally been 
politically neutral or supportive of the government [65] Both 
the CST and the CCTEM called for Government-FMLN dialogue to 
end the war.
Left unions also regrouped in the rural sector. The 
Agricultural Workers Union of El Salvador (Sindicato de 
Trabajadores Agricultura, Simitares y Conexos Salvadorenos - 
SITAS) and the Confederation of Cooperative Associations of 
El Salvador (Confederacion de Asociaciones Cooperativas de El 
Salvador -COACES) became active during this period. [66]
One should note that the regrouping of these 
organisations in the public, private, and rural sectors 
involved the participation of several unions (particularly in 
the public sector) who had traditionally avoided contact with 
unions clearly associated with the left, a sign that Duarte's 
failure to implement many aspects of the Social Pact and the 
crisis in the UPD had weakened the appeal of the moderate 
unions sponsored by AIFLD. Meanwhile, the U.S. press 
continued to follow AIFLD and the UPD. The New York Times 
reported in June that the UPD "...has been in uproar over 
efforts by the Washington-based American Institute For Free 
Labor Development to confine it to bread and butter issues." 
[67] The Los Angeles Times quoted the "maverick" leader of 
the agricultural workers union UCS, Ramon Mendoza, as saying 
that, now Duarte was elected, "Suddenly we're not of use to
335
the Americans anymore." [68] Further evidence of centre 
unions distancing themselves from AIFLD came with the 
formation of the May First Committee (Comite Primero de Mayo). 
The CTS joined FENASTRAS, FUSS, FESTIAVTSES and the CCTEM on 
the Committee, thus cementing an organisational link between 
the two otherwise distinct trade union groupings in El 
Salvador.
The May First Committee planned for a union 
demonstration in San Salvador for May Day 1985. In an April 
27 press conference the Committee was filmed by the 
government-owned Channel 10 television station. Channel 10 
attempted to reduce the size of the demonstration by accusing 
the Committee's members of being in league with the FMLN. [69] 
An estimated 20,000 workers participated in the demonstration, 
demanding higher wages, freedom of political prisoners, and 
negotiations to end the war. During the event, helicopters 
flew overhead and speakers and marchers concealed their 
identity with baseball hats and sunglasses. The following 
day two members of the water workers union, SETA, were found 
murdered. [70]
A number of significant strikes occurred in the period 
leading to and following the May Day demonstration which 
seemed to indicate that the Social Pact was disintegrating. 
According to one estimate 40,000 workers struck in May alone. 
[71] Furthermore, AIFLD's activities in El Salvador continued 
to attract controversy. In April AIFLD had reportedly cut off 
funds to the UPD. [72] An AIFLD official, John Heberle, told
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the Maimi Herald that the UPD had played "a useful role" but 
was now "off to the left of Duarte." [73] In a letter to Lane 
Kirkland on April 2 UPD General Secretary Mendoza accused 
AIFLD of arranging dummy conventions, buying-off union 
leaders, and using "anti-democratic destabilizing methods and 
blackmail against democratic trade unions." [74] On April 29 
a letter was sent by the Political Committee of the UPD to 
President Reagan. Signed by representatives of several 
affiliated unions, the letter attacked AIFLD for "the 
misappropriation of funds..(to)..try and destroy the UPD by 
blackmail" and of "armed aggression and persecution." The 
letter also stated, "We believe this attitude is not in 
accordance with (presumably U.S.) Government policy, or, for 
that matter, AFL-CIO policy." The Political Committee 
suggested that AIFLD should be forced to discontinue its 
activities and "the (U.S. Government) funds earmarked for the 
development of a democratic labor movement be used in a proper 
direction." [75]
The FMLN's Trade Union "Strategy."
Towards the end of April 1985 the Salvadoran army 
reported that it had been involved in an armed exchange with 
a leader of the Central America Revolutionary Workers1 Party 
(Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores de Centroamerica - 
PRTC), Ms. Nidia Diaz. Diaz, who was wounded in the incident, 
was the most senior rebel commander to be captured by the
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army. The army claimed that they seized Diaz's personal 
diary, letters, plans of action, and minutes of meetings? all 
told, the complete archive of the PRTC, one of the five 
guerilla formations grouped within the FMLN. U.S. press 
interest in the documents was stimulated by information which 
purportedly linked the FMLN to the Sandinista Front. In 
addition, the documents were described as providing an 
unusually close look at the guerilla high command. [76]
In due course AIFLD intended to call attention to parts 
of the documents which the press had deemed less interesting. 
To the Institute the Diaz collection revealed a three-layer 
guerilla strategy pertaining to the trade unions in El 
Salvador. Firstly, the FMLN wished to establish a 
guerilla-controlled labour front to compete with the unions 
supported by AIFLD. The key organisations behind this effort 
would be FENASTRAS, FUSS, and FESTIAVCES. Secondly, the FMLN 
was committed to undermining the Social Pact and the UPD, 
which was then supported by AIFLD. This would be accomplished 
by several union leaders secretly working with the guerillas, 
referred to in the documents under a code name, "cocos". 
AIFLD claimed, "Although the identity of the individuals 
cannot definitely be established, the activities described in 
the documents relate to the actual events that contributed to 
the virtual dissolution of the UPD." Finally, the FMLN was 
determined to promote strikes and work stoppages in individual 
industries to provoke an economic crisis. Agents of the 
guerillas had penetrated the unions in transportation, the
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water industry, the coffee sector, and other areas where they 
had sometimes been successful in leading strikes. None of 
these strikes, claimed AIFLD, "served a traditional trade 
union purpose." [77]
AIFLD claimed that the documents provided a revealing 
insight into the struggle between Marxist-Leninist and 
democratic unionism. Significantly, AIFLD also made it clear 
that the battle in the AFL-CIO itself over Central America was 
inseparably part of the same struggle. As the Institute 
expressed it, the documents were "essential for understanding 
labor events reported in the press, and for interpreting the 
claims of certain travelling 'Salvadoran labor leaders' who 
make appeals to U.S. trade unionists for labor solidarity 
against human rights abuses. Such appeals, however compelling 
they seem at first glance, serve a hidden agenda." 
Furthermore, "U.S. citizens have good reason to be wary about 
involvement in 'solidarity committees' for the kind of 
Salvadoran 'unions' that serve as fronts for the guerilla 
groups that produced these documents." [78] AIFLD spelled out 
the difference between a "front" union and a legitimate one: 
"To most U.S. citizens, labor unions are supposed to work to 
improve the standard of living and working conditions of 
members by representing them effectively before employers and 
political institutions. To the guerillas in El Salvador, 
unions serve a radically different purpose...The FMLN's labor 
plan had nothing to do with collective bargaining, economic 
improvements, and other changes traditionally supported by
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trade unionists." The guerillas, claimed AIFLD, saw unions 
as part of "the economic struggle within the structure of 
bourgeois legality...preparing the terrain for insurrection 
in coordination with the military offensive of the FMLN." [79] 
Revolutionary unionism was also considered to be illegitimate 
because it involved the clandestine entry of unions by 
hardened revolutionary cadres, who then manipulated legitimate 
trade union grievances to achieve political ends formulated 
by non-unionists, that is, the FMLN.
Leaving aside the issue of the authenticity of the 
documents, AIFLD's response to their contents was revealing 
in a number or respects. Firstly, the only legitimate trade 
unionism seemed to be that which conformed to the 
understanding of "most U.S. citizens." Clearly, the 
understanding of Salvadoran workers of trade unionism, in the 
context of their own political choices, history, and culture, 
was not the guiding principle. Secondly, and more important, 
the applicability of "U.S. unionism" to El Salvador was not 
considered at all problematical, despite the presence of death 
squads and an intransigent oligarchy in a country crippled by 
war and economic crisis. Thirdly, AIFLD's view that Duarte's 
democracy was being subverted by a handful of "cocos" pursuing 
their own insurrectionary agenda conveniently sidestepped the 
question of the Salvadoran government's inability to prevent 
the radicalisation of certain sectors of the trade union 
movement by responding favorably to the "legitimate" demands 
of the infiltrated unions. The Salvadoran left maintained
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that fifty years of peaceful struggle had not improved the 
lives of the Salvadoran workers and peasants and had cost the 
lives of 80,000 people. The only progressive option was to 
defeat, through force of arms, the oligarchy and its 
supporters in the military. If AIFLD and the pro-Government 
union leaders could not advise how long it would take Duarte's 
fledgling democracy to ease the misery of the workers, the 
revolutionary left could point to the repeated failures of 
reformist methods that some of its own supporters had once 
endorsed. If AIFLD and its union leaders could not precisely 
guarantee that the death squads might not someday unleash a 
repression like that of 1980-83, the revolutionary left 
contested that such a backlash was a certainty given the 
experience of Salvadoran history since the Matanza of the 
early 1930's. Moreover, Duarte's first year had seen the 
President backtrack on the key clauses of the Social Pact and 
the military strengthened by U.S. aid.
There remained only one argument at AIFLD's disposal 
which had not been seriously impaired by events: that El 
Salvador under the control of the guerillas would usher in a 
situation infinitely worse than the one that presently 
prevailed. In the event of an FMLN victory, AIFLD and its 
allies maintained, the democratic process initiated under 
Duarte would be willfully smashed as part of a gradual 
systematic establishment of a totalitarian state along the 
lines of Cuba.
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Duarte's Summer of Discontent.
In early May 1985 striking health workers at the Social 
Security hospitals began a peaceful occupation of their 
workplace. The action was led by the 3,000-member union 
Social Security Institute Workers' Union (Sindicato de 
Trabajadores del Instituto Salvadoreno -STISSS). During the 
1970's STISSS was active in left union coalitions, although 
was never formally affiliated to any. In 1980 the union was 
close to the FDR and suffered badly as the repression 
unfolded. During the months leading to the occupation, STISSS 
had been instrumental in organizing the public sector union 
coalition CCTEM. The decision to strike was taken after a 
stalemate had occurred in negotiations over a union pay claim.
On June l, the first anniversary of his presidency, 
Duarte stated: "We have become aware of strikes being carried 
out by labor unions and organizations. Strikes that, with the 
pretext of labor demands, have a background of indisputable 
political inclinations...Unions are channels for participation 
in the material and spiritual progress of the people. What 
cannot be accepted is that these channels be used and the 
needs of the people manipulated." [80] The day following 
Duarte's speech, with its oblique reference to the alleged 
contents of the Diaz documents, a U.S.-trained SWAT team were 
transported under the cover of night to the roof of the Social 
Security Hospital. Together with units of plain-clothed 
National Security police, they stormed the hospital on
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presidential orders. In the confusion the SWAT team fatally 
shot four of the plain-clothed National Police who were 
bearing revolvers. Also, a thirty-year old patient whose 
emergency heart surgery was interrupted died, and a baby*s 
incubator was disconnected, reportedly causing permanent 
damage to its occupant. Four people were arrested, including 
STISSS leaders Guillermo Antonio Rojas and Jorge Lara Albena. 
During the takeover of the hospital there were beatings of 
both hospital workers and patients. A strike leader stated: 
"There was a blackout, and the police arrived all in black and 
wearing gasmasks. During the invasion they were brutal with 
the doctors and nurses, alleging that they had guns. They 
made the women who had just had babies lie on the floor while 
they searched their beds for guns." Rojas described his 
capture: "We thought when we were arrested...that our union 
days were over. We thought we were going to be taken out and 
killed right there. But as time went on and we were still 
alive, we thought we might end up in Mariona. They started 
interrogating us immediately at the National Police H.Q.; we 
were blindfolded for the four days we were there barely 
sleeping at all, enduring constant interrogation. They tried 
to get us to admit that we were members of an underground 
organization. Over time I sensed that there was a lot of 
agitation going on outside regarding our case. The jailers 
said that the situation outside had become ‘difficult.1" [81] 
The "difficult" situation had been created by strike 
action taken by workers in telephone and communications,
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water, electricity, and the clinic facilities protesting the 
invasion of the hospitals. The next day the solidarity 
coalition CST called a demonstration. One source reported, 
"Despite prohibition by the army...more than 7,000 workers 
joined the protest." [82] The demonstrations did not die down 
until June 6 when the government agreed that the four arrested 
would be released and that the STISSS strikers would receive 
a pay increase if they agreed to call off the dispute. STISSS 
agreed and won assurances from Duarte that there would be no 
reprisals against the strikers.
UPD leaders condemned the military action ordered by 
Duarte against the hospital occupation. A communique issued 
following the incident stated: "No legalistic excuse can erase 
the damage inflicted on a sector of our people? (the) attempt 
to excuse this action by calling (the strike) communist 
inspired is not only untrue, but will only provoke the 
unification of the entire labor sector against the regime 
which looms as repressive as the former regime." [83] Duarte 
declared the act was legitimate because the FMLN had 
infiltrated STISSS. [84]
Duarte had accused the unions of being infiltrated by 
the FMLN on previous occasions. In July 1984, just weeks 
after his election, the defunct MUSYGES were labelled 
Marxist-Leninist and with the guerillas. [85] The armed 
forces also accused MUSYGES and FENASTRAS of having links with 
the "maximum leaders of the guerillas," and they, too, based 
their accusations on captured documents (although the
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documents were captured from the unions, not the guerillas). 
Both federations had denied the charges and jointly stated 
that, "In El Salvador anyone who demands education, housing, 
health, and food, is a communist, and therefore persecuted 
until he or she is dead." [86]
The incident at the hospitals, however, marked a turning 
point in Salvadoran trade union politics. The government had 
demonstrated its willingness to deal violently with strikers, 
and both Duarte and AIFLD were in open agreement regarding 
what constituted legitimate and illegitimate trade union 
activity. In the context of El Salvador's ongoing political 
and economic crisis, however, even "legitimate" trade union 
actions constituted a threat to the regime and assisted the 
guerilla's stated objectives pertaining to the destabilization 
of the economy and the government. In other words the overall 
crisis made it virtually impossible to distinguish between 
"legitimate" trade union behaviour and "illegitimate" 
revolutionary actions because any serious pursuit of workers' 
economic and political demands could paralyse or overthrow the 
government.
Duarte's decision to repossess the hospitals occurred 
at a time when industrial unrest had increased considerably. 
In the first half of 1985 38 strikes were recorded involving 
4 5,000 workers. For the whole of 1983, there had been only 
four recorded stoppages, with just 2,300 participants. In 
1984 2 6,000 had taken strike action. [87] The increased
degree of union militancy would not, however, pass with
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impunity. During the first six months of 1985 ten trade union 
officers and members were either assassinated or 
"disappeared". Of the 26 unionists arrested during the 
period, at least eleven were subjected to torture, including 
beatings, asphyxiation to the point of vomiting and electric 
shocks. From January to September 1985 FENASTRAS alone 
suffered incidents involving 41 of its members being either 
terrorised or murdered by government forces. [88]
The period of the hospital strike coincided with 
increased belligerence on the part of the UPD towards AIFLD. 
On May 11 UPD leaders remaining outside the new CTD signed a 
paid advertisment in the Salvadoran newspaper La Prensa 
Graphica which referred to the leaders selected by AIFLD as 
"gold-plated scorpions, who with gold in their teeth attempt 
to buy off the consciousness of all honest workers in El 
Salvador." [89] Following the raid on the hospital relations 
between AIFLD and the UPD deteriorated further. In mid-June 
an official AFL-CIO delegation to El Salvador met with the 
leaders of the new CTD, ignoring the UPD altogether. [90] In 
early July the UPD convened a special assembly, electing 
Mendoza as its president. Following the event the UPD called 
on the AFL-CIO to establish, within 30 days, an investigative 
commission into the allegations and complaints made against 
AIFLD. If the AFL-CIO refused to act, the UPD would request 




In the year following the election of the Christian 
Democrats in April 1984 the UPD's support for Duarte had 
seriously diminished. The new AIFLD-sponsored federation, 
CTD, was established amid protests from several UPD leaders 
who refused to join the new formation. AIFLD, accused of 
bribery and manipulative practices by the UPD, cut off funds 
to the federation it had earlier helped establish. By early 
1985 the principal unions of the UPD had split into rival 
factions with AIFLD supporting one group against the 
dissidents.
This situation placed in severe jeopardy AIFLD1s 
objective of consolidating trade union support for Duarte as 
a means of reinforcing the democratic opening. For the Reagan 
Administration and Congress, El Salvador, now a "fledgling 
democracy", was a foreign policy success. Duarte's victory had 
facilitated U.S. military aid to "professionalize" the armed 
forces who were now expected to move decisively against the 
FMLN. The deterioration of the Social Pact and the conflict 
in the UPD, therefore, simultaneously threatened the 
legitimacy of both AFL-CIO and U.S. Government foreign policy.
AIFLD maintained that the UPD crisis did not reflect a 
major or even significant diminution of Duarte's trade union 
support, that the whole affair amounted to little more than 
a turf battle between union leaders. Opponents of AIFLD's 
policies in the U.S. trade unions reached a different
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conclusion: AIFLD had provided an important service to the
U.S. Government by helping to elect Duarte. When the UPD 
asserted its independence and urged the implementation of the 
Social Pact agreements, AIFLD moved to set up a new federation 
(CTD) - a bureaucratic manoeuvre which put the needs of the 
U.S. Government above those of Salvadoran workers.
Two additional problems for the AFL-CIO's international 
policy lay in the regroupment of the left unions in El 
Salvador and in the initiatives taken by anti-interventionists 
in the U.S. trade unions pertaining to the situation there, 
particularly in the area of trade union rights. With the 
death squads and the military still murdering people, the 
city-committees and the NLC extended moral and political 
support to endangered trade unionists whose plight had been 
ignored by AIFLD because of their purported support for the 
FMLN.
Thus, the challenge to the international policy of the 
AFL-CIO in El Salvador during this period was made of three 
interrelated components: the involvement of the
anti-interventionists, the regroupment of the left unions, and 
the crisis in the UPD. A central underlying factor behind the 
emergence of this challenge was the failure of Duarte to grant 
significant material reforms to Salvadoran workers. If 
Salvadoran capitalism had been in a position to raise living 
standards, the UPD would have sustained its support for 
Duarte, the left unions would have lost impetus and the 
success of AIFLD's policy (and that of the Reagan
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Administration) would have arrested the rising tide of 
criticism directed at the Institute in the U.S. labour 
movement.
Chapter Six explores the role of leading Cold War 
unionists in the AFL-CIO in the Reagan Administration's effort 
to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua.
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CHAPTER 6
"A REVOLUTION BETRAYED": U.S. LABOUR AND THE WAR 
AGAINST NICARAGUA
The invasion of Grenada in October 1983 signalled an 
intensification of U.S. Government initiated measures directed 
against the Sandinistas. In November Congress approved $24 
million in contra aid which was expected to last until June 
1984. In the interim period the CIA embarked on numerous 
military assaults against Nicaragua; one such attack resulted 
in severe damage to the oil and storage facilities at San Juan 
del Sur. In January 1984 mines were deployed in three major 
Nicaraguan harbours, causing considerable damage to shipping 
and inflicting roughly a score of casualties. In early April 
the U.S. Senate approved an additional $21 million in contra 
aid. Congress criticised the CIA and the President for 
proceeding with military actions without its approval, 
although this did not seriously encumber the broad thrust of 
the Administration's anti-Sandinista project. The U.S. 
Government was more determined than ever to overthrow the 
revolutionary regime in Managua. [1]
The Reagan Administration's military and political 
intensification of the war against Nicaragua was also
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reflected in the official policy of the AFL-CIO. The 
Federation's national bi-annual convention of October 1983 
adopted a resolution that was unrestrained in its criticism 
of the Sandinista regime and referred to the jailing of seven 
dockworker union leaders for recommending that their union in 
Corinto - a location mined by the CIA - rejoin the AFL-CIO 
supported CUS. [2]
In its written presentation before the Kissinger 
Commission in September 1983, AIFLD echoed the complaints of 
CUS representatives that they continued to be victims of 
jailings and beatings. [3] By March 1984, however, Federation 
criticism of the Sandinistas became more detailed. William 
Doherty completed a report on the trade union situation in 
Nicaragua, which Lane Kirkland circulated to all AFL-CIO 
unions. The document should be used by union members, said 
Kirkland, "when they are confronted by the campaign of 
disinformation which has been undertaken by the Government of 
Nicaragua and their representatives and supporters in 
different parts of the world, and, especially, here in the 
U.S." [4] Kirkland claimed that the Report, entitled
Nicaragua: A Revolution Betrayed. Free Labor Persecuted,
provided documented proof that the Sandinistas were 
deliberately and methodically destroying free trade unionism 
in Nicaragua. Doherty's report presented brief descriptions 
of a series of FSLN-conducted-or-inspired incidents where 
unionists of the CUS and the "social Christian" federation CTN 
were reportedly harassed. This harassment was interpreted as
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an integral part of the FSLN's objective of bringing all the 
unions into a single national federation under its control.
The incidents reported by Doherty accused the 
Sandinistas of intimidation of trade unionists, rigged union 
elections, arrests for alleged counter-revolutionary activity 
and other infringements of trade union rights. The report also 
noted the affiliation of the principal Sandinista federation 
CST to the pro-Soviet WFTU in October 1980 and the 
introduction of the State of Emergency in October 1982. Under 
this decree strikes were banned, no collective contracts could 
be signed, and non-CST demonstrations or public meetings were 
disallowed. In all the cases cited, however, physical 
violence received only one specific reference, although it was 
not administered by a Sandinista soldier. In this case CTN 
leader Carlos Huembes was allegedly "attacked and brutally 
beaten by Sandinista thugs..He was taken to hospital and found 
to have a broken nose and deep lacerations about his body." 
[5] Interestingly, the incidents of harassment documented by 
Doherty were cited without significant alteration in a 
document released by the U.S. Department of State in October 
1984 which attacked the Sandinista's human rights record. 
Further examples of mutual cooperation between AIFLD and the 
Department of State in the pursuit of anti-Sandinista 
objectives would emerge as time progressed. [6 ]
The FSLN's behavior towards certain trade unionists was 
also criticized by the ICFTU and the ILO. [7] Furthermore, 
Amnesty International (AI) recorded the detention of
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unionists, particularly from the CTN, and declared that they 
believed some of the detained were prisoners of conscience 
and not "counter-revolutionary," as the Sandinistas had 
alleged. However, AI were more critical of the contras: 
"Reports were received throughout 1984 of detentions, torture, 
and summary executions by armed opposition groups...AI 
received a copy of a field manual issued to FDN contra forces 
which recommended the public. * neutralization* of civilians 
believed to be collaborating with the Nicaraguan government 
as well as the selective assassination of local government 
officials, police, and military personnel." The FDN manual, 
"Psychological Operations in Guerilla Warfare" referred to the 
"use of violence for propagandistic effects." Meanwhile, the 
U.S. Government acknowledged that the CIA had issued the 
manual to FDN forces, and declared that the manual would be 
recalled and reissued without reference to 'neutralizations. 1 
[8 ]
The simple fact that AIFLD criticised the trade union 
record of the Sandinistas is not, in and of itself, convincing 
evidence that official AFL-CIO policy statements became 
another outlet for the anti-Sandinista propaganda of the 
Reagan Administration. Indeed, the ICFTU, ILO, and Amnesty 
International had voiced similar complaints. However, the 
crucial difference between AIFLD and other critics of the 
Sandinista's performance in this regard was that AIFLD 
remained totally silent in the face of mounting evidence of 
contra atrocities and muted in their response to the murder,
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disappearance and torture of trade unionists in El Salvador. 
By any objective measure, the human and trade union rights 
record of the Sandinistas was much better than the 
corresponding record of the Duarte government, to say nothing 
of the genocidal character of the repression in El Salvador 
during 1980-83 which claimed the lives of thousands of trade 
unionists. It was this naked bias against the Sandinistas 
that AIFLD shared with the Reagan Administration, a bias 
reflected clearly in the policy positions of the AFL-CIO.
Anti-Interventionists Respond.
The National Labor Committee (NLC) began to respond to 
the Reagan Administration's campaign against the Sandinistas 
following the CIA's military actions. In March 1984 the NLC 
sent a letter to Congress which protested contra aid and the 
undeclared war against Nicaragua. In so doing it referred to 
how "The majority of Nicaraguans have rallied around their 
government and the U.S. has become morally isolated from the 
international community." [9] Nicaragua was now an NLC 
concern, despite the fact that the Committee was initiated 
around questions pertaining to developments in El Salvador. 
The NLC, however, was not prepared to publicly scrutinize 
AIFLD's charges against the Nicaraguan government pertaining 
to the abuse of union rights. Similarly, local
anti-intervention activists involved in the city or state 
committees did not attempt to refute or explain AIFLD's
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allegations, although Kirkland's allusion that the Sandinistas 
had erected an international propaganda network prompted one 
SEIU official in Pittsburg to write: "Apparently any
discussion of U.S. labor's 'foreign policy' concerning 
Nicaragua that does not originate from AIFLD falls under the 
title of 'disinformation.'" [1 0 ]
Anti-interventionists returning from Nicaragua focused 
their attention on contra atrocities, a subject completely 
ignored by AIFLD and the State Department. In its report the 
Philadelphia union delegation to Nicaragua described how, "At 
a daycare center in Estelli, near the front, we were told of 
a recent contra attack on another nearby center, where several 
children were killed by mortar fire. The contras who launch 
such attacks are hired by the Reagan administration, and paid 
with our tax dollars." The U.S. Government was killing 
Nicaraguans, read the delegation's report, at a time when 
other countries were offering material assistance; "Holland 
is building a hospital near Matagalpa, Yugoslavia has donated 
ambulances, and Belgium sent sewing machines to a clothing 
cooperative we visited in Estelli." [11]
The Trade Union Peace Conference in Managua.
In April 1984 a major trade union event took place in 
Managua. Three-thousand delegates from 335 unions representing 
68 countries converged on the city to participate in the Trade 
Union Peace Conference organised by the pro-FSLN unions in
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Nicaragua under the umbrella of the Nicaraguan Trade Union 
Coordinating Council (Coordinadora Sindical de Nicaragua - 
CSN) . [12] The conference, sponsored by the pro-Moscow WFTU, 
invited the CUS and the CTN as well as to the ICFTU and 
affiliates of the "social Christian" federation, the World 
Confederation of Labor (WCL) , from outside Nicaragua. Both 
the CUS and the CTN failed to endorse the conference.
Thirty officially endorsed U.S. trade unionists from 
seventeen unions attended the event; the group ranged from 
district directors to local presidents and members of local 
and regional executive boards. Richard Metcalf, Manager of 
the Twin City Joint Board of ACTWU Textile Division in St 
Paul, Minnesota, was spokesperson for the delegates. The 
group issue a statement: "We, with all our differences, are 
testimony here today, that Ronald Reagan does not speak for 
all of the people in the U.S...We know that it is the U.S. 
Government which is the main cause of the problems Nicaragua 
is experiencing." [13] The statement pointed to the irony of 
the AFL-CIO's official support for U.S. intervention given the 
attacks on the unions instigated and encouraged by the Reagan 
administration. Metcalf's report to Sheinkman expressed 
unreserved sympathy for the Sandinistas and lamented the 
current AFL-CIO policy of support for Reagan's policy in 
Central America. [14] Two statements were adopted by the 
conference were entitled, "The Declaration of Central America" 
and "The Managua Declaration". In condemning U.S.
intervention, the conference agreed that practical trade union
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internationalism was required to defend the Nicaraguan
revolution; the representatives blamed "the present
international economic order" for being "at the root of 
economic imbalances, wars, poverty and suffering," and called 
for "negotiated political solutions to conflicts." [15]
The objectives of the Managua conference appeared to be 
consistent with the WFTU's approach to both national and 
international trade union relations. The WFTU had stood for
"unity of action" since its inception at the end of World War
Two. In its ongoing political and ideological contest with 
its principal opponent, the AFL-CIO, the WFTU posed trade 
union unity as a counterposition to the AFL-CIO's total 
refusal to work with communist federations. The WFTU had 
already stated that such unity was particularly imperative in 
the developing countries, where, "the danger of setting the 
various contingents of the relatively small and weak working 
class against each other" could have very serious 
consequences. [16]
The Latin American section of the WFTU, the CPUSTAL, had 
made similar arguments since its formation in 1964. CPUSTAL 
called for fraternal cooperation between the ORIT and the 
"social Christian" Confederation of Latin American Workers 
(Condeferacion de Latinomerica Trabajo -CLAT). This unity, 
argued CPUSTAL, was necessary to put an end to dictatorial 
regimes, and to establish democratic governments capable of 
dealing with the general crisis in the region - demands which 
echoed the popular front perspective of the orthodox communist
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parties throughout post-war Latin America. [17] The 
Sandinista CST, in particular, was known to be sympathetic to 
this view. [18]
To the AFL-CIO's Cold War adherents the objective of 
the WFTU initiative was quite transparent: the Managua
conference was designed to be a showpiece for the section of 
the international trade union movement which registered 
unambiguous support for Soviet-Cuban positions in 
international affairs, attacked the U.S., and attempted to 
deflect attention away from, and thus delegitimize, the 
democratic trade union movement in Nicaragua. The U.S. trade 
unionists attending the conference had, therefore, performed 
a service for the forces of international communism.
Nicaraguan Elections and the Trade Unions.
The April trade union conference came shortly after the 
Sandinista government announced a general election would take 
place on November 4th, 1984. Following the February 
announcement, the anti-government CDN, otherwise known as the 
Coordinadora. which had earlier pressed for elections, 
announced that its participation depended on the willingness 
of the FSLN to negotiate with the contras. [19] The two 
contra groups, FDN and ARDE, declared they would cease 
hostilities if Arturo Cruz, the CDN/Coordinadora1s candidate, 
and Sandinista-turned-contra Eden Pastora, were allowed to 
return to the country to participate in open elections. The
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Sandinistas refused the accept these conditions and, on July 
25, the CDN/Coordinadora withdrew from the elections, pulling 
the CUS and the CTN behind them. In early August Alphonse 
Robello's ARDE and Adolfo Calero's FDN signed an agreement 
joining their political and military organisations. [2 0 ]
Widely held suspicions that Cruz and the
CDN/Coordinadora were operating under National Security 
Council (NSC) and CIA orders to discredit the electoral
National Security Council (NSC) were later substantiated in 
several instances. [21] The NSC openly called for trade union 
leaders and other non-government officials to follow the lead 
of the Administration and the State Department and publicly 
denounce the elections. AIFLD and the DIA issued several 
statements which appeared to conform to this directive; the 
CDN/Coordinadora1s decision to withdraw from the contest, they 
declared, had been determined by the undemocratic practices 
of the FSLN. Full use was made of a speech by a Sandinista
commandante before a gathering of the Nicaraguan Socialist
Party (a Moscow-line party in the popular front tradition). 
Excerpts of the speech were reprinted in the Free Trade Union 
News as confirmation of the FSLN's Marxist-Leninist pedigree. 
[22] The speech by Bayardo Arce was reportedly not for wider 
consumption, but it was tape-recorded and eventually published 
by the Barcelona newspaper La Vanouardia in July. In the 
portions of the speech reproduced in the AFL-CIO's newspaper, 
Arce referred to the election as a hindrance, to the intention 
of the Sandinistas of "putting an end to all this artifice of
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pluralism" and of the need to view the elections as a weapon 
of the revolution in the construction of socialism. [23] For 
AIFLD and the DIA the speech proved "that the objective of 
Nicaragua's revolution was to establish a one-party state on 
orthodox Marxist-Leninist lines." [24] Interestingly, (given 
accusations that AIFLD helped destabilize the Allende 
government) Arce's reference in La Vanquardia to the 1973 coup 
in Chile, where the democratic choice of the Chilean people 
was "reverse(d) by force," was omitted from the version that 
appeared in Free Trade Union News. [25] Perhaps the AFL-CIO's 
editors considered any reminder of the events in Chile to be 
an unnecessary distraction from the task of depicting the 
Sandinistas as undemocratic.
Anti-interventionist trade unionists visiting Nicaragua 
during the pre-election period, however, were unequivocally 
positive in their assessment of the election preparations. 
In September a twelve-person trade union delegation organized 
by the Labor Network on Central America, arrived in the 
country. The delegation included several local presidents and 
AFSCME vice-president, George Popyack. Once again, white 
collar and service sector unions predominated; four of the 
visitors were from the SEIU, two from AFSCME, and one each 
from the AFT, SAG, and the non-AFL-CIO ILWU. The delegation 
reported: "The Sandinista revolution has meant a thriving
labor movement..There exists a diversity of organizations and 
political perspectives. We could not reconcile what we found 
with the official position of the AFL-CIO, that union
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organizing and union rights are being suppressed? we found the 
opposite to be true." [26] Indeed, far from criticising the 
Sandinistas, the report attacked the CUS which had been 
awarded $194,000 by AIFLD in fiscal year 1984-85. "Placed in 
the context of the thriving trade union situation in 
Nicaragua, we would have to characterize the CUS as an 
anti-Sandinista propaganda organization, with a vanishing 
trade union base, plenty of money, and close political ties 
to all the traditional enemies of Nicaragua*s workers." [27] 
The report called for an end to U.S. intervention, for 
trade unions in the U.S. to "develop friendly relations" with 
Nicaraguan unions and support Nicaraguan workers in their 
efforts to rebuild their country, and it also urged the 
AFL-CIO to revise its position on Nicaragua and come out 
clearly against the contras and all forms of U.S. military 
intervention. [28] The West Coast delegation did not dismiss 
the complaints made against the Sandinistas by the CUS and the 
CTN. However, without significant exception, the explanations 
and justifications of the Sandinistas were accepted. The 
delegation clearly identified more with the problems and 
dilemmas of the revolutionary government than with the CUS 
and their complaints. Historically, the AFL-CIO explicitly 
rejected the notion that the monopoly of political power by 
the organisations of the working class was in any way a 
desired objective. This had been the view of the AFL even 
before the Bolshevik revolution; private capital and private 
property, if constrained by law, were essential for political
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pluralism. In this view the post-revolutionary experience of 
Bolshevik Russia, and every other communist state since then, 
confirmed the wisdom of dispersed political power over a 
"dictatorship of the proletariat," and it legitimized the 
AFL's and later the AFL-CIO*s implacable opposition to 
communism.
The West Coast unionists visiting Nicaragua, consciously 
or otherwise, were clearly not in step with this tradition. 
U.S. trade unionists who identified more with the Sandinistas 
than their trade union opponents in a sense represented a 
historical tendency in U.S. labour which envisioned a broader, 
social-transformatory role for the union movement. To them 
class-based trade unionism, even when formally linked to a 
political vanguard or party, deserved support? it was the 
purportedly narrow, racist, sexist, and otherwise exclusionary 
"aristocracy of labour" policies of the AFL-CIO that deserved 
to be criticised. Thus, the actions of the Sandinistas 
pertaining to the labour movement constituted a legitimate 
attempt to defend the transformatory project from the threat 
of extinction, a project supported by the bulk of the unions 
in Nicaragua.
The report of the West Coast delegation was well 
received by the rest of the anti-intervention movement. It*s 
solidarity message was even more emphatic than the one which 
emerged from the Labor Notes tour of Nicaragua in September 
1984, which described Nicaragua*s labour movement as "dynamic 
and growing." [29] The Labor Notes publication, printed in
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Detroit, generally reflected the views of a relatively 
extensive network of left trade union lower officials and 
activists across the U.S. and clearly endorsed
anti-intervention activities and positions.
During this period the tension that existed between the 
nonintervention and the solidarity perspectives continued to 
simmer beneath the surface of trade union action around the 
Central America issue but showed no signs of developing into 
a major split. One activist criticized the West Coast report 
for not disclosing the full picture of Nicaraguan trade union 
politics: "In an understandable desire to counter the hostile
propaganda directed against the Sandinistas, the Report tends 
to gloss over some of the genuine conflict and tensions within 
Nicaraguan labor. Union federations both to the left and to 
the right of the official Sandinist group have criticized 
pressures to create a single union centre controlled by the 
Sandinistas. Since each of the six competing union 
federations is linked to a political tendency, a single 
Sandinist-dominated federation would reduce the space for 
political pluralism in Nicaragua." [30]
The Nicaraguan Elections of 1984
The elections themselves saw the FSLN win 67% of the 
vote; 23% voter support was given to the two conservative 
parties, and 1 0 % for the four parties standing to the left of 
the Sandinistas. Most international observers recorded a
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positive verdict regarding the electoral procedures, although 
Reagan and the State Department maintained that the whole 
affair was merely "another step in the anti-democratic 
direction set by the FSLN". [31] In August 1984 the 
Sandinistas had announced that strikes in Nicaragua were no 
longer banned, one of a series of pre-election measures 
implemented to protect their international image from the 
charges emanating from Washington. AIFLD and the DIA viewed 
cynically the shift in the Sandinista position on strikes. 
AIFLD circulated a New Republic article by Robert Leikin which 
maintained that the Sandinistas lifted the strike ban because 
they feared a rash of wildcat stoppages resulting from 
declining real wages and other severe economic problems. 
Leikin wrote, "I found myself wishing that some of my fellow 
union activists had come with me to Nicaragua. They would have 
been as shocked and disappointed at the repressiveness of this 
government of workers and peasants' as I was." [32] According 
to former contra figure Edgar Chammorro, Leikin was actually 
a contra sympathiser attempting, with others, to garner 
support for the contra FDN among intellectuals in the U.S. 
[33]
Leikin's article had an impact beyond trade union 
circles. It received considerable press attention and was 
widely referred to by right-wing Democrats in Congress. Said 
one source, "More than any other single piece, Leikin's 
article shifted the contours of the debate over Nicaragua; for 
the first time, Democrats felt free to join the growing chorus
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of complaints against the Sandinistas...The article took on 
special force from Leikin's assertion that he had once been 
a fan of the Sandinistas. For a former sympathiser to go 
public with his disillusionment caused a sensation.” [34]
Despite the formal removal of the ban on strikes the 
Sandinista leadership exhorted the pro-FSLN unions to refrain 
from taking industrial action. According to a U.S. Embassy 
report from Managua, 106 leaders of the CST from the Managua 
area met on September 4 and approved a statement strongly 
criticising the use of the right to strike. Victor Tirado, 
the member of the National Directorate responsible for the 
trade unions, presided over the gathering. He asserted that, 
"in the current situation, strikes make no sense. They 
diminish production and weaken the revolution...the strike, 
as a weapon, as a political instrument of the working class, 
has passed into history...(workers) have to improve their work 
discipline, be more efficient and give all they can." [35] 
Five days later the CST held its Third National Assembly and 
once again rejected the use of strikes. The document approved 
by the Assembly described the strike as a method of struggle 
"used by the workers against their class enemies, the 
capitalist exploiters. There is no room for this type of 
struggle in Nicaragua because power is in the hands of the 
workers." [36]
Despite FSLN and CST appeals for industrial peace, a 
major strike occurred involving 1,500 brewery workers employed 
by a CST-organised beer company part-owned by the government.
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CST leaders were officially sympathetic to the strikers pay 
demands but urged a return to work. The U.S. Embassy reported 
that other groups of workers demonstrated in support of the 
brewery workers and claimed the strike was only terminated 
after the Ministry of Labour threatened to make the stoppage 
illegal. The Embassy acknowledged that, in the ensuing 
negotiations, the workers were awarded a 70% pay rise. This 
period coincided with several attacks on the CUS and the CTN 
in the Sandinista press for incidents of sporadic industrial 
action. The non-Sandinista federations were castigated for 
being on the side of imperialism and the bourgeoisie. [37]
Divisions in the Opposition Unions.
Despite the call for greater sacrifices the FSLN's 
direction of the revolution enjoyed clear support from the 
bulk of organised labour in Nicaragua. In the opposition 
union federations, however, signs of disunity had become more 
visible. Divisions in the CTN had burst to the surface during 
1982 when, at an Extraordinary Congress in November, a 
dissident group which had emerged around Antonio Jarquin were 
expelled following their condemnation of the 
"counterrevolutionary" direction of the federation. The 
Jarquin faction criticised both the FSLN and the right-wing 
anti-Sandinista coalition of business and political parties, 
Coordinadora, which was supported by the CUS and CTN 
leaderships. Jarquin's version of events differed from the
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official CTN account; at a delegates' conference 80% voted to 
expel Huembes and his followers after Huembes had become 
vice-president of the right-wing CDN/Coordinadora. Now there 
were two groups claiming to the title of the CTN. However, 
the headquarters of the "social Christian" CLAT, based in 
Caracas, gave its endorsement - and thus its resources - to 
the more conservative Huembes faction. [38]
The issue of affiliation to the CDN/Coordinadora. and, 
by extension, support for the armed counter-revolution, also 
provoked a struggle inside the CUS. In August 1984 both CUS 
delegates on the Council of State reportedly called on the 
federation leadership to withdraw from the CDN/Coordinadora. 
which, they argued, was a coalition that defended the 
interests of Nicaragua's capitalists. [39] CUS dissidents 
reportedly telegrammed Lane Kirkland questioning the AFL-CIO's 
endorsement of CUS's decision not to participate in the 
November elections. One version of the story holds that the 
decision to leave the CDN/Coordinadora was taken by a 
conference of the CUS, but the leadership ignored the 
directive. [40] AIFLD contested that the Council of State 
representatives (See Chapter Three) behaved undemocratically? 
instead or arguing for disaffiliation at a full gathering of 
the CUS, they and a gang of twenty others occupied the CUS 
headquarters. Furthermore, in a detailed account of the 
incident AIFLD accused the dissidents of open collaboration 
with the Sandinista police. Following several days of 
occupation by the dissidents, the police occupied the
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headquarters, an action which received letters of condemnation 
from Lane Kirkland and several national union centres and ORIT 
and the ICFTU. [41]
The occupation episode came at a time when the CUS's 
influence over Nicaraguan workers was becoming increasingly 
marginal. One observer generally sympathetic to the CUS 
recorded, "The CUS... appears able to withstand Sandinista 
repression as long as its united leadership continues to forge 
important international ties. While its importance in the 
workplace has declined drastically, the CUS's political role 
has increased significantly. The CUS leadership has chosen 
to participate as a political entity even while its influence 
in the labor field has declined to critical levels." [42]
Support for the CUS in the international labour movement 
also suffered notable setbacks during this period. The 
Socialist International's (S.I.) generally friendly 
disposition towards the Sandinistas had, because of the S.I. 's 
connections to the ICFTU, put the CUS at the centre of the 
controversy regarding the nature of the Sandinista regime (see 
Chapter Three). ICFTU affiliates closer to the AFL-CIO tended 
to characterise the CUS as a beleaguered bastion of democratic 
trade unionism. Those loyal to the S.I.'s formulations 
regarded the CUS with some suspicion because of its 
comfortable relationship to the Somoza regime. As in the case 
of the U.S. labour movement, union delegations returned from 
Nicaragua with picture of the trade union situation which 
stood in complete contrast to that transmitted to
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international union audiences by Lane Kirkland and Irving 
Brown. Some union reports were more pro-FSLN than the S.I. 
itself. For example, a British NALGO-sponsored delegation to 
Nicaragua attended the trade union conference in Managua 
during April 1984. Its report, highly sympathetic to the 
FSLN, noted, "We were all aware that the CUS, an affiliate 
of the ICFTU, has links with the AFL-CIO and alleged links 
with American-backed contras.." [43] The British TUC at its 
1984 conference in Brighton unanimously passed a CPSA 
resolution which was completely uncritical of the Sandinistas, 
condemned the interventionist policies of the U.S. Government, 
and urged British unions to send material aid as one means of 
forging "direct relations with the broad trade union movement 
in Nicaragua." [44] The TUC had traditionally defended 
AFL-CIO foreign policy since the formation of the ICFTU in 
1951; this resolution reflected a significant departure from 
the Cold War partnership between the AFL-CIO and their British 
counterparts.
Perhaps more worrying for the AFL-CIO were the events 
in the ORIT, the ICFTU's organisation for the American 
continent. ORIT met in April 1985 in Mexico, just days after 
the Reagan Administration had demanded the Sandinistas 
negotiate with the contras and hold new elections. ORIT 
adopted a resolution "emphatically rejecting" the U.S. 
Government's "ultimatum" to Nicaragua, declaring that such an 
order was tantamount to a virtual declaration of war. The 
resolution, introduced by the Canadian Labor Congress (CLC),
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was opposed only by the AFL-CIO's delegate and AIFLD official, 
Jesse Freedman. [45]
CUS-AIFLD Support For Contra-FSLN Dialogue
The Reagan Administration's demand for FSLN-Contra 
negotiations was shared by the CDN/Coordinadora and faithfully 
echoed by the CUS before an ICFTU delegation visiting 
Nicaragua in February 1985. A group of 17 ICFTU 
representatives from the U.S., West Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Venezuela, Israel and Canada heard CUS's principal 
spokesperson, Alvin Guthrie, call for "national dialogue" to 
resolve the political crisis in Nicaragua. One month earlier, 
in January, the CDN/Coordinadora's chief political 
representative Arturo Cruz urged the U.S. Congress to resume 
military aid the contras. On March 2, 1985, contra leaders 
Adolfo Calero and Alfonso Robello signed a declaration in San 
Jose with Cruz and the CDN/Coordinadora which also called for 
national dialogue. Moreover, the declaration offered a 
ceasefire if the FSLN complied to the dialogue request. [46] 
AIFLD added its voice to the dialogue demand three days after 
the San Jose declaration when William Doherty appeared before 
the House Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. "The 
AFL-CIO," said Doherty, "viewed the armed insurgency against 
the Sandinista government as a consequence of Sandinista 
restrictions on freedom and human rights." [47] Doherty also 
criticised the Sandinistas for refusing to negotiate with
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"their armed opposition" in the same spirit that Duarte was 
prepared to meet with his armed opposition, the FMLN. [48]
Doherty's sympathy for the contras caused him to qualify 
the AFL-CIO's position pertaining to regional peace proposals 
known as the Contadora treaty. The AFL-CIO, like the ICFTU, 
was officially behind Contadora, an agreement that emerged 
from a January 1983 meeting of foreign ministers from four 
Latin American countries, namely, Mexico, Columbia, Venezuela 
and Panama. The meeting at Contadora (a Panamanian island) 
issued a statement which urged the countries of Central 
America to "reduce tensions and establish a framework for a 
permanent atmosphere of peaceful existence and mutual 
respect... through dialogue and negotiations." [49] By 
September 1983 Nicaragua, El Salvador, Honduras, Guatamala 
and Costa Rica had agreed on 21 points necessary to establish 
peace in the region. The Contadora treaty itself formally 
came into ettect in September 1984 and was widely acclaimed 
as a realistic peace option for the region.
Doherty departed from the ICFTU's position when he 
qualified AFL-CIO support for Contadora: "A bilateral facet 
of our policy" (i.e., Kissinger's proposals) "should never be 
thought of as subordinate to the multilateral efforts" (i.e., 
Contadora.) This now "bilateral", now "multilateral" policy 
framework was excerpted directly from the Kissinger Report: 
the U.S. should "actively encourage the Contadora process 
(but) the U.S. cannot use the Contadora process as a 
substitute for its own policies." [50] The Kissinger Report
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had been criticised by a number of ICFTU national affiliates 
and remained generally out of step with ICFTU sentiment. 
Doherty's statement in this instance illustrated the 
usefulness of AIFLD's formal independence from the ICFTU to 
the AFL-CIO international policymakers: ORIT (the ICFTU's
organisation for the Americas) had criticised U.S. policy 
pertaining to Nicaragua and adopted a generally 
anti-interventionist posture resisted only by the AFL-CIO. 
Doherty now appeared before Congress and declared that the 
AFL-CIO should, when appropriate, pursue its own policy in 
Central America - a policy loyal to that of the U.S. 
Government and the anti-communist predilections of the 
AFL-CIO*s DIA.
In their support for the dialogue position AIFLD and the 
CUS demonstrated their regard for the contras as a legitimate 
political force, one which should be empowered, politically 
and perhaps militarily, to fight the repressive and 
expansionist Sandinistas. AIFLD and the CUS, despite efforts 
to convey the contrary, were at this point more in step with 
the Reagan Administration, the CIA, and the U.S. Department 
of State than they were with both the spirit and the letter 
of the ICFTU regarding Nicaragua. The AFL-CIO was perhaps now 
as isolated in the international labour movement as it was 
before the onset of the Cold War. In 1961 ORIT voted almost 
unanimously to support the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. [51] 
ORIT's support for U. S .intervention had now virtually 
evaporated; only the AFL-CIO at this point refrained from open
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criticism of the U.S. Government. Even the CUS and other 
smaller national federations more dependent on AIFLD's 
pecuniary assistance formally (although often ambiguously) 
opposed U.S. intervention.
The Sandinista government rejected calls for 
negotiations with the contras. During the period 1982-84 the 
U.S.-backed insurgents had killed more than 4,000 civilians 
and 3,300 government troops-- an average of 43 Nicaraguans 
every day. Civilians killed by the contras included 134 
children under the age of 12, 207 teachers, 18 doctors, and 
184 technicians. Contra forces were said to have
"systematically violated the applicable laws of war throughout 
the conflict. They have attacked civilians indiscriminately; 
they have tortured and mutilated prisoners? they have murdered 
(wounded soldiers)? they have taken hostages, and have 
committed outrageous acts against personal dignity." [52] One 
contra atrocity committed on Boxing Day 1984 involved the 
massacre of a wedding party on its way home from the church. 
Six people died, including the bride. The material damage of 
the war, for 1984 alone, was estimated at $254.9 million. 
More than 3 0% of the cotton and coffee crop for the year had 
been lost. [53]
In early April 1985 President Reagan met with contra 
leaders Robello and Cruz. An additional $14 million in U.S. 
aid was made available to the insurgents for non-military 
purposes. In June 1985 the contra groups formed the United 
Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) under the leadership of Cruz,
378
Robelo* and Adolfo Calero, a former director of the Nicaraguan 
Coca Cola company and political leader of the anti-Somoza 
bourgeoisie during the pre-insurrection period. Former contra 
Edgar Chamorro later described Calero as someone "who had been 
working for the CIA in Nicaragua for a long time. He served 
as, among other things, a conduit of funds from the U.S. 
Embassy to various student and labor organizations." [54] The 
formation of UNO opened up a new period in the Reagan 
Administration's war on the Sandinistas.
The AFL-CIO and the UNO
The AFL-CIO had become linked to the contra cause 
through AIFLD's support of the CUS; the CUS were a component 
of the Nicaraguan political opposition to the Sandinistas, the 
CDN/Coordinadora. The CDN/Coordinadora had championed Arturo 
Cruz as its political representative, and Cruz had been open 
in his request for U.S. aid to the insurgency. Some U.S. 
trade union leaders were, however, at this point prepared to 
find a more direct way to assist the contras.
At a Washington press conference in November 1984 a 
group was launched which called itself the Friends of the 
Democratic Center in Central America (PRODEMCA). Cruz was 
featured at the conference and alongside him was a founding 
member of PRODEMCA, William Doherty. [55] PRODEMCA's board
also included Max Singer, president of the Potomac 
Organization, a conservative business strategy consulting
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firm. [[56] In its Statement of Purpose PRODEMCA reiterated 
the underlying principle of AFL-CIO foreign policy: the
extremists of left and right were the enemies of democracy. 
However, according to PRODEMCA, in Central America the 
principal threat to democracy came from the revolutionary 
left. With Soviet-Cuban support the totalitarians were 
tightening their hold on Nicaragua, "carrying out guerilla and 
terrorist attacks in other countries in the region, and 
building unprecedented military forces." [57] In the future 
PRODEMCA would play an important, perhaps critical, role in 
acquiring Congressional aid for the contras. Moreover, 
PRODEMCA provided a vehicle for trade union leaders to 
actively assist the contras even if the anti-interventionists 
were at some point successful in changing AFL-CIO policy on 
Nicaragua.
The creation of PRODEMCA needs to be seen in the context 
of the Administration's formal encouragement during this 
period of private efforts to assist U.S. government policy in 
Central America. [58] In October 1984, just weeks before the 
launching of PRODEMCA, Reagan declared that such efforts were 
"quite in line with what has been a pretty well established 
tradition in our country." [59] In April 1984, Reagan's 
National Security Advisor and supervisor of Oliver North, 
Robert McFarlane, decided to coordinate all private aid to the 
contras, and McFarlane appointed John Singlaub as a chief 
fundraiser. [60]
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AFL-CIO President Lane Kirkland chose not to openly 
identify with the contras, and his public statements were more 
guarded than Doherty's. When asked in March 1985 if he 
supported aid to the armed counter-revolution, Kirkland 
stated, "I don't think we should make a commitment that we 
are ill-equipped psychologically, politically, and otherwise 
to pursue...I am opposed to contracting out our defense and 
our security. If the threat is not sufficient to warrant our 
own defense of it, then its not that persuasive to me." Was 
the threat sufficient to warrant direct U.S. military 
involvement? Kirkland implied that it was. The Sandinistas 
were the source of a "great many problems in Central America. 
I think there is a serious problem of Soviet-Cuban involvement 
that is going to plague us for a long time." [61]
Reagan had himself by this point ceased expressing any 
faith in the civilian opposition to the Sandinistas, and the 
Administration prepared to ask Congress for a major infusion 
of aid. In March the President described the contras as "our 
brothers. And we owe them our help...They are the moral 
equivalent of our Founding Fathers." [62] On another occasion 
he described the Sandinistas as "infinitely worse" than 
Somoza. The political opposition had been "expunged" and 
democratic freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, had been 
rendered punishable by "officially sanctioned harassment, and 
imprisonment or death." [63] In April, however, Congress 
voted to deny the request for aid. On May 1st - international 
workers' day - Reagan announced that all commerce, navigation,
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and aiir transport between the U.S. and Nicaragua would cease. 
"The government of Nicaragua," said the President, 
"constituted an unusual and extraordinary threat to the 
national security of the United States." [64]
Another aid request, however, quickly followed. On 
Sunday, June 2nd, just days before the second Congressional 
vote, PRODEMCA took out a paid advertisment in the New York 
Times. The statement by PRODEMCA offered incontrovertible 
evidence that key union leaders supported the contras and 
therefore concurred with Reagan. The statement claimed, "The 
Sandinista rulers of Nicaragua are now seeking to impose a 
totalitarian system upon their people. They will not be 
deterred simply by humanitarian pleas, diplomatic appeals, or 
economic pressures. If the Sandinistas succeed, the 
Nicaraguan people will suffer greatly, and democracy 
throughout the Americas will face an unprecedented threat." 
The statement continued, "But the Nicaraguan democratic 
resistance movement can alter this dangerous course of events. 
Its leaders - figures like Arturo Cruz, Adolfo Calero, Pedro 
Joaquim Chamorro and Alfonso Robello - proved their dedication 
to democracy in their struggle against the Somoza 
dictatorship." For the signatories to the advertisment, the 
basic issue regarding U.S. policy toward Nicaragua was clear: 
"will we stand behind the Nicaraguan democratic resistance in 
its struggle against totalitarianism? Or will we declare that 
this movement is a lost cause, and offer only to help its 
supporters adjust to lives of victims, refugees and exiles?"
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Of the 67 names appearing with the PRODEMCA advertisment, 
Doherty, Shanker of the AFT, Frank Drozak, the leader of the 
Seafarers union (SIUNA) , and John Joyce the Bricklayers' (BAC) 
president, were from the trade union movement. Other names 
included Seymour Martin Lipset, a renowned sociologist and 
author of several publications related to trade unionism, 
veteran social democrat Sidney Hook, Michael Novak of the 
anti-union American Enterprise Institute? Penn Kemble, 
chairman for the Coalition For a Democratic Majority (CFDM) 
and president of PRODEMCA, and Rita Freedman, the Executive 
Director of Social Democrats USA. [65]
The story of national union leaders calling for contra 
aid even made the tabloids. The New York Post quoted Penn 
Kemble as saying, "There's been a big effort on the part of 
some labor leaders to support the revolutionary left in 
Central America for the last five years." Other union 
leaders, declared the PRODEMCA president, opposed this 
position and were now speaking up for democracy. [66] Kemble 
himself represented a section of the Democratic Party that 
commentators and activists referred to as "Cold War liberals." 
This significant segment of the Party's right-wing was 
supported by Cold War union leaders and was ideologically akin 
to Social Democrats USA. (In 1985 Kemble was national 
vice-president of SDUSA.) This section of the Democratic 
Party agreed with the anti-communist thrust of the Republican 
Party's foreign policy. As Kemble expressed it in a 1985 
SDUSA paper, "The Reagan Administration has helped restore
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the US as a world power. . .We (SDUSA) can help to build bridges 
between the labor movement and those Democrats and 
independents who stand somewhat to the right of labor on 
economic issues, but who also reject the social and foreign 
policy radicalism of the Democratic Party's Left.” [67]
Kemble's own bridge-building efforts became a highly 
significant factor in the Congressional battle to secure 
military aid to the contras. In his view the anti-communists 
in the AFL-CIO, joined by like-minded Democrats, needed to be 
mobilized behind Reagan to support contra aid. Dissidents in 
the AFL-CIO would be castigated in the popular press and 
elsewhere as supporters of the totalitarian left in Central 
America. Although a blatantly untrue assertion, such 
accusations were intended to weaken the resolve of the less 
committed members of the NLC. Kemble, according to 
journalistic reports inspired by the Iran-contra scandal, met 
in March 1985 with three other Democrats, Bernard Aronson, one 
of President Carter's liason personnel responsible for 
relations with the labour movement; Robert Leikin, ex-Maoist 
and author of the influential New Republic article which payed 
particular attention to depicting the Sandinistas as 
repressive toward the unions; and Bruce Cameron, an escort of 
contra leaders to Washington in their pursuit to pressure 
Congress for aid. Cameron would eventually be brought into 
the services of Carl "Spitz" Channel, who would later receive 
an indictment for collecting tax-exempt money for the contras. 
[68]
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The four Democrats, three of whom had operated 
politically within the orbit of the labour movement, were 
concerned that the President's rhetoric against the 
Sandinistas had had a negative effect on the prospects for 
Congressional support for aid. Reagan appeared obsessed by 
the Sandinistas; instead of focusing on their evils the 
President should, in their judgement, stress the "democratic 
alternative" and the good and positive aspects of the contras 
in order to pull moderate Democrats away from their more 
liberal colleagues who opposed the contra strategy. Working 
through the Oklahoma congressman, David McCurdy, the four 
impressed upon the President the need to adopt the PRODEMCA 
approach. Reagan complied. In the period preceding the 
second contra vote the President tailored his speeches in 
order to stress political rather than military solutions, 
human rights and freedoms, and the democratic calibre of the 
contra leaders. On June 13 the House approved the President's 
request for $27 million in aid to the contras by a resounding 
64 votes. Aside from Kemble's manoeuvre, a factor in the size 
of the victory had been the visit in April of Nicaraguan 
President, Daniel Ortega, to the Soviet Union. The fact that 
Ortega had also visited several western European countries was 
ignored. Kirkland drove the point home: "Ortega's trip...it's 
just simply further confirmation of the orientation of that 
particular regime." [69] Significant as Ortega's presence in 
Moscow was, the initiative of the four Democrats was described 
by Time magazine as "the most effective step in changing
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congressional minds" on contra aid. [70] Thus, PRODEMCA, 
supported by leading union figures and the Executive Director 
of AIFLD, helped ensure that a significant section of the 
labour movement leadership used their authority as workers' 
leaders to support the contras. More importantly, PRODEMCA's 
support was arguably decisive in securing $27 million towards 
continuing a covert war which had already claimed the lives 
of thousands of unarmed civilians.
The Democratic quartet (one source described them as 
the "four meddlers") [71] were also pursuing another 
objective. The contras themselves had to change. Through 
PRODEMCA Kemble and Doherty had formed a political 
relationship with UNO leader Arturo Cruz. AIFLD, during the 
period before the Nicaraguan elections in 1984, had supported 
the Cruz candidacy and his subsequent withdrawal from the 
contest, which he claimed was due to Sandinista harassment. 
The Washington Post (November 6, 1984) and the Wall Street
Journal (April 23, 1985) later disclosed, however, that Cruz 
had been persuaded by the CIA to boycott the elections soon 
after he had joined the contras. The Post published portions 
of a "secret-sensitive" briefing paper by the National 
Security Council (NSC) which outlined a "wideranging plan to 
convince Americans (that the) elections were a sham." [72]
At this time much of the propaganda being used by the 
Administration had been produced by the State Department's 
Office of Public Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean 
(OPD) . OPD worked closely with Oliver North, the NSC, and the
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CIA. According to the New York-based Fairness and Accuracy in 
Reporting group (FAIR), the OPD planted "dozens of false 
stories in major media outlets aimed at manufacturing a 
Nicaraguan threat'". [73] Several of the OPD stories and 
accusations were repeated by AIFLD, Kirkland, and other union 
leaders. One such story described how the Sandinistas were 
embarking on a disinformation campaign aimed at the U.S. 
public to build opposition to the U.S. Government's Nicaragua 
policy. Unionists travelling to Nicaragua on tours not 
endorsed by AIFLD were either victims of a well orchestrated 
and ongoing Sandinista propaganda exercise or conscious agents 
of Sandinista disinformation. Visiting Nicaraguan unionists 
who supported the Managua government (which meant everybody 
except the CUS and the CTN) were also depicted as agents of 
the Sandinistas. [74]
The AIFLD-Cruz connection was paralleled by a 
relationship forged between the Cold War Social Democrats USA 
(SDUSA) and Alfonso Robelo, another leading contra. The 
contra group, UNO, had been established in June 1985 and 
promoted by PRODEMCA. In a presentation to SDUSA, Robello 
claimed that the UNO stood for free trade unionism in 
Nicaragua, "And it is we (the UNO) who want and deserve the 
full support of liberals in the U.S." [75] Kemble and
Cameron drafted a statement entitled "From a Proxy Force to 
a National Liberation Movement," which depicted the contras 
as an authentic popular force with democratic objectives. [76] 
The objective of the document was to help tilt the political
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balance inside the contra camp away from Calero, who 
represented the Somocista contra army, the FDN, towards Cruz 
and Robelo who had a more respectable democratic record. The 
Kemble group reportedly convinced Assistant Secretary of State 
Elliot Abrams to side with the civilians Cruz and Robello in 
their efforts to get the FDN dissolved. For the remainder of 
1985, the four, especially Leikin, wrote a series of articles 
describing the Cruz-Robelo . project. The "democratic 
resistance,” he maintained, had to be broadened and violations 
of human rights and terrorizing the population in Nicaragua 
had to cease if the anti-Sandinista project was to win 
widespread support in the U.S. [77]
AIFLD's Allegations of Sandinista Repression of Unions 
Challenged.
AIFLD's pronouncements and the independent initiatives 
of Doherty and of union leaders through PRODEMCA had clearly 
made a major contribution to the contra cause. A consensus 
had been forged pertaining to the totalitarian status of the 
Sandinistas and the authentic character of the "Nicaraguan 
democratic resistance" which stretched from the AIFLD-DIA wing 
of the labour movement, through the Cold War Democrats, the 
Republican Party, the White House, the State Department and 
the CIA, to the anti-union right wing both inside and outside 
Congress. The union leaders who were part of that consensus 
were therefore in agreement with right-wing bodies like the
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Heritage Foundation, the Committee on the Present Danger, and 
the World Anti-Communist League - organisations whose hatred 
of the Sandinistas could only be matched, perhaps, by their 
hostility to the labour movement.
One of the building blocks of this consensus had been 
accusations of Sandinista repression against the independent 
unions in Nicaragua. Doherty's report, A Revolution Betrayed; 
Free Labor Persecuted, had been widely circulated following 
its release in April 1984. For example, in February 1985 the 
Report was inserted into the Congressional Record by 
Republican Senator David Durenberger from Minnesota, who 
declared that the Report documented "in stark detail the 
Sandinistas1 efforts to destroy independent labor 
organizations in Nicaragua." [78] The report by the West 
Coast trade union visit organised by the Labor Network had 
made available the most succinct reply up to that time to 
AIFLD's characterisation of the Nicaraguan trade union 
situation. [79] However, the anti-intervention movement in 
the U.S. unions (and more generally) had yet to match 
Doherty's detailed allegations with an equally detailed 
response. In December 1984 the National Lawyers Guild sent 
a nine-person delegation to Nicaragua with the specific 
mission of cross-examining the Doherty report of March 1984. 
Three of the nine were employees of the National Labor 
Relations Board, and six were attorneys representing a variety 
of unions, including many affiliated to the AFL-CIO. In April 
1985 the report of the lawyers delegation was released under
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the titlee, Are Nicaragua's Trade Unions Free? A Response to 
the American Institute For Free Labor Development. [80]
The lawyers claimed that most cases of repression cited 
in the report were either fictitious or exaggerated. The 
report bore the appearance of a careful case-by-case 
dissection of the charges against the Nicaraguan authorities, 
which pointed to "significant disputes with regard to 
virtually every allegation of trade union repression in 
Nicaragua" [81] and "numerous examples of exaggerated and 
possibly fraudulent accusations of Government repression made 
by the CUS and the CTN to the ILO and other human rights 
organizations." [82] The Doherty report was, therefore, "a 
grossly inaccurate and misleading document." [83] 
Furthermore, the lawyers explicitly rejected the accusation 
that Nicaragua's union movement was moving in the direction 
of the Soviet model or that the activities of the CUS and the 
CTN were analogous, as AIFLD had suggested, to those of 
Solidarnosc in Poland. A more appropriate analogy for the 
"young, dynamic and expanding labor movement in Nicaragua" 
was, they suggested, the early organising drives of the CIO 
where there had been intense competition between unions. 
Tensions among Nicaragua's unions, however, had been 
"heightened by the CUS and CTN's alignment with the violent 
counterrevolution (which had resulted in) spontaneous, popular 
expressions of opposition to the CUS and the CTN - actions 
beyond the control of the government." Furthermore, the 
failure of the CTN and the CUS "to share in (the) dramatic
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growth in trade union membership" was attributable to the 
widely held belief that they were "weak and inefficient 
company unions rather than to any systematic government 
repression." As for the pro-Sandinista federations such as 
the CST and ATC and their relationship to the government, this 
was depicted by the lawyer's report as somewhat similar to 
that of the AFL-CIO's relationship to the Democratic Party. 
Moreover, both the ATC and the CST were said to be opposed to 
the suspension of the right to strike but accepted the 
restriction because of the contra aggression. [84]
The report immediately became an important tool in the 
hands of the anti-interventionists. However, the report 
originated from the periphery of the labour movement, unlike 
AIFLD's publications which carried with them the official 
weight of the AFL-CIO. Nevertheless, the seriousness in which 
AIFLD greeted the report testified to the Institute's apparent 
concern to maintain an unambiguously negative image of the 
Sandinistas on the trade union question. By the end of August 
1985 AIFLD had produced an even more detailed and lengthy 
sequel to the 1984 report "A Revolution Betrayed". The new 
document, entitled Sandinista Deception Re-Affirmed: 
Nicaragua's Cover-Up of Trade Union Repression, began by 
criticising what was described as Sandinista-organised visits 
of U.S. trade unionists to Nicaragua. [85] In language which 
echoed that used by Oliver North's Office for Public Diplomacy 
inside the Department of State, these unionists were charged 
with "outright deception" for not conveying the poverty wages
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of the Nicaraguan workers. Visiting unionists, it continued, 
"are detoured around the market-place, where they are certain 
to be exposed to outraged vendors of housewives complaining 
about the purchasing power of the cordoba (the Nicaraguan 
currency) in real terms." The participants on the Labor 
Network tour in 1984 were described as "those who have 
concerted with the Sandinista government (in spreading) 
distortions and disinformation." [86] AIFLD criticised the 
lawyers* report for relying heavily on information provided 
by the Nicaraguan Ministry of Labor? the Ministry's version 
of events was cited no less than thirty times. Furthermore, 
the so-called independent newspaper La Prensa had not been 
consulted, and the complaints made by the ICFTU delegation to 
Nicaragua in November in 1982 had not been addressed. [87] 
The lawyers also allegedly misrepresented the findings of 
Amnesty International and sidestepped completely the question 
of the CST's affiliation to the WFTU. Pertaining to 
individual cases of repression, AIFLD retracted none of its 
earlier evidence. More than this, AIFLD proceeded to present 
case descriptions of further allegations of Sandinista 
harassment of the CUS and the CTN that had emerged since the 
publication of "A Revolution Betrayed." [88]
In October the lawyers produced an open letter to AIFLD. 
[89] It argued that they had not been hoodwinked by the 
Sandinista government, that they set their own agenda and had 
been free to walk around and talk with anyone they pleased. 
Attempts to talk to business people and La Prensa had not been
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thwarted by the government. The extensive use of Ministry of 
Labor information, they claimed, testified to the "failure of 
international delegations to specifically substantiate the 
charges." AIFLD's criticisms of the Report were described as 
"little more than a feeble attempt to divert attention away 
from the plain fact that the original AIFLD report was replete 
with significant errors." AIFLD's position, argued the 
letter, had virtually no support among Nicaraguan workers and 
"the greatest hypocrisy of all is AIFLD*s refusal to 
acknowledge that Nicaragua is at war." AIFLD was also accused 
of misrepresenting the CUS over the question of the contras. 
CUS leaders had stated their clear opposition to the contras, 
but AIFLD had implied that CUS did not unconditionally oppose 
aid to the insurgents. (AIFLD had stated that, "the CUS 
refuses to condemn those unionists who have chosen the path 
(of armed resistance as opposed to) civilian non-violent 
opposition." [91]
Clearly, ideological leanings and political motives were 
as obvious a part of this exchange as they were in the 
majority of exchanges pertaining to the Central American war. 
This notwithstanding, it was nonetheless the case that AIFLD*s 
charges against the Sandinistas, which had reverberated 
uncontested (in any detailed way) throughout international 
trade union circles and world opinion as a whole, were now 
challenged by carefully documented evidence. Therefore, the 
lawyers report, while less widely circulated, marked a 
qualitative breakthrough for anti-intervention trade unionists
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in the U-S. and beyond. Despite this achievement, the report 
itself failed to convincingly handle AIFLD1s accusation that 
the lawyers frequently only cited the view of the Nicaraguan 
Ministry of Labor and were therefore prepared to accept 
official Sandinista explanations. The lawyers' attempt to 
dismantle AIFLD's prosecution of the Sandinistas, case by 
case, detail by detail, was in this sense only partially 
successful.
However, in the area of substantive political and human 
rights issues, the arguments of the lawyers exposed AIFLD's 
own disinformation and double-standards. By focusing on the 
aggression against Nicaragua, and the support of AIFLD and top 
union leaders for that aggression, the lawyers left AIFLD to 
complain about relatively minor infringements of union rights 
and the grumbling of street vendors. Amnesty International's 
1983 report stated that unionists arrested by the government 
were seldom detained for more than a few days. Similarly, 
AI's 1984 report referred to "many supporters" of legal 
political parties and trade unions who were held for periods 
ranging from several hours to over one months' incommunicado 
detention before being released without charges. [92] 
However, the 1984 report continued: "While certain trade union 
activities, including strikes and stoppages, were banned under 
the prevailing state of emergency and punishable under the 
Public Order Law, AI was unaware of any trade unionists having 
been detained or prosecuted under these provisions. Charges 
were generally reported to have been based on allegations of
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collaboration with violent opposition groups, or involved with 
specific acts of sabotage or terrorism within the terms of the 
Public Order Law." [93]
AI. unlike AIFLD, also investigated the behavior of the 
contras, citing evidence of "armed groups based in neighboring 
countries regularly carried out the execution-style killing 
of individuals captured in Nicaragua..In some cases prisoners 
were reportedly tortured and mutilated before being killed. 
[94] The lawyers' report also put into perspective AIFLD 
complaints about Sandinista harassment. "In El Salvador," they 
noted, "many union leaders are in jail or dead? in Nicaragua 
no labor leader has been killed and the leadership of the CUS 
and the CTN are not in jail. Indeed, they have
representatives touring the U.S. and giving speeches critical 
of the Nicaraguan government." [95]
AIFLD's principal line of defence against the damaging 
political allegations made by the lawyers report concerned 
Sandinista intentions more than their actual behavior. The 
U.S. Department of State had translated and circulated an FSLN 
internal document which recorded the proceedings of a 
three-day gathering of FSLN leading cadres in September 1979, 
just weeks after the fall of Somoza. The document, entitled 
Analysis of the Situation and Tasks of the Sandinista's 
People's Revolution (or "72-Hour Document") was sub-titled by 
the Department of State "The Sandinista Blueprint For 
Constructing Communism in Nicaragua." [96] AIFLD, using 
similar terminology, considered the document to be "a
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blueprint for the complete subjection of workers' 
organizations in the FSLN's state." [97] For AIFLD the 
totalitarian objectives of the Sandinistas not only pre-dated 
the formation of the contras, but made the contras a 
thoroughly legitimate movement of anti-totalitarian 
resistance. Therefore, while the lawyers report to some 
extent redeemed or put into perspective the Sandinista record, 
it did not confront or attempt to interpret the "72-Hour 
Document" or the CST's affiliation to the WFTU. This 
partially reflected the way many anti-interventionists came 
to view their political role: for them the issue was not what 
U.S. unionists, acting as referees, read on the Sandinista 
scorecard. The issue concerned the right of a people to 
self-determination.
Yet the contents of the 72-Hour Document did reveal a 
number of important things about the Sandinistas. The 
Document itself conveyed the Sandinista's commitment to 
prevent the revolution from being overturned, by pulling the 
mass organisations behind their political authority. It 
outlined a strategy to prevent the establishment of "somocism 
without Somoza" in Nicaragua following 1979. Interestingly, 
the State Department's preface to the translated document 
registered apparent surprise that the FSLN "actually believed" 
that, in the words of the FSLN statement, "the true enemy we 
would have to confront was the imperialist power of the United 
States." It was as if the State Department authors were 
themselves unaware of the history of U.S. armed intervention
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in Nicaragua and the entire region, or that this history might 
cause the FSLN to politically prepare themselves for what they 
perceived to be an imminent U.S.-inspired destabilization 
efforts. The 72-Hour Document indicated that the FSLN 
anticipated the AIFLD-supported CUS would support the counter­
revolution. (Indeed, just prior to the insurrection, the CUS 
was the only trade union formation which still supported the 
anti-Somoza bourgeoisie and its call for the U.S. Government 
to mediate in negotiations between Somoza and his opponents. 
See Chapter Three.) Despite this (accurate) prediction, there 
was no indication that the FSLN intended to eradicate its 
trade union opponents. [99]
The Nicaraguan Ministry of Labor also responded to 
AIFLD's accusations. [100] It denied that "the FSLN's 
National Directorate has insisted that all trade union 
centrals join the CST," and pointed out that during the Somoza 
era only the CUS, CTN and Somoza's own CGT were allowed to 
exist. "A new type of unionism," said the Ministry, had become 
available since 1979 - and it was this that Nicaraguan workers 
wanted. The CUS had only joined the struggle against the 
dictatorship at the last minute "at a time when no-one, not 
even the American government, would have given a cent for 
Somoza." [101] Furthermore, before this date, "they (the CUS) 
never questioned the Somoza dictatorship..and maintained 
excellent relations with somocista officials." [102] Unions 
could affiliate with whom they pleased, wrote the Ministry, 
but, "the Revolutionary Government is not responsible if
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Nicaraguan workers know that the CUS and the CTN's leaders 
have sold out to the owners, and that they receive daily 
instruction from the.. .American Embassy. This type of 
behavior is not well received. .(.) If the large majority of 
workers decide to affiliate to the CST, they have the right 
to do so and no DOHERTY has the authority to tell them who 
they should affiliate with...The organization of which he is 
director (AIFLD) has not been able to make the Yankee 
government, .respect the rights of North American workers. MR. 
DOHERTY has mistaken the enemy; the battle must not be waged 
against a popular, workers' revolution but against his 
government, against Reagan, who represents the darkest 
interests of the North American monopolies which exploit and 
oppress the North American worker." (Blocks in original). 
[103]
Conclusion.
The support of the contras registered by leading U.S. 
trade unionists during this period testified to the extent a 
section of the U.S. labour leadership was prepared to take 
their Cold War sentiments. The postwar history of AFL-CIO's 
policy in Latin America indicated that, to these leaders, if 
reforms were not sufficient to derail revolutionary movements, 
the labour movement must endorse or condone military 
intervention to prevent communism being established. While 
the AFL-CIO stressed the need for right-wing regimes to
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democratise themselves, support for U.S. military intervention 
to fight communism did not depend on the U.S. government first 
trying to intercept revolution by trying to influence change. 
The AFL-CIO viewed the U.S. Government's historical lack of 
vision in this area as regrettable but not sufficient to 
disqualify an Administration from trade union support for 
whatever action (covert or overt) it felt was necessary to 
repel communist expansion. Furthermore, there could be no 
thought of acquiescing to the totalitarians by fatalistically 
accepting that revolutions were inevitable, irreversible, or 
both. The only thing that was certain regarding communism was 
its repressive character. As a leading protagonist of Cold 
War unionism expressed it, "Communism is a system based on 
terror and total power. Post-revolutionary Vietnam, Cambodia, 
etc, confirmed the full horror set in motion by the Russian 
Revolution." [104] For Kirkland, Doherty, Shanker, and other 
like-minded trade union leaders the Sandinistas and the Khmer 
Rouge were essentially indistinct from each other; both had 
the objective of eliminating their political opposition and 
would pursue any means for it to be achieved. In their view 
the Sandinistas had not succeeded, yet, in constructing a 
totalitarian society but surely intended to do so. Kirkland, 
et. al. , now shared with Reagan a desire to prevent the people 
of Nicaragua being reduced to slavery by the Sandinistas.
By mid-1985 internal opposition to Sandinista rule 
remained relatively unthreatening. The Reagan Administration 
threw everything behind an effort to provide military aid to
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the armed counter-revolution, convincing Congress that the 
contras were a legitimate democratic alternative to Sandinista 
Marxism-Leninism. The evidence presented above demonstrates 
clearly that AIFLD and a section of the AFL-CIO leadership 
actively assisted the Reagan Administration in achieving this 
end. By disseminating (and, in the area of trade union 
rights, helping to compose) anti-Sandinista propaganda 
emerging from Oliver North's OPD office in the Department of 
State, AIFLD and the DIA, in an unquantifiable but nonetheless 
significant way, helped turn Congress towards supporting 
Reagan's military objective. Such an objective was not only 
emphatically opposed by the AFL-CIO's sister federations in 
the ORIT and ICFTU, it was also opposed (as opinion polls 
consistently indicated) by the majority of the U.S. public. 
[105] Moreover, the formation of the pro-contra lobbying 
group PRODEMCA witnessed the alliance of certain union leaders 
with the anti-union Republican right-wing. PRODEMCA leader 
Penn Kemble (a key figure in SDUSA) and other right-wing 
Democrats with trade union connections (Aronson and Leikin), 
the evidence suggests, helped North, the CIA, and the Reagan 
Administration "re-package" the contras in a manner more 
acceptable to Congressional moderates. Indeed, some sources 
(cited above) claimed that this intervention contributed 
decisively to the shift in Congress towards the contras.
This period also witnessed attempts by PRODEMCA, AIFLD 
and the DIA to explain trade union opposition to the contras, 
and anti-intervention activities in the unions more generally,
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as an integral part of a Sandinista disinformation campaign 
aimed at the U.S. public. It would later be revealed that 
this accusation, a standard "red-baiting” method, also came 
directly from North and the OPD.
The anti-interventionist elements in the U.S. trade 
unions were, by comparison, peripheral to the debates on 
Capitol Hill. However, considerable headway was being made 
in other areas. Chapter Seven documents the momentum and 
extent of the anti-interventionist challenge to AIFLD and the 
DIA in the period leading to the AFL-CIO's full Convention in 
October, 1985.
NOTES AND REFERENCES
1. Holly Sklar, Washington's War on Nicaragua (Boston: 
South End Press, 1988) pp. 162-168.
2. Resolution 90, Fifteenth Constitutional Convention, 
AFL-CIO, 1983, Proceedings, Vol.l p. 261.
3. The Salvadoran unionists before the Commission 
omitted any written reference to death squads, torture, 
disappearances and assassinations in El Salvador. They did, 
however, call for "radical changes..in the entire structure 
of the government and the military." See AFL-CIO/AIFLD 
Briefing Before the National Bipartizan Commission on Central 
America, Sept 8, 1983.
4. Lane Kirkland, letter to Principal Officers of 
Affiliated State and Local Central Bodies, April 10, 1984,
introducing William Doherty's Nicaragua: A Revolution
Betrayed. Free Labor Persecuted. AIFLD, March 1984.
5. ibid. p.4
6 . U.S. Department of State, Broken Promises: 
Sandinista Repression of Human Rights in Nicaragua. Washington 
D.C.: October 1984, pp.11-15.
7. ILO Report June 1984 conference in Switzerland, 
cited by S. J. Diamond, "Should One Class Mean One Union," In
401
These Times, Nov. 14-20, 1984, pp. 14-15.
8 . Amnesty International Report, AI, London, 1985 p. 
171-76. See also William Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History 
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J. : Zed Books, 1986)
9. NLC. TL to members of Congress, March 18, 1984.
10. Paul Garver, untitled typescript essay, 1985 
Unpublished.
11. Report of the Philadelphia Labor Committee, 
Untitled. August 1, 1984.
12. The CSN emerged from a 1980 conference organized by 
the CST, the objective of which was to discuss labour movement 
unity. The CUS and the CTN refused to cooperate with the 
initiative. See Report on the West Coast Trade Union 
Delegation to Nicaragua, (Sept. 8-15, 1984) Nicaragua: Labor. 
Democracy, and the Struggle for Peace (Oakland Ca. : Labor 
Network on Central America, Nov 1984)
13. Statement cited by Richard Metcalf, report to J. 
Sheinkman on Managua Trade Union Conference, June 1984. See 
also the WFTU's monthly English language journal, World Trade 
Union Movement (WTUM), October to December 1984.
14. Metcalf to Sheinkman, op. cit.
15. WTUM ibid.
16. Sandor Gaspar, President WFTU, address to the WFTU 
convention in Havana, 1982, in WTUM. July 1982, p.11-12.
17. WTUM. Feb. 1983.
18. WTUM interview with Allan Chavarrio, international 
representative of the CST, June 1984.
19. Central America Historical Institute (CAHI), 
Nicaragua: Political Parties and Movements April 1984.
20. Nicaraguan Perspectives. Fall 1984, p.27. See also 
Douglas Payne, The Democratic Mask: The Consolidation of the 
Sandinista Revolution Perspectives on Freedom Series, (New 
York: Freedom House, 1985) pp.58-60
21. Sklarr, op. cit. pp.192-200.
22 "A Secret Sandinist Speech," Free Trade Union News 
39 7-8. July-Aug 1984.
23. Joaguim Ibarz, "El Commandante Bayard Arce afirma 
que se ba a implantar el marxismo-leninismo y el partido 
unico." La Vanguardia. Barcelona, July 31, 1984. Translated
402
and circulated by the OPD for Latin America and the Caribbean, 
U.S. Deptt of State, Washington, D.C. References to the speech 
later appeared in the Economist. August 23, 1984? Christian 
Science Monitor. August 9, 1984; Wall St. Journal. October 12, 
1984r Washington Post. August 8, 1984.
24 Free Trade Union News , July-August 1984, op. cit.
25. ibid.
•
VOCM West Coast Delegation, op. cit.
27. ibid. p. 4
28. ibid. p. 14
29.
Growing,"
Kim Moody, "Nicaragua' 
Labor Notes (Detroit}




Paul Garver, Review 
and the Struggle
Essav of Nicaragua: Labor, 
for Peace. Jan 21. 1985.
Unpublished.
31. For example, a parliamentary delegation from the 
Republic of Ireland concluded, "The electoral process was 
carried out with total integrity. The seven parties 
participating in the elections represented a broad spectrum 
of political ideologies.11 Cited by Fairness and Accuracy in 
Reporting (FAIR) Extra! Oct.-Nov 1987. See also U.S. Dept, 
of State Special Report No. 132, "Revolution Bevond Our 
Borders.": Sandinista Intervention in Central America. Sept. 
1985.
32. R. Leikin, "Nicaragua's Untold Stories," New 
Republic Oct. 8, 1984 pp.17-19.
33. E. Chamorro, Packaging the Contras. Institute for 
Media Analysis, New York, 1987, p. 54.
34. Michael Massing, "Contra Aides: Why Four Democratic 
Operatives Enlisted in Oliver North's Crusade, Mother Jones. 
Oct. 26, 1987.
35. U.S. Embassy, Managua. Report on the Labor
Situation, (typescript) Nov. 1984.
36. ICFTU, Report on Communist Controlled Organizations 
6 Nov. 20, 1984.
37. U.S. Embassy, Managua, op. cit. p. 5.
38. For more on the CTN split, see P. Garver, "Union
Federations in Opposition," Report to SEIU President John
Sweeney, March 19, 1984. See also Pablo Mateo, Labor in
Nicaragua, research project on Central American trade unions,
403
Institute of Interamerican Studies, Graduate Sch. of 
International Studies, Uni. Miami, Fa. Directed by Prof. Jaime 
Suchlicki & Damian J. Fernandez. Unpublished, pp. 33-36. See 
also CLAT Report, undated, probably Summer 1983.
39. T. Barry & D. Preusch, Agents As Organizers: AIFLD 
in Central America (Albuqurque, N.M.: Resource Center, 1987) 
p.28.
40. U.S. Labor Lawyers Delegation to Nicaragua (Dec. 
1984) "Are Nicaragua's Trade Unions Free?: A Response to AIFLD 
(AFL-CIO) Report, ‘Nicaragua, A Revolution Betrayed: Free 
Labor Persecuted."' April 1985. p.21; Mateo, op. cit. cites 
New York Times coverage, Aug. 27, 1984.
41. AIFLD Report. Sept.-Oct. 1984 p.l
42. Mateo, op. cit. p.537.
43. NALGO, (U.K.) Nicaragua: Report on the NALGO Visit 
22nd Aoril-lst Mav 1984. London, Dec. 1984 p.9
44. TUC Resolution cited in Trade Unions and Revolution 
in Nicaragua. Nicaragua Solidarity Campaign (pamphlet), NSC 
Nicaragua Today Series, 1, London 1984.
45. Labor Report on Central America. (LRCA) No.l, July- 
Aug. 1985.
46. "Rebel Leaders Demand Talks with Sandinistas," 
Washington Post. March 3, 1985.
47. AIFLD Report. March-April 1985.
48. ibid.
49. Information Bulletin, Contadora Island, Panama, Jan. 
9, 1983. Cited in Sklarr, op. cit. p. 301.
50. Kissinger Report, op. cit. pp. 142-143
51. S. Romualdi, Presidents and Peons: Recollections of 
a Labor Ambassador in Latin America (New York: Funk and 
Wagnalls, 1967) pp. 228-230.
52. CAHI, "Nicaragua 1984: Human and Material Costs of 
War." Envio Jan. 1985, 4 1, pp. 3-4. See also Americas
Watch, "Violations of the Laws of War by Both Sides in 
Nicaragua," (Washington D.C.: March 1985); for damage to
Nicaragua's development prospects caused by the contra war, 




54. Affidavit of Edgar Chamorro, cited by Sklar, op. 
cit. p.129.
55. Barry and Preusch, op. cit. p.56
56. Chamorro, Packaging.. op. cit, p. 52.
57. Cited by Barry and Preusch, op. cit. p. 56.
58. Roy Gutman, Banana Diplomacy; The Making of American 
Foreign Policy in Nicaragua. 1981-87 (New York: Simon & 
Shuster, 1988) p. 332. Gutman, a former national security 
correspondent for Newsdav. described PRODEMCA as "a formation 
formed to encourage support for Reagan's Central America 
policies."
59. Quoted by Robert Matthews, "Sowing Dragon's Teeth: 
The U.S. War Against Nicaragua," NACLA Report on the Americas. 
XX 4, July-Aug. 1986, p. 28. Matthews noted, " The origins 
of citizen's support for the contra war are rooted in the 
proliferation of right-wing Washington organizations and 
lobbies that flourish in the Reagan era..The network comprises 
of dozens of organizations.. that work closely together in a 
heirarchy that ends in the White House." ibid.
60. ibid.
61. AFL-CIO News. Interview with Lane Kirkland, April 
6, 1985.
62. Matthews, op. cit. p.30
63. Antony Lewis, writing in the New York Times, 
commented that "President Reagan on the subject of Nicaragua 
sounds more and more these days like something from the pages 
of Orwell. His disregard for the facts has become 
hallucinatory. His rhetoric rings with hate." Lewis, op. ed. 
contribution, NYT April 18, 1985. Abraham Brumberg, former 
editor of the journal Problems of Communism commented that 
President Reagan's tactics had been "borrowed from the 
totalitarian arsenal. He is determined to portray those he 
wishes to destroy in the most lurid and reprehensible colors." 
Blumberg, op. ed. page NYT June 18, 1985.
64. President Reagan, nationally televised speech, May
1, 1985.
65. PRODEMCA, paid advertisement, New York Times. June
2, 1985.
66. Frederic Dicker, "Union Chiefs Laboring For American 
Aid to Contras," New York Post. June 11, 1985.
67. Penn Kemble, "Rebuilding the Democratic Party: A 
Matter of Principles," S.D. Papers No. 7, 1985. Kemble also
405
noted, "This departure in foreign policy (from the D.P. 
mainstream) is..a revival of an approach employed by President 
Truman in Europe, and again by President Reagan in Latin 
America. In both instances, the labor movement, here and 
abroad, was a key actor in carrying out the foreign policy of 
'democratic solidarity.1" ibid. p.6.
68. Michael Massing, op. cit.
69. John Herling's Labor Letter, May 11, 1985.
70. Time cited (no date provided) by Massing, op. cit.
71. Gutman, op. cit. p. 331
72. Washington Post and Wall St. Journal disclosures 
cited by Fairness and Accuracy in Reporting (FAIR), Extra! 1 
4, (Oct-Nov.) 1987.
73. ibid.
74. See William Doherty, Introduction to AIFLD, 
Sandinista Deception Reaffirmed: Nicaragua Coverup of Trade 
Union Repression. Aug. 1985, pp. i-ii.
75. A. Robelo, "The Nicaraguan Democratic Struggle: Our 
Unfinished Revolution," Presentation to SDUSA in New York, 
June 15, 1985. Reprinted in S.D. USA Papers. No. 8.
76. Cited by Peter Kornbluh, "The Contra Lobby: How a 
Secret Propaganda Network Tipped the Scales in Contra Aid," 
Village Voice. Oct. 13, 1987, p.23
77. For an overview of Leikin's role in changing the
image of the contras, see Kornbluh, op. cit.
78. The Congressional Record. (Feb. 28, 1985, S.
235-55), cited in U.S. Labor Lawyers Delegation Report, op.
cit. p.2.
79. Labor Network on Central America, op. cit.
80. U.S. Labor Lawyers Delegation Report, op. cit.
81. ibid. p. 54.
82. ibid. p. 76.
83. ibid. p. 58.
84. ibid. p. 60.
85. AIFLD, Sandinista Deception Re-affirmed: Nicaragua's 
Cover-Up of Trade Union Repression. (Washington D.C.: August,
1985.
406
86. ibid. p.p. ii. The Miami Herald noted that union 
leaders, along with "solidarity groups, church, civic..and 
political opinion makers were involved in the propaganda 
campaign of the Sandinistas inside the U.S." Tim Golden, 
"Sandinistas Gearing Propaganda to Grass Roots America," Miami 
Herald. August 14, 1985.
87. AIFLD, Sandinista Deception.. op. cit. pp. 8-21.
88. ibid. p.p. 21-25.
89. U.S. Labor Lawyers Delegation to Central America, 
"Open Letter to AIFLD," October 25, 1985.
90. ibid.
91. AIFLD Brief, cited without date, ibid.
92. Amnesty International Report, London, 1984, p. 179
93. ibid.
94. ibid. p. 182.
95. Lawyers "Open Letter," op. cit. p. 8
96. U.S. Dept. of State, Coordinator for Public 
Diplomacy for Latin America and the Caribbean, "The 72-Hour 
Document;" The Sandinista Blueprint for Constructing Communism 
in Nicaragua. Feb. 1986
97. AIFLD, Sandinista Deception op. cit. p. 2.
98. U.S. Dept, of State, "The 72-Hour Document." op. 
cit. Introduction, p.l. See also p.4.
99. ibid. pp. 3-19.
100. Nicaraguan Ministry of Labor, Commentary on the 





104. Carl Gershman, "After the Dominoes Fell," 
Commentary. May 1978.
105. For evidence of U.S. public opposition to contra 
aid during this period, see Barry Sussman, "In Poll, Public 
Approves Denial With Contra Aid," Washington Post. March 26,
1986.
407
Labour Imperialism or Democratic 
Internationalism? U.S. Trade Unions 
and the Conflict in El Salvador and 
Nicaragua, 1981-1989
Submitted by Sean Sweeney 
for the degree of PhD 
of the University of Bath 
1990
COPYRIGHT
'Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright 
of this thesis rests with its author. This 
copy of the thesis has been supplied on 
condition that anyone who consults it is 
understood to recognise that its copyright 
rests with its author and that no quotation 
from the thesis and no information derived 
from it may be published without the prior 
written consent of the author'.
UNIVtfiji 11 ill- UATH 
 LIBRARY
( ? [  27  JUL 1993**
CHAPTER 7
U.S TRADE UNIONS 1985: THE CONTROVERSY SHARPENS
The re-election of President Reagan in November 1984 
predictably resulted in the intensification of the political 
and military war against Nicaragua in 1985. Aid to the 
contras, the economic embargo and other measures ensured that 
Nicaragua remained the principal foreign policy concern of the 
Reagan Administration as it entered its second term. In the 
U.S. trade unions anti-intervention work registered steady 
advances. The city-committees continued to function and the 
NLC maintained a certain identity, although the precipitous 
decline in Congressional and media attention to the situation 
in El Salvador following the election of Duarte threatened the 
political existence of the Committee. As explained in earlier 
chapters, the NLC majority held serious reservations regarding 
the Sandinistas. Later this became more evident when some NLC 
members made statements which seemed to put them 
simultaneously in a position of supporting both AIFLD and the 
NLC.
This chapter documents the growing internal challenge 
to U.S. Central America policy and Cold War unionism in the
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AFL-CIO during 1985, a challenge that culminated into a major 
confrontation between anti-interventionists and DIA loyalists 
at the Federation's full convention in November. As is 
evidenced below, the traffic of trade unionists to and from 
Central America increased markedly during this period, a 
factor which helped sharpen the differences between the two 
camps. It is important to note that at the full convention 
and at several state AFL-CIO conventions that preceded it no 
issue provoked more controversy and discussion than Central 
America - this at a time when the labour movement faced the 
spectre of three more years of a hostile Republican 
Administration and growing political marginalisation in the 
Democratic Party.
The Second National Labor Committee Tour of Central America.
The NLC, with 21 union leaders now on its letterhead, 
conducted its second tour of Central America in February 1985. 
In June 1983 the NLC had organised a tour of El Salvador and 
the visitors returned with a perspective of events that 
strongly contradicted accounts made available by the Reagan 
administration and AIFLD. Thirty-five thousand copies of the 
tour's report, El Salvador: Labor. Terror, and Peace, were 
circulated. [1] The second NLC tour returned to El Salvador 
but this time travelled on to Nicaragua. Duarte's election 
and the military containment of the FMLN had dispelled 
Congressional anxieties regarding El Salvador, although the
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conflict in the Salvadoran unions did receive some attention 
in the U.S. press. Nonetheless, in 1985 it was Nicaragua that 
captured most attention.
Several union leaders made the trip, most notably 
ACTWU's Secretary-Treasurer Jack Sheinkman, AFGE's president 
Kenneth Blaylock, and Keith Johnson, president of the 
woodworkers (IWA). Also on the delegation was the president 
of UAW Local 909, Frank Hammer, brother of the AIFLD worker 
who had been assassinated in the Sheraton Hotel by right-wing 
death squads in 1980 (see Chapter Three) and AFSCME 
vice-president Victor Gotbaum (a visible opponent of the 
Vietnam War). [2]
The arrival of the visitors in El Salvador coincided 
with deepening splits in the AIFLD-sponsored UPD over Duarte's 
failure to honour pre-election agreements known as the Social 
Pact, and with AIFLD's decision to form a new federation, the 
CTD (See Chapter Five). AIFLD's representatives in the 
country refused to meet with the visitors, and an atmosphere 
of union repression - and resurgence - surrounded the tour.
[3] Just days before the delegation arrived a transport 
workers union official was machine-gunned to death as he 
stepped from his taxicab. He had been involved in two recent 
strikes. Another officer in the same union was assassinated 
outside his home the day after the U.S. delegation arrived.
[4]
The report released by the NLC delegation, The Search 
For Peace in Central America, noted that the resurgence of
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Iunion activity in El Salvador could be attributed to the 
"trade unions' spirit of defiance." [5] The land reform had 
been obstructed by the right-wing in the National Assembly and 
the judicial system, unlike the death squads, was not 
functioning. The report investigated the Salvadoran 
military's reported aerial bombardment of civilian locations, 
a subject not normally mentioned by AIFLD. Occupants of the 
refugee camp San Jose de la Montana recounted stories of 
indiscriminate bombing and shooting from helicopter gunships. 
Whole families were reportedly slaughtered, and hundreds of 
children in the camp were thought to be orphaned. According 
to the U.N., 2,285 civilians in El Salvador died from actions 
of the army and paramilitary groups, during "indiscriminate 
bombardment" in the first ten months of 1984. [6] U.S. aid, 
concluded the report, had not stopped "the widespread and 
systematic violation of human and trade union rights...In El 
Salvador, the army has the real power. It is controlled by 
the right." AIFLD's role in El Salvador, however, was not
discussed. [7]
The NLC report then turned to Nicaragua, and 
contradicted AIFLD's characterisation of the trade union 
situation. Importantly, leaders of the CUS were again 
described as opponents of U.S. aid to the contras - this at 
a time when AIFLD and certain trade union leaders were clearly 
pressing for contra aid having cited, among other things, the 
valiant struggle of the democratic CUS federation. The report 
regarded as "particularly hypocritical" the complaint made by
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1the Nicaraguan business group (COSEP) that union freedom had 
been curtailed by the Sandinista's ban on strikes? Nicaraguan 
business under Somoza, noted the report, had not won any 
awards for their encouragement of strikes or unions. The 
report stated, "Although opposition unions in Nicaragua have 
occasionally been harassed, they have been allowed to exist 
and press their demands." [8] Criticisms levelled at the 
Sandinistas were mild in comparison with those expressed by 
AIFLD, although the report did echo Amnesty International1s 
protests regarding the improper detention of civilians and the 
lack of due process in the popular courts. Nevertheless, the 
report concluded, "there is political opposition, free speech, 
thought and assembly existing in Nicaragua today." [9] The 
contras were unambiguously condemned.
The NLC's report was essentially a statement of critical 
support for the Sandinista revolution. The U.S. Government, 
suggested the report, should make available genuine aid to 
Nicaragua, without conditions. Present policy towards 
Nicaragua amounted to "an unwise self-fulfilling prophesy of 
cold-war fears..The U.S. has successfully denied Nicaragua 
access to Western aid sources, leaving them no alternative but 
to turn to Eastern Bloc suppliers. U.S. policy of aid to the 
corntras has fueled the civil war, polarised the country, 
caused the government to become more hard line, and compounded 
Nicaragua's need for military aid. U.S policy is thus turning 
Nicaragua into a pawn in the East-West conflict." [10]
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The NLC's policy recommendations were, as in 1983, 
directed at the U.S. Government, and not the AFL-CIO. By not 
criticising AIFLD and the DIA, the NLC again demonstrated its 
desire to avoid a clear split in the AFL-CIO over 
international issues. Moreover, several NLC members preferred 
not to publicly acknowledge that their position actually 
differed from Federation policy. AIFLD reciprocated by 
greeting the NLC's report with stony silence - in stark 
contrast to the voluminous, detailed, and highly charged 
response to the lawyers' report (See Chapter Six), even though 
the NLC's report had totally contradicted AIFLD's assessment 
of the situation in El Salvador and Nicaragua.
The DIA and AIFLD did, nevertheless, demonstrate their 
concern in another way. No less than four official 
AIFLD-sponsored tours to the region were immediately 
scheduled; the DIA were clearly anxious that their view would 
prevail at the AFL-CIO's Convention in November. Suggestions 
that the convention might see a showdown between the 
contending forces within the leadership had already been 
raised. One NLC tour participant noted, "The days when a 
small group of right-wing staffers in the AFL-CIO make 
(foreign) policy and have it rubber stamped by the Executive 
Council are over. If they're not over, we intend to make sure 
that they are." [11]
The 10-person delegation organised by AIFLD went to 
Nicaragua and El Salvador in June, composed of mainly AFL-CIO 
officials from the Western states and officials in the CWA,
413
AFT, and the UFCW - unions that had shown themselves to be 
susceptible to the incursions of the anti-interventionists. 
The Trip Report bv Western States1 Trade Union Delegation to 
Central America attacked the Sandinistas for "their use of 
mass organizations, secret police, party-controlled newspapers 
and government run unions.” The Sandinistas "were clearly 
moving towards totalitarianism...initial widespread support 
for the revolution has been replaced by feelings of betrayal 
and fear.” [12] Betrayal and fear, however, were not the 
terms used to describe the popular sentiments in El Salvador: 
"Everyone we talked to,” - which, incidently, did not include 
AIFLD's former friends in the UPD - "believed that the human 
rights situation had greatly improved," and death squad 
killings had, said the report, been "greatly reduced". As for 
the bombing of civilians, these allegations had been "hotly 
contested" by the U.S. Embassy. [13] The report said nothing 
of the rash of strikes that had occurred in El Salvador both 
before and during their trip, nor did it comment on the raid 
on the Social Security hospitals which had taken place just 
hours after the delegation arrived. (See Chapter Five) [14]
A second delegation composed of middle-level union 
officials and several vice presidents travelled to Central 
America in August. In Nicaragua, the trip coincided with the 
arrest of a CUS official and a demonstration of 1,000 farm 
workers protesting his detention. [15] Their report referred 
to the "horrendous conditions..in particular the torture 
techniques" in El Chipote prison where unionists "were forced
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to take hypnotic drugs to induce confessions.” The delegates 
never actually visited the prison, but the Managua-based 
Permanent Commission on Human Rights had informed them that 
this was indeed the case. The Commission, they omitted to 
note, had received U.S. Government funds through NED and 
PRODEMCA.
In El Salvador the delegates held a reception for 
President Duarte at the offices of AIFLD. The Institute 
reported that the situation in El Salvador was still a source 
of optimism, and yet the left union federation FENASTRAS alone 
reported 10 assassinations or disappearances of FENASTRAS 
officials in the first half of 1985. [16] AIFLD also ignored 
the 3 0-day UPD ultimatum to the AFL-CIO calling for an inquiry 
into AIFLD*s Salvadoran operation. UPD leader Mendoza wrote 
to Lane Kirkland in June saying that "AIFLD*s work is rapidly 
deteriorating in a process of corruption, manipulation, and 
false representation.” He demanded that AIFLD leave El 
Salvador. [17]
A more serious setback for AIFLD occurred when the 
"social Christian" Confederation of Salvadoran Workers 
(Confederacion de Trabajadores de Salvadorena -CTS), 
representing mainly public sector workers, withdrew its 
support for Duarte over the non-implementation of the Social 
Pact. The CTS commented that this decision was taken in part 
to escape the "long tentacles of the AFL-CIO, the Institute, 
and the U.S. Embassy." [18]
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One month before the AFL-CIO's convention another AIFLD 
delegation followed the now well-beaten track to Nicaragua and 
El Salvador. The report fell into the familiar pro-Duarte, 
anti-Sandinista pattern. There was no reference to Duarte*s 
Decree 162 that had been sent before the National Assembly, 
one that was widely interpreted to be an attempt to render 
impotent the union leadership in the public sector. [19] A 
fourth visit came immediately- after the AFL-CIO convention. 
Seven of the 13 delegates were from the SEIU. [20]
Countdown to the Convention.
The sequence of AIFLD-sponsored tours to Central America 
occurred during a period of considerable anti-intervention 
activity in the wake of the second NLC report. The NLC*s 
latest recruit was CWA President Morton Bahr. Sheinkman wrote 
to Bahr in September 1985, "We have seen our ranks grow over 
the years as the crisis over Central America has deepened. 
Despite the Reagan Administration's rhetorical and military 
escalation in that part of the hemisphere, a significant 
number of labor leaders and members have continued to call for 
sanity and restraint." [21] Bahr's decision was particularly 
encouraging for anti-intervention trade unionists: the CWA,
the world's largest telecommunications union, had been 
stronghold of Cold War unionism. In the 1950s the 
international activities of then CWA president Joseph Bierne 
paved the way for the creation of AIFLD (see Chapter One) .
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Bahr's predecessor, Glenn Watts, had served as Secretary- 
Treasurer of AIFLD and in 1983 played a visible role in the 
AFL-CIO*s campaign against left Salvadoran unionists touring 
the U.S. Bahr's decision to join the NLC perhaps suggested 
a certain change in direction for the 650,000 member union.
During this period the NLC's coordinator, David Dyson, 
was joined by ACTWU organiser Daniel Cantor to develop NLC 
activities. In the process of integrating Bahr, Dyson and 
Cantor articulated the NLC's differences with the AFL-CIO's 
DIA. The NLC's post-tour reports had addressed U.S. policy, 
but had avoided direct criticism of official AFL-CIO 
positions. The expression of the NLC's differences with the 
DIA was for Bahr's benefit and was not a public criticism of 
official Federation foreign policy. Nevertheless the 
statement confirmed the differences that existed among union 
leaders regarding the crisis in Central America. The 
fundamental difference, wrote Cantor and Dyson, was "one of 
world-view...While both sides in this debate share a 
commitment to the development of free trade unionism, the 
(NL)Committee has rejected a Cold War interpretation of the 
crisis in Central America." [22]
Specific disagreements with AIFLD were also outlined. 
AIFLD and the DIA saw the FMLN as the main source of terror 
in El Salvador; the NLC felt that the indiscriminate bombing 
of civilians was a far greater problem. While AIFLD-DIA saw 
Duarte making strides towards re-establishing a functioning 
judicial system, the NLC considered Duarte to be incapable of
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enforcing the law. AIFLD and the DIA shunned the left unions, 
accusing them as supporters of the FMLN. "In the 
(NL)Committee1s view," the statement continued, "it is not 
accurate to simply portray these unions as guerilla supporters 
without describing which part of the guerilla program they 
favor, such as land reform, dialogue, wage raises, etc." [23] 
Most importantly, the NLC opposed AIFLD because it "supports 
the Administration's policies in El Salvador (and) like the 
Administration AIFLD appears to support a military solution 
over a political settlement." [24] The NLC rejected such a 
solution. In respect to Nicaragua, the NLC saw the 
Sandinistas as a political force independent of any foreign 
government and considered itself much closer to the ICFTU's 
position on the question of contra aid. Whereas AIFLD 
supported the political opposition allied to the contras, and 
never discussed the devastating impact of the contra 
incursions, the ICFTU had called for an end to all forms of 
aggression against Nicaragua. [25]
As Bahr was being brought into the NLC, 
anti-intervention work continued. The Labor Network on the 
West Coast sent a tour to Nicaragua in late June. CUS leader 
Alvin Guthrie wrote to Lane Kirkland expressing dismay that 
"visiting groups of north American trade unionists, often 
working in cooperation with Nicaraguan government agencies or 
government supported unions, try to extract statements from 
us that support their own slanted version of Nicaraguan 
reality." [26] Guthrie was probably referring to
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anti-intervention unionists who had pressed the CUS over its 
position regarding the contras, which seemed to vary depending 
on whether the audience was in Washington or Managua.
Meanwhile trade unionists reporting back from Nicaragua 
prompted the Seattle City Council to vote unanimously to 
establish a sister-city relationship with Managua. [27] Also 
in June a delegation of 27 teachers and other U.S. unionists 
attended the 19th national convention of the Salvadoran 
teachers union ANDES.
Two more local committees, in Western Massachusetts and 
New Jersey, were created in 1985. In the Spring the East 
Coast committees in New York, Washington, New Jersey, 
Philadelphia, Boston, West Massachusetts, etc, began meetings 
known as "regionals" where representatives of the individual 
committees would meet in a rotating host city every three 
months to plan events and discuss the changing situation both 
in the U.S. and in Central America. The Washington committee 
circulated a speech by AFGE leader Ken Blaylock made during 
a meeting with them in late February shortly after the 
conclusion of the NLC tour. Before his trip to Central 
America with the NLC, Blaylock had been unsure regarding which 
side of the conflict he supported. "Union leaders in El 
Salvador," said Blaylock, "sleep in different places each 
night trying to avoid getting killed...I talked to people in 
refugee camps; they told me stories that would tear your heart 
out." On Nicaragua, Blaylock addressed the question of the 
ban on strikes, noting that in the U.S. Federal workers (many
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of them AFGE members) were legally prohibited from taking an 
active part in political campaigns. Furthermore, their unions 
were prevented by law from bargaining over wages or benefits 
or from conducting strike action. "Until our government 
subscribes to the principles of free trade unionism, 
collective bargaining, and political rights for its own 
employees," said Blaylock, "it will never enforce those rights 
for the rest of the workers in this country and around the 
world." [28]
Attitudes Towards The Broader Union Membership.
In the war of words over Central America the 
anti-interventionists were still disadvantaged. The widely- 
circulated AFL-CIO News and the AIFLD Report (estimated 
readership 2-3,000 [29]) were not only loyal to the Cold War 
position, their coverage of Central America gave little 
indication of the organisational and argumentational 
challenges of the anti-interventionists. The first edition of 
the four-page bi-monthly Labor Report on Central America 
partially redressed this imbalance. Established by the Labor 
Network on the West Coast, the Labor Report propagated a clear 
"solidarity" position, that is, unequivocal support for the 
Sandinistas and the FMLN. The Oakland-based bi-monthly 
publication would attempt, inter alia, "to build long lasting 
support for the workers' movements in Central America" and to 
provide regular information and analysis to the "proliferation
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of labor committees, caucuses, and political action 
committees" which had been formed since 1980 to promote 
anti-intervention and solidarity work in the unions. The 
political difference between the editorial line of Labor 
Report and the NLC was stated, but not stressed. The NLC's 
"less than enthusiastic" approach to the Sandinistas was 
considered unfortunate, but the NLC members, said the editors, 
deserved applause for their principled stand. [30]
The posture of both the Cold War and anti-intervention 
forces towards the broader membership was intriguing. The 
anti-interventionists contributed articles to the papers and 
newsheets of their union locals and engaged in other forms of 
education and agitation. Many, however, believed that the 
issue of Central America should be promoted cautiously. True, 
the structural relationship of the U.S. worker to the world 
economy was now weaker; true, Reagan had marginalised the 
unions and encouraged employers to exert greater control in 
the workplace; true, Vietnam had led to a shift in 
consciousness which facilitated broader acceptance of 
anti-intervention arguments: but, from Kirkland to the
shop-floor, conservatism and anti-communism were perceived to 
be persistent and prevalent obstacles to anti-intervention 
work.
This was considered especially true of the white and 
still relatively affluent sectors of the working class. The 
Labor Network activists behind the Labor Report were formally 
aware of the need for anti-interventionism to penetrate the
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rank and file in order to develop what they described as a 
genuine internationalist current in the unions. However, as 
a Network activist expressed it, "the leadership of the 
AFL-CIO has a considerable base of support within labor for 
its international policies. Support among U.S. workers for 
the invasion of Grenada, for 'Buy American' appeals, and for 
the notion that immigrant and minority workers are stealing 
American jobs indicates that many U.S. workers are more 
concerned with protection the American way of life than 
expressing international solidarity." [31] And yet, anti­
interventionists had consistently posited that the economic 
and political changes of the Reagan period meant that 
preserving the "American way of life" actually required 
international solidarity as a means of defending jobs and 
living standards against the predatory incursions of the 
multinationals. Many anti-interventionists, it seemed, still 
believed that the relatively high living standards of a broad 
segment of the U.S. working class was attributable to the 
exploitation of workers in the third world. The theoretical 
premise which underscored the Labor Network's appraisal, that 
is, Lenin's understanding of an aristocracy of labour kept in 
a position of relative privilege due to the extraction of 
superprofits from the colonial countries by the forces of 
imperialism (- a view reinforced by Dependency Theory -) had 
caused the Labor Network and other anti-interventionists to 
regard internationalism as morally and politically necessary 
rather than something which was materially advantageous to the
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mere privileged U.S. workers.
Another discussion on anti-intervention work among the 
broader membership appeared in the widely read (among more 
left-wing union activists) publication Labor Notes in May 
1985. The writers suggested that the main difficulty was not 
the lack of anti-intervention sentiment but the perception 
that Central America was not a union issue. The most fruitful 
means of approaching the membership, they reported, had been 
on the basis of "other identities" - churchgoer, taxpayer, 
person of colour, person of conscience - rather than relying 
on appeals to trade union sympathies. [32] Elsewhere another 
observer wrote that local union leaders who endorsed anti­
intervention events were often unprepared to defend their 
stance before the membership. Union opposition to intervention 
was therefore not as broad or as deeply rooted as the number 
of official endorsements appeared to suggest. Furthermore, 
the "best educated, mostly white, sectors of the service 
unions" were responding to the anti-intervention movement, but 
little support was coming from the construction ("hard-hat") 
unions, the Teamsters, or even from the unions with a high 
proportion of third world immigrants in their ranks, "such as 
those in transportation and other segments of the service 
sector unions." [33]
In December 1984 the West Coast group Trade Unions in 
Support of El Salvador (TUSES) expressed similar concerns. 
Anti-intervention work had been inhibited by the fact that 
"The labor movement has a long tradition of racism, sexism,
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and homophobia," an assertion purportedly evidenced by the 
2FL-CI0's endorsement of Walter Mondale over Jesse Jackson 
for the U.S. Presidential contest of 1984. [34]
It was somewhat ironic that AIFLD and the DIA, despite 
tieir official status and resources, seemed equally cautious 
in their approach to the rank and file. The caravan of 
carefully selected delegations to Central America had 
adequately conveyed AIFLD and the DIA's anxiety that their 
interpretation of events in Central America might be 
challenged, at least within the union bureaucracies. And yet, 
no attempt had been made to utilise their open access to the 
union movement's propaganda apparatus by appealing over the 
heads of the dissident leaders on the NLC to the purportedly 
racist, sexist, and homophobic rank and file. In the age of 
wage concessions, legal and political setbacks on union, and 
management reportedly reclaiming shop-floor control from 
organised labour, it was perhaps feared that shop stewards and 
activists might question why so much organisational and 
political energy, as well as financial resources, was being 
expended on Central America. Was the U.S. not itself scarred 
by idle plant and machinery and the disrupted lives of many 
thousands of union men and women affected by the recession of 
1980-81? And - perhaps the most difficult question of all - 
why did Kirkland and other union leaders continue to support 
the foreign policy of such an anti-union President? In not 
appealing directly and confidently to the rank and file for 
support, it was almost as if AIFLD, the DIA and the officials
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who supported their position were more aware of the effect 
anti-intervention arguments might have on the union membership 
than were the anti-interventionists themselves.
Trade Unions and the Central America/Anti-Intervention 
Movement.
Meanwhile, the broader Central America/Anti-Intervention 
Movement (CA/AIM) continued to attract some trade union 
support for its activities. The idea of a working coalition 
of anti-intervention forces had been raised on numerous 
occasions as a way of linking the activities of the wide array 
of anti-intervention groups. Clearly, if every single group 
organised its own march in Washington or San Francisco the 
result would be close to a fiasco. One anti-intervention 
group, the Emergency National Council (ENC) met in Cleveland, 
Ohio, in September 1984. Some 500 attended, many of them 
union activists. The leader of the ENC, Jerry Gordon, was a 
veteran anti-war organiser in the 1960s who was now a 
full-time official in the UFCW. Gordon and the ENC had worked 
to keep alive the traditions of mass mobilisation and 
agitation established during that period. Anti-war efforts 
had attracted the support and participation of trade 
unionists, but, as Gordon himself recorded, "with rare 
exceptions, they would not attempt to get anti-war resolutions 
passed at membership meetings or at official union bodies. 
Nor would they try to mobilize their membership to participate
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in anti-war marches." [35]
Some alleged that the ENC was maintaining another, less 
fruitful, tradition of the 1960s. It was accused of pursuing 
its own "sectarian" agenda without regard for the broader 
CA/AIM. The September gathering of the ENC went ahead despite 
protests from other leading anti-intervention groups such as 
CISPES and the Rainbow Coalition, which had been built around 
Jesse Jackson's 1984 campaign. These bodies argued that the 
ENC's call for a major demonstration against intervention in 
Central America had occurred without due consultation with 
all segments of the CA/AIM. No single group, they argued, 
should claim organisational control or hegemony over the 
CA/AIM in pursuit of its own agenda. [36] Once convened, the 
ENC gathering focused on the need for the CA/AIM to reach the 
mainstream of U.S. political life. The struggle in the trade 
unions over Central America was viewed as pivotal to this 
objective. Said one commentator, "The Cleveland group 
(ENC)...wants to base the coalition in the labor movement and 
the mainstream churches. They want to bring the peace and 
solidarity groups into the coalition in a subordinate 
position." [37]
At this point there appeared to be two coalitions taking 
shape. One was based around Gordon and shared the view that 
the labour movement had a particular importance in the 
struggle against U.S. intervention. The other, based in 
Washington, appeared to grow from a loose alliance between 
CISPES and the Rainbow Coalition. This coalition apparently
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saw no special role for the unions; union activists were 
invited to participate, but they were not encouraged to see 
themselves or their organisations as especially important. 
With this issue unresolved, a functional unity was eventually 
forged around plans to conduct a "Spring Mobilization" on 
April 20, 1985. Moreover, it would be a multi-issue
demonstration, for "Peace, Jobs, and Justice" - and not 
exclusively Central America or anti-interventionist. As many 
as 1000 organisations - trade union, religious, senior 
citizens, native American, womens' groups, etc.- reportedly 
endorsed the demonstrations in San Francisco and Washington, 
D.C. [38]
The April 20 Moblization attracted an estimated 55,000 
demonstrators. A1 Lannon, president of ILWU Local 6, 
representing San Francisco's longshoremen, said that the 
attendance confirmed that the labour movement should build 
alliances with the rest of the "progressive community" in 
order to rejuvenate itself. [39] For Gordon the success of 
the Mobilization reaffirmed both the historical role and 
future potential of mass demonstrations: "The labor movement," 
he told the San Francisco crowd, "was built in this country 
because of its ability to mobilize the masses into action." 
[40] Other observers, however, claimed union participation 
in the event, while significant in San Francisco, was only 
peripheral in Washington. Many felt this was inevitable as 
long as the NLC chose not to call a major mobilization of its 
own. [41] The issue of the role of the trade union leaders
427
in the broader CA/AIM became more acute in the period that lay 
ahead. It was becoming increasingly clear that, in order to 
bring the CA/AIM into the political mainstream, union and 
church leaders had to be more assertive. Two years would 
elapse before this actually occurred.
Tours and Protests: The Road to Anaheim.
In the unions most anti-intervention work continued to 
involve, in one way or another, trade unionists from Central 
America. A number of struggles against deportation as well 
as campaigns for political asylum for Salvadoran union 
activists were conducted by U.S. trade unionists. In 
particular, Marta Alicia Rivera, an exiled leader of the 
Salvadoran teachers union ANDES who narrowly escaped being 
murdered by the death squads, applied for asylum. Rivera, a 
familiar figure at anti-intervention events, won the support 
of several AFT and NEA locals and I AM Local 1111 which 
represented 1,500 airline employees. The campaign reached a 
successful conclusion in March 1985. [42] Earlier, in
February, Alejandro Gomez, a former official in the Salvadoran 
University Workers Union (Sindicatos de Trabajadores 
Universitarios -STUS) won the support of Rochester, N.Y., AFL- 
CIO in his fight against deportation. Gomez had been jailed 
in Mariona for six months during 1973. In June, the Los 
Angeles city committee announced the formation of a panel of 
exiled Salvadoran trade unionists. [43] A similar group, the
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Labor Committee for Salvadoran Unionists in Exile, was 
established in Chicago and immediately organised a delegation 
to El Salvador. The Committee announced that the delegation 
had been organised following a request by "several Salvadoran 
labor union federations (who were) pleading with the labor 
movement to come to their aid as quickly as possible." [44] 
Central American unionists continued to perform 
political work in the U.S. In the Spring, a Central America 
Teachers Tour was sponsored by AFGE Local 12 in Washington, 
D.C.; the two delegates were from the Nicaraguan teachers 
federation, ANDEN, and the Honduran teachers federation 
COLPROSUMAH. Irving Brown denounced the tour, as did Donald 
Slaiman, the Deputy Director of the AFL-CIO's Organization and 
Field Services. In a statement to Principal Officers of State 
and Local Central Bodies of the AFL-CIO, the two officials 
complained, "The group which has been seeking support before 
labor audiences throughout the country does not represent any 
of the AFL-CIO supported unions in Central America." [45] 
Albert Shanker informed all regional AFT officials that the 
two unionists were being sponsored by the Federation of 
Central American Teachers (Federacion de Obreros Magisteriales 
de Centroamerica -FOMCA) which he claimed was being "run out 
of Nicaragua and is controlled by the Sandinista teachers 
group, ANDEN, and, to a great extent, by a group called 
ANDES...of El Salvador." Both groups were controlled, said 
Shanker, "at the top levels by Marxist-Leninist leaders who 
maintain a close working relationship with Cuba and the Soviet
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Union." FOMCA, said Shanker, was not a legitimate teachers 
organisation: "a close look at its international work shows 
that it is primarily concerned with support for the Nicaraguan 
Sandinistas and the Salvadoran guerilla movement and is 
discrediting U.S. foreign policy in the region." [46]
During the Summer the city committees on the East Coast 
began preparations for a tour of representatives from the 
Salvadoran teachers union ANDES, the left federation 
FENASTRAS, the Nicaraguan public employees union UNE, the 
Sandinista Workers1 Central CST, and left unionists from 
Guatamala and Honduras. The committees had worked together 
for the teachers tour but this was politically and 
logistically a more adventurous undertaking. The goals of the 
tour were articulated by the Boston Central America Solidarity 
Association's Labor Committee; union-to-union ties had to be 
strengthened, reinforced by material aid. "This tour", said 
the Boston group, referring no doubt to the participation of 
the Sandinista unions, "will act as a strengthening factor for 
the solidarity forces at the core of the (anti-intervention) 
movement." [47]
As the campaign to acquire union endorsements for the 
tour gathered momentum the AFL-CIO Executive Council issued 
a DIA-prepared statement on August 14th which called on "all 
American trade unionists to shun contacts with the World 
Federation of Trade Unions and its affiliates...The WFTU and 
its front groups are engaged in a propaganda war on the 
international activities of the AFL-CIO, while simultaneously
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seeking to encourage American trade unionists to participate 
in meetings and exchanges with WFTU affiliated unions.” [48] 
The EC appeared to be saying that the forthcoming East Coast 
tour was a project promoted by the WFTU, implying that U.S. 
unionists organising such events were little more than WFTU 
agents in a propaganda war against the AFL-CIO. Such language 
was reminiscent of the Kissinger Commission: the movement in 
Central America was not indigenous, it was created by the 
forces of Soviet imperialism. Similarly, the internal 
challenge to Cold War unionism emerged not from domestic 
political and economic realities but from the Prague offices 
of the WFTU.
Two weeks later a letter from Kirkland to State and 
Local Central Bodies attacked the proposed tour. The 
participants, wrote Kirkland, "usually represent organisations 
that are associated with the WFTU based in Prague, 
Czechoslovakia, or that openly support the Marxist-Leninist 
guerilla movements in Central America." Kirkland was 
especially concerned about the Nicaraguan CST. Not just a 
WFTU affiliate, the CST, "instead of serving workers' 
interests (it) functions as an arm of the Nicaraguan 
government." FENASTRAS, too, was described as having 
"observer status at the WFTU" and ANDES part of an 
international teachers organisation controlled by the Soviet 
Union. Both FENASTRAS and ANDES were accused of supporting 
the FMLN. If organisations wished to discuss the
international struggle for trade union freedom, Kirkland
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added, then they should contact the AFL-CIO or AIFLD. [49]
Following the EC statement and Kirkland's attack a 
handful of AFL-CIO state and local bodies withdrew their 
endorsements but the bulk of the existing endorsers stood 
firm. By September 3, six national presidents had endorsed 
the tour. These were Blaylock of AFGE, Butsavage of the 
International Molders and Allied Workers Union (IMAWU), 
Johnson of the Woodworkers (IWA), Nicholas of the hotel and 
restaurant workers (HERE) , Scarbrough of the furniture workers 
(UFWA) and Winpisinger, leader of the Machinists (IAM). James 
Kane, president of the non-AFL-CIO UE would later add his name 
to the list, as did more than fifty union locals and local 
presidents. [50]
On September 9, FENASTRAS responded to Kirkland's 
allegation that the federation was linked to the WFTU. It 
announced, "We maintain fraternal relations with three 
international bodies (ICFTU, WFTU and the social Christian 
WCL) but have no formal relations with any. Nevertheless, we 
have observer status with the ICFTU." [51] Indeed, Hector 
Recinos, the exiled FENASTRAS official and one of the 
Salvadoran electrical workers released from prison in early 
1984 - the so-called STECEL eleven (see Chapter Four) - had 
toured Europe and met with ICFTU leaders. Moreover, the ICFTU 
had invited FENASTRAS to send delegates to its 1983 convention 
in Oslo. [53] Kirkland had inferred that ANDES, UNE, and the 
Honduran federation FUTH, had been associated with the WFTU? 
in reality only the CST was formally affiliated to the
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Prague-based organisation.
The tour itself began on October 15 and covered New 
England, New York City, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware 
and Baltimore before concluding on November 16. The themes 
of the tour closely resembled that of the West Coast tour of 
1983: Reagan's anti-union agenda, runaway shops and U.S.
corporations use of cheap labour in Central America, and the 
advances made by workers in Nicaragua. The tour reportedly 
reached over 8,000 union members, and its organisers 
considered it to have been a resounding success. However, 
controversy surrounding the tour continued. Local 201 of the 
IUE, representing almost 10,000 arms-industry workers on 
Boston's north shore, invited Francisco Acosta of FENASTRAS 
and Irene Zuniga, the 23-year old representative of the 
Nicaraguan public employees union (UNE) to speak at the 
Local's union hall on October 15. The October edition of the 
unofficial broadsheet covering Local 201 affairs ("The Union 
Activist") reported the story under the headline "Marxist 
Revolutionaries Lecture 201's Membership" [53] The broadsheet 
claimed that the speakers supported the Salvadoran guerillas 
and that one of them was actually affiliated to a group "which 
endorsed the murder of U.S. Marines in San Salvador a few 
months ago" - a reference to the guerilla assassination of 
four U.S. marines guarding the U.S. Embassy in early 1985. 
The broadsheet also asked, "What the hell is our local doing 
getting involved in international politics when our grievance 
and seniority systems are crumbling around our collective
ears, not to mention a hundred other shop problems?” [54] One 
angry local official wrote to the official paper of Local 201, 
Electrical Union News: "I am totally opposed to utilizing the 
union's time and money for this purpose... There is not a 
single union official who was elected based on their positions 
on world affairs. It's time for Local 201 to concentrate on 
the business for which the membership is paying." [55] 
However, the paper's editors recorded that "The union speakers 
were well received at the meeting, and 201 members were glad 
to have the chance to hear and judge and talk for themselves." 
[56] Weeks after the Central American unionists had left the 
country, Local 201 was still debating the issue. The 
unofficial paper, in January 1986, accused FENASTRAS of being 
implicated in the murder of the U.S. Marines. [57]
FENASTRAS's purported support for the FMLN made Acosta 
the target of a further attack, this time from AIFLD staff 
member, David Jessup. Jessup and Acosta confronted each other 
during a current affairs television program staged by Channel 
32 in Washington, D.C. Also on the program was Michael 
Urquhart, a leading figure on the Washington Area Labor 
Committee. The subject of the November 14 discussion was the 
AFL-CIO's opposition to the East Coast tour. Jessup accused 
FENASTRAS of referring to the FMLN-FDR as its vanguard. 
Acosta responded, "We do not endorse the FMLN; we endorse the 
peace. We have no guns in our hands, and that is why the 
death squads are killing us." [58]
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Later, Urquhart himself clashed with Irving Brown. 
Following Kirkland*s condemnation of the tour, Urquhart 
complained to Brown that unionists in the U.S. should have the 
opportunity to hear the full range of views espoused by the 
Central American labour movement, regardless of international 
affiliation. [59] Brown replied by saying that Urquhart*s 
position was a clear betrayal of solidarity. For the AFL-CIO 
to have sponsored a U.S. tour of the WFTU-affiliated unions 
in Poland, wrote Brown, would have undermined **the brave 
workers of Solidarnosc. Similarly, the democratic union 
movement in Nicaragua would have been undermined had the 
AFL-CIO hosted a visit by the Somoza-controlled company 
union(s)... even if this might have permitted that 
confederation (CGT) to present Somoza's position to US 
workers." Brown concluded, "It is difficult for me to 
understand how any U.S. trade unionist could support the 
organizations on your tour." [60] The Washington Committee, 
replied Urquhart, believed that "international solidarity 
extends to all unions that are struggling for survival against 
repression from the companies, governments, and paramilitary 
death squads." Defending the Nicaraguan CST, Urquhart argued 
that its support for the "democratically elected government 
party (FSLN) does not make it less of a trade union, nor does 
the British unions' support for the Labour Party make them any 
less legitimate." [61]
AIFLD and the DIA*s reaction to the East Coast tour went 
beyond written protests. They responded by organising a
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touring contingent of their own. The tour, described by 
anti-interventionists as "the AIFLD Roadshow", began in New 
York City on September 13, and travelled through Philadelphia, 
Boston, Providence, Milwaukee, Chicago, Portland, and other 
cities. [62] Just prior to the start of the tour the AFL- 
CIO's Organization and Field Services division distributed a 
model resolution - a reaction to the anti-interventionist 
resolution passed by the Oregon State AFL-CIO convention in 
August - that endorsed the Kissinger Report, denounced the 
Sandinistas and recommended continuing economic and military 
aid to the Duarte government. Furthermore, it called on the 
AFL-CIO to "launch an international appeal urging the 
Nicaraguan government to open a dialogue with the democratic 
opposition to end the war and implement a system of democratic 
pluralism." AFL-CIO regional directors were asked to inform 
Federation headquarters of any attempts to move resolutions 
on Central America at state or local conventions. [63]
Both Brown and Doherty were central figures in the 
AIFLD-DIA tour, accompanied by Jose Espinoza of the Nicaraguan 
CUS, Cristobal Aleman, a representative of the Salvadoran CDT, 
and a Honduran union leader. At the New York event 100 people 
heard SEIU leader John Sweeney speak from the platform, which 
indicated that some NLC members were vulnerable to official 
pressure. [64] In Philadelphia, a reportedly smaller meeting 
was punctuated by heated exchanges between the tour organisers 
and anti-interventionists in the audience. In Detroit the 
speakers met further audience opposition, and during the
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meeting a disagreement became apparent between Brown and 
Doherty over the AFL-CIO's position on contra aid. Doherty 
claimed the Federation had no position, but would adopt one 
at the convention. Brown, rhetorically closer to the CUS, 
emphasised that the Federation did have a position: opposition 
to aid to the contras, but supportive of Sandinista-contra 
dialogue. [65]
Meanwhile Central America was an issue which prompted 
intense debate at several state AFL-CIO conventions held prior 
to the national AFL-CIO convention. Oregon had already 
declared itself to be against intervention. At the Minnesota 
state AFL-CIO convention Thomas Donahue, Secretary-Treasurer 
of the AFL-CIO, arrived at St. Paul to present the model 
resolution to the 700 delegates. The resolution, despite 
being recommended for acceptance by the resolutions committee, 
was decisively defeated. [66]
The vote was tighter at the state conventions in 
Massachusetts, where a compromise resolution was passed, and 
Connecticut, where an anti-intervention resolution squeezed 
through. [67] Following the Maine convention, the Bangor 
Daily News reported, "Most of the resolutions were accepted 
with little or no debate by the delegates. It was the Central 
America resolution that caused some shouting." Delegate John 
Hanson accused the AFL-CIO of being an accomplice of the U.S. 
Government abroad. "We cannot stand idly by," said Hanson, 
"while these actions in Central America are done by the Reagan 
Administration in our name." Prophetically, Hanson stressed:
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"This capricious foray into Central America is being conducted 
in defiance of the U.S. Congress...It was not too many years 
ago that the Marines invaded the Dominican Republic. The 
Marines paved the way for our own Bass Shoe (a Maine-based 
footwear company) to be located in the Dominican Republic at 
the expense of my union brothers in this state." The 
resolution, which passed comfortably, called for an end to 
both military aid to El Salvador and military attacks against 
Nicaragua. [68]
On the eve of the full Convention in Anaheim, the "AIFLD 
Roadshow" concluded its itinerary with a day-long DIA seminar. 
As the final preparations for the Convention were being made, 
every effort was made to stave off the expected anti­
interventionist challenge. Delegates were reportedly 
encouraged to meet with AIFLD's Central American guests in 
private sessions. This bonding exercise was expected to pull 
the waverers back into the Cold War fold. [69]
Just days before the Convention, the mass-circulation 
Business Week asked "Is Big Labor Playing Global Vigilante?" 
It reported that the AFL-CIO was scheduled to spend $43 
million in 1985 in international operations covering 83 
countries "for anti-communist projects that tend to merge with 
the Administration's foreign policy themes." More than 90% 
of the funding, noted the article, came from the U.S. 
Government. Business Week focused particular attention on the 
UPD split in El Salvador and the emergence of the NLC. It 
bluntly described how, "AFL-CIO officials, through a private
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group called PRODEMCA, are sponsoring tours of the U.S. by 
contra leaders who are fighting - with Reagan*s help - to 
overthrow Nicaragua's Sandinista government.” [70]
Just one month earlier another mass-circulation magazine, 
Readers Digest, provided a glowing account of AIFLD's 
activities. Known for its conservative stance on most issues, 
the RD described how William Doherty "wangled his way into 
Grenada" during the 1983 invasion "before the shooting had 
stopped" and contacted unions who had "fought Grenada's 
Marxist dictators with Doherty's support." Moreover, AIFLD 
was "in the vanguard of the struggle against the 
Marxist-Leninist government of Nicaragua." [71] The article 
certainly impressed New York Congressmen Jack Kemp. Kemp, who 
would run for the Republican presidential nomination as a 
"Reaganomics" conservative in the 1988 primaries, entered the 
article into the Congressional Record on September 12. Kemp 
described the entry as "a salute to the freedom fighters of 
AIFLD" and Doherty himself was hailed as a "remarkable 
American." [72]
The Convention Debate.
For the first two days of the Anaheim Convention 
backroom bargaining over the Executive Council's Central 
America resolution appeared to produce a compromise between 
the NLC, Kirkland, and the DIA. Reports described how 
Kirkland, after intense discussions, agreed to slightly alter
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the wording of the resolution, and the NLC accepted the 
change. [73] Both Nicaragua and El Salvador would now be 
subject to a call for a negotiated, rather than military, 
settlement to their respective conflicts. The original 
resolution had restricted this to El Salvador -leaving the 
door open for the AFL-CIO to support contra aid. [74] 
Representatives from AFSCME, the UAW, and other unions sought 
an unambiguous condemnation .of Reagan's support for the 
contras while the DIA and other leading AFL-CIO officials 
wanted greater condemnation of the Sandinistas with no 
specific reference to the contra war. [75] As it stood, the 
amended resolution seemed to allow space for individual unions 
or union leaders to pursue their own policy. Everything 
depended on how the role of the contras was interpreted. If 
their military campaigns were perceived to be the best 
available means of forcing the Sandinistas into a political 
settlement, then contra aid could be supported. If contra aid 
was seen as a direct military escalation which might harm the 
prospects for such a settlement, then it should be opposed. 
[76] Either way, an open confrontation on the convention 
floor seemed to have been averted.
The confrontation, however, did take place. Furthermore, 
the debate that unfolded stood in sharp contrast to the kind 
of discussion which normally transpired at AFL-CIO 
Conventions. Debates were usually cordial bordering on 
insipid, and in the area of foreign policy and the 
Federation's international work little open dissent had
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emerged in the 30-year history of such gatherings.
First to the rostrum was Kenneth Blaylock of AFGE; his 
contribution set the tone for the 90-minute exchange. 
Blaylock recalled his visit to El Salvador and Nicaragua in 
highly personal and emotional language:
As I sat in the church (in El Salvador) late one night 
and listened to mothers..tell about the atrocities being 
perpetrated against them and their families by this 
("sanitization") technique of military operation, it 
would literally bring tears to your eyes. When we travel 
through those areas and we see not just homes 
destroyed where people maybe did support the rebel 
forces, but square miles and miles and miles of homes 
and farms destroyed, it makes you wonder what our 
government is all about.
In Nicaragua I totally support the resolution in its 
statement against anti-human rights, anti-labor rights, 
the suppression of the press. We are dead on target. 
But..we fail to mention the contras who are perpetuating 
not a war against military targets in Nicaragua, but a 
war of terror against the people of that country...
As I visited the (Nicaraguan) coffee plantations and the 
farms up close to the Honduran border, we talked with 
Miskito indians, we talked with campesinos who do not 
fear the Sandinistas. They are carrying weapons from 
sticks to rifles to protect themselves against the 
contra. Then I have a young farmer tell me about an 
attack on his farm where his wife was raped and then 
killed, (and) he lost two children, not from the 
Sandinistas, but from the contra..
Now..when I look at Iran, I look at Vietnam, I look at 
Nicaragua, I look at El Salvador, Guatemala? I would 
like for one time for my government to be on the side 
of the people, not on the side of rich dictators living 
behind high walls...So every fibre of my body that 
triggers my reflexes and my basic instincts says 
to me, if Ronald Reagan supports these efforts..we damn 
well better be against it. [77]
Following Blaylock's rousing introduction was 
steelworkers' delegate Leon Lynch. Lynch had visited Central
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America also, but on an AIFLD-sponsored tour. In Nicaragua 
Lynch had visited "grave sites of union leaders who were 
trying to fight for a pluralistic society". The Sandinistas, 
he argued, had caused the growth of the contras. Delegate 
Nita Brueggeman from Oregon AFL-CIO then spoke in favour of 
a more firmly anti-contra resolution. John Joyce, the 
Bricklayers' leader who had been a signatory to the PRODEMCA 
newspaper advertisements, referred to the "armed resistance" 
and the Sandinista policy of controlling trade unions. Later 
in the debate, Jerry Brown of the hospital workers (NUHHCE) 
also called for the Convention to take a firm anti-contra 
position. It was not, said Brown, an East-West issue? "This 
is a north-south issue, an issue of poverty... Poverty is our 
enemy as it is the enemy of the Nicaraguan people. It's an 
issue of exploitation by the same corporations that we fight 
every day. They're our enemies and the enemies of the 
Nicaraguan people." Former SAG President Ed Asner followed, 
describing support for the contras as "unforgivable". 
Speaking in a personal capacity, Asner expressed deep concern 
about the state of emergency in Nicaragua. But, asked Asner:
Where are our voices when our government destroyed the 
only oil depot in Nicaragua and mined their harbor? 
Where were our voices of outrage then? And where are 
our voices raised against the continuing assault against 
trade unionists and other civilians in El Salvador where 
322 teachers have been killed and another 150 
disappeared since 1979? Eight have been murdered in 
1985 so far...
Where are our voices when the American Institute for 
Free Labor Development decides that even the pro-Duarte 
unions they supported only months before are suddenly 
too liberal, too uncontrollable? How far to the right
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are we willing to travel in the name of democratic trade 
unions?...The human death toll in El Salvador has been 
100 times greater than in Nicaragua.
And yet our institutional rhetoric offers no reflection 
of the truth, no reflection of this great contrast (.) 
(And) I don't want the labor movement used to do the 
dirty work of President Reagan or our large 
multinational companies. [78]
Asner was followed by a delegate from Missouri who spoke 
favorably about AIFLD. Then Albert Shanker spoke. The 
AFL-CIO, he remarked, had performed "almost the miraculous" 
in El Salvador. The right had been defeated, there had been 
democratic elections, and a "revolutionary" - but still 
insufficient - land reform had been introduced. Shanker 
feared that the phraseology in the resolution revealed a split 
in the AFL-CIO and might "send the wrong message to this 
Sandinista government." Nicaragua was "well on its way..to 
full dictatorship...It is a nation that has warmed up to the 
crushing of Solidarity in Poland...and support the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan." Shanker's speech illustrated how 
rapidly the changes in the political situation in Central 
America became part of the fabric of the struggle in the 
AFL-CIO. Just prior to the Anaheim Convention on October 15, 
the Sandinistas had issued a decree which again suspended the 
right to strike, along with several other restrictive 
measures. [79] Shanker asked, "I don't know how many people 
sitting here, if they lived in a country and those rights were 
suspended, would not decide to become contras in their own 
country (.)" The AFT leader remarked that the resolution both 
legitimised support and opposition to the contras. There was
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little doubt how it would be interpreted by Shanker. [80]
Ed Cleary, President of New York State AFL-CIO, spoke 
next. He attacked the East Coast tour organised by the city 
committees. The visiting unionists were described as "the 
enemy within" coming into New York "like a trojan horse" 
attempting to convince workers of their legitimacy. Gordon 
Flory of Louisiana AFL-CIO, an attender of every Convention 
since the merger of the AFL and the CIO in 1955, then spoke. 
Flory's position was clear: if he lived in Nicaragua, "with 
the poverty, no freedom of religion, when armed soldiers come 
in and tell the priest he can't read a homily over the radio, 
no freedom of assembly" -he would be a contra too. Completing 
a quintet of speakers in favour of the AIFLD-DIA position was 
Dan Gustafson of Minnesota AFL-CIO, and a visitor to Central 
America. In Nicaragua, said Gustafson, "there is no freedom 
of religion. There is no freedom of speech. There is no 
freedom of trade unions...The whole thing is one hundred per 
cent a Marxist state." [81] ACTWU vice-president Ed Clark was 
the last anti-interventionist to speak, describing the 
Salvadoran land reform as "nothing but a joke." The labour 
movement, said Clark, should reflect the wishes of 80% of the 
U.S. public and call for an end to military aid. Finally, 
Lane Kirkland took the floor. He referred to "certain 
misunderstandings" that had penetrated the debate. 
Insinuations that the AFL-CIO was in league with Reagan and 
the right wing were, said Kirkland, "beneath contempt...And 
I believe that those who made (them) would be those who would
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react most vigorously if it was pointed out what associations 
their support for the Sandinista regime would place them 
with." Furthermore, "When we send our people around the 
world, expose them to conditions of great danger, I think they 
deserve your support and not a knife in the back...This 
resolution will encourage them to continue in that great 
work."
The resolution was formally adopted by the Convention 
as a statement of compromise between two distinct and 
conflicting leadership positions. The anti-interventionists 
appeared content that backroom bargaining had stressed the 
need for a political rather than military solution to the 
Central America conflict and, despite the heated debate, did 
not attempt to amend the compromise resolution. [82]
The significance of the convention exchange was not lost 
on the anti-intervention movement. At the same event in 1967, 
an attack had been made on a delegate who moved a resolution 
urging the AFL-CIO to take a neutral stand on the Vietnam War. 
Joseph Curran, a Federation vice-president, characterised the 
fight against communism in Vietnam as a sequel to the fight 
waged against communism in the trade unions of the U.S. which 
led to the expulsion of the CIO left. Commenting on the 
longshoremen's assistance to the unions in Camranh Bay who 
supported the U.S.-backed government of President Thieu, 
Curran said, "We fought communism on the waterfront many, 
many, years ago. And, fortunately for us, we licked them and 
drove them off the waterfront in the U.S..(.)" Curran had a
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message for the "innocent and non-thinking youngsters" active 
in the anti-war movement: "you are either anti-communist or, 
whether you like it or not, you are in bed with the 
communists." [83] This was perhaps the closest the AFL-CIO 
convention came to debating the Vietnam war. The 1985 
Convention indicated that some of the innocent youngsters of 
the 1960s had perhaps begun to make their mark on the U.S. 
trade union movement.
The Washington Area Labor Committee's Labor Link 
publication wrote, "For the first time in the AFL-CIO's 
30-year history, federation foreign policy was openly debated 
by elected union leaders on the floor of the biannual 
convention...The debate itself was a strong setback to the 
Federation's traditional decision-making on foreign policy."
[84] The Labor Report praised the stand taken by certain 
union leaders in the face of Kirkland's pressure, but 
considered the compromise to be a disappointment. The 
resolution, claimed the editors, "rehashes the Reagan line" 
and "mirrors the Reagan Administration's lies about Nicaragua 
(and) makes no reference whatsoever to the repression of the 
trade union movement in El Salvador." The Report stated, "The 
AFL-CIO's resources are just as surely being used to support 
U.S. intervention today as they were before the convention."
[85] Following the convention, the chemical workers' President 
Frank Martino wrote to Sheinkman. Martino referred to the 
ACTWU leader's critical role, but, he added, "There remains 
a lot of work to be done on the issue of Central America. The
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resolution compromise permits that work to continue by each 
International union." [86]
AIFLD*s report of the convention reprinted substantial 
excerpts from the resolution, but chose not to reproduce the 
"compromise paragraph" around which the whole debate had 
revolved. The AIFLD Report, distributed in Spanish throughout 
AFL-CIO affiliates in Latin America, referred to a "lively 
debate" at the convention but provided no clue as to the 
precise contours of the respective positions. (The AIFLD 
Report did find enough space, however, to mention Kirkland*s 
"fiery address...which brought great applause.") [87] The 
mainstream press reported on the debate. For example, the Los 
Angeles Times interpreted the exchange as symptomatic of a 
shift in leadership style. Kirkland was described as less 
aristocratic and more intellectual than previous Federation 
leaders, someone who encouraged open discussion. [88]
Central America was the Convention's only contentious 
issue. This was despite the fact that the labour movement, 
in economic, political, and legal spheres of activity remained 
dismally on the defencive. Real gross earnings for wage 
earners in the U.S. had fallen one-eighth from 1972 until the 
end of 1984. The Bureau of Labor Statistics recorded a 22.4% 
drop in unionisation in the private sector. In the growth 
industries, such as finance, insurance and real estate, only 
2.7% of workers were in unions. In services the figure was 
7.2%, and in the wholesale trade, 8.2%. In 1984, for the 
third consecutive year, unions organised fewer than 100,000
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workers in representational elections before the NLRB. [89] 
For the anti-interventionists Anaheim was a victory. For 
large sections of the union rank and file, however, perhaps 
the 90-minute discussion reflected the misplaced priorities 
of a trade union federation devoid of ideas and energy in the 
areas that mattered most to them.
Significantly, the majority of the participants in the 
Central America debate at Anaheim had recently visited the 
region, either with anti-intervention or AIFLD-sponsored 
tours. Clearly, this contributed to the intensity of the 
discussion; the delegates were forced to ponder discomforting 
images of war and repression from speakers who were themselves 
noticeably effected by their direct exposure to the situation 
in El Salvador and Nicaragua. All told, the debate revealed 
an emotionally charged political polarization of the upper 
ranks of the labour movement over an issue that would reach 
higher peaks of controversy as time progressed.
Conclusion.
The history of the U.S. trade unionism, despite the 
generally consistent official conservatism of the AFL and, 
later, the AFL-CIO, is one marked by periodic conflict around 
international issues. Sharp differences existed between the 
IWW and the AFL, the early CIO and the AFL, and, at various 
times, within the AFL itself. Each of these conflicts 
reflected profound ideological differences; the AFL leaders
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had explicitly rejected the socialist explanations of the 
Second International, accepted capitalism, and, in turn, 
struggled to be accepted by U.S. capital and the state. The 
socialists in the AFL, the IWW, and many in the early CIO, 
embraced various currents of socialist thought which shaped 
their international perspective and policies.
The intensity of these past conflicts helps put the 1985 
confrontation into proper perspective. The Convention at 
Anaheim clearly marked an important moment in the internal 
challenge to the Cold War policies of the DIA and AIFLD. For 
the first time since the purge of the CIO, U.S. foreign 
policy, and with it the international activities of the 
AFL-CIO, was again a contentious issue. However, despite the 
relative significance of this development, the ideological 
parameters of this challenge to official AFL-CIO and U.S. 
Government international policy remained far less precise than 
was the case in the past. In other words, the NLC and a large 
portion of its supporters in the lower ranks of U.S. trade 
unionism had expressed dissatisfaction with certain aspects 
of Cold War unionism, but had been unable to offer an 
alternative internationalism based on clearly defined 
objectives. The NLC itself had avoided faction status on the 
AFL-CIO Executive Council and only a few of its members, such 
as Sheinkman and Blaylock, were clearly identified as 
opponents both of AFL-CIO and U.S. Government policy in 
Central America.
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The city committees continued to reflect a functional 
unity between anti-interventionists and those with a 
solidarity perspective. In the case of the latter, 
unequivocal support for the FMLN and FSLN reflected their 
anti-imperialist and formally socialist predilections. 
However, quite unlike the challenges of the past, the Left in 
this case was devoid of the mass base of the IWW and the early 
CIO which developed their following as a result of intense 
class battles with U.S. capital in the domestic arena. In 
total contrast, the development of the anti-interventionist 
challenge in the U.S. trade unions coincided with a period of 
general inertia in the labour movement. In the absence of 
serious and sustained trade union resistance to the Reagan 
agenda, the relatively small contingent of anti-intervention 
activists had tapped into the accumulated frustration of a 
whole layer of trade unionists, including certain union 
leaders, who to some extent appeared to grasp the Central 
America controversy as a chance to ventilate anger in the 
direction of the White House.
Of course, the process of forming a new world view or 
ideology is frequently inaugurated by a negative and confused 
response to all the seemingly available options. The AFL-CIO 
was now the scene of a political insurgency which had neither 
an active mass base or a clear long term objective. As 
Blaylock expressed it, this was about "basic instincts... if 
Ronald Reagan supports these efforts...we damn well better be 
against it." [90]
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AIFLD and the DIA's support for liberal intervention in 
Central America had provided the AFL-CIOfs Cold War adherents 
with some "progressive" cover, particularly during the period 
following the Salvadoran elections of 1982. The Salvadoran 
land reform was posited as a concrete achievement in the 
general and gradual process of taming the forces of reaction 
and supporting moderate democrats, an achievement inspired by 
the intervention of the AFL-CIO. What was needed, AIFLD and 
the DIA now argued, was more U.S. Government effort in this 
direction in order to build a genuine democratic centre. In 
the case of Nicaragua, the thrust of AIFLD and DIA policy was 
toward support for the purportedly more democratic elements 
of the contras, or, as the CIA called them, the Democratic 
Resistance. The following chapter documents the fate of the 
AFL-CIO's reform proposals adopted by the Kissinger 
Commission, and the part played by certain union leaders in 
the ongoing Congressional battle to secure aid to the contras 
in 1986.
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CHAPTER 8
AIFLD'S LOW INTENSITY CONFLICT: FROM LIBERAL INTERVENTION 
TO ARMED COUNTERREVOLUTION.
Chapter Four discussed how in early 1984 the Kissinger 
Commission issued a report which urged U.S. military aid was 
necessary to defeat the guerilla insurgencies in Central 
America and protect the democratic opening achieved by the 
forces of moderate reformism. [1] Such aid, suggested the 
Report, should be accompanied by a program of liberal 
intervention: economic assistance directed at small producers 
in the private sector, democratic trade unions and rural 
cooperatives in order to facilitate the economic betterment 
of a broad section of the working population. Real economic 
improvements, it claimed, would weaken the influence of the 
revolutionary left and the dictatorial right and provide a 
popular base for a vibrant "democratic centre". [2]
The pre-emptive reform or liberal interventionist 
proposals contained in the Kissinger Report, despite 
alterations which accorded a pivotal role to the private 
sector and the free market, came almost entirely from the 
AFL-CIO's written and verbal contributions to the Commission's 
proceedings. [3] This chapter examines the fate of the
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AIFLD/AFL-CIO's Kissinger proposals, and the role of the 
National Endowment For Democracy (NED). In addition, this 
chapter focuses particular attention on the involvement of 
U.S. trade unions in the Reagan Administration's attempt in 
1986 to secure a $100 million military aid package for the 
contras. This chapter demonstrates that, in the face of 
Administration inaction regarding the reform proposals, AIFLD 
did not withdraw its support for Reagan's military agenda. 
Indeed, AIFLD and other Cold War union leaders actually 
intensified their pro-contra activities during this period. 
This chapter also reviews the trade union situation in 
Nicaragua in 1986 at a time of deepening economic hardship.
The Fate of the AFL-CIO's Reform Proposals
In 1983 AIFLD successfully urged the Kissinger 
Commission to recommend the formation of a Central America 
Development Organization (CADO) in order to implement the 
Commission's reform proposals. The CADO, or so AIFLD 
anticipated, would be funded by the U.S. Government from the 
monies earmarked for the implementation of the Commission's 
economic proposals. By early 1986 two years had elapsed since 
the AFL-CIO Executive Council's endorsement of the Report. The 
military dimension of the Report had been promptly 
implemented; the Salvadoran army, in particular, had been 
re-equipped and "professionalized" and the FMLN appeared at 
this time to be militarily contained. Had the Administration
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moved with similar urgency to implement the CADO 
recommendation?
It seemed not. In the Spring of 1985, after more than 
a year of Administration inaction, Lane Kirkland criticised 
Reagan for missing "a golden opportunity to embark on an 
approach that I think could have stirred people's 
imaginations." [4] In March 1985 William Doherty noted that 
proposed Administration funding for the implementation of the 
Report's reform recommendations was one-third less than the 
sum suggested by the Kissinger Commission. "We have noted 
that CADO," said Doherty, "to say the very least, does not 
appear in Administration testimony to occupy a position of 
prominence in the new proposed foreign aid legislation. The 
AFL-CIO can only hope that it has not been fully informed, and 
that the Administration is, indeed, prepared to follow through 
on their previous commitments to this innovative 
recommendation." [5]
Congressional authorisation to move ahead with CADO was 
eventually included in the Foreign Aid Legislation approved 
in August 1985. However, CADO's inclusion required the 
passage of an AFL-CIO supported Congressional amendment to the 
Foreign Assistance Act which committed the President to 
establish CADO. [6] Before the Defense Strategy Forum in 
December 1985 Doherty was more optimistic. CADO, he claimed, 
was "nothing short of revolutionary" and would become a 
reality "during the second quarter of 1986." [7]
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Union representatives from the AFL-CIO and its 
affiliates in Central America, Panama, and Belize met in Miami 
in late February, 1986, to discuss the way forward for CADO. 
The gathering stipulated that "only democratic labor 
organisations should be eligible for membership of CADO,” 
which effectively barred WFTU affiliates and other 
undesirables. The union leaders resoloved "to return to their 
respective countries and enter into serious negotiations with 
their business and government counterparts." [8] Later, in 
September, a seminar hosted by the Central American Business 
Institute (INCAE) in San Jose met to discuss CADO.
Almost three years had by this time elapsed since AIFLD 
presented CADO to the Kissinger Commission. Little had been 
accomplished. The principle vehicle designed to implement the 
reform agenda outlined in the Kissinger Report had still not 
been constructed. In San Jose Doherty requested a date be 
finalised for the formal launch of CADO. Before union, 
business, and government representatives, Doherty reaffirmed 
his faith in the U.S. Congress: CADO, said Doherty, "embodies 
democracy and pluralism;" for this reason "it should be 
obvious..that Congress..is going to pay attention to the 
recommendations of CADO..[.]" [9]
Meanwhile, the Administration continued to snub the CADO 
project. Secretary of State George Shultz's August 1986 report 
on the implementation of the Kissinger proposals discussed 
CADO in a short final-page appendix. Shultz's choice of words 
was also revealing. The meetings that had already taken place
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between labour, government, and business were, he stated, 
convened in order "to discuss the desirability of organizing 
a CADO." Moreover, the United States, suggested the report, 
"will continue to explore the feasibility of organizing a CADO 
on a regional basis." (Emphasis added.) Such language 
strongly indicated that the Reagan Administration was not 
convinced, or did not wish to be convinced, that CADO should 
actually be established. [10].
U.S. and Central American government, business, and 
union representatives met in Tegucigalpa in December, 1986, 
to draft a statute for the CADO. [11] In March, 1987, 
Tegucigalpa was again the scene of a broader meeting of 
representatives from each sector. CADO, it was (again) 
agreed, should be established. However, there was
disagreement over the method of selecting the representatives 
for the respective sectors. Another meeting would need to be 
arranged, although the date was not specified. [12]
CADO was, in reality, a clear non-starter. The Reagan 
Administration had rejected the liberal interventionism of the 
AFL-CIO. The Kissinger Report had served its purpose; it had 
been accepted by Congress because it had addressed the 
economic and social problems of the region as well as the need 
for military aid to defeat the immediate threat of a 
Soviet-Cuban backed guerilla insurgency. The military aid was 
sent and the economic assistance was channeled to the existing 
rulers of the region, who, according to the Commission, had 
helped perpetuate and intensify the unrest. CADO had, on
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paper, challenged the established modus ooerandi of U.S. aid 
distribution to its allies by arguing for direct assistance 
to non-government organisations such as trade unions. 
Furthermore, the model of development that CADO envisaged was 
clearly at odds with the free-market, foreign investment 
formulas favoured by the Reagan Administration and embodied 
in the ultimately ineffectual Caribbean Basin Initiative. [13] 
Having outlived their usefulness to the Administration, 
the AFL-CIO*s reform proposals were now being quietly ignored. 
No one except AIFLD and the AFL-CIO appeared to notice. 
Congress had become as besotted with Duarte as it was enraged 
by the Sandinistas: no one now was talking about the root 
social and economic causes of the Central American crisis. 
Furthermore, AIFLD and the DIA had themselves focused much of 
their political energy on defaming the Sandinistas and 
expressing virtually unqualified praise for the Duarte 
government. The Administration and the AFL-CIO's foreign 
policy spokespersons therefore agreed not just on politics, 
but also on priorities. Had AIFLD and the DIA shown 
commitment to their own reform project by giving CADO priority 
over their anti-Sandinista, pro-Duarte agenda, at least some 
Democrats may have been persuaded to shift the debate back to 
the root causes of the crisis identified by the Commission. 
This, however, would not have saved CADO. AIFLD had insisted 
on tripartite structures, operating in several countries 
simultaneously. This alone posed serious political and 
organisational problems, even if it was accepted that there
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existed a basis for agreement on economic matters between the 
unions, business and the various governments in Central 
America.
In August 1987 AIFLD finally acknowledged the truth: "It 
must be deeply regretted," noted the Institute, "that the 
Administration's several endorsements of the CADO 
concept...have proved hollow; indeed the Administration has 
cut this highly promising idea adrift." [14] In April 1988 
Doherty, speaking before a conference on Central America in 
Denmark sponsored by the Danish national union federation LO, 
remarked that the prospects for CADO were somewhat gloomy. 
Doherty1 s presentation generated a somewhat cool response from 
the assembled delegates. [15]
The National Endowment For Democracy. 1985-88
The Administration and AIFLD were, however, more united 
on the need for concerted political intervention. While CADO 
failed to get off the ground, the AFL-CIO continued to play 
a major role in the activities of the National Endowment For 
Democracy (NED), an initiative inspired by President Reagan 
to export democratic ideas as a means of fighting the 
ideological war against Marxism-Leninism on a global scale. 
For AIFLD and the DIA the political and ideological struggle 
against the revolutionary forces in Central America was, in 
any case, a pre-requisite to genuine reform. The formation 
of NED in 1983 consummated the political partnership between
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the Administration and the AFL-CIO1s international apparatus 
around the need to develop the political and ideological 
offensive to bolster the democratic centre in Central America 
and elsewhere against the forces of left and right (see 
Chapter Four.)
From its beginnings NED was controversial both in theory 
and in practice. Congress had been reluctant to give cash to 
private organisations for political purposes, and thus 
"privatise" a portion of Government foreign policy and remove 
it from Congressional scrutiny. The mini-scandal of the 
AFL-CIO actively taking sides in the Panamanian election of 
1984 (supporting the military's candidate, Nicholas Barletta) 
aroused further Congressional anxiety.
As NED's activities increased, however, so too did 
AFL-CIO involvement. NED had already channeled $11 million 
to the AFL-CIO in 1984 for its international work and a 
further $13.8 million was made available in 1985. NED also 
funded the pro-contra PRODEMCA in 1985 for the purpose of 
assisting the anti-Sandinista newspaper La Prensa in Managua. 
In June 1986 the Sandinista government closed down La Prensa; 
it eventually cited NED funding as the principal reason for 
the action. NED also provided $60,000, via the AFL-CIO, to 
the AIFLD-supported CUS in Nicaragua, a considerable sum given 
the fact that the CUS's membership, according to most 
estimates, was only a few thousand members. During this 
period NED money was also being distributed to favoured labour 
movement organisations in the Philippines, Fiji, South Africa,
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Central Africa, France, Britain, Poland, Portugal, Spain, 
Israel, Haiti, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica and Guatamala. [16] 
The NED's activities appeared to have only a limited 
propaganda value for the anti-intervention movement. Ed Asner 
had attacked the NED from the rostrum at the AFL-CIO 
convention at Anaheim (See Chapter Seven) and the Labor Report 
produced an article on NED-AIFLD/PRODEMCA activities in 
Central America. [17] However, this limited attention aside, 
the NED marked another institutional manifestation of the 
active relationship between the international affairs network 
of the AFL-CIO and U.S. Government agencies and projects, a 
relationship which extended to the door of the President's 
office. A White House briefing paper leaked to the press in 
September 1985 stated that the Department of State and the 
National Security Council, at that time the sphere of activity 
of Lt. Col. Oliver North, had "been getting help from 
organizations such as the National Endowment for Democracy and 
the AFL-CIO" in their pursuit of Administration objectives in 
Central America. The briefing paper also disclosed that the 
White House was "prepared to seek additional sources to allow 
them (NED and the AFL-CIO) to undertake an even greater role." 
[18] Indeed, right-wing Senator Orrin Hatch, a board member 
of the NED alongside Kirkland and AFT leader Albert Shanker, 
openly stated that the AFL-CIO's international work had been 
more useful and effective than the activities of the CIA. 
Hatch's office informed the Washington Post that the AFL-CIO 
"has tremendous leverage for political activity compared to,
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say, the CIA covert operations, which often fail." [19]
During 1985 to 1988 NED*s total grants exceeded $66 
million, of which $24.6 million was channelled to the 
AFL-CIOfs Free Trade Union Institute (FTUI). The principal 
recipients of the FTUI's portion of NED cash were Solidarnosc 
in Poland ($3.6 m.); the formerly pro-Marcos Trades Union 
Congress of the Philippines ($2.7 m.), and the Portuguese 
social democratic union federation UGT ($1.6 m.). NED money 
to the CUS or CUS-supported projects in Nicaragua totalled 
$410,000 in 1985-88, although Central America as a whole 
received only 3 per cent of FTUI's allowance from NED. [20]
Unions. Congress, and Contra Aid: 1986.
Meanwhile, the period that followed the AFL-CIO's 1985 
convention demonstrated that the compromise established 
between the NLC and the Cold War wing of the Federation 
leadership, in effect, unsustainable even in the short term. 
During early 1986 AIFLD and the DIA's pro-contra activity 
shifted into a higher gear, coinciding with an Administration 
request for $100 million in aid to the Nicaraguan insurgents. 
The establishment of PRODEMCA in 1984 provided a vehicle for 
union leaders to support the contras? by 1986 PRODEMCA was 
prepared to intervene to support Administration efforts to win 
Congressional support for the "Nicaraguan Resistance."
Earlier, in November 1985, Congress approved action 
which converted $27 million in "humanitarian aid" approved the
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previous June into a fund for military hardware. The Boland 
amendment which prohibited CIA assistance to the contras was 
also repealed in 1985, thus permitting the Agency to provide 
the contras with information and training. Now the contras 
needed arms to fight the Sandinistas, and, their opponents 
believed, to terrorise the Nicaraguan population. [21]
The most important priority for the contra aid campaign 
remained the transformation of the image of the contras from 
that of a brutal and ramshackle mercenary army to heroic 
freedom fighters in the front line of battle against 
communism. The Department of State's Office for Public 
Diplomacy (OPD) directed its propaganda to this end, taking 
its cue from PRODEMCA and the "Gang of Four" Democrats who 
played such a significant role in the 1985 contra aid 
campaign. (See Chapter Six) The OPD declared that the issue 
of free trade unions was an integral part of the democratic 
(i.e. contra) struggle. On January 22 1986 the contras'
political front, the United Nicaraguan Opposition (UNO) came 
forth with a manifesto entitled "Principles and Objectives For 
the Provisional Government of National Reconciliation." The 
document payed homage both to the armed contra forces and to 
the "civic courage" of trade unions and others in the internal 
opposition forces. The UNO promised to honour the right to 
strike, outlined its intention to de-nationalize properties 
and businesses expropriated by the FSLN, and to act as a 
guarantor of "private property as the expression of a national 
right." [22]
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OPD propaganda also made efforts to deny the contras 
had committed atrocities and claimed that the crimes 
themselves had been perpetrated by the Sandinistas, who then 
blamed the contras in order to discredit the "democratic 
resistance." [23] These allegations were tantamount to saying 
that the Sandinistas had deliberately murdered hundreds, if 
not thousands, of its own health workers, teachers, and 
agricultural specialists, as well as several non-Nicaraguans 
who had spent periods working in the country as an act of 
support for the revolution. [24] In 1985 alone 70 
construction workers had been killed by the contras for their 
part in building clinics and schoolhouses for the rural 
population. Between 1981 and 1985 more than 300 leaders of 
peasant cooperatives had been selectively assassinated in 
northern Nicaragua. [25] And yet Secretary of State Shultz 
could only note that "One of the most striking characteristics 
of Sandinista communism is its messianic impulse to violence." 
The contras, on the other hand, had merely responded to a 
"long series of repressive acts", an example of which, said 
Shultz, had been insults aimed at the Pope. [26]
Spokespersons for AIFLD, principally Doherty, did not 
offer official support for the President's aid request, but 
clearly echoed OPD propaganda that was designed to win 
Congress to the contras. In December 1985 Doherty appeared 
before the Defense Strategy Forum at the International Club 
in Washington, D.C., where he referred to "the brutality of 
the Sandinistas" and described the contras as "freedom
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fighters." [27] Shortly afterwards the Washington Times 
quoted Doherty as saying, "The Sandinista dictatorship is even 
worse than the Somoza dictatorship (and) there are more..true 
Sandinistas fighting in the freedom forces than there are in 
the Sandinista militia." Doherty also called for a worldwide 
economic and political boycott of Nicaragua. By these means, 
said Doherty, "the government would fall and you wouldn't have 
to have any type of outside armed intervention." [28]
During the same period AIFLD official David Jessup 
circulated an article to trade union leaders and officials 
written by SDUSA intellectual Joshua Muravchik. An attached 
note described the article as "one of the best analyses I have 
seen on the nature of the Sandinistas unique brand of 
communism." Muravchik called for force to be used against the 
Nicaraguan regime, either that or the U.S. must get used to 
the idea of a Communist government not far from its southern 
border. [29]
The call by the full AFL-CIO convention for a 
non-military solution to the Central American crisis was at 
this time being consciously undermined by AIFLD officials. 
On paper the AFL-CIO's position seemed to support the 
Contadora peace initiative, although AIFLD had publicly stated 
that the U.S. should not be restrained by the Contadora treaty 
(See Chapter Six). Nicaragua had accepted the treaty in 
September 1984 but the other Central American countries then 
came forward with amendments and Nicaragua withdrew. [30] 
The Administration's discomfort with Contadora was by this
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time obvious; the Reagan strategy, in the words of one 
observer, was "to convince observers that it is actually 
Nicaragua that is blocking peace efforts so that military 
assistance to the contras is seen as the only way to bring 
Managua to the bargaining table." [31]
AIFLD's portrayal of the Sandinistas as heinous and 
untrustworthy was advanced still further by means of the 
Institute's collaborative relationship with the NED-funded 
conservative human rights organisation, Freedom House. Freedom 
House had already echoed OPD propaganda when it accused the 
Sandinistas of deliberately committing atrocities to discredit 
the contras; now, in March 1986, Freedom House writer Bruce 
McColm attacked the Sandinistas in a lengthy article in AIFLD 
Report. [32] In May McColm called for the U.S. to enact the 
Rio Treaty of 1947 whereby countries could combine their 
military capabilities to defeat a threat to peace in the 
Americas - in other words, the U.S. should launch a 
Grenada-style invasion of Nicaragua. [33]
The DIA, in late 1985, published a 59-page statement on 
the situation in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Irving Brown's 
preface stated that the AFL-CIO's "active role" in both 
countries had been "subject to considerable misunderstanding, 
misinformation, and even disinformation." The contras were 
again depicted as a genuine and indigenous social movement 
responding to Sandinista repression. The document quoted from 
an article by Bernard Aronson, one of the so-called "Gang of 
Four" Democrats, which stated that the contra ranks "include
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poor peasants, small farmers, indians, devout Christians, 
draft resisters, and deserters from the Sandinista army." [34] 
There was no mention of Somoza's former National Guard, who, 
even the Department of State acknowledged, constituted 27% of 
the contra leadership. [35] Ex-contra Edgar Chammorro had 
declared in September 1985 that the contras were "totally 
controlled" by ex-Guard personnel who, he said, had "little 
respect for human rights or the rights of prisoners." The 
former contra referred to the "systematic killing" of
civilians in the rural areas. [36] Later, in 1987, Chammorro
described how the OPD "disseminated false stories" about 
Sandinista persecution of Jews, churchpeople, and other
groups. [37]
Amnesty International's 1986 report substantiated the 
claims made by Chammorro and numerous others that the contras 
were indeed terrorising the Nicaraguan population. AI 
referred to "summary execution by irregular forces opposing 
the Government of Nicaragua..(and)..a pattern of torture and 
extrajudicial killings." AI also complained that the 
"Governments of Honduras and the USA..appeared to encourage 
or expressly condone such abuses." The UNO, said AI. 
"continued to routinely torture and summarily execute their 
captives." [38]
While AIFLD and the DIA were putting as much effort as 
they dared into defaming the Sandinistas and promoting the 
contras, the NLC came out against the $100 million aid package 
requested by the Administration. The 23 national union
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leaders on the Committee signed a letter to Congress in early 
March that described the contra package as 
"counterproductive." [39] The New York Times commented that 
the PRODEMCA-NLC split revealed an ideological division in 
the U.S. labour movement which spanned decades. [40] The 
NLC's statement of opposition to contra aid was supplemented 
by William Wynn, the non-NLC president of the UFCW. Wynn, 
representing 1.3 million workers, urged Congress to "save the 
American people from this morass by voting to end all contra 
aid." [41] Union efforts to defeat the Administration on 
contra aid coincided with a wave of lobbying and protest 
activity throughout the U.S.
Despite these protests the union leaders who favoured 
contra aid kept the initiative. On March 16 PRODEMCA bought 
full-page advertisements in the New York Times and the 
Washington Times that requested tax-deductible contributions 
to assist the contra cause. Similar advertisements in 1985 
had requested support for those in Nicaragua fighting for 
democracy. PRODEMCA was this time more explicit regarding the 
true character of their project, and called openly for 
"military assistance" for the democratic opposition. Union 
names attached to the full-page advertisments were Doherty, 
ILGWU President Sol Chaikin, Shanker of the AFT, Drozak of the 
Seafarers and John Joyce of the Bricklayers. [42]
The anti-intervention movement quickly condemned the 
statements. Union leaders had given explicit support for a 
military option in Central America at a time when the
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Federation's policy was to support a non-military solution to 
the conflict. In one case, the opposition went beyond verbal 
condemnations. Following the first PRODEMCA advertisments in 
1985, 427 college faculty and higher education members of the 
New York State United Teachers (representing AFT members) 
attempted to insert a paid advertisement of their own in their 
local union newspaper, the New York Teacher. The
advertisement complained that AFT leader Albert Shanker's 
support for the contras, expressed through PRODEMCA, did not 
reflect AFL-CIO policy. Edward Bleeker, the paper's editor, 
refused the advertisement on the grounds that it was a 
political statement. The 427 filed a federal law suit against 
the AFT in April, 1986, which charged that Bleeker had 
violated their rights of expression as individual union 
members. However, the financial cost of pursuing this course 
of action to a conclusion was later considered too prohibitive 
and the suit was withdrawn. [43]
The PRODEMCA advertisments also generated some 
controversy in Congress. Since its formation in 1984 PRODEMCA 
had received roughly $4 00,000 in NED funds. Suspicions were 
therefore raised that U.S. Government money had been used to 
pay for PRODEMCA's advertisments, which, in turn, championed 
an explicitly partisan (i.e., Administration) objective. Even 
Congressional supporters of contra aid voiced complaints. [44] 
PRODEMCA denied using NED funds for the advertisments, and 
cited its receipt of grants from several right-wing bodies 
such as the 01 in Foundation, the Carthage Foundation, and the
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Smith-Richardson Foundation. Nevertheless, the human rights 
group Americas Watch denounced PRODEMCA for "flying under 
false colors in portraying itself as a citizens organization 
when it is actually a vehicle for distributing funds to 
anti-Sandinista organizations.11 [45]
The PRODEMCA advertisments were designed to appear on 
the same day, March 16, as the President was scheduled to make 
a major speech on the Administration's contra aid request. 
Reagan delivered what was widely considered to be his most 
vituperative and comprehensive attack on the Sandinistas. In 
his twenty-minute address, Reagan accused the Sandinistas of 
plotting to overthrow Mexico; constructing a military 
deep-water port for the Soviet Union; laying the largest 
airfield in Central America; destabilizing Brazil and other 
Latin American countries; creating a haven for European 
terrorist organisations, and of being heavily involved in 
smuggling cocaine to the United States. [46] Several 
commentators claimed that the tone of Reagan's attack tilted 
the Congressional balance away from supporting the aid package 
because it failed to emphasise the purportedly democratic 
project of the contras. [47] Four days later the aid request 
was defeated in the House by just seven votes.
The March 20 defeat did not arrest the momentum of 
PRODEMCA and the pro-contra lobby. Congressional opposition 
to contra aid had collapsed before and the pro-contra forces 
set their sights on a new vote towards the middle of the year. 
One PRODEMCA initiative, the seeds of which had been sewn in
475
1985, came to fruition in time for a second Congressional 
debate on contra aid. In August 1985 PRODEMCA channeled a 
$44,000 NED grant to the Managua-based Permanent Commission 
on Human Rights (Comision Pemanente de Derechos Humanos -CPDH) 
for the translation of their reports and their distribution 
beyond Nicaragua. The CPDH's investigations into human rights 
abuses, cited frequently by AIFLD in its material, had 
targeted only the Sandinista authorities, not the contras. 
In February 1985 a New York-based organisation called the 
International League of Human Rights sent a delegation to 
Nicaragua which was accompanied by Robert Leikin - one of the 
"Gang of Four" Democrats. The delegation's principal source 
of information was the NED-funded CPDH.
The League's 221-page report utterly condemned the human 
rights performance of the Sandinistas. The mainstream press, 
not surprisingly, gave the report ample attention. [48] In 
particular, the report claimed that there were as many as 
6,500 political prisoners in Nicaragua. Moreover, the timing 
of the report coincided with a period of intense Congressional 
debate and lobbying around the aid issue, thus amounting to 
what one commentator described as "a contrived coup in the 
campaign to win Congressional approval for contra aid." [49]
Disclosures connected to the Iran-Contra affair, which 
began in November 1986, cast a shadow of scandal and 
illegality over the Administration's campaign for contra aid. 
Among other things, the OPD, the activities of which were 
supervised by Oliver North on behalf of the National Security
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Council, engaged outside contractors to conduct pro-contra 
propaganda work. [50] The Iran-Contra hearings also revealed 
how attempts to change the system of authority inside the 
contras - a PRODEMCA objective - had suffered setbacks during 
this period. PRODEMCA had hoped to parade the non-combattant 
leadership in the form of Cruz and Robello in order to weaken 
the hold of the Somocistas over the contras. On the day 
following Reagan's speech of March 16, 1986, Oliver North's 
assistant Robert Owen sent a memo to North which described 
UNO's Adolfo Calero - one of PRODEMCA's "freedom fighters" - 
as a "strongman" propelled by "greed and power". UNO, wrote 
Owen, was a non-functioning creation of the Administration to 
"garner support from Congress." [51]
Furthermore, PRODEMCA's Executive Director, Penn Kemble, 
was referred to in two memos sent from Owen to North, which 
confirmed the close nature of PRODEMCA's relationship to the 
National Security Council and the North operation. In one of 
the memos sent on February 27, Owen wrote that "Penn Kemble 
believes that FDN and Adolpho (Calero) should be left alone 
at this time because the conditions are so fragile." [52] In 
May UNO was still posturing as the political leadership of 
the contras and claimed to represent the civilian opposition 
to the Sandinistas, opposition which included trade unions. 
In a communique issued May 29, UNO stated that Nicaraguan 
trade union organisations - clearly the CUS and the CTN - had, 
alongside political and business entities, "confirmed their 
recognition of the Directorate (of UNO) as the body
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responsible for conducting the struggle to achieve peace and 
democracy in Nicaragua." [53]
On June 25, the eve of the second Congressional decision 
on the $100 million, President Reagan delivered another 
nationally televised speech. The speechwriter for the 
occasion was Bernard Aronson, one of the "Gang of Four" 
Democrats whose close proximity to the AFL-CIO establishment 
had been cited as an explanation for his Cold War politics.
[54] Reagan invoked the political message of the PRODEMCA 
advertisments: assisting the contras constituted a noble 
struggle for democracy. Of the contras, Reagan asked, "Who 
among us can doubt their commitment to bring democracy to 
Nicaragua?" The President, assisted by Aronson, scored a 
victory. Six House Democrats and five Republicans moved over 
to the contra camp, securing a vote in favour of contra aid 
by 221 to 2 09. Yet, on the eve of the vote, opinion poll 
figures showed clear public opposition to Reagan's contra 
policy, with 62% against and only 29% expressing approval.
[55]
Trade union leaders opposed to contra aid had again 
raised their voice, but this time in vain. Two weeks before 
the vote, machinists' leader William Winpisinger appealed to 
the House: "American workers," he wrote, "have seen the
funding for (social) program after program slashed - job 
training, unemployment benefits...health care, medicare, and 
social security, etc. Now the Administration wants to squander 
$100 million in a vain attempt to overthrow the Nicaraguan
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government." [56] IUE President Bywater, too, sent a letter 
to House members selected on the basis of IUE membership in 
their Congressional districts, urging them on behalf of the
175,000 IUE members to vote against the aid package. [57] 
Following the vote Bywater wrote to Sheinkman, "The outcome 
was an outrage - particularly in terms of the number of 
Democrats who succumbed to Reagan's pressure and red-baiting. 
I want to commend you, Jack, for continuing to lead the fight 
on our side. You know you can count on IUE for continuing 
support." [58]
At least one union official informed their Congressional 
representative that their vote in favour of contra aid had not 
passed unnoticed. CWA Vice President Jan Pearce notified 
Bronx Congressman Mario Biaggi that "a representative 
delegation of your constituents would like to meet with you 
and explain why it is imperative to cast a suspicious eye 
towards spending one more cent on the contras in the future." 
A suspicious eye would eventually be cast on Biaggi himself 
concerning his illegal involvement with the Wedtech 
corporation. In 1988 Biaggi was sentenced to two years 
imprisonment for corruption. [59]
The approval of the $100 million in aid to the contras 
stunned the entire anti-intervention movement. Some argued 
that the defeat reaffirmed the need for a mass mobilization 
strategy. Real lobbying, it was claimed, should be conducted 
on the streets, and not, primarily, on Capitol Hill. Within 
the unions the achievements of the AFL-CIO convention now
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seemed hollow. Even those outside the labour movement had 
interpreted the Anaheim debate as an important breakthrough 
in the struggle to change AFL-CIO foreign policy. Clearly, 
the Federation's call for a political settlement to the 
Nicaraguan conflict had forced Shanker, Joyce, and others to 
use PRODEMCA as their main expression of support for the 
contras and the Reagan policy, unlike during the Vietnam 
period when the AFL-CIO officially and unreservedly endorsed 
the Johnson-Nixon war effort. It was surely a major advance 
for the anti-interventionists that the AFL-CIO had been unable 
to lend official support to the contras. With the approval 
of the $100 million, now appeared to be much more modest 
indeed.
On the very eve of the June 25 reversal by Congress the 
NLC coordinator Daniel Cantor wrote to actor and former SAG 
President Ed Asner. Cantor noted that, "The Cold-Warriors 
still have control over the apparatus of 16th Street (the 
address of AFL-CIO headquarters in Washington), but they are 
not winning the battle for the hearts and minds of the rest 
of labor." The U.S. public opposed contra aid, said Cantor, 
and further U.S. intervention in Central America. There was 
no evidence to suggest that the broader union membership was 
out of step with public opinion on this issue. [60] How could 
this sentiment be activated in proportions sufficient to 
disassociate the labour movement completely from a policy of 
military escalation in Central America? A cohort of 
anti-intervention activists had achieved impressive results
480
in their political challenge to the foreign policy 
establishment of the AFL-CIO, but the limits of this 
achievement were now apparent. The Cold-Warriors1 control 
over the AFL-CIO's extensive and government-funded apparatus 
meant that the AFL-CIO was still an important auxiliary to 
the Administration's policy in Central America and elsewhere. 
As the initial disappointment regarding the contra aid vote 
subsided, signs began to emerge that the anti-intervention 
movement was ready to raise the stakes within the trade unions 
by soliciting greater involvement from the broader union 
membership.
1986: The Trade Union Situation in Nicaragua and its Impact 
on the U.S. Labour Movement.
While the contra aid struggle in and around the U.S. 
Congress continued, inside Nicaragua the trade unions showed 
no remarkable changes. The CUS continued to complain of 
Sandinista harassment, including the arrest and periodic 
detention of their members. These complaints were
communicated to the U.S. and to the international labour 
movement via AIFLD. The Institute hosted CUS leaders in 
Washington throughout 1986 where by-invitation-only gatherings 
heard accounts of Sandinista repression. During the Spring 
in Managua the pro-Sandinista unions were involved in a May 
Day campaign which urged more production and more sacrifice 
to defend the revolution. Union contingents from Costa Rica,
Cuba, Panama, Japan, and the Soviet Union attended the May Day 
rally, as did a handful of U.S. union activists. One CWA 
member, Dudley Burdge from Local 1038 in Woodsbury, New 
Jersey, visited Nicaragua's CWA counterparts in the 
telecommunication workers union. Burdge discovered that the 
union, named Blanca Arauz de Sandino (after Sandino's wife), 
had lost 38 members in the war with the contras. He also 
relayed their desire for closer links with the CWA. [61]
In August the Washington Area Labor Committee organised 
a 16-person tour of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua. The 
delegation included a number of full-time union workers and 
was predominantly white-collar. (This author also participated 
in the trip.) In Nicaragua, although the delegates were 
sympathetic to the Sandinistas, questions regarding the right 
to strike and the harassment of the CUS recurred in meetings 
with both pro and anti-Sandinista union leaders. [62] The 
pro-government union organisations such as the CST, ATC, 
FETSALUD, and ANDEN, considered strikes to be destructive in 
the context of Nicaragua's prevailing political and economic 
situation. The CST, in particular, stressed that the ban on 
strikes was voluntary; government action against strikes was 
only necessary for those "against the process."
All the pro-Sandinista federations claimed to regard the 
right to strike as valuable to workers, one that should be 
re-introduced once the emergency had passed. However, Eduardo 
Garcia, leader of the agricultural workers' federation ATC, 
referred the Government-union tension on this question, and
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claimed that, "We (the ATC and the FSLN) have a conflict 
concerning the right to strike." Leaders of the health 
workers' federation FETSALUD described the right to strike as 
a "historic right..a civic weapon to make sure our demands are 
met." [63]
The pro-FSLN union leaders also voiced other concerns. 
Garcia, for example, made a general complaint against 
government officials who "say they operate in the interests 
of workers..but there are certain things that serve the 
government institutions but they don't necessarily protect the 
worker." [64] The teachers' federation, ANDEN, 80% of whose
12,000 members were women, complained that government 
bureaucracy had interfered with efficiency and called for more 
de-centralized decision-making. Wages were too low, but this 
was attributed to the prevailing wartime conditions. [65]
The CST's controversial affiliation to the pro-Moscow 
WFTU was also raised by the Washington delegation. Many 
anti-interventionists regarded the affiliation to have been 
a tactical blunder, one which had made their work in the U.S. 
trade unions more difficult. CST leader Lucio Jiminez 
defended the move; the WFTU, said Jiminez, had been the only 
federation to encourage joint action between the various trade 
union internationals, a position rejected by the AFL-CIO and 
many ICFTU affiliates (See Chapter One). Jiminez also 
attacked the Cold War divisions in the international labour 
movement. The Nicaraguan working class, he said, had forced 
unity on the Sandinistas in 1978 at a time when when factional
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differences had impaired the FSLN's ability to fight Somoza. 
A similar unity should be accomplished, said the CST leader, 
between the different sections of international trade 
unionism. [66]
The question of international affiliations was also 
raised with Garcia: why had the ATC followed the CST and also 
joined the WFTU? Garcia stated that "We would not win friends 
by affiliating (to the WFTU) . Rather, we would lose them. 
We think it is very possible to have the solidarity, 
interchange, and support from workers in the U.S. who are 
interested, without formal affiliation." The health workers 
federation, FETSALUD, had also not aligned itself with either 
the ICFTU, WFTU or the smaller "social Christian" WCL. [67] 
The activities of AIFLD and the CUS were also discussed 
by the pro-Sandinista unions and the Washington delegation. 
The CST attacked the CUS for allying itself with big business 
and for its timid opposition to U.S. intervention. CST 
representatives from the Port of Corinto were even more 
critical. Corinto had been a scene of CIA sabotage of 
Nicaraguan oil-storage facilities in 1983 and an arena of 
CUS-CST rivalry. AIFLD had made charges, echoed by President 
Reagan, that the Sandinistas had coerced workers into 
pro-government unions. Andre Sabine, General Secretary of the 
Corinto Longshoremen's Union, met the Washington delegates in 
Corinto, where he was accompanied by other union officials and 
rank and file members of the union. Sabine indicated that he 
had been a member of the CUS during the Somoza period. During
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the dictatorship, said Sabine:
The leadership of the CUS would take it upon themselves 
to go and negotiate with the dock owners here, and then 
they would go to fancy restaurants with the 
Administration. They were for the capitalists.
Another longshoreman remarked:
The CUS leadership never consulted the members about the 
content of a contract. In one example, they made a 
contract where they brought in a ship which had old scrap 
metal and we got practically nothing for unloading it. 
The difference now is that the leadership consults with 
the rank and file...The CUS leadership - Guthrie and 
Espinoza - were always in Managua. [68]
The representatives of the Longshoremen strenuously 
denied Sandinista interference in their decision to affiliate 
with the CST, although they conceded that, following the 
insurrection, "some of the workers continued to support the 
old leadership." [69]
The Washington delegation met the CUS in Managua where 
they sought clarification of the CUS's position regarding the 
contras. That AIFLD and other top U.S. union officials 
favoured contra aid was clear? AIFLD, however, had 
consistently argued that this was also the position of the
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CUS. CUS national official Oscar Baca Castillo stated, ”We 
always opposed the Somoza system, and we see that the contras 
are a successor to that. Logically, then, we do not support 
the contras." But had the CUS condemned the contra 
insurgency? "We have never condemned their intervention as 
such...but we are against all intervention in Latin America, 
be it from the USA or the Soviet Union." Were the Sandinistas 
"worse than Hitler" as Doherty had claimed on the eve of the 
Anaheim convention? "I don't think the Sandinista Front is 
capable of killing us, although both ourselves and the FSLN 
know there have been abuses. We do have international friends 
who sometimes exaggerate the situation." Pertaining to AIFLD, 
Baca Castillo complained, "The Institute has created many 
problems for us. Their representative in 1983 (Joseph 
Bermudez) made statements on behalf of the CUS and almost 
provoked a split." [70]
No section of the unarmed or internal opposition to the 
Sandinistas had by this time declared themselves to be 
supporters of the contra' s military campaign - and the CUS was 
no exception. Furthermore, given the Sandinistas1 attack on 
the imperialist intent of AIFLD, the CUS were perhaps wise to 
distance themselves somewhat from the Institute. To shift the 
beam of suspicion in another direction, it was possible that 
the CUS's interpretation of the situation in Nicaragua 
differed from that suggested by AIFLD, but the CUS needed the 
Institute's generous funding to remain in existence.
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During the AIFLD-sponsored tour of the U.S. by the CUS 
and other union representatives around the time of the AFL-CIO 
Convention, Irving Brown and Doherty themselves appeared to 
differ with each other regarding the AFL-CIO's position on the 
contras. Brown had said that no Federation support for the 
contras existed. Doherty, however, implied that such support 
was imminent. (See Chapter Seven) Alvin Guthrie, the CUS 
leader known throughout the international labour movement 
either as a victim of Sandinista harassment or as a counter­
revolutionary accomplice to U.S. intervention, reportedly sat 
silent and motionless as Doherty made his "worse than Hitler" 
remark about the Sandinistas on the eve of the Convention. 
AFSCME staff member and the coordinator of the Washington 
committee's tour of Central America, Fred Soloway, witnessed 
the incident. Following the pre-Convention meeting Soloway 
solicited Guthrie's response to Doherty's comment. Guthrie 
apparently said that he did not seek a contra victory because, 
unlike the Sandinistas, the contras would certainly kill him. 
[71]
The cautious rhetoric of the CUS may have stood in 
marked contrast to the outpourings of AIFLD, but the CUS - 
Guthrie's remarks aside - seemed to share AIFLD's view that 
the contras were a legitimate political force and not just a 
mercenary army in the service of a foreign power. The CUS 
stood for dialogue and reconciliation as an alternative to the 
war of two extreme ideologies, namely Marxism-Leninism and 
Somocista-anticommunism. "Mistakes have polarised the
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Nicaraguan people," said Baca Castillo, "whereas for some the 
contras constitute some kind of hope." [72]
The Washington committee's tour contributed to a series 
of favourable first-hand accounts of the Sandinista's 
direction of the Nicaraguan revolution, accounts which took 
their place alongside the other arguments against U.S. 
intervention. The Labor Report stated that the revolution 
was eminently defencible from a trade union standpoint because 
Nicaragua had made enormous advances in vitally important 
areas of social welfare, had introduced a land reform and had 
involved the Nicaraguan people in the construction of a new 
Nicaraguan Constitution. [73] Individual unionists also
contributed to this positive assessment of the revolution's 
achievements. Milt Tambor, staff representative of AFSCME 
Local 25 made a contribution to the first newsletter of the 
Michigan Labor Committee For Democracy and Human Rights in 
Central America. The newsletter itself marked the official 
beginning of the committee's activities and was circulated to 
the five hundred Locals across the state. Following his visit 
to Nicaragua Tambor noted that, "For a country in the midst 
of war, such free political debate and discussion should be 
considered remarkable." [74]
The President's report in the ILWU's newspaper 
Dispatcher continued in this vein, noting how the Sandinistas 
"had vastly improved the quality of life for the average 
Nicaraguan and appears to enjoy solid majority support" [75] 
Dudley Burdge from CWA Local 1038 in New Jersey observed the
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Telecommunication workers' high level of enthusiasm for their 
union and for its contribution to the revolution. [76]
Positive accounts of developments in Nicaragua, however, 
were mixed with stories of arduous struggle. Burdge described 
how the telecommunications workers, "performed their duties 
with a rifle in one hand and telephone equipment in the 
other." [77] Clearly, the revolution now depended on the 
physical, moral, and intuitive resources of the working class 
for its very survival. With the Nicaraguan economy 
spluttering on one cylinder, and overburdened by the huge 
economic and human costs of war, talk of day-to-day survival 
had all but replaced the discourse on building a new society. 
The Central America Historical Institute (CAHI), a 
Managua-based Jesuit research organisation sympathetic to the 
government's social project, warned that "A real economy of 
resistance and survival will have to go much deeper than 
simple appeals to the working class and peasantry to work with 
more discipline." In fact, "labor indiscipline has grown in 
the productive sector," due to "the drop in real salary levels 
of the laboring class." CAHI echoed the complaints of some 
pro-Sandinista union leaders: government officials had shown 
"little confidence in the peasants, characterizing them as 
dispersed, backward, and unable to incorporate modern 
technology and increase production." [78]
Broad sections of the population considered the 
government guilty of economic mismanagement but, argued the 
Jesuit group, political support for Sandinistas remained firm.
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However, workers were now compelled to take survival 
initiatives either as individuals or as family and community 
groups. This involved meeting inflation with barter and 
taking over and controlling government distribution channels. 
The pro-Sandinista agricultural unions, UNAG and ATC, had 
facilitated initiatives among cooperatives and small growers 
to explore different means of popular control over production 
and consumption. The CAHI report indicated, "These 
initiatives are much more widespread than the examples of 
worker consciousness that fill the pages of the daily 
(Sandinista) papers." [77]
Neither wing of the anti-intervention movement in the 
unions, that is, the solidarity and nonintervention forces, 
were inclined to delve too far beneath the surface events in 
the Nicaraguan union movement, or into the economic situation 
in which it attempted to operate. For the solidarity forces 
such as those behind the Labor Report the task was to fight 
intervention, not to publicly advance a socio-economic 
analysis of the Nicaraguan revolution. The utterances and 
arguments of leading Sandinistas, including union leaders, 
would suffice, given the Goliath nature of the forces against 
the revolution. Yes, the revolution had problems, but its 
biggest difficulty was the actions of the U.S. government. 
All energies, maintained the solidarity activists, must be 
directed against imperialist intervention. For the
nonintervention forces the record of the Sandinistas was also 
a secondary factor. Disposed to a more critical evaluation
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of the Nicaraguan situation and Sandinista rule, they were, 
nonetheless, emphatically opposed to U.S. military 
intervention. Whatever the situation inside Nicaragua, U.S. 
intervention was sure to make matters worse.
It is important to stress, however, that the situation 
in the Nicaraguan trade union movement continued to impact 
significantly on the state of the conflict over Central 
America in the U.S. trade unions. For anti-interventionists 
attempting to forge relations with the Sandinista unions, it 
was not just the survival of the revolution that was 
important, but also the methods used to ensure its survival. 
In the trade union sphere it was important for the leaders of 
the Sandinista unions to maintain at least some degree of 
vitality, a plurality of ideas and a sense of vision. The 
internal challenge to Cold War unionism in part depended on 
the health and character of the external challenge and the 
Sandinista unions were key custodians of such a challenge. 
If the Sandinista unions degenerated into skeletal and 
lifeless objects, unable to mobilize the rank and file, the 
solidarity wing of anti-intervention trade unionism in the 
U.S. might quickly become demoralised. For the issue here was 
not which of the two "models" of trade unionism was the most 
successful because neither class-based Marxist-Leninist 
unionism or Cold War unionism based on class-collaboration 
could register any astounding material successes in such dire 
economic conditions. No, the real contest was between 
possibilities. For many U.S. anti-interventionists, even
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those uncomfortable with aspects of Sandinista policy, the 
revolution embodied hopes of real social change in Nicaragua. 
If the revolution could resist both internal degeneration as 
well as external aggression then the prospects for progressive 
change throughout the Americas, including the United States, 
would be significantly enhanced. The other possibility, that 
being the triumph of the counter-revolution - with which the 
CUS and AIFLD were clearly associated - was too disturbing to 
contemplate. For many anti-interventionists the stakes were 
as high as this.
Despite profound economic worries, generally favourable 
reports about the Sandinistas appeared to have a ripple effect 
in the U.S. trade unions and reinforced opposition to the 
contras. AFGE at its 1986 convention adopted a Report on 
National and International Affairs which stated, "The 
conditions of workers and their unions have improved under the 
Sandinista government, particularly in regard to land reform, 
health care and literacy, despite the U.S. economic blockade." 
[80] In an interview, AFGE's President, Ken Blaylock, harked 
back to his visit to Nicaragua in 1983: "I saw Nicaraguans
teaching their people to read and write and do basic math...I 
saw Eastern bloc teachers and educators down there helping 
them set up schools and helping them with outreach 
programs. . .And what do they get from America? They get the 
military and the contras and the terror raids." [81]
The Industrial Union Department (IUD) of the AFL-CIO - 
representing large industrial unions like the UAW - condemned
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the contras at its convention, but, unlike the full AFL-CIO 
convention, registered no similar condemnation of the 
Sandinistas. [82] At AFSCME's convention contra aid was also 
firmly opposed. Particularly significant was the position 
adopted by the Steelworkers' (USWA) convention held in 
September. The statement on Central America declared that 
"War can no longer be considered a legitimate instrument of 
foreign policy." The U.S Government was condemned for 
"financing a war of terrorism against the people of 
Nicaragua." [83]
The role of anti-intervention activists in shifting the 
steelworkers' position offered tangible evidence of the 
effects of continued agitation. Twenty-five USWA local 
officers signed a letter to the union's Canadian president, 
Lynn Williams, urging him join them in opposition to Reagan's 
policies in Central America. [84] Reagan's policies, they 
argued, were harmful to steelworkers, "and (to) all other 
working people in the U.S." The 25 endorsed an
anti-intervention resolution passed by USWA District 1 at its 
convention. USWA anti-interventionists then made a written 
appeal to convention delegates under the heading "Solidarity 
and Self Interest: The Connection Between Steelworkers and the 
Crisis in Central America." [85] The USWA had seen its share 
of crisis in the pre-convention period. The strike against 
the USX corporation (formerly U.S. Steel) had been long, 
bitter, and ultimately unsuccessful. William's keynote 
address to the convention attacked the multinationals and
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urged an explicit rejection of the national chauvinism 
frequently encouraged by the Steel industry employers. The 
employers wanted steelworkers, said the USWA President, to 
attach blame for their domestic situation to the worker 
overseas. Williams said, "We do not intend our actions to 
have a negative effect on our working brothers and sisters 
around the world who are forced to toil for barely subsistence 
level wages." The convention issued a call for international 
trade union unity: "The time has come for the labor movement 
to form a strong united front worldwide in dealing with the 
multinationals." [86]
While some unions appeared reluctant to attack the 
Sandinistas, to others they continued to be emblematic of 
communist expansion and trade union repression. In the 
470,000-member AFT, anti-intervention activists had become 
vocal and active. However, Shanker continued to be a forceful 
and articulate defender of Cold War unionism and U.S. foreign 
policy. The California Federation of Teachers (CFT) in April 
protested Shanker's pro-contra position at Anaheim, and 
claimed that Shanker had violated the anti-intervention 
resolution passed at the AFT convention in 1979. At the CFT 
gathering a delegate urged those on the convention floor who 
opposed U.S. intervention in Central America to rise to their 
feet. According to one source, "The entire convention rose. 
President Shanker smoothly responded, 'I get the message.1" 
[87] At the national AFT convention in Chicago in July, the 
same stand-up protest was, however, less successful. In a
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session for college teachers an AFT member from Philadelphia 
urged delegates to stand in opposition to the leadership's 
resolution on Central America. Roughly one third of the 
delegates responded. On the main floor of the convention a 
resolution attacking the Sandinistas was carried with a 
comfortable majority although the debate itself prompted a 
fist-fight between some delegates that caused the convention 
to be temporarily adjourned. [87]
By late 1986, resolutions or executive action by the 
union leaderships had put the vast majority of the main 
AFL-CIO unions in the anti-contra camp. To this list needs 
to be added important non-AFL-CIO unions, such as the ILWU, 
the UE, the UMW and the 1.8 million members of the NEA. 
Scores of smaller unions which made up over a third of AFL-CIO 
affiliated members had by this time taken no public position 
on the question of the contras, and three major AFL-CIO unions 
remained pro-contra. These were the AFT, the Bricklayers 
(95,000 members), and the Seafarers (80,000). [89] The New
York-based ILGWU remained officially neutral although its 
President, Sol Chaikin, had signed the PRODEMCA statement 
which called for military aid to the contras.
Conclusion.
The period following the AFL-CIO's full convention in 
Anaheim marked an increase in official trade union opposition 
to the Reagan Administration's policy of so-called covert war
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against the Sandinista regime. However, a minority faction 
of trade union leaders had along with AIFLD openly agitated 
for military aid to the contras, and, in so doing, aligned 
themselves with an assortment of Cold War liberals and 
anti-union conservatives from political, intellectual, and 
business circles.
The DIA and AIFLD had during this same period observed 
the Reagan Administration's refusal to implement the reform 
proposals embodied in CADO and recommended by the Kissinger 
Commission. While Administration inaction was (somewhat 
belatedly) acknowledged and criticised by Kirkland, Doherty 
and others, AIFLD and the DIA were still prepared to support 
Administration efforts to advance a military "solution" to the 
crisis in Central America, and, in so doing, violate the 
spirit of the Anaheim compromise. Furthermore, AIFLD in 
particular had demonstrated that, while it strongly encouraged 
a relatively innovative and visionary reform agenda (CADO) to 
address the root causes of the Central America crisis, the 
Institute regarded this reform agenda as subordinate to the 
Administration's goal of defeating the FMLN and overthrowing 
the Sandinistas.
In 1986 the NLC and the broader anti-intervention 
movement had suffered a serious setback with the passage of 
the $100 million contra aid package and began to scrutinize 
its own tactics and methods. In the trade unions opposition 
to the contras had deepened and the NLC had issued statements 
to that effect. However, Congress had demonstrated how
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detached it was from public opinion on the contra aid issue? 
towards the end of 1986 it was clear that anti-interventionist 
pressure on Congress had not brought the desired results.
While enormous attention was being payed to the events 
in Washington and Managua, developments in San Salvador were 
posing new challenges to U.S. policy in the region. Chapter 
Five described how the Duarte Government had quickly lost 
substantial trade union support following its failure to 
implement promised reforms related to the AIFLD-sponsored 
Social Pact. Duarte's election had, many observers believed, 
been a consequence of AIFLD-encouraged trade union support for 
his Christian Democratic party? the dispute over the Social 
Pact had therefore weakened the U.S.-backed government's base 
of support. This problem for U.S. policymakers was compounded 
by the steady re-emergence of the left trade unions. By 
mid-1985 Duarte had authorised the use of military force 
against strikers and accused them of being terrorists and 
communists. The AIFLD-supported federation, the UPD, 
continued to be wracked by splits and controversy, some of 
which revolved around AIFLD's alleged interference and 
financial manipulation of the UPD unions. In late 1985 AIFLD 
facilitated the formation of a new pro-Duarte federation, the 
CTD.
The next chapter documents the continuing revival of the 
left unions in El Salvador during late 1985 and 1986 and the 
increasing connection between these unions and the 
anti-intervention trade unionists in the U.S. Furthermore,
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it documents AIFLD's role in building parallel unions, and its 
efforts to discredit the ascendant left unions.
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CHAPTER 9
TAKING SIDES: U.S. TRADE UNIONS AND THE POLARIZATION 
OF SALVADORAN LABOUR 1986-87
San Salvador: The FENASTRAS Convention
Following the AFL-CIO convention at Anaheim in November 
1985 anti-interventionists turned their attention to another 
labour movement gathering, this time in San Salvador. The 
event, staged on November 7-9, was the annual convention of 
the largest left federation, FENASTRAS.
The relationship between anti-intervention forces and 
FENASTRAS had grown increasingly strong since 1980, partly 
because of the presence in the U.S. of FENASTRAS 
representative Francisco Acosta. The increased level of 
personal interaction between U.S. anti-interventionists and 
their counterparts in El Salvador had already become a very 
significant factor both in the struggle in U.S. labour and in 
the revival of left unions. Acosta had led a semi-nomadic 
existence before receiving office space at the IAM's 
headquarters in Washington, D.C. He had performed union work 
in Toronto, with ACTWU in New York City, and with AFGE in 
Washington. The NLC's successful STECEL campaign which
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culminated in the release of eleven Salvadoran electrical 
workers from custody in 1984 and the East Coast tour were 
examples of constructive collaboration between anti­
interventionists and FENASTRAS. Acostafs presence in the U.S. 
ensured that AIFLD's positive version - and vision - of El 
Salvador did not go unchallenged in the movement. Following 
the STECEL victory Acosta thanked Kirkland for his written 
intervention on behalf of the detainees: "Unfortunately, the 
campaign against unionists in my homeland continues. Enclosed 
is a list of 51 who have been assassinated by death squads, 
arrested, or "disappeared" this year (1985)." [1] Not only 
had Acosta brought a different perspective of the Salvadoran 
situation to the AFL-CIO leadership, he had also addressed 
scores of trade union rank and file audiences across the U.S.
The FENASTRAS convention commenced with two members of 
the Executive Board, elected twelve months previously, absent. 
Both had been victims of the death squads. One was the leader 
of the fisherman's union? the other was head of a 
transportation workers' union. At the convention FENASTRAS 
adopted a "Platform of Struggle" which demanded salary 
increases, the construction of a national workers' parliament 
to debate the situation in the country, and for a National 
Forum to be established to encourage the participation of the 
popular movement (defined as unions, small businesses, 
professionals and intellectuals) in formulating a solution to 
the Salvadoran conflict. The Platform also called for renewed 
government-guerilla dialogue, the right to strike, the
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demilitarization of worksites and the unconditional release 
of all political prisoners. [2] The convention was attended 
by 300 FENASTRAS delegates from 23 unions claiming to 
represent 90,000 Salvadoran workers - only half of which were 
legally recognised by the Government. The attendance was 
substantially higher than the convention of 1984.
The U.S. contingent to the event numbered 35 - a
considerable advance on the. handful of observers able to 
attend the previous year. Unionists in either official or 
personal capacities attended from a broad cross-section of 
U.S. unions. A member of IUE Local 201, where the East Coast 
tour had registered a controversial impact, also attended. 
In his report to the (Boston) North Shore Labor Council, Don 
Gurewitz described how, "Everyone at the FENASTRAS convention 
knew about the debate at the AFL-CIO in Anaheim. They are all 
pinning their hopes on the U.S. labor movement." [3] Nine 
unionists attended from the Bay Area and the Labor Network 
placed a paid advertisement in the Salvadoran daily newspaper 
El Mundo which demanded that the Duarte Government "stop the 
repression of workers." [4]
The convention also marked the return to El Salvador of 
Hector Recinos, who, little over a year before, had been a 
prisoner in Mariona for his activities with STECEL. Recinos, 
who had previously been nominated to receive the Nobel Peace 
Prize by Mockton University in New Brunswick, Canada, was met 
at the airport by jubilant workers. [5] In his keynote 
address to the convention Recinos attacked the AIFLD-supported
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agrarian reform as "a measure to intensify control and
repression in the countryside.” More generally, he noted how
the repression was "shifting from indiscriminate terror to 
selective terror...In the face of (labour movement) 
resurgence, President Duarte has resorted to the old gimmick 
of linking the labor movement with the guerillas in order to 
justify his anti-labor policy." [6] Immediately after the 
convention Recinos would again leave for Europe.
The FENASTRAS convention took place amidst deepening 
industrial unrest. For example, postal workers occupied a 
central post office in the capitol to protest a government 
order which permitted the transfer of workers anywhere in the 
country without notice. [7] Water workers, too, were on
strike. Their union (SETA) had suffered mass firings
following an "illegal" stoppage that began in May 1985 
protesting the killing of two workers. Their bodies were 
discovered on May 1st, days after being detained by the Arce 
Battalion, the government's "immediate reaction" unit. [8]
The FENASTRAS convention also coincided with an 
important moment in a union dispute which, similar to STECEL, 
would be taken up by anti-interventionists and transformed 
into a sizeable campaign. The Telephone and Telecommunication 
Workers of El Salvador (ASTTEL) went on strike as the 
convention began. Humberto Centeno, a leading ASTTEL member, 
appealed to the FENASTRAS convention for support. Centeno and 
his two teenage sons had been dragged out of their home at 
6.00 a.m. by ten armed men in civilian clothes and taken to
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the headquarters of the Treasury Police where Centeno was 
released but his two sons kept as hostages. The two were 
accused of being supporters of the FMLN because of their 
involvement of a Boy Scout project distributing food to the 
impoverished street dwellers in San Salvador. The strike of 
ASTTEL members unfolded as news of the arrests spread and 
supportive industrial action by other unions shut down all 
automatic telephone and teller services. The U.S. delegation 
went to the Treasury Police headquarters and asked to hear the 
charges made against the Centeno brothers. One U.S. unionist, 
Ann Loughlin, president of the Office and Professional 
Employees, Local 29 of Oakland, California, told the San 
Francisco Examiner that, "My union sent me here to observe 
union rights. But I didn't expect to get involved so
directly." [9] The delegation was informed that Jose and
Jaime Centeno (aged 22 and 19 respectively) had been arrested 
for their involvement in an October 26 kidnapping of the head 
of Civil Aviation.
The Salvadoran Telecommunications Agency (ANTEL) had 
been a scene of industrial and political conflict since 1979. 
In February 1980 the ANTEL worksites were militarized and in 
November union organiser Francis Moran and his female partner 
were abducted by death squads and decapitated. The union, 
then called ATANTEL, was disbanded. Later in 1980 ANTEL's 
security forces were positioned on the roof of the ANTEL
building from where they fired on a huge peaceful
demonstration of workers protesting union repression. Some
510
57 marchers were killed, hundreds wounded, and the show of 
force ended street demonstrations for nearly five years. [10] 
Late 1984 marked a period of resurgent union activity at 
ANTEL, with ASTTEL beginning to operate openly. In March 
1985, reportedly under the direction of AIFLD, ANTEL created 
a parallel union called ASTA. According the ASTTEL's leaders 
AIFLD then succeeded in getting ASTA affiliated to the 
International Federation of Postal, Telephone, and Telegraph 
Workers (PTTI). In May, ASTTEL, claiming over 5,000 members, 
staged a two-day stoppage to protest the failure of ANTEL's 
management to fulfill its contractual obligations. Duarte met 
with the union on June 1, 1985, and assured them that ANTEL 
would comply with the terms of the contract. Then came the 
arrest, on November 8, of Centeno and his two sons. Amnesty 
International later declared the Centeno brothers had endured 
14 days of torture. [11]
Charles Kernaghan, a freelance union photographer from 
New York, took a personal interest in the Centeno case and 
visited the Centeno sons a few weeks after their capture. 
Kernaghan recorded: "When I saw Jose and Jaime in Mariona the 
scars on their arms still remained from their torture with 
electric shock. Their lungs were impaired, especially those 
of the younger son Jaime, from the time when they were forced
to inhale lime during their interrogation." [12]
By late November the strike was over and ANTEL
management took reprisals against several activists who were 
arrested, tortured, and forced to sign confessions which
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stated that the strike had been engineered by the FMLN. On
January 10, 1986, ANTEL fired Raphael Sanchez, the General
Secretary of ASTTEL. In newspaper interviews ANTEL accused
Sanchez of "running around with communists." The New York-
based District 65 of the UAW reported the story in the
Distributive Worker: Sanchez's lawyer, who had claimed that
the dismissal was contrary to Salvadoran law, received death
threats and dropped the case.. [13]
Once again, a U.S. union contingent had come into direct
contact with El Salvador's turbulent political and trade union
situation and witnessed for themselves the hostility of
government and military forces towards trade unionists. The
3 5 visitors made considerable use of their experience in El
Salvador and several newspapers, particularly on the West
Coast, ran stories about their experience. [14] A few weeks
after her return from the FENASTRAS convention, Ellen Starbird
of the Santa Clara County Central Labor Council wrote to U.S.
Ambassador Edwin G. Gorr in San Salvador. Part of her letter
focused on the accusation, echoed by AIFLD, that FENASTRAS had
links to terrorist organisations. She wrote:
This accusation is an Orwellian distortion of the word 
terror. Only in a nation whose government fears human 
dignity could every effort to improve the lot of the 
people of El Salvador be construed as "terrorism". That 
these acts are crimes swiftly revenged, while 
thousands of murders go unpunished because death squads 
enjoy an extraordinary impunity from the law, speaks 
harshly of the Duarte regime and its judicial 
priorities. [15]
The FENASTRAS convention marked another important moment
in the revival of the left trade unions in El Salvador.
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Moreover, the convention, and the events which surrounded it, 
strengthened the personal and political links between U.S. 
anti-intervention trade unionists and their Salvadoran 
counterparts. It was perhaps premature, at this juncture, to 
suggest that a "new internationalism" had begun to take shape 
which rivalled the official internationalism conducted by the 
DIA. How could the actions of such a small number of U.S. 
trade unionists compete with the recognised authority of the 
AFL-CIO? One should note, however, that the Cold War unionism 
conducted by the DIA did not require or request rank and file 
involvement. In terms of numbers of individuals involved the 
internationalism of the anti-interventionists was perhaps 
already as extensive as the DIA's, although the disparity in 
resources available to the two contending groups was too 
enormous to calculate. The DIA had literally millions of U.S. 
taxpayers' dollars (and several hundred thousand dollars from 
the AFL-CIO's budget) to pursue its objectives. In contrast, 
the majority of anti-intervention trade unionists payed their 
own way to El Salvador (and Nicaragua) and their material 
solidarity efforts usually amounted to whatever miscellaneous 
items could be squeezed into a suitcase or backpack.
The political character and pedigree of the 
anti-interventionist challenge to AIFLD and the DIA remained, 
in many respects, the most significant factor. However, much 
depended on the performance of Duarte; if the Salvadoran 
president maintained his precarious political position, and 
retained the loyalty of the AIFLD-supported unions in the CTD,
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then the challenge to AIFLD's own legitimacy in the U.S. 
labour movement might be seriously arrested.
Left Unions Unite: The National Union of Salvadoran Workers.
In late 1985 the DIA issued a major statement on El 
Salvador. Accompanying the highly positive assessment of the 
Duarte period was a rancourous condemnation of the FMLN. The 
statement declared that the tactics of the guerillas were a 
deliberate ploy to provoke repression from the Salvadoran 
right. Furthermore, the purportedly pro-FMLN unions were not 
legitimate trade union entities and were, in any case, 
minuscule in comparison to the so-called democratic unions. 
Only 3,000 workers, declared the DIA, were in the pro-guerilla 
unions, but they continued to be "well-financed and vocal." 
More than this, the left federations were "expert at 
misleading foreign delegations - labor included - as to the 
good faith and moderation of their aims." Visiting 
delegations - doubtless a reference to the NLC and other 
anti-intervention tours to El Salvador - "do not have extended 
experience of Marxist-Leninist tactics." [16]
The escalation of strike activity in El Salvador 
throughout 1985 indicated one of two things: either the DIA
had seriously underestimated the strength of the left unions, 
or, if such strikes had indeed not been "political" or left 
inspired, there existed a level of legitimate union discontent 
that the DIA had not been prepared to fully acknowledge. More
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transparent, perhaps, was the omission of any mention of the 
crisis in the UPD and divisions in other important unions, 
such as those in the SUTC, FESINCONSTRANS and the UCS which 
threatened the leaderships of those unions favoured by AIFLD. 
[17] Furthermore, there was no mention of the June 1985 raid 
on the occupied hospitals, the assassination of union leaders, 
or of the UPD's call for AIFLD's expulsion from El Salvador. 
The statement also conflicted considerably with Amnesty 
International who documented "torture, disappearance and 
extra-judicial executions directed at Salvadoran trade 
unionists" throughout 1985. Moreover, said AI, a "campaign 
of intimidation of the trade union movement" was in full swing 
and the Salvadoran authorities had attempted to weaken trade 
union activism by murdering trade unionists for allegedly 
supporting the FMLN. [18]
Towards the end of 1985 the political and economic 
pressure on Duarte intensified. In a U.S. Embassy memorandum 
in late December, Ambassador Edwin Corr expressed concern that 
"The worst in terms of labor unrest is probably still to come, 
and the developments on the labor front in the first quarter 
of 1986 could present the President with the most serious 
challenge to his power to date." [19] This proved to be an 
accurate prediction. In January 1986 Duarte introduced a 
Program of Economic Stabalization and Reactivation, 
essentially an IMF austerity package introduced to improve the 
investment climate and! stimulate exports. [20] The immediate 
consequences for workers was registered in increased prices
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for gasoline, agricultural products, basic foods, medicine, 
and public services. [21] Since 1981 workers* living 
standards had fallen by more than one-third in both industrial 
and agricultural sectors, and were now sure to fall even 
further. [22]
The economic measures, known as the pacruetazo (package) , 
provoked an immediate labour movement response. On February 
8, the UPD, FENASTRAS, ANDES., STISSS, COACES, the Treasury 
Ministry workers (Asociacion General de Empleados del 
Minesterio de Hacienda -AGEMHA), and the CLAT-affiliated CTS 
formed with others the National Union of Salvadoran Workers 
(Unidad Nacional de Trabajadores Salvadorenos -UNTS). 
According to FENASTRAS, 2,000 unionists from 100 union 
organisations met in San Salvador to discuss and endorse 
demands which called on Duarte to repeal the proposed attacks 
on workers and to enter into a dialogue with the FMLN to end 
the war. [23]
The UNTS organised a demonstration around these demands 
on February 21 which some observers claimed was the largest 
in San Salvador since 1980. UNTS leaders claimed 80,000 
participants; the University of Central America (San Salvador) 
said that nearer 60,000 were mobilised. AIFLD claimed the 
figure was closer to 12,000 and the Salvadoran government 
estimated that only 7,000 were involved. [24] Whatever the 
true figure the demonstration marked a new polarization of the 
Salvadoran trade unions. The formerly pro-Duarte UPD, CTS, 
and others, were now marching against the government they had
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earlier helped bring to power. These centre unions were now 
part of loose alliance with strong left unions like ANDES and 
FENASTRAS.
The AIFLD-supported unions, however, responded quickly 
to the situation. On February 24, a group calling itself the 
Christian Democratic Workers* Movement published paid 
advertisements in several newspapers which implied that the 
UNTS had taken its platform from a broadcast of the FMLN*s 
clandestine Radio Venceremos. In the ensuing days these 
unions renamed themselves the National Worker Peasant Union 
(Unidad Nacional Obreros y Campesinos -UNOC) and issued a 
declaration of principles on March 7. On paper the 
differences between the program of the UNOC and the UNTS were 
not immediately evident. The UNOC, too, called for genuine 
(rather than "tactical") dialogue to achieve peace. One 
source commented that members of the divided UPD unions were 
unsure as to which of the two federations they now belonged. 
[25]
Possible confusion notwithstanding, UNOC organised a 
huge March 15 demonstration in San Salvador which was widely 
reported to be 50% larger than the UNTS march. However, the 
Washington Post claimed that "The Government had to bus in 
large numbers of marchers, and the effort reflected the degree 
of its concern." [26] The New York Times declared that "most 
of the marchers, who were trucked in by government backers, 
seemed to be doing only what they were told." [27]
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In April the UNTS staged a joint forum with the small 
traders group FENAPES. Before the 600 participants the UNTS 
announced it would establish a commission to build 
international trade union solidarity and both the UNTS and 
FENAPES called for the expulsion of AIFLD from El Salvador. 
[28] Leading UNOC figures responded by pointing out that the 
UNTS was supported by the far-right ARENA party; ARENA'S 
leader, the notorious Roberto D'Aubuisson had congratulated 
the UNTS on Salvadoran television, apparently because ARENA 
opposed Duarte's proposed tax increases and therefore shared 
with the UNTS a desire to see the paauetazo defeated. [29] 
Two UNOC leaders wrote to the Washington Post:
North Americans may think it strange that the far right 
and the far left are allies against the Duarte government 
and the democratic unions of El Salvador. But to us, it 
is an old story. Both extremes know that if democracy wins 
in El Salvador, they lose. With enemies like that, we 
know we must be doing something right. [30].
The formation of the two new union coalitions, UNTS and 
UNOC, took place as strike action and repression reached new 
levels. In a partial general strike called by the UNTS on 
April 24, 70,000 workers stopped work demanding wage
increases; shortly afterwards the human rights office of the 
Archdiocese of San Salvador, Tutela Legal, reported that 376 
civilians were assassinated during the first three months of 
1986, not including victims of military operations and 
bombings. [31]
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U.S. Unionists and the UNTS.
Anti-intervention trade unionists in the U.S. greeted 
the formation of the UNTS with enthusiasm. The Labor Report 
described the activities of the UNTS as "a dramatic expression 
of the sharpening conflict between El Salvador*s workers and 
the Duarte government." [32] Michael Urquhart, co-chair of 
the Washington Area Labor Committee, challenged the Salvadoran 
government's view of the UNTS before the Congressional 
Sub-Committee on Western Hemisphere Affairs. "Any attempt," 
said Urquhart, "to dismiss this coalition as a shadow 
organization that is the creation of the guerillas is totally 
mistaken," although the AFGE member did refer to a number of 
UNTS unions who "have traditionally maintained positions close 
to the FDR." [33] David Dyson, the NLC coordinator, remarked 
that the UNTS opened new possibilities for U.S.-Salvadoran 
trade union relations, possibilities that could involve "a new 
model of initiative and independence within the progressive 
sectors of U.S. labor." [34]
For noninterventionists who felt uncomfortable 
supporting the openly Marxist-Leninist FMLN, the UNTS 
re-opened the space formerly occupied by the left Christian 
democratic and social democratic leaders of the FDR. It was 
widely asserted that FDR-FMLN political-military alliance, 
formed in a period of intense repression, disguised serious 
ideological and tactical differences between the two 
formations. The military containment of the FMLN and the
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re-emergence of the unions appeared to pull the gravitational 
centre of the struggle away from rural guerillaism towards the 
urban mass movement, a development which probably pleased most 
of the union leaders on the NLC.
AIFLD's opposition to the UNTS could be measured by the 
speed in which the Institute facilitated the formation and 
activation of UNOC. The Institute's role in the creation of 
UNOC was confirmed in a March 1986 U.S. Embassy memorandum 
which praised the tireless efforts of AIFLD. The memorandum 
disclosed that "AIFLD (had) held a meeting with Salvadoran 
democratic leaders in Miami several weeks ago to discuss ways 
of unifying democratic labor, and UNOC grew out of that 
meeting." [35] It is worth noting that the platform of the 
UNTS closely resembled the essentially economistic agenda of 
the AIFLD-sponsored UPD which, two years earlier, had been at 
the centre of the Social Pact upon which Duarte won the 
election. For AIFLD, however, the problem was not the 
platform of the UNTS, but the militant and confrontational 
methods that the new federation might employ in order that it 
might be advanced. However strident the UNOC platform might 
be on paper, its policy was to support Duarte. Militant 
action not only exposed the infirm nature of Salvadoran 
capitalism and its incapacity to raise real living standards 
according to workers' demands, it also stretched the patience 
of the right-wing. Both AIFLD and the Reagan Administration 
feared that, should the death squads be unleashed to deal with 
the "subversives", Duarte's democratic opening could be lost
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under a fresh avalanche of repression. Congressional liberals 
might then campaign to cut U.S. aid to El Salvador which, if 
successful, might greatly enhance the possibilities of an FMLN 
triumph. The programmatic similarities between the UNTS and 
the UNOC, therefore, did not reflect the differences in the 
conservative agenda of AIFLD and UNOC leaders and the more 
radical agenda of the UNTS.
The UNTS was formed by the flowing together of two 
distinct tributaries in the Salvadoran trade union movement. 
One was a contingent which once invested faith in Duarte and 
the other was a group which had already seen their reform 
agenda - and their cadre and organisations - brutalised by 
the 1980-83 repression. The social (and trade union) base of 
the Duarte regime had been squeezed by the war and economic 
crisis. AIFLD's financial and political weight continued to 
be an important factor in maintaining support for Duarte 
although charges of bribery and manipulation, accompanied by 
calls for the expulsion of AIFLD from El Salvador, had 
contributed to the growing delegitimization of AIFLD in the 
ranks of the U.S. trade unions.
AIFLD's War on the UNTS: The "Captured Documents."
AIFLD's opposition to the UNTS spread to the U.S. media. 
In March, the U.S.'s FENASTRAS representative, Francisco 
Acosta, criticised Duarte's trade union record in a letter to 
the New York Times. AIFLD's Chief of Information Services,
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John Heberle, responded by accusing Acosta of "not being 
candid about what his organization represents." FENASTRAS, 
he alleged in the Times. had met with the pro-Soviet WFTU and 
regarded the FMLN to be its vanguard. Furthermore the UNTS, 
in which FENASTRAS played an important role, was merely a 
hollow shell "run by a handful of self-appointed leaders." 
[36]
In May AIFLD resurrected the contents of the documents 
captured from the FMLN-PRTC leader Nadia Diaz by the 
Salvadoran army one year earlier. (See Chapter Five). Duarte 
had himself referred to the documents before he ordered the 
militarization of the Social Security hospitals in June 1985. 
Now AIFLD, in association with the NED-funded Freedom House, 
released translated excerpts of the documents, claiming that 
their contents exposed a three-level FMLN strategy pertaining 
to the trade unions. Firstly, the FMLN attempted to undermine 
the Social Pact during Duarte's first months as president; 
secondly, the FMLN would attempt to encourage strikes in order 
to destabilize the Salvadoran economy and, thirdly, the FMLN 
would work to create an anti-Duarte union coalition. [37]
Union anti-interventionists appeared unaware of the 
twelve-month time lag between the purported capture of the 
documents and their translation and release by AIFLD and 
Freedom House. Indeed, there was an obvious advantage in 
delaying the release of the documents. Recent events appeared 
to confirm that the FMLN's "strategy" had been successful: the 
Social Pact had disintegrated, a left union coalition had
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emerged, and strikes were on the increase. On the day of the 
AIFLD-Freedom House press release the UNTS had mobilized a 
major demonstration in San Salvador - if ever there was a time 
to implicate the Salvadoran trade unions with the armed left, 
it was now. Furthermore, anti-intervention unionists could 
not debate the contents of the documents because to do so 
would appear to acknowledge their authenticity.
Close inspection of the documents, however, reveals that 
the 'infiltration' of the unions by FMLN militants amounted 
to no more than hopeful overtures made in the direction of one 
or two leaders of the UPD. At that time the UPD was already 
beginning to show signs of disunity as a result of Duarte's 
failure to honour the Social Pact. Furthermore, the UPD 
dissidents who came into contact with the guerillas had, 
according to one of the documents, "not shown any commitment 
to the FMLN." [38] Elsewhere, a document containing the 
minutes of a PRTC (a faction of the FMLN -See Chapter Five) 
meeting on September 24, 1984, - sometime after the UPD
dissidents had had made their controversial television 
appearance - recorded:
It is questionable which side they (the UPD dissidents) 
would join if there was a split (in the UPD); with the 
CL*, or with the Latin American Institute For Free Labor 
Development (sic-AIFLD). The communique they issued 
proclaiming themselves in favor of a dialogue prompted 
the..Institute (AIFLD) to cut its aid from them.
(Note: *CL is an unknown entity.) [39]
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Another document exclaimed that "the terms of our relationship 
with the cocos (code name for UPD dissidents) is not very 
clear." [40]
The documents revealed FMLN-PRTC approval of the trade 
union situation but suggested at the same time that their 
influence over that situation was quite limited. The 
impending split in the UPD had indeed enhanced the prospects 
of a new federation coming into existence which, one document 
predicted, "would make it possible to mobilize the trade union 
bases and achieve one of the aspirations of the labor
movement: the creation of its own organization, an
organization of which it feels a part and for which it can 
heed its calls and mobilize itself." [41] Other passages 
further suggested labour movement independence from the 
guerillas. One read, "In the mass sector, there are constant 
strikes, mobilization causing fear in the streets, and 
propaganda. But all of this is scattered. Efforts and plans 
are not articulated which detracts from their force and
political impact." More explicitly, "It is urgent to
establish a minimum level of coordination in the worker
sector, since each organization maintains its own expectations 
of hegemony.(.)" Somewhat ironically, FENASTRAS, denounced 
repeatedly by AIFLD for following the dictates of the FMLN, 
was criticized for its desire to strengthen itself while 
paying only lip service to MUSYGES, the coalition of left 
unions which collapsed under the weight of the 1980-83 
repression. [42]
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Several apparent tactical and political differences 
within the component factions of the FMLN also raised 
questions as to the guerilla's ability to provide a consistent 
lead to its sympathisers in the unions. At one point in the 
documents, the PRTC criticised the Salvadoran Communist Party 
(PCES- an FMLN affiliate) for its "reformist, economist 
proposals." The PCES had not been consistent, said the PRTC, 
with "the plan of different organizations that make up the 
FMLN about the tasks of the working class." Indeed, PCES 
influence was described as the "basic problem." [43]
All told, the documents revealed that the FMLN's 
relationship to the trade unions was highly problematical and 
uneven. Nevertheless, AIFLD maintained that the documents 
provided evidence that "some of the individuals who profess 
to be authentic trade unionists are something else entirely," 
and that the UNTS was an FMLN front. [44]
AIFLD used several opportunities to attempt to discredit 
the UNTS. (For example, see AFL-CIO News. August 2, 1986).
The Salvadoran federation, it was claimed, was being directed 
by the Salvadoran Communist Party and that the left unions 
were attempting "to hide their most obvious connections with 
the Communist international trade union movement, and thus 
gain a degree of respectability in the U.S. and Europe." 
Faced with this challenge, noted AIFLD, democratic trade 
unionists needed a guiding principle to help them make the 
appropriate characterization of acts of repression. It was 
necessary to determine whether individuals were being
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targetted for their trade union activities or for their 
political or revolutionary activities. As John Heberle of 
AIFLD expressed it, "A violent Communist revolutionary should 
not claim that the attacks on his person or property are the 
result of his trade union activities.” Presumably using this 
criteria, Heberle concluded, "Practically all anti-union 
activities in El Salvador have ceased under... Duarte." [45]
Perhaps unexpectedly, the captured documents provided 
an insight into the FMLN's view of AIFLD. In these 
purportedly internal records of a revolutionary organisation, 
reference was made to AIFLD's manipulation and bribery and its 
adherence to the U.S. Government's "imperialist project." 
AIFLD was described as "carrying out conspiratorial work" in 
the unions. Certain unions were purportedly destined to act 
in a manner pre-arranged "by imperialism at the assigned 
moment." It was said of the AIFLD-supported construction 
workers' union, FESINCONSTRANS, that "They offer money. 
Behind all this is the American Institute for Free Labor 
Development." [46] Interestingly, throughout the documents 
AIFLD's alleged bribery and corruption is discussed not as 
propaganda to discredit the Institute, but as fact.
The contents of the captured documents (accepting for 
argument's sake their authenticity) suggested that AIFLD 
deliberately misinterpreted the evidence in order to 
characterize the UNTS as an FMLN front, when, if anything, 
the documents supported the view that the UNTS was a militant 
and autonomous federation pursuing its own objectives. As
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FENASTRAS representative Francisco Acosta expressed it in a 
letter to the AFL-CIO Executive Council, "The demands of the 
UNTS are not anti-democratic; they are a serious challenge to 
the President (Duarte) to live up to his word... Demands which 
have been endorsed by groups as diverse as labor unions, small 
businesses, and the churches, are not communist demands, but 
the result of the process of democracy at work." [47]
Dual Unions. Sister Unions and Union Rights.
While AIFLD continued to pursue its traditional methods 
in El Salvador, anti-intervention unionists continued to chart 
new territory. The primary emphasis of their work remained 
trade union rights. FENASTRAS in Washington continued to 
release urgent communiques to U.S. unions when Salvadorans 
were abducted. In early May AFSCME and SEIU officials in 
southern California protested the detention of several bus 
drivers by the armed forces. [48] Also in May the first 
newsletter under the heading "Labor in El Salvador" was 
released by the Information Center of the Salvadoran Trade 
Unionists in Exile (CISSE). CISSE, based in Chicago, stated 
that helping trade unionists who had been detained or tortured 
was central to its view of international solidarity. [49]
In mid-1986 the West Coast city committees founded the 
"Salvadoran Labor Defense Network" (SLDN). The SLDN's 
coordinators collected lists of trade unionists who agreed in 
advance to have telegrams bearing their names forwarded to
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Salvadoran and U.S. authorities when news of an abduction was 
verified. This ensured that immediate pressure was brought 
to bear on those who violated trade union rights. During its 
first five months of operation the SLDN was activated on five 
separate occasions. As the Portland (Oregon) Labor Committee 
recorded in its newsletter, "We have been successful, often 
in coordination with solidarity strikes and demonstrations in 
El Salvador, in gaining the prisoners' quick release in three 
of the cases." Those freed were the General Secretary of the 
water workers union SETA, a local leader of the Federation of 
Agricultural Cooperatives (FEDICPADES), and Febe Velasquez, 
a leading officer of FENASTRAS. [50]
The Velasquez case was the most dramatic and significant 
of the SLDN's early accomplishments. Since the FENASTRAS 
convention in late 1985, anti-intervention unionists were 
frequently on first-name terms with the 24-year old 
Salvadoran. Velasquez, General Secretary of a textile union 
at CIRCA, a factory which makes jeans for Levi Strauss and 
Calvin Klein, was also the FENASTRAS official responsible for 
international relations. On July 7 1986 Velasquez was
kidnapped by the Treasury Police. The abduction triggered an 
immediate strike and demonstration by her 3 00 workmates at the 
CIRCA factory which was quickly followed by stoppages 
involving seven other FENASTRAS unions.
The SLDN, in coordination with CISPES and the city 
committees, sent scores of telegrams to the Treasury Police, 
Duarte, and the U.S. Department of State. In addition, the
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Labor Network on Central America took out a paid advertisement 
bearing the names of a hundred U.S. trade unionists in the 
Salvadoran newspaper El Mundo which demanded Velasquez be 
released. Hours after the advertisement appeared on July 11 
President Duarte personally escorted Velasquez from the 
headquarters of the Treasury Police to the offices of 
FENASTRAS. [51]
In March 1986 a sizeable campaign was launched by the 
New York Labor Committee on behalf of the telecommunications 
union ASTTEL. The tvo sons of ASTTEL leader Humberto Centeno 
had been captured in late 1985 and remained in prison (see 
above -this chapter). The telecommunications agency ANTEL 
continued to be occupied by the military and key ASTTEL 
officers remained fired. A steady stream of letters and 
telegrams pressured Salvadoran and U.S. authorities to cease 
their obstruction of ASTTEL and to release those imprisoned. 
On May 20, Edward Cleary, President of New York State AFL-CIO, 
sent a letter to Duarte. Cleary's protest, however, reflected 
his lack of commitment to the ASTTEL campaign? the New York 
State AFL-CIO, he wrote, had heard reports of repression but 
"other reports indicate that strike actions are being fomented 
to serve the political purposes of the guerillas...However, 
we do firmly believe," said Cleary, "that persons accused of 
a crime are entitled to fair treatment." [52]
In mid-July the New York Labor Committee, in 
coordination with the NLC, hosted a "labor-congressional" 
breakfast to promote the ASTTEL campaign. Among the 100 guests
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were several union leaders, including Jan Pearce, national 
Vice President of the CWA and Amy Newell, Secretary Treasurer 
of UE. The principal Congressional figure was Ted Weiss from 
New York. Pearce drew the connection between repression in 
El Salvador and crisis facing U.S. labour:
The lives of Centeno and his sons are bound up with our 
lives in the American labor movement..That 
imprisonment and torture seem to be reserved for the 
third world nations today should not fool us. Corporate 
America and our government have used those weapons 
against the American labor movement at one time or 
another in our history. And I can assure you that 
they'll use them get away with it in..El Salvador. Their 
enemy is our enemy. [53]
The ASTTEL campaign spread to fifteen countries, 
including Britain. Despite all these efforts the ANTEL 
management refused even to acknowledge the existence of 
ASTTEL, although they did find time to comment that the "labor 
congressional breakfast" was nothing but a gathering of 
"international Marxists." [54]
The campaign also had opponents closer to home. In 
early October New York AFL-CIO President Cleary attacked 
Congressman Weiss for entering into the Congressional Record 
a resolution passed by the New York Labor Committee pertaining 
to ASTTEL. In a letter to Weiss, Cleary said, "I regret 
seeing your name associated with a disinformation campaign 
designed to undermine the democratic trade union movement in 
El Salvador." The obvious intent of the ASTTEL campaign, 
Cleary added, "is to convince Salvadorans that numerous New 
York trade unionists and political figures oppose U.S. aid to
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El Salvador and support the two guerilla-backed Salvadoran 
trade unions, UNTS and ASTTEL." [55]
Meanwhile in El Salvador the ASTTEL campaign was also 
being undermined by the activities of AIFLD. In March 1985 
AIFLD had reportedly colluded with ANTEL's management and the 
Salvadoran authorities to establish a rival union to ASTTEL 
known as ASTA. AIFLD reportedly ensured that the PTTI, an 
International Trade Secretariat (ITS) of ICFTU-affiliated 
telecommunications unions, recognised ASTA over ASTTEL, 
although not without opposition from several PTTI affiliates. 
[56] The Labor Report accused AIFLD of engineering the 
affiliation "to rob ASTTEL of desperately needed international 
support." [57]
The legitimacy of ASTTEL was unexpectedly enhanced, 
however, when in May 1987 two ASTA Executive Council members 
resigned and joined ASTTEL. In a press release and communique 
to the workers of ANTEL they accused other leaders of ASTA of 
"corrupt, accomodationist, and manipulative acts." Not only 
did ASTA have no legally affiliated members, they charged, but 
ASTA officials "take trips to Washington..to meet 
representatives of the AFL-CIO...The President (of ASTA) 
receives 1,000 colones (U.S. $200) a month from AIFLD." The 
communique declared that ASTA leaders had "deceived the U.S. 
Embassy, the AFL-CIO, and the international community...These 
pseudo leaders are working for personal profit...and pleasure 
trips abroad." [58]
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Embarrassing as this latest revelation regarding AIFLD*s 
methods may have been to the Institute and the DIA, it 
remained the case that the substantive demands of the ASTTEL 
campaign had not yet been achieved. The Centeno brothers were 
still incarcerated, the union's offices still occupied by the 
military, and ASTTEL1s leaders remained fired. Despite these 
realities the ASTTEL campaign had been successful in other 
less obvious respects. Firstly, it demonstrated how one or 
two serious activists (particularly Charles Kernaghan) with 
few resources could generate a sustained, visible, and 
multinational solidarity effort. Secondly, the campaign 
uncovered more information regarding the character of AIFLD*s 
dual unionism, that is, its conscious decision to establish 
unions such as ASTA for the purpose of delegitimizing and 
competing against the more militant left unions. Classified 
U.S. Government documents eventually provided insight into the 
full scope of AIFLD's dual unionism tactic to combat the 
influence of the UNTS (see below, this chapter) . Thirdly, the 
ASTTEL campaign exposed the complicity of international labour 
movement structures such as the PTTI in perpetuating the 
priorities of Cold War unionism. In April 1986, the General 
Secretary of the PTTI, Stefan Nedzynski, travelled to El 
Salvador and met only with the leaders of ASTA, ignoring 
ASTTEL completely. [59] Nedzynski also ignored the UNTS, even 
though two PTTI affiliates, the postal workers (SUCEPES) and 
the electricity workers (SIES) had joined the UNTS coalition. 
In May 1987 ASTTEL requested affiliation to the PTTI. They
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received no reply. In mid 1989 several ASTTEL activists were 
brutally assassinated - largely behind the backs of the 
international labour movement. (See Chapter 11) The ASTTEL 
case was distinct because it bore the character of an ongoing 
campaign on behalf of a 5,000-member union. The Velasquez 
case, in contrast, saw U.S. trade unionists intervene on 
behalf of one person. In four days the affair was over. In 
September 1986 the anti-interventionists charted new territory 
when FENASTRAS's U.S. representative Francisco Acosta 
addressed the California Joint Board of ACTWU in Los Angeles. 
Acosta presented the Board with details of a three week old 
strike of a FENASTRAS affiliate, the Industrial Textile and 
Cotton Workers Union (Sindicato de Trabajadores de la 
Industria Textil y Algodon Salvadorena -STITAS) in San 
Salvador. STITAS workers had occupied Velasquez's workplace, 
the CIRCA factory, which made jeans for Levi Strauss and 
Calvin Klein for the U.S. market, and demanded higher wages 
and the reinstatement of sacked workmates. At the meeting 
California ACTWU decided to establish a sister union 
relationship with STITAS. A videotape expressing solidarity 
was produced and sent to San Salvador. [60]
California ACTWU immediately began to exert pressure on 
the Levi Strauss company in the U.S. which claimed that it 
could not affect the strike negotiations because it did not 
own the factory - the owner was a Salvadoran businessman 
living in Miami. The company then complained that the action 
had impaired their relationship with ACTWU and threatened the
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future of its U.S. operations. Interestingly, in a letter to 
Jack Sheinkman, a company spokesperson saw fit to refer to 
AIFLD's characterization of FENASTRAS:
I am not going to get into the debate over whether or 
not FENASTRAS is, as the American Institute For Free 
Labor Development has apparently stated, dominated by 
certain factions of political life in El Salvador. In 
times when we are making significant efforts to avoid 
the further erosion of Levi Strauss and Co.'s domestic 
employment force, it seriously makes us wonder whether 
or not it is first, worth it, and second, whether or not 
ACTWU is seriously interested in maintaining and 
strengthening the kind of healthy working relationship 
we have both agreed we need to be successful in our 
highly competitive industry. [61]
Meanwhile in San Salvador Duarte declared the strike 
illegal and threatened to use troops to reclaim the 
factory. FENASTRAS in Washington then announced that six 
union leaders had commenced a hunger strike in San Salvador 
to call national and international attention to the strikers' 
demands. On October 2 California ACTWU, supported by CISPES 
and the Labor Network on Central America, mobilized a picket 
of the Levi Strauss headquarters in San Francisco. On the 
same day, CIRCA management agreed to talks. CIRCA succumbed 
to the workers' main demands and within days the strike was 
over. [62]
It is difficult, of course, to accurately evaluate the 
precise impact California ACTWU's actions may have had on the 
successful outcome of this dispute. More significant, 
perhaps, was the thinking which underscored the initiative. 
In recent years, Levi Strauss and Co. had closed several 
plants in the U.S. organised by ACTWU, preferring to
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sub-contract work to operations like CIRCA where wage rates, 
at $4.00 per day, were approximately one tenth of comparable 
union rates in the U.S. To counter such developments ACTWU 
like other U.S. unions had turned to Congress for assistance 
in the form of restrictions on textile imports. Congress had 
either repelled such moves, or, as in August 1986, proposed 
legislation which fell to a Presidential veto. California 
ACTWU confirmed that the decision to forge a sister union 
relationship with STITAS was motivated by concern for its own 
membership as much as it was for the strikers in San Salvador. 
As the San Francisco Chronicle expressed it: "American unions 
have long called for protectionist legislation to stop the 
flow of jobs offshore. The textile union (ACTWU) has taken 
a different tack, reasoning that direct intervention to 
improve the lot of Salvadoran laborers will make the remaining 
American textile workers more secure." [63]
The ACTWU-STITAS episode appeared to mark the point 
where anti-intervention sentiment overlapped with material 
trade union interests in the context of a specific struggle. 
To say that the incident constituted a "model" for a new 
internationalism was perhaps a serious overstatement. 
Nevertheless, the affair constituted an important milestone 
in the ongoing effort to develop an alternative to Cold War 
unionism and its support for U.S. multinationals.
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AIFLD Targets the UNTS.
The formation and consolidation of the UNTS provided an 
outlet for the internationalist impulse of anti-intervention 
unionists in the U.S., nourishing both in the process. The 
fortunes of the UNTS therefore constituted an important factor 
in the challenge to Cold War unionism and, perhaps, the 
development of a new internationalism for both the U.S. and 
Salvadoran trade union movements.
The UNTS had displayed a serious approach to 
international work from the moment of its formation. In 
November 1986 the UNTS, working with CISPES, organised a 
U.S.-El Salvador "In Search of Peace" conference in San 
Salvador. The success of the event hinged around the 
participation of U.S. trade unionists, although invitations 
were extended to others in the CA/AIM in the U.S. The 
delegation from the U.S. numbered 176, of which only 45 were 
trade unionists, a figure the city committees considered to 
be disappointing. At a December meeting of the East Coast 
committees in Boston it was generally agreed that the U.S. 
unionists had been "shamed by the organizational efficiency 
of the UNTS... in the (East Coast) region we did not build 
sufficiently. Nobody above the rank of local president 
attended." [64] This negative appraisal aside, the conference 
further strengthened the relationship between the UNTS and 
anti-intervention union activists.
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The UNTS also played a role in providing relief to the 
victims of a devastating earthquake which hit San Salvador on 
October 10, 1986. More than 1,500 Salvadorans died and an
estimated 200,000 were made homeless by the disaster. During 
the relief operation one UNTS activist was shot and killed by 
the security forces, allegedly for looting. FENASTRAS 
reagarded the killing as a political retribution which took 
advantage of the post-quake turmoil. The AIFLD-backed UNOC 
was apparently represented on the official relief committee 
established by the authorities. [65]
As these events were taking place the UNTS was being 
targeted by AIFLD and the U.S. Embassy. Just days before the 
"In Search of Peace" conference, Ramon Mendoza, General 
Secretary of the UPD, announced the UPD's withdrawal from the 
UNTS. Anti-intervention unionists had made much of Mendoza's 
attacks on AIFLD during the previous two years; Mendoza's 
action was, therefore, more than a minor embarrassment. At 
first the reason for the departure of Mendoza and the UPD was 
unclear. Then in March 1987 freelance journalist Frank Smyth 
revealed in The Nation the true character of the schism. U.S. 
Embassy memorandums sent to Secretary of State Shultz that had 
been leaked to the Washington-based anti-intervention 
organisation National Security Archive revealed that $3,000 
of AIFLD's money was used to lure Mendoza away from the UNTS. 
The UPD, because of its former partnership with Duarte, had, 
in the eyes of the Embassy, provided "the left with a 
democratic facade to manipulate international labor and
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opinion." It was hoped that the UPD's departure would help 
delegitimize the UNTS as a democratic union coalition. 
Furthermore, the UNTS had received "strong support" from the 
U.S. trade unions and thus constituted "a threat to democratic 
labor." [66]
That the U.S. Embassy worked with AIFLD to destroy the 
UNTS is beyond doubt. As the memorandum to Shultz stated:
UNTS unions have accused UPD Secretary General Ramon 
Mendoza of "selling out" and have charged AIFLD, the 
Embassy, and the PDC [Christian Democratic Party] with 
attempting to destroy the UNTS (a charge we accept).[67]
AIFLD, it was recommended, should now "direct its policy 
at holding our side together, while continuing to pick off 
UNTS members one by one." A May 9, 1986, memorandum disclosed 
that AIFLD and the Salvadoran government had collaborated to 
establish "democratic unions..either to take over leftist 
unions or to form rival democratic unions in leftist 
strongholds." [68] The industries listed were sewage and 
water, the agricultural ministry, telecommunications, the 
postal service, Housing Institute employees and high school 
teachers. [69] The Embassy then informed Shultz:
In the past twelve months, U.S. interests have been 
greatly served by the overall trends in Salvadoran labor. 
UNTS now stands demuded of its democratic facade and we 
have about as clean and neat a division between 
democratic and communist labor as we are ever likely to 
get in El Salvador. [70]
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Interestingly, months before the memorandums were 
published, AIFLD, commenting the UPD departure, used almost 
identical terminology. The UPD action, AIFLD stated, "strips 
the UNTS of practically all its democratic facade." [71] In 
April 1987 the UPD expelled Ramon Mendoza for corruption. A 
UPD spokesperson announced that Mendoza had embezzled more 
than $5,000 in UPD funds. [72]
Conclusion.
The developments in El Salvador during 1986 virtually 
closed the door on the arguably progressive features of 
AIFLD's intervention. The Reagan Administration had ignored 
AIFLD's CADO proposals; the Salvadoran oligarchy had 
obstructed the AIFLD-assisted land reform, and living 
standards for workers continued to fall. The Duarte 
presidency had been weakened by the war with the FMLN and its 
base of support, not least in the labour movement, had 
atrophied. AIFLD had lost the UPD, set up the CTD and then 
closed it down, and finally established the UNOC as a rival 
to the newly formed UNTS. It was difficult to determine which 
of the two major federations was at this time numerically the 
larger given the conflicting claims of the respective 
leaderships, the existence of dual or parallel unions, as well 
as other difficulties. Despite the U.S. Embassy and AIFLD1s 
apparent obsession with numbers, it remained clear that the 
UNTS was not only the more militant and vibrant of the two
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formations, but that this had resulted in concrete gains for 
workers. (See Chapter 11) In contrast, AIFLD and UNOC 
appeared more concerned with competing with UNTS unions than 
struggling to reverse the falling living standards of its own 
membership. The evidence suggested that AIFLD used dollar 
bills to greater effect than it did political argument in 
fighting its battles in El Salvador. Moreover AIFLD, anxious 
to perpetuate the view that El Salvador was well on the way 
to democracy, denied that serious abuses of trade union rights 
still occurred. The Institute had gone as far to suggest that 
in the event of torture or murder of an individual, U.S. trade 
unionists should first ask themselves if the victim had been 
so treated because of legitimate union activities or because 
of their support for the revolutionaries. [73]
The formation of the UNTS illuminated the connection 
between the internal and external challenges to Cold War 
unionism. A nascent and unofficial internationalism now 
existed between the left Salvadoran unions and the city based 
committees and a layer of union officials in the U.S. The 
U.S. labour movement, at least as far as Central America was 
concerned, now had two internationalisms: the State Department 
funded, quasi-corporatist, Cold War internationalism of AIFLD 
and the DIA, and the more anti-capital, anti-imperialist 
internationalism of the anti-intervention unionists.
Both "internationalisms" had, as yet, failed to activate 
a mass base. The anti-interventionists had reached thousands 
in educational activities, speaking tours and the like, but
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the pool of activists remained no more than a few hundred. 
AIFLD and the DIA had responded to the anti-interventionist 
challenge with their own smattering of one-day conferences and 
forums but these seldom, if ever, reached the rank and file. 
The AFL-CIO's international activities had historically been 
the domain of "experts11; there was no real evidence to suggest 
that the DIA might wish to take its arguments to the broader 
membership.
Chapter Ten returns to the situation in the U.S. trade 
unions following the Reagan Administration's successful bid 
to secure $100 million for the Nicaraguan contras. It 
describes how the internal challenge to Cold War unionism was 
qualitatively enhanced by the decision of the NLC and national 
religious leaders to call for a major demonstration against 
U.S. intervention in Central America and Southern Africa. It 
also documents the part played by certain labour movement 
figures in the Iran-contra affair which began in November 
1986.
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CHAPTER 10
THE APRIL 25th MOBILIZATION AND THE IRAN-CONTRA SCANDAL
Anti-intervention activity in U.S. trade unions had 
registered significant gains in the period 1980-1986. A 
network of city and state based union committees performing 
Central America work had been established? the NLC was now a 
stable entity (although hardly an irresistible force)? the 
international affairs establishment of the AFL-CIO - an 
edifice of Cold War unionism in the international labour 
movement - by this time had to contend with an unprecedented 
level of scrutiny from other sections of the U.S. labour 
movement. Moreover, both AFL-CIO and U.S. Government foreign 
policy had become not only subjects of open and heated debate, 
at certain levels in the movement they constituted the most 
contentious and time-consuming items. (See Chapter Seven).
Despite these achievements U.S. intervention in Central 
America continued to escalate and the DIA and AIFLD continued 
to spend millions of Department of State dollars pursuing 
objectives in Nicaragua and El Salvador which many believed 
responded more to the priorities of the Reagan Administration 
than the needs of the U.S. labour movement. For FY1986, 
AIFLD's total revenues were $16.9 million of which $12.4
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million came the Department of State, $4.2 million from the 
NED via the FTUI, and $314,408 - approximately 2% of the total 
- came from the AFL-CIO. [1]
This chapter focuses on developments in the U.S. labour 
movement following Congress's approval of the $100 million 
contra aid package in the Summer of 1986 until mid-1988. In 
particular, it focuses on the first major and nationally 
coordinated expression of anti-intervention sentiment from the 
trade union rank and file in April 1987. The April 25th 
Mobilization, as it became known, saw thousands answer the 
call of the NLC and 55 national religious figures to march in 
Washington against U.S. intervention in Central America and 
Southern Africa. Because of the prominent role of religious 
leaders in the Mobilization, a brief comparison is made 
between the growth of anti-intervention sentiment in the 
churches and the trade unions. Another major area of concern 
of this chapter is the trade union connection to the 
Iran-contra scandal and the developments which occurred in its 
wake.
CA/AIM At the Crossroads.
Congress's decision on June 26, 1986, to approve $100 
million in aid to the Nicaraguan contras was a major setback 
for the entire Central America/Anti-Intervention Movement 
(CA/AIM). The CA/AIM now stood at an uncertain crossroads. 
As one source expressed it, "Over the last seven years we have
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accomplished much: we have created a major political
movement, educated hundreds of thousands, if not millions of 
Americans, and as a result we have been a factor restraining 
the Reagan Administration from carrying out a full-scale 
intervention in Central America... (However) for the solidarity 
movement as a whole, the heady days of growth in the early 
eighties have certainly slowed.” [2] Commenting on the 
increasingly intense and hemispheric nature of the crisis, 
another writer urged, "We must broaden our conception of 
'anti-intervention' and rethink our very definition of 
'solidarity'. To do so our vision must see more than Central 
America." [3] Another commentator criticised the CA/AIM 
activist milieu for viewing themselves as "adjuncts to the 
struggles of other peoples. For them, revolutionary struggles 
are elsewhere, a reflection of their deep pessimism about 
building a movement for social change in the U.S." [4]
The disappointment regarding the $100 million contra aid 
decision was compounded by the fact that attempts in the 
Spring of 1986 to pressure Congress to reconsider U.S. 
Government aid to El Salvador also came to nought. CISPES 
launched a major campaign of street activities and lobbying 
which generated some concern on Capitol Hill regarding human 
rights and the Salvadoran airforce's bombing of civilians. 
The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs heard 
first-hand accounts of the air-war being waged against the 
FMLN-occupied territories. Assistant Secretary of State 
Elliot Abrams maintained that independent human rights
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organisations in El Salvador had reported "imaginary 
violations" in order to serve the propaganda objectives of the 
FMLN. AIFLD's Executive Director, William Doherty, assured 
the hearings that major steps forward had been made in the 
trade union field; unions could strike, organise, and protest 
government policy. Doherty agreed that air attacks had 
resulted in the "occasional killing of civilians" but it was 
the FMLN's human rights abuses that were responsible for the 
increase in the number of deaths. [5]
Sections of the CA/AIM began to argue that the contra 
aid vote and the CISPES campaign demonstrated the limited 
value of Congressional hearings and conventional lobbying. 
Furthermore, the CA/AIM was, some suggested, too scattered and 
diverse. One group asked, "Shall we continue as a fragmented 
movement with the major sectors - labor, solidarity, and 
religious - going their separate ways? Or shall we unite and 
create a broad...national coalition that can bring these 
sectors together?" [6]
By mid-1986 concern over Central America was now 
accompanied by growing attention to the convulsive 
developments in South Africa. On June 14 approximately 
100,000 attended an anti-Apartheid demonstration in New York 
City. The success of the demonstration was partially 
attributed to the existence of a single national organisation 
to coordinate the protest. In September representatives from 
a number of anti-intervention groups met at the IAM's retreat 
at Placid Harbour, Maryland, to discuss ways of building more
550
effective opposition to U.S. policy in Central America. 
Following the event the NLC's coordinator, David Dyson, 
informed Sheinkman (now President of ACTWU following the 
retirement of Murray Finlay) of the thrust of the discussions: 
information leaked from the White House indicated that the 
Reagan Administration was deeply divided regarding Nicaragua 
and how best to deal with the Sandinistas. Elliot Abrams and 
the State Department purportedly favoured a massive increase 
in contra aid and CIA support to help the insurgents win a 
piece of Nicaraguan territory and to then pronounce the 
formation of a provisional government. Admiral John 
Poindexter and the National Security Council, on the other 
hand, considered the contras to be militarily incapable of 
securing the needed territory and favoured staging a 
"terrorist" incident followed by direct U.S. intervention. [7] 
This situation, urged Dyson, required immediate action. 
National union and religious leaders should call a major 
demonstration. CISPES and the solidarity groups had conducted 
three national demonstrations in five years, events which 
attracted between 3 0,000 and 75,000 participants. Larger 
displays of public opposition to U.S. intervention were needed 
with the trade union movement leading from the front. Dyson 
wrote, "I do not need to tell you how historic an event like 
this would be. The proposed action would represent the 
broadest opposition to U.S. intervention since Vietnam." The 
scheduled date for the demonstration was April 25, 1987. [8]
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Dyson's proposal came at a time when the NLC appeared 
particularly inert. Plans to bring representatives of the 
UNTS to the U.S. were shelved because the NLC, who had applied 
for the required entry visas, was unprepared to wage a 
campaign to ensure that the applications were not rejected by 
the Department of State on grounds that the UNTS was a 
subversive organisation. At a September regional meeting of 
representatives of the East Coast city committees in 
Washington one unionist commented, "The NLC is frightened of 
a red-baiting campaign; the leadership seems held hostage." 
[9]
As talk of plans for a major anti-intervention 
demonstration spread, individual NLC members began to 
vacillate. This was confirmed in several instances. For 
example, plans for a third NLC tour of Central America were 
jettisoned because NLC members responded negatively to the 
idea. AFSCME's President, Gerald McEntree, informed
Sheinkman: "To begin with, the climate in Nicaragua is rotten, 
and I don't mean the weather." On October 5, unemployed 
steelworker Eugene Hasenfus was captured from a contra supply 
plane shot down by the Sandinistas. Hasenfus was due to face 
a Nicaraguan court when McEntree wrote, "the show trial may 
still be going on, or recently concluded. The predictable 
support for a captured American," claimed the AFSCME leader, 
"will outweigh the realities of Reagan's interventionist 
moves." These moves had prompted "a predictably undemocratic 
reaction" on the part of the Sandinistas who, said McEntree,
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continued to harass the CUS. [10]
In another instance the President of the Newspaper 
Guild, NLC-member Charles Perlik, agreed to act as coordinator 
of an AIFLD-instigated campaign to assist the 235 workers of 
La Prensa. the Managua-based newspaper closed by the 
Sandinistas in late June for its support for the counter­
revolution. Perlik approached unions for cash contributions 
for the "La Prensa Workers' Aid Fund"? the AFL-CIO Executive 
Council, with no registered objections, launched the campaign 
with a $10,000 donation. [11] The pro-contra newspaper had 
already received generous financial assistance from the U.S. 
Government, via NED and PRODEMCA. Finally, efforts to 
persuade Richard Trumka, President of the United Mine Workes 
(UMW), to join the NLC failed. Douglas Fraser, then leader 
of the UAW, reassured Trumka that many NLC activities "don't 
require a great deal of time." Trumka, known as a new 
generation left-winger, ignored the invitation. Trumka's 
decision, however, probably reflected concern regarding the 
UMW's possible return to the AFL-CIO. To join the NLC at this 
time would have risked losing the support of Lane Kirkland and 
other leading Federation officials for the UMW's affiliation. 
However, Trumka had in the past been openly critical of the 
multinationals and expressed the need for more international 
solidarity between workers. [12]
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The Churches and Anti-Intervention.
The decision made in September 1986 to promote a major 
mobilization against intervention in Central America and 
Southern Africa called by union and religious leaders provided 
a focus for anti-intervention work for several months leading 
to April 1987. Significantly, it was the religious leaders, 
eight in all, who became signatories to the "Call to Action” 
before the first union leaders put their names forward. 
Clearly, a full account of the development of 
anti-intervention sentiment in the religious community can not 
be presented here. However, it is necessary to point out that 
the political and theological shifts in the major 
denominations have traditionally impacted upon the U.S. labour 
movement in one way or another. Indeed, the links between the 
labour movement and the churches which spring from a vast 
shared constituency of worker-churchgoers makes the 
distinction between the two communities somewhat artificial.
Among the major denominations the Roman Catholic Church 
(RCC), because of its huge working class base, is widely 
perceived to have exerted most influence on the labour 
movement. For instance the anti-Communist and Cold War 
sentiment of prominent R.C. leaders was institutionally 
expressed earlier this century in the formation of the 
Association of Catholic Trade Unionists (ACTU). By the time 
of the outbreak of World War Two, says Cochran, "The Catholic 
Church was... accepted in official society...as a leading
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participant in the anti-Communist cause." [13] Another 
source noted how this impacted on the CIO? during the same 
period there existed "two extreme poles of power..the 
Communist pole and the ACTU pole." [14]
During the Vietnam War period leading Catholics such as 
Cardinal Spellman prevailed upon the Catholic President 
Kennedy to, as Belden Fields observed, "intercede in defense 
of the Catholic President Diem and the Catholics of South 
Vietnam." [15] It was surely no coincidence that prominent 
Catholic AFL-CIO officials, such as Federation President 
George Meany, prevailed upon Kennedy to do the same. [16]
The response of certain layers - particularly the active 
laity - of the RCC and other denominations to the events in 
El Salvador and Nicaragua during 1979-81 indicated important 
political and theological changes had taken place in the 
religious community since the Vietnam period. In particular, 
the murder of Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero and four 
North American nuns in 1980 (see Chapter Two) resulted in a 
marked acceleration of anti-intervention activity in many 
denominations, orders and dioceses, aimed initially against 
the atrocities of the Salvadoran security forces. [17] In 
March 1982 - just days after the U.S.-supported elections in 
El Salvador - five churches in Tuscon, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, Washington, and Long Island declared themselves 
sanctuaries for Salvadoran refugees fleeing the repression
[18] Political refugees in the eyes of the Sanctuary Movement 
were "economic migrants" in the view of the Reagan
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Administration, which publicly rejected any notion that 
Salvadorans might wish to flee a country which had just become 
a democracy - unless it was to seek fame and fortune in the 
U.S. By 1985 key Sanctuary Movement activists had been 
prosecuted and convicted for sheltering "illegal immigrants"
[19] and by 1987 considerable evidence had come to light which 
indicated that the FBI had authorized and conducted break-ins, 
burglary, and vandalism against sanctuary churches and other 
faith-based anti-intervention groups concerned with Central 
America, such as Pledge of Resistance and Veterans Fast For 
Life. [20] Church or faith-based groups were not the only 
components of the CA/AIM investigated by the FBI or targeted 
for official harassment. (See Chapter Eleven for the FBI's 
probe of CISPES). [21] Nevertheless, such actions testified
to the significance of anti-intervention activities generated 
by the religious community.
While it is not possible to discuss the religious 
dimension of the CA/AIM in any detail, it is worth noting that 
the basic trajectory of its historical development to some 
extent parallels the pattern of anti-intervention activity in 
the trade unions. Trade unionists and religious activists 
played a certain role in the movement against the war in 
Vietnam, but major denominations as well as the bulk of major 
unions supported the actions of the U.S. in Indochina. (See 
Chapter Four) Moreover, both the religious community and the 
labour movement responded to the events in Central America by 
producing within themselves organised opposition to U.S.
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intervention in the region, and a section of church and trade 
union leaders to greater or lesser degrees supported (and in 
some cases pioneered) this movement. By late 1986 the broader 
CA/AIM regarded greater involvement of trade union and 
religious leaders to be essential in order to qualitatively 
expand visible public opposition to U.S. intervention in 
Central America and elsewhere.
It is necessary to add, however, that faith-based 
activists were more prominent in the early period of the 
CA/AIM than their trade union opposites. As Van Gosse 
explains, the former were directly involved in the formation 
of the principal solidarity groups concerned with Nicaragua 
and El Salvador, namely Nicaragua Network and CISPES. [22] 
Moreover, it was activists from these groups that played a 
major role in developing anti-intervention activity in the 
unions. (See Chapter Four) [23]
In general, anti-interventionism in the churches was 
more deeply rooted and perhaps more seriously pursued than was 
the case in the trade unions. Several factors can be 
identified which help to explain this. Firstly, the issues 
of human rights and war, especially following the 
assassination of Romero and the nuns, were quickly identified 
as church issues. [24] In contrast, while such matters 
clearly concerned trade unionists, they were not per se trade 
union issues as traditionally defined. [25] Secondly, 
Salvadoran and Central American refugees quickly made an 
impact on the composition of many U.S. church congregations
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and pioneered anti-intervention work in, for example, 
Salvadoran communities in the Bay Area. [26] Indeed, the 
Sanctuary Movement was in part modelled on the experience of 
the border ministry of Southside Presbyterian Church in Tuscon 
which was forced to deal directly with the needs of homeless 
and persecuted Salvadorans who had escaped to the U.S. The 
urgent needs of the refugees therefore propelled certain 
churches in a clear and frequently militant anti-intervention 
direction. [27]
In contrast, refugee or emigree Salvadorans were almost 
completely shut out of the trade unions. In cities like 
Washington D.C., Los Angeles, and San Francisco where large 
Salvadoran communities had mushroomed, working Salvadorans had 
gravitated towards largely non-unionized service sector and 
low-wage manufacturing occupations. [28] Consequently 
Salvadoran refugees were for the most part excluded from the 
city-based union committees on the West Coast; on the East 
Coast they played no direct role whatsoever. Perhaps the only 
clear exception to this general pattern was the United 
Farmworkers Union of America (UFWA) led by NLC-member Cesar 
Chavez. The UFWA's efforts to organise California
agribusiness brought thousands of Central and South American 
immigrants into the labour movement, and many UFWA campaigns 
- including the national "poison grapes" boycott - have been 
supported by the religious community. [29]
Thirdly, the religious component of the revolutions in 
Central America, particularly the Theology of Liberation,
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immensely strengthened the appeal of anti-intervention 
activity in the churches. In Nicaragua, the presence of 
Theology of Liberation priests at all levels of the 
revolutionary process, including the government itself, helped 
dispel actual or potential fears that the Sandinistas were 
building a gulag in Central America. As the Jesuit-run 
Central America Historical Institute expressed it in 1986, 
Theology of Liberation Christianity "has served as ferment for 
the new humanity, a heart within the heart of the 
revolutionary world" which obliged Christians "not to be 
Marxists, but to be more Christian." [30]
The class-based trade unionism of the Sandinista 
revolution resembled Theology of Liberation only in the sense 
that both constituted radical challenges to an existing 
orthodoxy (respectively, class-collaborationist unionism as 
encouraged by AIFLD and its supporters in Nicaragua during the 
Somoza period, and the RCC's leading clergy who shared the 
Vatican's disapproval of Theology of Liberation). However, the 
appeal of such unionism had over an entire period been 
discredited by its association, formal or otherwise, with the 
bureaucratic Stalinist model of workers' organisations, i.e. 
party-controlled unions with no genuine independence. Indeed, 
the religious thrust of the Nicaraguan revolution was not only 
largely free of such historical baggage, it was widely 
considered to be a counterweight to the secular 
"Marxist-Leninist" perspective of certain Sandinista leaders. 
[31] Other Christians began to openly consider the
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development of an authentic Christian-Marxist hybrid. As one 
U.S. Christian publication observed, "The Nicaraguan 
revolution has demonstrated that a new social order in Central 
America, though strongly influenced by Marxism, will not be 
a reproduction of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe or Cuba. 
The possibility exists of creating something quite new." [32] 
Whatever the interpretation, the Christian component of the 
Nicaraguan revolution was probably a greater inspiration to 
a section of liberal-left U.S. Christians than the 
revolution's trade union situation was to a wide segment of 
anti-intervention trade unionists. Sandinista harassment of 
trade unionists both to the left and right of the pro-FSLN 
unions and the CST's controversial affiliation to the WFTU, 
whose affiliates included the non-Solidarity unions in Poland 
and the official unions of other Eastern bloc countries, had 
not generated much enthusiasm even among U.S. trade unionists 
who felt otherwise generally sympathetic to the Sandinistas.
A final factor which partly explains why 
anti-interventionism in the religious community sank deeper 
roots than in the trade unions is the religious dimension of 
the New Right. The emergence of the New Right in the late 
1970s resulted in a sharp polarisation of the Protestant 
denominations in particular; the movement tapped into public 
demoralisation and insecurity following the fall of Saigon and 
Watergate and advocated an aggressive anti-communist foreign 
policy. [33] Because of their heterogeneous social base the 
churches became scenes of sharp confrontation between the
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widely divergent contending forces in U.S. politics, such as 
Jesse Jackson's Rainbow Coalition and Jerry Falwell's Moral 
Majority. Again in contrast, the greater class homogeneity 
(important intra-class gradations notwithstanding) of the 
labour movement precluded any similar polarisation. New Right 
sympathisers in the trade unions, where they existed, did not 
make themselves heard in a sustained and organised way despite 
the perhaps fairly high proportion of union members who voted 
for New Right Republican Ronald Reagan in both the 1980 and 
1984 Presidential elections. [34] Moreover, the conflict in 
the churches revolved around a vast array of contentious 
issues, such as reproductive rights, prayer in schools and 
homosexuality. In the labour movement, at least at the 
leadership level, foreign policy, and particularly Central 
America, was the only real source of conflict.
When viewed in context of the broader political spectrum 
in the U.S., the differences between the right wing social 
democracy of the AFL-CIO Cold Warriors and the more left-wing 
social democracy of Sheinkman, Winpisinger, and the NLC were, 
at this juncture at least, relatively minor. Moreover, one 
side had not declared open and unrestrained war on the other. 
In contrast, the struggle against an interventionist U.S. 
foreign policy in the churches, however, was connected to a 
do-or-die battle with the U.S. right wing and was generally 
more urgently pursued than in the trade unions. Even the 
deeper (i.e. "domestic") programmatic differences between 
solidarity activists (who openly identified with the
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objectives of the Nicaraguan and Salvadoran revolutionaries) 
and the AFL-CIO leaders were minimalised by the decision of 
the solidarity activists to prioritise Central America work 
above all other union concerns and their decision to support 
the NLC as the "progressive" wing of the trade union 
leadership, and, finally, because the general malaise of the 
labour movement had not yet given rise to major programmatic 
revisions where more fundamental ideological differences might 
become apparent.
It is necessary to add that certain elements of the 
AFL-CIO's Cold War establishment appeared cognizant of the 
anti-interventionist potential of a political alliance between 
the left-liberal sections of the religious and labour 
communities and took measures to obstruct the development of 
such an alliance. In 1980, leading SDUSA members Penn Kemble 
and David Jessup, also a prominent AIFLD official, launched 
the neo-conservative Institute For Religion and Democracy 
(IRD) which, in 1983, began to publicly attack the National 
Council of Churches (NCC) in right-wing publications such as 
Readers1 Digest for its purported "pro-communist" bias. Some 
of the NCC's third world assistance had been directed towards 
the Sandinista's literacy project; similar projects in 
Mozambique and Cuba had also been supported by the NCC. [35] 
Later the IRD was accused of having used Jessup's 
senior position in the AFL-CIO in order to appear politically 
moderate and representative of mainstream labour movement 
opinion. The NCC called upon the AFL-CIO to disassociate
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itself from the IRD. Kirkland refused. The NCC then threatened 
to not cooperate with AFL-CIO affiliates in their various 
campaigns. Sheinkman, Winpisinger and other union leaders 
informed Kirkland that they supported the NCC and several 
unions issued statements disassociating themselves from the 
IRD. [36] The NCC’s relationship to the NLC union leaders 
was in evidence when union and religious leaders jointly 
called for a major demonstration against the U.S. Governments 
interventionist foreign policy. The period prior to the 
demonstration (discussed below) also indicated that the NCC 
still had its enemies in the U.S. trade unions.
The National Mobilization for Justice and Peace in Central 
America and Southern Africa.
On January 22, 1987, Kenneth Blaylock and William
Winpisinger were the first union leaders to follow their 
religious counterparts and endorse the "Mobilization For 
Justice and Peace in Central America and Southern Africa." 
The "Call" was made official in advance of other union leaders 
confirming their support for the initiative. [37]
The steering committee that was constructed to 
coordinate preparations for the Mobilization was drawn from 
five sectors of the CA/AIM: the labour movement, the churches, 
the so-called "faith-based groups", Central America solidarity 
and aati-Apartheid, and the anti-war movement. Not
surprisingly the committee became a cockpit for advocates of
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different political strategies and agendas to argue their 
respective positions pertaining to a host of issues and 
considerations. Some argued that not enough blacks, 
hispanics, or women were being involved in the organisation 
of the Mobilization. Others lamented the lack of coordinated 
action and political discipline flowing from the national 
steering committee to the local coalitions which began to 
mushroom as soon as plans for the demonstration had started 
to circulate the anti-intervention and anti-Apartheid 
communities. [38]
It became quickly apparent, however, that the NLC 
exercised a virtual power of veto over all the major decisions 
pertaining to the Mobilization. The NLC opposed a 
majority-supported proposal to invite representatives of the 
Salvadoran UNTS and a pro-Sandinista representative of the 
Miskito indians. Speakers from the ANC and SWAPO, however, 
were invited. In September 1986 the NLC coordinators, Dyson 
and Cantor, suggested that the NLC embrace the UNTS as its 
political ally. The meetings of the steering committee 
unequivocally demonstrated that the NLC majority was prepared 
to speak out against intervention, but was not prepared to 
speak on the same platform as the UNTS let alone enter into 
a political partnership with the Salvadorans. [39]
The NLC also wanted no association with the organised 
left and therefore opposed the participation of the various 
socialist groups such as the Socialist Workers Party and the 
Communist Party in the preparations for the Mobilization. It
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was somewhat ironic given the degree of NLC influence over the 
political nature of the Mobilization that the NLC as a 
committee did not actually endorse the initiative, although 
almost all the NLC became signatories to the Call, The fact 
that the NLC members each endorsed the Call helped allay fears 
that individual union presidents were being pulled towards the 
position of AIFLD and the DIA. Charles Perlik of the 
Newspaper Guild, Gerald McEntree of AFSCME, and John Sweeney 
of the SEIU had each shown signs of drifting in this 
direction, but all endorsed the Call. So too did William 
Wynn, the non-NLC President of the UFCW and a likely successor 
to Lane Kirkland as President of the AFL-CIO.
The NLC's insistence on non-association with the various 
left groups in the U.S. and the UNTS testified to the degree 
of trepidation regarding possible "red-baiting" from inside 
and outside the labour movement. The steering committee, 
anxious not to jeopardise the participation of the union 
leaders, acquiesced to the NLC's conditions. However, despite 
successful NLC efforts to sterilise the project of left-wing 
and other perceived contaminants, the Kirkland forces spoke 
out forcefully against the planned Mobilization, which, they 
declared, was being organised by supporters of the Sandinistas 
and the FMLN. The NLC also compromised the steering committee 
by insisting that the committee not publicly challenge the 
Kirkland-led accusations. The religious leaders, who had 
suffered similar attacks from the organised right-wing within 
their denominations, urged the steering committee to register
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a collective response. The NLC's wishes again prevailed. [40] 
Kirkland's condemnation of the initiative came on March 
23, 1987. He attacked "groups seeking to shape AFL-CIO
policies from the outside in accordance with their own 
agendas." [41] Kirkland said it was the duty of the local and 
regional bodies of the AFL-CIO to respect the Federation's 
Constitution and conform to the policies decided by the 
Convention, thereby implying that the resolution passed by the 
AFL-CIO at Anaheim did not authorise anti-intervention 
activities which attempted to mobilize the broader union 
membership. [42]
John Joyce, President of the Bricklayers' union and 
supporter of PRODEMCA and the contras, circulated a more 
condemnatory statement to 500 Bricklayers' locals in the U.S. 
and Canada. The statement advised: "Anyone who knows or
remembers the popular fronts put together by the communists 
in the 1930's will know precisely how the April Mobilization 
works and what it is all about." [43] Joyce's assistant, Joel 
Friedman, compiled a 14-page "Analysis of the April 25th 
Mobilization" which attacked CISPES and the Nicaragua 
solidarity groups for their FMLN and FSLN sympathies as well 
as religious or quasi-religious organisations such as the NCC, 
Witness for Peace, the Inter-Religious Task Force on Central 
America and the Catholic Quixotic Center. Friedman justified 
the attacks by indicating that all the organisations had in 
some way identified with the Sandinista Front or spoke 
favourably of the Nicaraguan revolution. [44] The
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Bricklayers’ official also claimed that the NLC members had 
been duped into endorsing the Mobilization by middle-layer 
leftists in the union bureaucracy and that full disclosure of 
the nature of the forces behind the initiative made possible 
a rank and file revolt in certain unions, such as the CWA, 
SEIU, and the UFCW. [45] Albert Shanker also condemned the 
Mobilization in a paid advertisement in the New York Times in 
April, where he, too, warned of Communist Popular Front 
tactics. [46]
Right-wing commentators outside the labour movement made 
full use of the statements of Shanker, Joyce and Kirkland. 
Jeanne Kirkpatrick, writing in the Washington Post, alluded 
to the political seriousness of the allegations. She 
remarked, "No group has more experience with the 
organizational tactics of the hard left than the U.S. labor 
movement, and no group has been more deeply involved in the 
struggle to promote reform and build democracy in Central 
America." [47] Prominent political commentator Morton 
Krondrake, writing in the New Republic, disagreed with the 
popular front comparison made by Kirkpatrick, Joyce, and 
others. "The reality," wrote Krondrake, "is much more 
ominous than the (AFL-CIO) perceives. It is not that many 
well-meaning liberals are being duped by a few leftists, but 
rather that a vast, committed network of church, labor, peace 
and justice, student, and women's groups has grown up that 
opposes U.S. policy in Central America...The movement ends up 
rooting for the success of the Sandinistas and other Marxist
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liberation groups around the world." [48] Perhaps the most 
extreme attack on the Mobilization came from the Washington 
Times. On the eve of the march the Times made an undocumented 
claim that the Mobilization*s organizers received $3 million 
dollars from Libya's President Gadhafi via Nicaragua's 
President Daniel Ortega. [49]
Kirkland's official condemnation of the Mobilization did 
not result in any of the 24 union leaders, 18 representing 
AFL-CIO affiliates, withdrawing their endorsements. However, 
CWA President Morton Bahr reportedly chastised his executive 
board with the words, "When we are asked to endorse these 
things let's take the time to check with the AFL-CIO (.)" [50] 
Stanley Hill, the black Executive Director of the New York 
based District Council 37, AFSCME, responded differently. On 
the eve of the rally, Hill took out a large advertisement in 
the New York Times that urged union members to attend the 
Mobilization in Washington. Hill explicitly attacked 
"Red-baiting, Shanker-style!" pointing out that the AFT leader 
had used "the same infuriating cliches and innuendo we heard 
in the days before Dr. Martin Luther King's legendary March 
on Washington in 1963." The union leaders who had endorsed 
the April 2 5th Mobilization were, said Hill, "walking away 
from the old ideas and feeble rhetoric that have served labor 
so poorly recently." [51]
The individual endorsements made by union leaders proved 
to be critical in building support within the unions for the 
Mobilization, and for directing considerable union funding and
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resources behind the initiative. By early February 52 cities 
had formed local coalitions to build for the Mobilization, 
many with strong union participation. By early April this 
figure grew to 170. By the time the steering committee staged 
its final meeting on April 15, 1054 buses and 18 car trains 
were ready to go to Washington. Significantly, even before 
Hill made his announcement in the Times. AFSCME D.C. 37 in New 
York were forced to turn away union members because its 50 
hired buses were filled. [52]
The April 25th Mobilization brought between 75,000 and 
150,000 to Washington, according to several estimates. (The 
U.S. Capitol Police estimated 75,000 attended the event) [53] 
Trade union participation in the event was a reported 
30,000-45,000. Unions with the largest contingents appeared 
to be the health workers NUHHCE (4-5,000), AFSCME (4,000), and 
ACTWU (1,000). The NEA and the UAW were also well 
represented. [54] Smaller contingents of workers from unions 
who did not endorse the Mobilization, such as the AFT, the 
ILGWU, and the Teamsters were also visible. Leading the march 
were four national union leaders, Gerald McEntree of AFSCME, 
Henry Nicholas of NUHHCE, Frank Martino of the ICWU and 
Kenneth Blaylock of AFGE. [55]
A sister march in San Francisco, also on April 25, 
attracted between 35-75,000 participants. While union 
contingents were in evidence - such as several hundred 
hospital workers from SEIU Local 250 - the bulk of the crowd 
were activists from the wide array of groups directly
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concerned with Central America and South Africa. [57]
The Significance of the Mobilization.
The Mobilization was significant in several respects. 
Firstly, due to the degree of union participation the 
character of the march was unique in recent U.S. political 
history. This visible challenge to U.S. foreign policy came 
in large part from the broader union membership and not just 
from the activist strata.
Secondly, the demonstrations participants reflected 
changes in the organised workforce in the United States, and 
particularly the nascent challenge for political influence 
within the trade unions of service and public sector workers. 
Unions such as the health workers of NUHHCE (National 1199 as 
well as the 70,000 strong autonomous Local 1199 in New York), 
AFSCME, ACTWU, NEA, etc, had consistently been more receptive 
to questions and issues generally neglected by the older 
craft-based and industrial unions, such as child care, sexual 
harassment, and affirmative action. Their ascendent position 
inside the labour movement (due mainly to the decline of the 
old craft and industrial unions than any major growth in their 
own size) provided a more suitable political climate for 
anti-interventionist efforts that focused on public spending 
priorities, the racist character of U.S. foreign policy and 
other issues.
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Thirdly, the anti-interventionists demonstrated that, 
far from being simply a cohort of activists "boring from 
within" the trade union movement in pursuit of a generally 
unpopular agenda, anti-interventionism had a substantial base 
of support among the broader union membership. Of course, it 
was uncertain how many union members travelled to Washington 
primarily to protest U.S. intervention in Southern Africa, 
Central America, or precisely what proportion of the union 
participants considered them equally worthy of support 
(although one observer noted that "South Africa was not 
ignored, but Central America was the dominant concern.") [57] 
Nevertheless, the demonstration was a success despite the 
condemnatory statements of Kirkland and other union leaders 
who for the most part targeted the Central America issue 
(particularly the "communism" of the Sandinistas and the FMLN) 
as a means of dissuading unionists from attending the event.
Fourthly, although the demonstration was officially 
organised to protest U.S. Government foreign policy, the 
statements of Shanker, Kirkland, and Joyce effectively made 
the Mobilization a trial of strength between the Cold War and 
anti-intervention wings of the labour leadership over who 
could reach and activate the rank and file. Had the union 
contingent attending the march been confined to the 
anti-intervention activists, then the Kirkland forces would 
have claimed a victory. The extent of rank and file 
participation, however, delivered the victory to the 
anti-interventionists. Furthermore, the statements of
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Kirkland, et. al., brought the issue of official AFL-CIO 
activities in Central America and Southern Africa to the 
forefront. Ed Asner, former SAG President, in his address to 
the Washington crowd, attacked AIFLD: "It is painfully hard
to swallow the AFL-CIO's rhetoric on democratic trade 
unionism," said Asner, "when faced with the shady, truly 
subversive activities of their American Institute For Free 
Labor Development and its meddling in the politics of Central 
America, mirroring the role of the administration, and quite 
possibly the CIA." The New York Times noted how Asner1 s 
comments drew "loud applause." [58]
Fifthly, the banners and slogans of the demonstration 
repeatedly made the connection between anti-intervention 
themes and economic issues, and criticised both the 
multinationals and the U.S. Government. Since 1980 the 
development of anti-intervention sentiment in the U.S. labour 
movement had been inseparably tied to traditional trade union 
concerns such as jobs, wages, and conditions. The April 25th 
Mobilization again confirmed that the political and economic 
attacks on organised labour in the 1980's had provided a firm 
bedrock upon which anti-interventionism had been erected. One 
trade unionist recorded, "Most of the labor marchers...have 
borne the brunt of Reagan's economic and social policies: 
predominantly minority workers at the bottom of the wage 
scale, public sector workers squeezed by budget cuts, and 
workers in labor intensive industries who are most vulnerable 
to foreign competition. Probably very few had ever been to
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a peace demonstration before.” [59]
All told, the April 25th Mobilization constituted a 
major political advance for anti-intervention trade unionism 
and the CA/AIM as a whole. The internal challenge to Cold War 
unionism had now reached tens of thousands of trade unionists. 
However the NLC, primarily because of its fear of ”red 
baiting", failed to seize the opportunity to turn strong rank 
and file sentiment against U.S. intervention into a clear step 
towards developing a new internationalism for the U.S. labour 
movement.
Iran-contra and After.
The period of preparation for the April 25th 
Mobilization coincided with the dramatic opening weeks of the 
so-called Iran-contra affair which began in November 1986. 
The 1987 Federal investigations into Lieutenant Colonal Oliver 
North's project to secure money for the contras by selling 
arms to Iran disclosed the existence of an elaborate network 
of private and public individuals and organisations working 
to sustain the contra's military campaign against the 
Sandinista government during 1984 and 1985 when Congress 
decided not to approve military aid.
The enormous impact of the scandal on the Reagan 
presidency virtually ensured that labour movement involvement 
in the affair passed without notice in the media. However, 
inside the headquarters of many unions and in the regional and
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local bodies where anti-interventionism had established a 
voice, the role of PRODEMCA in North's mission to acquire 
funds and political support for the "Nicaraguan Resistance" 
was an issue of considerable interest. Doherty, as co-founder 
of PRODEMCA and on personal terms with the contra leadership, 
and perhaps Joyce, Shanker, Drozak and Mazur as union leaders 
identifying with PRODEMCA's objectives, were suspected of 
having at least some knowledge of North's efforts. PRODEMCA 
was clearly part of North's contra support network which 
included, among other neo-conservative and New Right figures 
and groups, beer capitalist Joseph Coors whose anti-union and 
racist reputation was known throughout the labour movement. 
(See Chapter Six)
The House-Senate committee which investigated the affair 
established that New Right fundraiser and North associate Carl 
"Spitz" Channel gave between $80-90,000 to PRODEMCA in the 
Spring of 1986. [60] The money, purportedly raised from
private donors, was, according to Channel, to fund a publicity 
campaign to win the support of "swing vote" House Democrats 
for the President's $100 million 1986 contra aid proposal. 
(See Chapter Eight) PRODEMCA's involvement in Congressional 
lobbying was illegal due to its status as a non-profit tax- 
exempt organisation. [61] PRODEMCA, embarrassed by the 
revelation, announced that it returned the money to Channel 
in March 1987. [62] NLC coordinator Daniel Cantor commented 
that, "The revelations of ties between Channel, Oliver North, 
PRODEMCA and AIFLD is only spectacular evidence of what many
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unionists have felt in their bones for years." [63]
Another labour movement connection to the North 
operation was revealed in the part played by Roy Godson, 
Director of the International Labor Program at Georgetown 
University. Godson had served as foreign policy advisor to 
AFL-CIO Presidents Meany and Kirkland, a consultant to the 
DIA, and as a principal teacher in AIFLD's school for Latin 
American union leaders at the Meany Center in Maryland. 
Furthermore, Godson was the principle defender of Cold War 
unionism in intellectual circles (See Chapter One.) Godson's 
role in the Iran-contra scandal was described by former 
National Security Advisor John Poindexter during the 
House-Senate investigations. Poindexter said on July 20, 
1987, that he retained Godson as a special consultant to 
assist the contra fundraising effort. [65] It was later 
disclosed that Godson, while working for North and the 
National Security Council, secured a $100,000 contribution to 
the contras from the right-wing Heritage Foundation, an 
organisation widely regarded as a policy "think-tank" for the 
Reagan Administration. One source commented, "Roy Godson is 
now emerging as an important figure in the Iran-contra 
scandal...Godson served as a middle-man in a complex series 
of financial transactions to provide funds for the rebel war 
in Nicaragua." [66]
Godson's activities further illuminated the ideological, 
institutional, as well as personal links between the AFL-CIO's 
foreign policy establishment and the openly anti-union New
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Right. Moreover, in the early 1980s, Godson was also 
connected to Government intelligence. In 1982 Godson became 
Director of the National Strategic Information Center, founded 
in 1962 by the late Director of the CIA, William Casey. 
Godson was also a paid consultant to the U.S. Information 
Agency and heavily involved in the Consortium for the Study 
of Intelligence which in 1982 focused attention on the U.S. 
Governments domestic intelligence requirements. Godson 
wrote: "Some (Consortium) participants suggested that the
heart of the internal security problem lies less in the 
activities of extremists...and more with those of leading 
members of society who, by example, legitimize cooperation 
with foreign adversaries." [67] The participants included 
David Jessup (before his AIFLD appointment), Eugenia Kemble, 
then Albert Shanker's assistant at the AFT, and Penn Kemble 
the chief spokersperson for PRODEMCA. Also participating were 
representatives of leading corporations such as Adolph Coors 
and the Rand Corporation. [68]
The Iran-contra scandal provoked discussion and argument 
everywhere. The AFL-CIO in Washington, however, remained 
strangely mute on the issue. Federation headquarters, 
including Kirkland's office, preferred not to comment. The 
AFL-CIO News. normally outspoken on international affairs, 
ignored the matter. However, the AFL-CIO Executive Council 
met in February and, without reference to the scandal issued 
a DIA-prepared statement on the contras which constituted a 
marked shift in Federation policy. The statement declared,
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"The...CUS labor federation in Nicaragua has called for a 
withdrawal of U.S. military assistance to the contras linked 
to the simultaneous withdrawal of Soviet-Cuban military 
assistance to the Sandinistas." Moreover, the statement said 
the AFL-CIO would work with the CUS to promote dialogue 
between the Sandinistas and the contras. [69]
It appeared doubtful that the change in the Federation's 
position on contra aid had been determined by a formal shift 
of position by the CUS. The latter's view of contra aid had 
always been ambiguous. When asked in Managua the CUS claimed 
to oppose aid. When in Washington, however, CUS
representatives normally deferred to AIFLD's strident 
pro-contra stance. Rather, the shift in the Federation's 
position appeared to indicate a tactical retreat by the DIA. 
With the April 2 5th Mobilization imminent, the Iran-contra 
scandal threatening to implicate labour movement figures in 
the North funding operation, and the Federation's full 
convention only six months away, the DIA probably anticipated 
a major defeat on the contra aid issue. It was perhaps 
realistic to hope that a slight shift in position at this 
time, attributed to the CUS (who might of course change its 
mind after the convention), could reduce the numbers 
travelling to the April 25th demonstration and prevent an 
unprecedented convention defeat for the DIA which might 
jeopardise its legitimacy and, in the longer term, its very 
existence.
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Whatever the tactical considerations, Cold War unionism 
found itself in a defencive position. The impressive rank and 
file participation in the April 25th Mobilization and the 
NLC's relative firmness in the face of "red-baiting” helped 
to confine the DIA to a political bunker. Just how long this 
defenciveness might last remained to be seen.
Countdown 87: The Campaign Against Contra Aid.
The Iran-contra affair at first appeared to signal the 
imminent cessation of Congressional aid to the Nicaraguan 
insurgents, not least because most of the money obtained in 
the arms deal appeared to have gone astray. North's 
assistant, Robert Owen, had disclosed that discrepancies 
existed in the bank accounts of at least one of PRODEMCA's 
proclaimed democrats, namely UNO leader Adolfo Calero. [70] 
Indeed, on March 3, 1987, the House introduced a moratorium 
on $40 million in aid which had been put aside for the 
contras.
However, the daily television appearances of North 
during the House-Senate investigations in the Summer of 1987, 
and the purported outbreak of "Olliemania" among the U.S. 
public, revived of the pro-contra forces. In Congress, 
despite the revelations of corruption and incompetence, 
support for the contras remained fairly firm. [71] Sensing 
North had charmed Congress and the U.S. public, the 
Administration began to prepare a request for a massive $270
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million contra aid package.
In July 1987 more than a dozen organisations formed 
"Countdown 87" to fight the impending aid proposal. The 
organisations extended the church-union partnership achieved 
during the April 25th mobilization and included the NLC, 
Coalition For A New Foreign Policy, Nicaragua Network, United 
Church of Christ, Witness For Peace, Presbyterian Church USA 
and Catholic Social Justice. In 1985-86 the pro-contra lobby 
of PRODEMCA and others had targeted the "swing votes" in the 
House and Senate, apparently to great effect. Countdown 87 
not only constituted itself as the anti-interventionist's 
answer to the pro-contra lobby, it even sought to emulate the 
methods of its opponents. The Countdown 87 campaign enlisted 
full-time staff members from union headquarters in Washington 
and activities were coordinated with professionals working 
with the church and advocacy groups. [72]
The Countdown 87 campaign embraced a dual strategy of 
conventional lobbying and grassroots mobilization, a method 
approved by representatives of the city-based labour 
committees who met in Washington on April 26, the day after 
the Mobilization. It was agreed that PRODEMCA's method of 
targeting selected members of Congress had brought results, 
but the momentum of the Mobilization should not be dissipated 
by a purely Congress-orientated strategy which excluded 
grassroots activism and rank and file involvement. A campaign 
spokesperson remarked, "We will surely be outspent by right- 
wing organizations... But we will match their dollars with
579
millions of letters from mainstream America." [73]
The NLC's coordinators Dyson and Cantor compiled a union 
membership breakdown in several "swing" Congressional 
districts thus to initiate pressure from the unions with the 
most members in any given district. For examples, the UAW 
targeted Senator Aspin, a Wisconsin Democrat? ACTWU pressured 
Senator Patterson from South Carolina and the IAM focused on 
Senator Pickett from Virginia. Moderate Republicans were also 
targeted; for example, the NEA approached Senators Snowe and 
Cohen from Maine. [74] In terms of broader public outreach, 
preliminary reports were positive. As Cantor recorded in a 
letter to a CWA official, "It appears that the general 
anti-contra feeling that the public opinion polls reflect is 
even stronger in the labor movement." [75] By mid-September 
five of the six largest AFL-CIO unions were lobbying on 
Capitol Hill against further aid to the contras and local 
union leaders were active in key congressional districts. [76]
The AFL-CIO Supports The Arias Plan.
As the Reagan Administration struggled to resuscitate 
support for the contras an independent diplomatic initiative 
by President Oscar Arias of Costa Rica delivered another 
setback to the pro-contra forces. In early August the 
presidents of the five Central American countries met in 
Guatamala city to approve an 11-point peace initiative known 
as the Arias Plan which required Nicaragua, El Salvador,
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Honduras, Guatamala and Costa Rica to lift restrictions on 
political dissent, press censorship, issue an amnesty to 
rebels and to hold elections for a Central American 
parliament. In addition, each country agreed to negotiate a 
cease-fire and to forbid the use of its territory by guerilla 
groups seeking to overthrow governments in other countries.
Since peace was now on the agenda the chances of 
Congress approving $270 million in contra aid seemed remote. 
At the AFL-CIO's full convention in Miami during late October 
a DIA resolution was approved which endorsed the Arias Plan 
and called for the cessation of all military aid to the 
insurgents in the region, including the contras, and the 
implementation of democratic reforms. As was the case at 
Anaheim, behind-the-scenes bargaining occurred over the 
wording of the resolution; the DIA agreed to oppose contra aid 
providing this was linked to a call for the withdrawal of 
Soviet-Cuban aid to the Sandinistas. The NLC preferred 
unqualified opposition to all types of aid. The resolution 
that was eventually approved called for a "withdrawal of U.S. 
military assistance to the contras, as well as the withdrawal 
of Soviet-Cuban military assistance to the Sandinistas." [77]
The floor debate in Miami was much shorter than the one 
which occurred two years earlier at Anaheim. Lane Kirkland, 
who chaired the proceedings, allowed only five speakers of 
which only one, Sheinkman of ACTWU, spoke against contra aid. 
The resolution's ambiguous language resulted in two 
conflicting interpretations of AFL-CIO policy to emerge
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following the convention. The pro-contra forces argued that 
the discontinuation of their support for the contras required 
a Soviet-Cuban moratorium on weaponry delivered to the 
Sandinistas. The anti-interventionists, on the other hand, 
maintained that the two elements in the resolution pertaining 
to Soviet-Cuban and U.S. aid were quite distinct from each 
other, and that the AFL-CIO was committed to oppose both forms 
of aid without conditions. [78]
Conflicting interpretations aside, the convention 
resolution registered official AFL-CIO opposition to contra 
aid for the first time. More significant than any change in 
the language of the Federation's position was, however, the 
disarray of the Cold War union leaders who supported the DIA's 
position. PRODEMCA, implicated in North's fundraising effort, 
had been eclipsed by Countdown 87 to the extent that a wide 
segment of Congress now began to think of the U.S. labour 
movement as a force against intervention in Nicaragua. One 
year earlier the most audible union voices had been firmly in 
support of contra aid.
In August AIFLD made its first ever public criticism of 
the contras, stating that, "Despite efforts by leaders of the 
armed Nicaraguan Resistance to train their forces to observe 
human rights standards, abuses are continuing...a contra 
attack...on July 16th left three children and one pregnant 
woman dead. The deaths were caused by indiscriminate firing 
of machine guns and grenades into homes." [79] U.S. trade 
unionists were invited to send protest letters to contra
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leader Alfonso Robelo in Miami. [80]
In the period following the AFL-CIO Convention in 1985 
AIFLD appeared to actively undermine the Federation's official 
support for a non-military solution to the Nicaraguan conflict 
by supporting PRODEMCA's campaign for contra aid and by 
circulating propaganda which extolled the democratic virtues 
of the contras. Was it now possible that AIFLD and the 
Institute's firmest supporters on the Executive Council had 
reconsidered their position? Were the contras not freedom 
fighters, after all, but murderers of innocent civilians?
AIFLD's support for the contras appeared to be as firm 
as ever. While Countdown 87 continued to press Congress to 
cease all contra aid in full accordance with the official 
AFL-CIO position, AIFLD and other leading Federation 
officials followed the lead of the Reagan Administration. 
This occurred in two important respects. Firstly, Congress 
between September and December 1987 approved three packages 
of CIA-administered "non-lethal" aid to the contras as a 
combined cost of $14.4 million. No official AFL-CIO 
opposition was registered. Indeed, Donald Slaiman, a key 
official in the AFL-CIO's Department of Organization and Field 
Services, commented that, "Neither the (convention) resolution 
or the Peace Accord (Arias Plan) prohibits non-military aid 
to insurgents while the details of the accord are being 
negotiated." [81] This view was refuted by President Arias 
himself on the eve of his acceptance of the Nobel Peace Prize: 
continued funding of the contras, he explicitly warned,
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threatened the peace process. [82]
Secondly, AIFLD claimed that endorsement of the Arias 
Plan did not amount to an acceptance of Sandinista rule. "The 
Marxist-Leninist regime imposed on Nicaragua by the 
Sandinistas," said the Institute, "must not be left in place 
by any peace settlement." [83] AIFLD further maintained that 
the Sandinistas had reneged on the conditions of the peace 
plan and intended to use the Arias initiative for tactical 
purposes. AIFLD submitted fresh charges of Sandinista 
harassment of the CUS which, said the Institute, contravened 
the peace plan's directive pertaining to the broadening of 
political freedoms. This, said AIFLD, was a clear violation 
of the peace agreement. [84]
It was clear that the DIA and its principal supporters 
had faithfully followed the Reagan Administration's lead and 
had used the Arias plan as a means to further attack the 
Sandinistas. In September 1987 the pro-contra forces launched 
"Peace and Democracy Watch," a group that claimed it stood for 
the pursuit of democracy in Central America through the full 
implementation of the Arias Plan. The group announced "it 
will take no position on the issue of aid to the Nicaraguan 
resistance" - although many of its participants and 
signatories were on record as contra enthusiasts. These 
included Drozak, Joyce and Shanker from the unions, and 
Bernard Aronson, Penn Kemble, and Robert Leiken - three of the 
"gang of four" Democrats instrumental in convincing "swing" 
Congresspeople to support contra aid in 1985 and 1986. [85]
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Bricklayers' leader John Joyce spearheaded the drive to 
win trade union support for the new group which showed no 
evidence of being anything more than a successor to the 
discredited PRODEMCA. Joyce announced that the new formation 
intended to "coordinate the activities of a number of existing 
organizations concerned with problems of democracy in Central 
America, among them...Freedom House, PRODEMCA and members of 
the AFL-CIO." [86] David Dyson informed Jack Sheinkman that, 
"With the exception of the AFL-CIO unions, every one of these 
organizations has an explicit pro-contra position. The whole 
project is an attempt to scuttle the peace process under the 
guise of being 'neutral1; in other words, an attempt to do 
contra work without admitting it." [87]
For the NLC the most worrying development was the 
decision of William Wynn, leader of the 1.6 million members 
in the UFCW, to endorse Peace and Democracy Watch. Wynn had 
endorsed the April 25th Mobilization but now appeared to have 
changed his stance. The UFCW's international affairs 
department formally discouraged Wynn from accepting Joyce's 
invitation, stating that Peace and Democracy Watch "may be an 
effort to support the Reagan Administration's quest for future 
contra aid, by showing that El Salvador is in full compliance 
with the Arias Plan and that Nicaragua is not." [88]
Peace and Democracy Watch organised a much publicized 
visit to Central America in early November 1987. The central 
figure of the delegation was Edward Koch, Mayor of New York 
City, who was accompanied by contra sympathisers Ronald Radosh
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and Douglas Payne of Freedom House as well as Joyce himself. 
Freedom House's contribution to the delegation's briefing 
papers contained material which explicitly called for military 
and non-military aid to "The Resistance" and for U.S. 
assistance to the CUS and other non-military opponents of the 
Sandinistas. [89] The delegation met with contra leaders in 
Miami before landing in Managua. [90] Once in Managua, pro- 
Sandinista mass demonstrations greeted the visitors. 
Unfortunately for Joyce and the tour's organisers, Koch proved 
to be an unreliable contra supporter and made press statements 
which expressed admiration for President Ortega who, said 
Koch, "deeply wants peace." [91] Nevertheless by January, 
1988, Peace and Democracy Watch had reached their verdict: the 
Arias Plan had not been implemented. And who was responsible? 
"For us...the burden of blame (falls) most heavily upon the 
Sandinistas." [92]
Once again several trade union leaders and Federation 
functionaries had defied AFL-CIO policy. The battle against 
the Sandinistas, indeed the Cold War itself, was for them far 
more important than any formal adherence to the views of the 
AFL-CIO majority. The latest ploy was clear: depict the
Sandinistas as the principal violators of the Arias Plan and 
therefore opposed to peace and democracy. Congress would then 
respond to this clear threat to national security and resume 
military aid to the contras.
The argument that the Sandinista government was the 
chief violator of the peace accords was entirely spurious.
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In January 1988 the International Verification and Follow-Up 
Commission, established by the five Central American
presidents to monitor implementation of the accord's
provisions, reported that Nicaragua had "taken concrete steps" 
towards democratization by re-opening La Prensa (no daily 
newspaper openly sympathetic to the left existed in El 
Salvador or Guatamala), and had lifted the state of emergency 
to allow broader political space for the opposition. 
Furthermore, Nicaragua was considered to be the only one of 
the five governments in the region to adequately represent 
opposition leaders on its national reconciliation commission. 
[93] Moreover, other observers noted how human rights abuses 
in El Salvador, Honduras and Guatamala which clearly violated 
the accords had been ignored by the Reagan Administration, the 
bulk of the U.S. media and, it could be added, the contra
supporters in the U.S. labour movement. [94]
Conclusion.
By 1988 the political balance of forces within the U.S. 
trade union movement had clearly shifted in favour of the 
anti-interventionists. On the question of contra aid, it was 
the advocates of Cold War unionism who were now the 
dissidents. Moreover, the change in the AFL-CIO's position 
on contra aid was accompanied by a growing anti-intervention 
trade union presence on Capitol Hill, at the local level in 
the "swing" Congressional districts and on the streets in the
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form of major demonstrations. In contrast, the pro-contra 
forces in the labour movement tainted by the Iran-contra 
scandal had resorted to "red-baiting" anti-interventionists 
and, in the case of Peace and Democracy Watch, had been forced 
to conceal their blatant pro-contra sympathies behind a 
perfidious support of the Arias Plan. In complete harmony 
with the Reagan Administration and most of the media, and 
despite clear evidence to the contrary, Peace and Democracy 
Watch and AIFLD attempted to depict the Sandinistas as sole 
violators of the peace accords in order to convince Congress 
to recommence military aid to the contras.
As far as Nicaragua was concerned the internal challenge 
to Cold War unionism, while be no means complete, could be 
described as a success. In 1980 the AFL—CIO was a vociferous 
opponent of the Sandinistas in U.S. political circles and in 
the international labour movement. By 1988, although the DIA 
and other federation officials continued to fight the Cold 
War, the U.S. Congress and the international labour movement 
were both cognizant of a marked change of direction in the 
U.S. trade union movement over a pivotal foreign policy 
question.
The contra war and the Congressional struggle over the 
issue of aid continued until the end of the Reagan period and 
into the Bush presidency which began in 1989. Nevertheless, 
the new president did not have the support of the U.S. labour 
movement for what amounted to the continuation of Reagan*s 
Cold War policies in Central America. Furthemore, the success
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of the April 25th Mobilization suggested that the labour 
movement might oppose U.S.intervention in other regions of 
the world. All other postwar U.S. presidents had come into 
office with the knowledge that the U.S. labour movement was 
a reliable supporter of U.S. foreign policy.
Meanwhile AIFLD's own Cold War projects in Nicaragua and 
El Salvador faced disaster. As Chapter Nine described, 
AIFLD's support for Duarte's stillborn reformism and its war 
on the UNTS had further discredited the Institute in the U.S. 
labour movement. In Nicaragua, the CUS continued to be a 
minority voice in the labour movement who, without U.S. 
Government assistance via the AFL-CIO would in all probability 
disappear.
Chapter Eleven summarises the developments in the labour 
movements of Nicaragua, El Salvador and the U.S. from 1988 to 
mid-1989. In addition, it attempts to evaluate the political 
significance of the struggle in the U.S. trade union movement 
over Central America, particularly with regard to the issues 
discussed in the opening pages of this thesis.
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THE 1987-1989 PERIOD AND CONCLUSION
[Notej. The first part of this chapter was written before the 
defeat of the Sandinistas in the February 1990 Nicaraguan 
presidential elections and prior to the FMLN's offensive of 
November 1989. The changes in Eastern Europe had also for the 
most part not occurred. The second part of the chapter (which 
concludes this thesis) was written after these events took 
place. ]
The period between late 1987 until early 1989 did not 
produce any qualitative changes in the conflict between the 
anti-interventionists and their Cold War opponents in the U.S. 
labour movement. The perennial timidity of the NLC (a handful 
of outspoken members aside) ensured that for the time being 
the international affairs apparatus would continue to operate 
as it had done for several decades. However, the DtA and 
AIFLD's criticism of the contras, and, eventually, the 
Salvadoran armed forces, suggested that the official apparatus 
perceived the need to respond somewhat to the concerns of the 
anti-interventionists, although this appeared to have little 
impact on the DIA's choice of friends and opponents :n the 
international labour movement.
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This chapter provides a condensed account of 
developments in the labour movement of the U.S., Nicaragua, 
and El Salvador from 1987 until early 1989. I will then 
conclude this thesis by returning to the empirical and 
theoretical tasks stated at the outset and to demonstrate that 
these stated tasks have indeed been fulfilled.
Nicaragua: War on the Internal Front?
In early 1988 the contras suffered serious political and 
military setbacks. Non-military leaders Cruz, Robelo, and 
Calero resigned due either to scandals associated with the 
Iran-contra affair and personal disillusionment. [1] Thus the 
CIA's attempt to present the contras as heroic freedom 
fighters, a strategy assisted by Cold War liberals and trade 
union figures such as Doherty, Joyce and Shanker had now all 
but completely collapsed. The counter-revolution had lost its 
diplomatic wing. What remained was the Somocista-dominated 
contra army, which had been mauled by a major Sandinista 
offensive in March, and its sympathisers inside Nicaragua. 
Meanwhile in Congress attempts to secure military aid to the 
contras were defeated.
Nicaraguan Unions Realign.
The Reagan Administration now faced two options: accept 
the presence of the Sandinistas ("losing" Nicaragua) or
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develope new methods to fight the regime. It chose the 
latter. One source predicted, 11 ..we*re going to see now an 
enormous effort to create an internal front opposed to the 
revolution...(The U.S. Governnent) can manipulate and 
establish...political parties, trade unions, youth, 
professional, women's groups... every social group you can 
imagine." [2] With the economy in a total shambles the 
prospects for developing a serious political challenge to the 
FSLN appeared favourable.
In reality the "internal front" had been in existence 
since 1979. Trade union formations like the CUS, the 
remaining capitalists in COSEP and numerous other political 
and religious formations constituted a visible non-military 
opposition to the Sandinistas and the revolutionary process. 
In January 1988 the Sandinistas relaxed restrictions on civil 
rights and reintroduced the right to strike. The CUS's 
newspaper Solidaridad could again circulate and the CUS 
declared that it hoped to affiliate 2 6 new unions previously 
denied recognition under the state of emergency. [3]
In February the labour movement realigned itself. Unions 
to the right of the Sandinista federations (CUS and the 
"social Christian" CTN) formed a united front with those on 
the left (the CAUS and the CP-linked CGTi). A strike against 
conscription and wage controls provoked counter-demonstrations 
organised by the pro-FSLN unions. [4] By mid-April 1988 the 
U.S. media claimed that industrial unrest in Nicaragua was 
higher than at any time since 1979. A strike of construction
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workers affiliated to the Nicaraguan Socialist (i.e. Moscow 
Communist) Party lasted several weeks. In another dispute two 
opposition union organisers were shot and killed by a 
Sandinista soldier in a confrontation between CAUS strikers 
and government troops. [5] The incident shattered claims made 
by Sandinista sympathisers in the U.S. that no trade unionist 
had lost their life in an act of government repression since 
the fall of Somoza. Americas Watch demanded President Ortega 
comment both on the killings and the reportedly violent FSLN 
counter-demonstrations directed against anti-Government 
strikers. [6]
The formation of the new anti-Sandinista labour alliance 
was a serious political setback for the FSLN who reacted by 
scornfully referring to the strike leaders as "servile lackeys 
of the bourgeoisie and American imperialism." [7] A 
pro-Sandinista union leader made more specific charges: 
"Members of the U.S. Embassy have been meeting with groups of 
both the right and the ultra-left in their union offices and 
in the Embassy." [8] The U.S. Embassy's close relationship 
to the CUS, a NED and AIFLD funded entity, was common 
knowledge in Nicaragua. Indeed, a contingent of U.S. postal 
workers visiting Nicaragua at the time reported, "A member of 
our delegation ran into a CUS leader and an Embassy employee 
in a cozy meeting over steaks and expensive drinks at a hotel 
bar. They identified themselves only reluctantly after one 
of our interpreters recognised them." [9] However, Sandinista 
accusations that the CAUS and the CGTi were agents of
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imperialism seemed inconsistent with their respective 
political histories. Both had opposed Somoza and, until now, 
had critically supported Sandinista direction of the 
revolution. It seemed highly unlikely that trade union 
opposition to the Government was the exclusive responsibility 
of the U.S. Embassy or the bourgeoisie, although what exactly 
motivated the CAUS and the CGTi to ally with the CUS and the 
CTN - federations in league .with the U.S. Government and 
Nicaraguan capitalism - remained somewhat unclear.
Economy Worsens
It remained more than sufficiently clear, however, that 
the Nicaraguan economy at the point of collapse. Workers' 
living standards in all sectors continued to fall, 
unemployment had risen to 21%, and, in 1987, Nicaragua spent 
46% of its budget on a war which had resulted in $531.5 
million in lost production. During the eight-year war $12.3 
billion had been lost in economic damage and an estimated 
50,000 Nicaraguans had died. [10] Shortages, rampant 
inflation, the war; these and other factors strained to 
breaking point the political as well as material resources of 
the revolution. A June 1988 independent opinion poll revealed 
that 74% of Managuan adults considered their family's economic 
situation to have worsened in the previous year; 34% of those 
asked felt Sandinista management of the economy to be either 
"bad" or "terrible". [11]
601
Towards the end of 1988 the Nicaraguan Government 
announced sweeping austerity measures which included a 60% cut 
in government investments and a further devaluation of the 
cordoba to fight an annual inflation rate of 23,000%. 
Furthermore, FSLN moved decisively to the right when it 
announced a "programmatic revision" (known as concertacionl 
which entailed long-term strategic economic arrangements with 
Nicaraguan capitalism, the end of expropriations, and, in some 
instances, returning nationalised concerns to their former 
owners. The pro-Sandinista unions, however, argued that the 
capitalists could not be trusted. Workers continued to make 
sacrifices, they said, while the rich decapitalized their 
enterprises and made money from speculation. Ortega responded 
by urging workers "to recover their trust in the producers." 
[12]
The pro-FSLN unions had consistently urged the Government 
to conduct further expropriations and hand production over to 
them. By mid-1989 the situation had reached a point where the 
FSLN leadership's policy of attempting to balance the 
interests of the capitalists on the one hand and the workers 
and peasants on the other had reached a critical point. The 
situation seemed pregnant with at least two clear 
possibilities: either the anti-Sandinista union alliance
(which included the CUS) might advance at the expense of the 
pro-FSLN unions (or perhaps electorally behind an opposition 
candidate in the elections scheduled for 1990), or the 
pro-FSLN unions would themselves need to mobilize behind
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demands for greater expropriation of the private producers.
During the first months of the Bush Administration 
Congress approved a $66 million "humanitarian" aid package to 
the contras. The worsening Nicaraguan economy, however, 
encouraged the Administration to persevere with building the 
internal front. The National Endowment For Democracy (NED), 
which spent $800,000 in Nicaragua during 1988, was expected 
to spend $2 million in 1989. [13] Recipients of NED money
included La Prensa and the Coordinadora - the anti-Sandinista 
political opposition which included the CUS and the 
capitalists in COSEP. [14]
El Salvador: The Rising Tide of Union Repression.
The AFL-CIO's defence of the Salvadoran government's 
trade union record continued into 1989 despite evidence of 
growing repression. The Federation's 1987 full convention 
again approved military aid to the country, operating on the 
belief - encouraged by AIFLD - that the human and trade union 
rights situation continued to improve. AIFLD also continued 
to applaud the results of the land reform at a time others 
pointed to its severe limitations. [15] In 1987, U.S. aid to 
the regime amounted to $606 million and exceeded the 
Salvadoran government's $582 million contribution to its own 
national budget. A government contributing less to its own 
budget than it received from the U.S. was apparently 
unprecedented in the history of U.S. foreign aid. In 1984
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Kissinger and the AFL-CIO had recommended that U.S. Government 
aid should be used to eradicate the economic under-pinnings 
of the crisis in Central America? in 1987, however, roughly 
75% of U.S. aid to El Salvador was spent on the counter­
insurgency war and dealing with its repercussions. [16]
AIFLD's defence of the Salvadoran government 
occasionally reached absurd proportions in 1987. For example, 
before a Congressional subcommittee in September Doherty 
announced that, "The Duarte administration has not declared 
a strike to be illegal...unless it has been called for overtly 
political purposes." [17] Yet, the disingenuous nature of 
this claim was made obvious by a statement to the same 
committee by Cristobal Aleman, a leader of the AIFLD-supported 
UNOC. Aleman stated, "During President Duarte's
administration there have been a total of 155 strikes, of 
which 3 were declared legal and 152 illegal. The majority of 
illegal strikes were promoted by the...UNTS." [18] Clearly, 
Duarte's (and Doherty's) conception of an illegal or political 
strike was broad enough to account for approximately 98% of 
work stoppages since the beginning of his presidency!
More disturbing was the way AIFLD and the U.S. Embassy 
determined the existence of an improved human rights situation 
in El Salvador. The most recent figures pertaining to death 
squad activity were measured against the level of atrocities 
recorded during the genocidal repression of 1980-82. 
Therefore, when a March 1987 report by the Lawyers Committee 
For Human Rights disclosed that "the monthly toll of death-
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squad style killings is down from hundreds to perhaps a 
dozen," AIFLD declared that the figures were "encouraging." 
[19]
Encouraging or not, AIFLD did protest a rash of 
assassinations, including the April 1987 decapitation by 
uniformed troops of Antonio de Jesus Hernandez Martinez, 
leader of the UNTS-affiliated National Association of 
Agricultural Workers (Asociacion Nacional de Trabajadores 
Agricultura -ANTA). [20] AIFLD also protested the actions of 
five armed men who "went on a killing spree" in an 
agricultural cooperative, killing four, seriously wounding 
five, and leaving four female teenagers raped. Such acts, 
said AIFLD, threatened the fragile democracy that existed in 
El Salvador. [21] Other sources confirmed a deteriorating 
human and trade union rights situation in El Salvador. UNOC 
noted the "marked reappearance" of death squad assassinations 
and disappearances. "Unidentified individuals" had murdered 
156 people and the armed forces were responsible for 56 
deaths. [22] Figures from church sources were even worse. 
Politically motivated violence in the first half of 1987 had, 
they calculated, claimed the lives of 742 people. [23]
At this point the terror directed against trade 
unionists appeared to be more indiscriminate, especially in 
the countryside where the UNTS-affiliate, COACES, had made an 
impact on the formerly pro-Duarte cooperative movement. [24] 
In the urban sector workers protesting falling living 
standards conducted major strikes, including the hospital
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workers in STISSS. A STISSS-UNTS demonstration on July 8 was 
fired on by the armed forces, wounding eight people. The 
following week five more workers were shot and wounded at a 
UNTS rally. [25] On the eve of a UNTS-sponsored May Day 
demonstration the UNTS's offices were bombed and on August 5 
a death sguad threatened to assassinate the entire UNTS 
leadership. [26]
During this same period the shadow of the death squads 
extended as far as Los Angeles. Salvadorans (including Marta 
Alicia Rivera the U.S. representative of ANDES) and CISPES 
activists suffered death threats and one Salvadoran woman 
activist was abducted, tortured, and sexually assaulted after 
leaving a CISPES office. Her assailants accused her of being 
with the FMLN. [27] In February 1988 the FBI confirmed 
accusations that it had conducted a two-year surveillance 
campaign against CISPES and others in the CA/AIM. [28]
Meanwhile, in El Salvador, it was the telecommunications 
union ASTTEL who endured the most brutal reprisals. The 
union's conflict with the telecommunications agency ANTEL had 
continued without respite. In mid-December, 1987, Medardo 
Cerafina Ayala, a founding member of ASTTEL, was assassinated. 
On January 13, 1988, ASTTEL activist Victor Manuel Hernandez 
Vasquez, aged 18, was shot to death close to the doorway of 
his parents' home. On March 1, ASTTEL member Jose Herbert 
Guardado was murdered. By the end of May, three more ASTTEL 
members had been killed by death squads or by uniformed 
troops. [29]
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The limits of "Telegram Internationalism."
The repression unleashed against ASTTEL exposed the 
limits of the anti-interventionist's "telegram 
internationalism." In its first year of operation the 
Salvadoran Labor Defense Network had forwarded more than 1,000 
telegrams from U.S. trade unionists demanding the release of 
31 union activists detained by the security forces. [30] The 
Network had, according to one UNTS leader, proven its 
effectiveness in securing the release "of many union brothers 
and sisters" from detention in Salvadoran prisons. [31] Yet 
the letters and telegrams campaign of the ASTTEL Support 
Project had been unable to prevent the murder of six ASTTEL 
members. Furthermore, Teamsters Local 111 in New York City 
and CWA Locals 9415 in Oakland, California, and 7901 in Oregon 
had formed sister union ties with ASTTEL, and international 
support for ASTTEL continued to advance. Even New York City's 
tabloids showed interest in the union's plight. [32] For two 
years the campaign appeared to provide some protection to 
ASTTEL. Just days before the first of the six assassinations, 
the ASTTEL Support Project stated, "When friend and foe alike 
know the international labor community is watching, it makes 
a difference. The oligarchy's death squads cannot stand the 
light of day." [33] The events which followed brutally 
refuted such a claim.
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AIFLD; Accomplices to Repression?
The ASTTEL Support Project was convinced that the 
AFL-CIO's failure to officially recognise ASTTEL had lessened 
the survival chances of members of the union singled out for 
assassination. [34] UNOC had certainly avoided the degree of 
repression suffered by the UNTS, although UNOC had also 
avoided political or industrial confrontation with the 
government and the armed forces. The ASTTEL murders, however, 
exposed AIFLD to a more serious charge. Anti-interventionists 
had repeatedly warned that the branding of union federations 
"communist” or "subversive" threatened the lives of 
individuals belonging to those organisations. AIFLD had 
repeatedly described the UNTS and ASTTEL as FMLN-controlled 
and had made a clear distinction between what was, in their 
view, legitimate and illegitimate union demands and practices. 
Even UNTS-conducted strikes over pay and conditions were 
considered by AIFLD to be FMLN-orchestrated acts of 
destabilization. Ironically, this view of the UNTS was 
largely dispelled by the Salvadoran Ambassador to the U.S., 
Ernesto Rivas-Gallont in a letter to the Washington Post. The 
UNTS1s freedom to operate, he said, could be measured by the 
fact that "fully 77% of the collective bargaining agreements 
registered by the (Salvadoran) labor ministry (in 1987) were 
between employers and UNTS affiliates." [35] AIFLD was forced 
to concede that, "Even the guerilla-controlled unions 
undertake legitimate union activities from time to time." [36]
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There can be little doubt that AIFLD, in collusion with 
the U.S. Embassy and the Salvadoran government, actively 
assisted in creating the type of atmosphere of persecution 
upon which the death-squads had been known to thrive. The tide 
of criticism against AIFLD had, however, reached new levels 
even before the atrocities against ASTTEL. An October 1987 
report sponsored by union locals in the SEIU, AFSCME and the 
NUHHCE concluded that AIFLD'.s policy of building parallel 
unions to divide and destroy the UNTS had turned the Institute 
into an agent of repression. The AFL-CIO, therefore, had 
allowed itself to be "a direct instrument of U.S. foreign 
policy in El Salvador." [37]
A more widely publicised attack on AIFLD came from the 
internationally recognised human rights group Americas Watch. 
In a March 1988 report, AW broke its own precedent by 
evaluating the impact of AIFLD on the overall political 
climate in El Salvador. The formation of parallel unions, and 
recurrent evidence pointing to the misuse of U.S. Government 
funds by AIFLD and the unions close to the Institute, 
necessitated an immediate Congressional inquiry. [38]
AIFLD and the DIA, in a 78-page response, took issue 
with AW's description of the UNTS as "more militant" than the 
UNOC and with AW's failure to cite evidence of FMLN atrocities 
against democratic trade unionists or the FMLN1s penetration 
of the UNTS. Arrests and detentions made by the Salvadoran 
authorities were, they said, not "primarily motivated by the 
desire to stifle union activity (but were mainly) to stamp out
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a guerilla insurrection.11 [39] Moreover, the AFL-CIO could 
not support ASTTEL because it were party to a "strategy of 
revolutionary violence." [40]
AW later accused AIFLD of deliberately suppressing 
evidence of state or state-sponsored repression against the 
unions it claimed to support. For example, AW claimed that 
AIFLD had remained silent when a leader of the construction 
workers' federation, FESINCONSTRANS, was murdered. [41] Jeanne 
Kirkpatrick added her voice to AIFLD's defence, attacking AW 
in three major newspapers. There was, she said, "no factual 
evidence" presented against the Salvadoran armed forces and 
AW demonstrated "no understanding of the FMLN's established 
strategy of infiltrating and co-opting selected labour 
organizations." Kirkpatrick emphasised, "Neither the 
AFL-CIO...nor the Department of State believes the charges 
have substance." [42] As the paper war between AIFLD and 
Americas Watch progressed, Salvadoran union activists 
continued to be murdered. Two nurses, members of STISSS, were 
killed when their ambulance was machine-gunned on December 17, 
1987. On March 11, 1988, STISSS member Francisco Climaco
disappeared. His tortured body was discovered three days 
later "covered with cigarette burns, wrists and ankles bound 
and eyes gouged out." [43]
The overall human rights situation in El Salvador 
continued to grow worse. In September 1988 AW reported an 
increase in assassinations conducted by the armed forces, the 
death-squads and the FMLN. The guerillas had killed elected
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Christian Democrat and ARENA officials as well as suspected 
collaborators with the armed forces, and caused death to 
civilians due to the use of land mines and car bombs. [44] 
In October 1988 Amnesty International declared that right wing 
death squads had abducted, tortured and executed hundreds of 
Salvadorans in the preceding eighteen months, often beheading 
their victims to spread terror. [44]
The Collapse of the Duarte Presidency: UNOC-UNTS Dialogue.
The growing repression coincided with the electoral 
defeat of the Christian Democrats. In March 1988 the 
right-wing ARENA party won overall control of the National 
Assembly and scored large victories at local government level. 
The UNTS abstained from the elections and later presented its 
analysis of the poll figures: Of all the eligible voters (3.1 
million) only 68% were registered (2.1 million) , and less than 
half of these (970,000) cast votes. Therefore, claimed the 
UNTS, only 15% of eligible voters supported ARENA. [46] The 
U.S. Embassy applauded the elections and the Department of 
State referred to the "growing maturity" of ARENA, a sign that 
the U.S. Government was concerned that in order to work openly 
with the party associated with the death-squads it was 
necessary to announce that ARENA had in recent years become 
a more sensitive to human rights concerns. [47]
Shortly after the March elections it was disclosed that 
Duarte was suffering from terminal cancer. With the Christian
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Democrats already engulfed in charges of corruption and 
ineptitude, an ARENA victory in the presidential elections in 
April 1989 appeared inevitable. In September 1988 UNOC 
entered into a dialogue with leaders of the UNTS to discuss 
possible joint actions and to promote a negotiated end to the 
war. [48] In January the FMLN had stated that it was prepared 
to participate in the elections providing they were delayed 
for six months so that measures could be taken to protect the 
safety of candidates and voters. [49] ARENA, in control of 
the National Assembly and favorites to win the presidency, 
rejected the proposal. On February 10 the UNOC, UNTS and two 
smaller federations, the public sector workers in AGEPYM and 
the CLAT-affiliated CTS, issued a joint declaration which 
stated that "the proposal of the FMLN contains fundamental 
elements for achieving peace." [50]
On February 23, 1989, the AFL-CIO Executive Council
urged the U.S. Congress to cease all military aid to El 
Salvador. The E.C. noted that, "Elements of the security 
forces have engaged in assassination, abduction and torture, 
including trade union victims." The FMLN, too, had 
"assassinated mayors and trade unionists, forced recruitment 
into guerilla-backed trade unions, and undertaken economic 
sabotage." Despite the E.C.'s harsh criticism of the FMLN, 
it expressed support for "the postponement if necessary" of 
the elections as a condition for a negotiated peace. [51]
This significant shift in policy could be attributed to 
the cumulative affect of two major factors. Firstly, the
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sheer weight of evidence of human rights violations by the 
Salvadoran military made continued aid to the regime 
indefencible, notwithstanding AIFLD's attempts to draw a line 
of distinction between the "government" - which was reformist 
and deserved aid - and the "military" which harboured renegade 
reactionaries aligned with ARENA. Secondly, the UNOC, once 
protected by their alliance with the Christian Democrats, now 
faced the spectre of ARENA'S, declaration of "total war" on 
subversion. The 1980-83 repression had claimed the lives of 
many unionists associated with AIFLD. (See Chapter Two) If 
ARENA'S candidate, Alfredo Cristiani, won the election both 
UNOC and the UNTS would become likely targets for a new wave 
of attacks on workers' organisations. The actual or 
threatened cessation of U.S. military aid to Cristiani might 
prevent the repression occurring. AIFLD responded to the 
UNOC-UNTS dialogue and joint declaration by calling on the 
UNTS to break with the FMLN. Despite the talks dialogue, 
however, the federations each staged their own demonstrations 
in February 1989 following the UNTS's claim that it could not 
support UNOC's endorsement of the Christian Democrat's 
presidential candidate Fidel Chavez.
ARENA'S Victory: "Total War."
ARENA decisively won the March 1989 elections. 
Cristiani secured 53% of the vote, the Christian Democrats 
won 37%, and the Democratic Convergence - the party of FDR
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figures Ruben and Zamora - won just 3.2%. However, mass 
non-registration (700,000) added to the decision of 
approximately 50% of those registered not to vote (900,000) 
brought into question the true extent of ARENA'S popularity. 
The FMLN claimed that wide sections of the population had 
heeded its call for a boycott of the elections, a demand 
echoed by the UNTS.
By mid-1989 El Salvador appeared to be on the precipice 
of complete social breakdown. The FMLN had made several 
successful strikes against the armed forces, and its "urban 
commandoes" were active in San Salvador itself. The armed 
forces, meanwhile, declared "Total War" on communism and 
subversion. The UNTS now focused on developing "alternative 
power" in the working class neighborhoods and the FMLN1s Radio 
Venceremos urged the people to prepare for insurrection. The 
situation of dual power which prevailed in June 1989, however, 
showed few signs of being quickly resolved by a decisive 
strike by the regime or it opponents.
U.S. Labour: Sister-unions and Caucuses.
Contrary to widespread predictions throughout the 1980s, 
El Salvador did not become another Vietnam, nor did Nicaragua 
become another Chile or Grenada. By mid-1989 a U.S. invasion 
of Nicaragua appeared less likely than it did in 1984-85. The 
political cost to the Bush Administration of a large scale 
employment of U.S. troops in Nicaragua or El Salvador was
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perhaps greater than ever. As fears of a direct U.S. 
intervention receded, so did the anti-intervention movement.
In the U.S. trade unions the activities of the 
city-based committees somewhat decreased. However,
significant progress was made inside individual unions. For 
example, the Postal Workers For Peace was formed by members 
of both the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC) and 
the American Postal Workers Union (APWU). These unions had 
passed anti-intervention resolutions at their 1984 conventions 
and NALC President Vincent Sombrotto eventually joined the 
NLC. The group visited Central America in 1987 and again in 
1988 where it forged links with the Salvadoran postal workers' 
union SUCEPES, and the Nicaraguan telecommunication workers' 
union, TELCOR. [52]
In the CWA, one source noted how, "A generation of former 
civil rights and anti-war activists, now in their thirties and 
forties, have become local officers, union activists and staff 
members. They have been key supporters of the anti­
intervention work in labor.." [53] Some CWA locals had formed 
sister union ties with ASTTEL. Support for AIFLD in the 
union, however, continued to hamper progress, as did CWA 
President Bahr's inconsistent attitude towards the NLC. [54]
The hospital workers' union NUHHCE 1199, which had 
adopted a clear anti-contra position in 1983, continued to 
develop ties with Central American unions. In 1984, 1199's
Puerto Rico district established relations with the 
pro-Sandinista health workers union, FETSALUD. In April 1987
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an 1199 delegation to Nicaragua established sister union 
relations with FETSALUD Region II, covering the central 
Pacific coast. Medical supplies valued at $13,000 were 
transported to Nicaragua in 1987. [55]
The 1.6 million-member NEA continued its relationship
with the Salvadoran teachers union ANDES. The "Peace and
Justice Caucus" - a quasi-official vehicle for
anti-intervention and international work - had by the Spring 
of 1988 enrolled 1100 members and seemed poised to establish 
regional chapters to expand its work. [56]
In the other main teachers' union, Albert Shanker's AFT, 
the struggle over AFL-CIO foreign policy continued into 1989. 
At its 1988 convention a resolution calling for the AFT to 
"halt all financial and professional support for AIFLD" was 
reportedly quashed by the convention's resolutions committee. 
Shanker, appointed chair of the AFL-CIO's International
Affairs Committee following the retirement of I LA president 
Teddy Gleason in late 1987, continued to direct the union by 
virtue of his powerful base in the huge New York Local 2. The 
California Federation of Teachers continued to challenge 
Shanker's Cold War positions and by mid-1988 at least ten AFT 
locals organised a National Educators Committee on Central 
America to build material and political support for teachers 
unions in Central America. [57]
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CONCLUSION
It was stated at the outset that the main empirical tasks 
of this thesis were threefold. Firstly, it has sought to 
demonstrate the impact the AFL-CIO's international policy has 
had on Nicaragua and El Salvador. Secondly, this thesis has 
tried to show how the practice of Cold War unionism advanced 
the neo-liberal economic agenda of the Reagan-Bush 
Administrations and the U.S. multinationals. Thirdly, it has 
attempted to elucidate the internal and external challenges 
to the AFL-CIO' s Cold War unionism and to document the 
development of a nascent alternative internationalism for the 
U.S. labour movement.
The broader implications as well as the theoretical 
objectives of this thesis were located in the context of two 
ongoing discussions. These were, firstly, the present crisis 
of U.S. trade unionism and, secondly, the growing debate on 
trade union internationalism and the role of international 
trade union bodies. Regarding the former discussion, this 
thesis has sought to demonstrate how the international 
activities of U.S. labour can have an independent bearing on 
the crisis of U.S. trade unionism, a factor often completely 
ignored by both liberal and radical commentators. Regarding 
the discussion on international trade unionism, and
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particularly the concern to advance the theory and practice 
of a post-Cold War "New Internationalism," I maintained that 
perhaps too much regard had been payed to the behaviour of 
international capital and particularly the multinationals. 
In so doing, these discussions have neglected to fully 
appraise the significance of what I termed the "political 
restructuring" of state-labour political relationships that 
emerged in the advanced capitalist countries following the 
demise of the postwar Keynesian accommodation. The foreign 
policy conflict in U.S. labour, and the cautious and 
preliminary steps taken towards developing a new 
internationalism for U.S. trade unions, emerged mainly as a 
result of the new adversarial relationship between the U.S. 
Government and organised labour. This is not to say that the 
behaviour of the multinationals was an unimportant feature in 
this process. But the penetration of so-called developing 
countries by U.S. capital is hardly a new phenomenon, and 
during the Keynesian accomodation U.S. labour generally 
encouraged U.S. investment abroad. In the 1980s the impulse 
towards a new internationalism emerged largely because the 
Reagan-Bush administrations launched a series of severe 
attacks on organised labour.
These empirical and theoretical objectives, I would 
argue, have for the most part been met. It remains necessary 
to conclude with a short discussion on each of them. I will 
begin with the empirical tasks, followed by a discussion of 
the stated theoretical questions which consider the broader
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implications of this subject.
AIFLD in Nicaragua and El Salvador: The Price of "Democratic 
Internationalism.11
In Chapter One of this thesis I criticised certain 
aspects of the trade union imperialism approach to the subject 
of the AFL-CIO's intervention in other countries. In 
particular, I argued that this viewpoint tended to exaggerate 
the impact of the AFL-CIO's interventions by understating the 
contributions of other actors. The role of AIFLD in Nicaragua 
and El Salvador, I would argue, generally supports this view. 
The splits in the Salvadoran and Nicaraguan working class and 
labour movements were not created by AIFLD, the DIA, or Lane 
Kirkland. The unions officially supported by the AFL-CIO 
espoused a conservative ideology which envisaged the emergence 
of a society characterised by capitalist economic growth, 
political pluralism and class harmony. In Chapter One I 
discussed how this ideology, strong in some instances, weaker 
in others, has been a distinct feature of working class 
politics in Latin America in the postwar period. In Nicaragua 
the Somoza dictatorship and weak capitalist development 
rendered this strain of trade unionism considerably less 
robust than was the case, say, in oil-rich Venezuela. 
However, the declared protagonists of liberal capitalist 
development did exist in the form of the so-termed anti-Somoza 
bourgeoisie, represented presently by Dona Violeta Chamorro.
619
True to its ideology, CUS never strayed from the political 
leadership provided by this section of the Nicaraguan elite - 
even if AIFLD did pay many of the bills along the way. 
Somewhat ironically, Nicaragua has now (1990) arrived at the 
destination mapped out for it by the AFL-CIO's international 
policy makers decades ago, although the landmarks along the 
way - such as guerilla war, popular insurrection and armed 
counter-revolution - stand in sharp contrast to the unhurried 
political and economic liberalisation they envisaged and 
propagated.
It is not possible to accurately determine how visible 
and significant moderate trade unionism would have been had 
AIFLD's considerable financial and political support not been 
available. Carew's research has revealed that, in the case 
of early postwar Europe, the AFL's financial assistance was 
"sufficient to grease the wheels of anti-communist labor group 
activity." [58] It is reasonable to argue that, in the case 
of Nicaragua and El Salvador in the 1980s, AIFLD's (i.e. 
mainly U.S. Government) funding was of even greater 
significance - so much so that it not only greased the wheels 
but also fueled the engine of moderate trade unionism.
The U.S. Left and left-liberals have consistently 
maintained that, due to the volume of U.S. aid, the Salvadoran 
economy is "artifical" in the sense that the U.S. Government 
acts as a 1ife-support machine to a country suffering from 
terminal dependency. With Chamorro scheduled to receive U.S. 
aid, the same will probably be said of Nicaragua. Implicit
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in the trade union imperialism treatments is the view that 
labour organisations who receive money and political support 
from the U.S. Government and the AFL-CIO are similarly 
artificial, either that or their political presence is hugely 
inflated by the availability of considerable external 
assistance. In one sense this is true; indeed, I have argued 
to this extent above. However, there was nothing in the 
ideology of the CUS and UNOC.which regarded this funding to 
be antithetical to their vision of legitimate trade unionism, 
just as AIFLD had no compunction about joining forces with 
U.S. business, the Department of State and, perhaps, the CIA. 
In fact, in all of these cases the receipt of such funding was 
in one respect an expression of their ideology: the U.S. was
viewed as a progressive force in the region, defending 
Nicaragua and El Salvador from sovietization and the worst 
excesses of the right.
I stated at the outset that I intended to demonstrate 
how the AFL-CIO had made an important impression on the 
conflict in Nicaragua and El Salvador and how these countries 
provided an opportunity to view the AFL-CIO's activities in 
two contrasting political contexts. In so doing, I showed how 
the official organs of the Federation spent and distributed 
large sums of State Department and NED money in the pursuit 
of objectives that were shared by a right-wing Administration 
in Washington. I also exposed the distance between the stated 
aims of the AFL-CIO's "democratic internationalism" - reforms, 
democracy and class-harmony - and what frequently transpired,
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namely persecution, murder, and undemocratic and manipulative 
practices.
The search for reforms is a legitimate and profoundly 
basic trade union exercise, and in El Salvador the need for 
reforms was and remains pressingly urgent. Ostensibly the 
objectives of AIFLD - land distribution, democratic rights, 
the creation of a stable judicial system, collective 
bargaining and worker protection - are also laudable. This, 
however, is not the main question. If the experience of El 
Salvador in the last sixty years is any reliable guide then 
serious reforms can not be achieved by the methods condoned 
by the Institute and the AFL-CIO. The peasants' union UCS, 
for example, pressed for land reform and many of its members 
died as a result. In 1984 the UPD, commanding mass support 
for its stance, entered into a "social pact" with the 
Christian Democrats which rapidly unravelled once Duarte was 
elected and demonstrated his inability to deliver on his 
promises for meaningful change. This does not mean, however, 
that AIFLD or the AFL-CIO had no alternative but to extend 
uncritical support for the armed struggle waged by the FMLN. 
The armed struggle intensified in 1981 as the possibility of 
peaceful change expired. In 1980 the revolutionary movement 
failed to take power and ran into a wall of repression. As 
discussed in Chapter Two, the lack of a clear strategy for 
taking power was of central significance, although the 
intervention of AIFLD and the aggressive promotion by the U.S. 
Embassy of land reform proposals was also a very important
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factor in turning the tide against the Left. Whatever 
illusions remained at that juncture regarding the possibility 
of reforms, these should have been dispelled during the bloody 
course of the last decade. Yet AIFLD continued to promote a 
brand of reformism - from a safe distance - when the history 
of such a policy has been constantly punctuated by the murder 
and disappearance of its adherents.
In 1980, AIFLD and the AFL-CIO*s only other alternative 
was to throw their political weight behind the popular 
movement. This, of course, was never going to occur for 
reasons that should by now be more than clear. Mass 
mobilisations, general strikes and appeals to the lower ranks 
of the armed forces - these forms of struggle are presumably 
permissible against a Honecker, Jarulzelski or a Ceausescu, 
but not against a Duarte, a Cristiani or even a Somoza. It 
is here that the AFL-CIO's claim to hold equal portions of 
contempt for the dictators of the left and of the right - the 
"Single Standard on Dictatorships" - is again found to be 
spurious. Militant methods can be used against communist 
dictators but not against the dictators of the right who 
murder anyone who fights for the most basic reforms.
The most distinct feature of the AFL-CIO's Cold War 
unionism has been its consistent and unbending opposition to 
the state-sponsored trade unionism in the Eastern bloc and 
Cuba. Had the AFL-CIO agreed to establish relations with 
these unions - as some in the ICFTU had wished - then, it is 
argued, this would have helped to legitimise Stalinist regimes
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and undermine any internal resistance to them. This is a 
political position with which many trade unionists would 
presumably wholeheartedly concur. However, the opposition to 
Stalinism conceals a broader opposition to an alternative 
socialist project. Since the late 1920s the two main camps 
in international labour have subscribed either to Stalinism 
on the one hand or reformism on the other. For most of the 
postwar period the weakness of a working class politics which 
opposed both Stalinism and capitalism to some extent precluded 
any clear exposure of the AFL-CIO's blanket hostility to all 
expressions of socialism. This opposition was clear before 
the consolidation of Stalinist influence over international 
communism both in the Federation's dealings with socialist 
opponents domestically and internationally. It was also 
revealed somewhat in the postwar purge of socialists in the 
U.S. labour movement who were not connected to the CPUSA and 
frequently opposed the CPUSA's Stalinist methods and ideology. 
[59]
In Latin America AIFLD's opposition to democratically 
elected left reformist governments further demonstrated the 
elastic nature of the AFL-CIO leaders' conception of 
communism. [60] AIFLD's intervention in Nicaragua also 
revealed that the Cold War unionists, while opposed to a 
revolutionary transformation instigated by the Left, were 
nevertheless prepared to endorse an armed counter-revolution 
from the Right. AIFLD loudly protested Sandinista harassment 
of trade unionists, although relatively minor infringements
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were made to sound like heinous crimes. Cold War ideology 
made it permissible for AIFLD to advance the cause of the 
brutal, reactionary and, needless to say, undemocratic contras 
for the sake of the greater good - the war against communism. 
Moreover, in the U.S. the Institute worked with notorious 
anti-union businessmen and politicians to get Congress to 
provide military aid to an army that raped, murdered and 
mutilated in truly numbing proportions. The contras had 
killed Sandinista teenagers who had volunteered to vaccinate 
campesino children against measles and polio. The contras 
told the villagers that the Sandinistas were injecting their 
infants with communism. AIFLD remained silent despite these 
appalling atrocities. [61]
A further serious charge against AIFLD and the DIA is 
that they did not tell the truth to Congressional committees, 
to the Executive Council of the AFL-CIO, or to the union 
members and U.S. citizens who read their contributions to the 
AFL-CIO News and mass-circulation newspapers and magazines. 
The evidence presented above, I would argue, makes clear the 
fact that AIFLD attempted to mislead everyone as to the 
direction of Salvadoran society by denying or dismissing the 
extent of trade union repression. While the AFL-CIO had set 
conditions on its support for military aid to El Salvador, 
AIFLD strained every nerve to give the broad impression that 
many of those conditions had been met when the evidence 
suggested otherwise. AIFLD*s attack on the UNTS also 
contributed to the atmosphere of political persecution which
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resulted in the assassination of UNTS militants and, perhaps, 
to the murders of unionists active in the federation favoured 
by AIFLD. Meanwhile the Sandinistas were described in the 
most reprehensible terms even though their record in the area 
of human rights was immeasurably better than that of El 
Salvador.
In sum, the AFL-CIO's impact on the political situation 
El Salvador and Nicaragua has been very significant. True to 
its record in Latin America, AIFLD and the DIA in Nicaragua 
used all available means - including, of course, millions of 
State Department dollars - to destabilize and overthrow a Left 
government. Also consistent with past practice, in El 
Salvador AIFLD and the DIA helped sustain a repressive right- 
wing regime. They faithfully echoed Administration propaganda 
regarding the purported achievements of a "fledgling 
democracy;" they "red-baited" labour movement critics of U.S. 
policy towards that country, and, most significantly, they 
attempted to manage and contain the reform agenda of a section 
of the labour movement.
Regarding Nicaragua, in the end it was not a military 
coup or the U.S. marines that ousted the Sandinistas, but the 
Nicaraguan people in a general election. Defenders of the 
U.S. Government's policy toward Nicaragua, including AIFLD and 
the DIA, will view this "democratic" outcome as indicative of 
a new phase in U.S. foreign policy. It will be claimed that 
the years of expediential support for the autocratic right 
have now passed, replaced by a principled support for the
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democratic revolution. And yet, the final electoral drama in 
Nicaragua aside, the methods and objectives of U.S foreign 
policy towards recalcitrant regimes in Latin America remain 
largely unchanged. In this sense, there remains little to 
distinguish the demise of the Sandinistas in 1990 from that 
of Jagan in Guyana, Goulart in Brazil, Bosch in the Dominican 
Republic, Allende in Chile and Bishop in Grenada.
Official bodies of the U.S. labour movement made a 
distinct contribution in all of these cases of 
destabilization. This thesis has shown that the AFL-CIO was 
also a significant actor in the destabilization and eventual 
collapse of the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua. The unions 
it supported in Nicaragua were, and remain, politically wedded 
to the counter-revolutionary project of the formerly anti- 
Somoza bourgeoisie, which, after 1979, forged a political- 
military alliance with exiled Somocistas. AIFLD and the DIA 
helped secure military aid to the contras when they charged 
the Sandinistas with the horrible persecution of the "free and 
democratic" trade unions.
In El Salvador the official AFL-CIO, through AIFLD and 
the DIA, offered a vision of liberal pluralism, economic 
growth, and political space for the labour movement. After 
25 of AIFLD's active involvement in that country there are few 
signs that these objectives can be realised. Meanwhile, the 
killings continue.
627
AFL-CIO Foreign Policy: In the Service of Neo-Liberalism.
I have shown throughout this thesis that the AFL-CIO's 
support for U.S. Government policy in Central America also 
helped advance and legitimise the Reagan Administrations neo­
liberal recipes for the region. The broad objectives of the 
AFL-CIO's Cold War unionism in El Salvador and Nicaragua put 
considerable political and material resourses behind a 
struggle to defeat the Sandinistas and the Salvadoran left: 
both of whom, at least until 1988, were categorically opposed 
to the neo-liberal formulas protagonised by the U.S. 
Government and the IMF. However, as I have also shown in the 
case of El Salvador, even the AFL-CIO-supported unions 
committed to a moderate reformism eventually clashed with the 
political as well as economic expressions of this neo-liberal 
agenda. The Christian Democrats were elected in 1984 largely 
as a result Duarte1s commitment to improve the economic and 
political circumstances of workers and their organizations. 
Duarte, activating Washington and IMF-encouraged neo-liberal 
policies to revive the Salvadoran economy, instead presided 
over a marked deterioration in workers' living standards and 
branded as "subversive" all efforts to hold the Christian 
Democrats to their election commitments. (See Chapters Five 
and Nine).
At this point the AFL-CIO could have put its considerable 
weight behind labour movement resistence to Duarte's economic 
agenda. The AFL-CIO might have even led such a resistence.
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However, this did not occur because a broad-based movement 
towards reform might well have toppled the Duarte government 
and thus opened the door to the Left, especially the FMLN. 
For the Cold War unionists this was too grave a risk. 
Ideology aside, there remained the issue of funding. Had the 
AFL-CIO broke from Duarte, the U.S. Department of State would 
have almost certainly suspended its multi-million dollar 
funding of AIFLD. Therefore .the AFL-CIO*s ties to Reaganite 
neo-liberalism were both material and ideological, and they 
also reflected the demise of moderate reformism in El 
Salvador.
It would be mistaken to conclude, however, that the AFL- 
CIO ' s international affairs establishment preferred to support 
free market neo-liberalism. As discussed in Chapter Four, 
AIFLD and the DIA tried to impress upon the Kissinger 
Commission the need for the U.S. Government to support a 
redistributive "basic needs" economic policy in Central 
America. The Kissinger Report stated its intention to pursue 
such a policy, although the main economic proposals reflected 
the administration's free market leanings. In the end, the 
free-market thrust of the Kissinger Report, which also 
endorsed the free-trade program known as the Caribbean Basin 
Initiative, stood in clear contradiction to the "fair-trade" 
neo-protectionism of the AFL-CIO's lobbyists on Capitol Hill. 
Moreover, even when it became clear that the Department of 
State had blatantly ignored AIFLD's "basic needs" approach to 
the economic crisis in Central America (CADO), neither AIFLD
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or, for that matter, the AFL-CIO's Executive Council, withdrew 
their support for the Administration's Central America policy. 
In the end, the AFL-CIO supported the Cold War and anti-Left 
objectives of U.S. Government policy even though this also 
carried with it a commitment to a neo-liberal economic agenda 
which clearly harmed organised workers in the U.S. Therefore 
while union locals across the U.S. throughout the 1980s fought 
(often in vain) to halt plant closures and "runaway shops," 
the AFL-CIO's foreign policy establishment was lending its 
authority to proposals which threatened to increase the flight 
of jobs away from the U.S.
The garment workers' (ILGWU) President Jay Mazur, 
bricklayers' leader John Joyce and several AIFLD and DIA 
personnel witnessed the inauguration of Chamorro in Managua. 
Mazur commented, "Nicaragua appears to be on the road to 
democracy and labor played a key role in that transition." 
[62] But it is a transition that also spells problems for 
U.S. workers - and especially in industries such as garments 
and textiles. The AFL-CIO, in one sense, helped pull
Nicaragua out of the Soviet-Cuban frying pan into the neo­
liberal fire stoked by the IMF. It will be interesting to see 
how Mazur will react when the UNO government sets in motion 
its plan to establish a free trade zone to export semi­
finished products to the U.S. Manufacturers will be invited 
to leave the U.S. and to relocate in Nicaragua in order to 
take advantage of low wage rates and tax incentives.
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The experience of the 1980s appeared to support the 
notion that the structural position of sections of the U.S. 
working class vis-a'-vis the world economy has been 
significantly altered. As discussed in both the Introduction 
and in Chapter One, the AFL-CIO's Cold War unionism was 
constructed on firm economic, political, and ideological 
foundations. The preponderant strength of the U.S. economy 
and the postwar global expansion cemented the "social accord" 
between U.S. labour, capital and the state. Trade union 
advances secured during the so-called "militant period" of 
1934-47 were officially regarded as irreversable, especially 
following the purge of labour movement radicals in the late 
1940s. The AFL-CIO supported the global activity of U.S. 
capital because it regarded this to be unambiguously 
beneficial both to the overall health of the U.S. economy and 
to U.S. workers.
By 1980 the Keynesian accomodation of the previous period 
had clearly passed. The neo-liberal domestic economic agenda 
of the Reagan Administration extended to the international 
arena. The AFL-CIO maintained that this aggressive neo­
liberalism threatened trade-impacted domestic industries and 
undermined the jobs and living standards of U.S. workers. As 
the 1980s progressed the Federation began to criticise U.S. 
multinationals for relocating to low-wage countries and for 
the level of exploitation of third world workers. The AFL- 
CIO 's enthusiasm for the capitalist industrialization of the 
third world and free trade, clearly in evidence during the
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1950s and 1960s, had now vanished.
What had not vanished, however, was the practice of 
actively promoting gradualist and moderate trade unionism, 
particularly in the so-called developing countries. The 
policy of implacable opposition to the Left, pro-Moscow or 
otherwise, also continued. Therefore while AFL-CIO economists 
and trade lobbyists argued against Reagan-Bush domestic and 
international economic policies, the AFL-CIO's official 
international affairs functionaries and some union leaders 
allied themselves with the the Administrations' Cold War 
political agenda in Nicaragua and El Salvador. In so doing, 
the AFL-CIO went on record and performed active duty in the 
service of neo-liberal development policy that harmed U.S. 
workers as well as their third-world counterparts.
Broader Issues. Implications, and Theoretical Concerns.
1. The Crisis of the U.S. Labour Movement.
I remarked at the outset that both liberal and radical 
observers of the U.S. labour movement have only recently begun 
to consider the changes in the world economy and the serious 
implications these changes hold for organised labour. I noted 
that these commentators, having taken this step, have so far 
said little regarding an appropriate international policy for 
U.S. labour and have generally paid only minimal attention to 
the role presently performed by the official AFL-CIO in its 
international work. For liberal commentators this neglect has
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been virtually total. Radicals have bemoaned the AFL-CIOfs 
Cold War unionism, but have not deemed it necessary to study 
it in depth. They have, moreover, offered only vague 
prescriptions which refer to the need for more international 
solidarity.
Two problems have emerged from this state of affairs. 
Firstly, scholars have as yet failed to fully comprehend the 
degree to which the active pursuit of Cold War unionism has 
had an independent bearing on the present crisis of U.S. 
labour. Secondly, this failure or blind spot has contributed 
to the extremely limited level of attention that has been paid 
to the question of a viable and vibrant alternative 
internationalism for U.S. trade unions.
This thesis has shown how Cold War unionism has 
contributed to the present crisis of U.S. labour in several 
ways. Most obviously, it has reinforced the position of a 
conservative U.S. administration committed to an anti-union 
political and economic agenda in the domestic arena. As this 
thesis has documented, the AFL-CIO's official positions on El 
Salvador and Nicaragua lent tacit and often explicit support 
for U.S. Government foreign policy. In part because of the 
special role of the U.S. in international affairs, the extent 
to which an Administration's foreign policy is perceived to 
be a success or a failure can have a clear impact on the 
electoral prospects of a President and his political party. 
In plain language, the AFL-CIO expressed concern regarding 
Reagan's handling of the economy, but was more than pleased
633
that the President was "standing up to Communism" in the 
so-called backyard. This can only have assisted the 
re-election of the Republicans in 1984 and 1988 and, perhaps 
just as important, provided further impetus to the shift to 
the right in the Democratic Party - a process the AFL-CIO 
helped inaugurate in the early 1970s. (See Chapters Four and 
Six)
Cold War unionism further contributed to the crisis of 
U.S. labour in that it directly and indirectly impeded the 
challenge to Reagan's domestic as well as foreign policy 
agenda. As documented in this thesis, a broad opposition 
movement developed in the U.S. committed to resist U.S. 
intervention in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Many union 
leaders, local officials, and thousands of trade union 
activists supported and became a part of this movement, and 
a significant portion of the latter made it their top 
political priority. Importantly, the movement against U.S. 
intervention also forcefully articulated the connection 
between Reagan's pro-business agenda at home and the U.S. 
Government's military agenda abroad. It pointed to cuts in 
social programs, runaway shops and plant closures as 
inseparable features or byproducts of an interventionist 
policy designed to make Central America safe for U.S. 
multinationals. The AFL-CIO's Cold War functionaries did as 
much as they could to derail and discredit this movement. As 
has been demonstrated throughout the course of this work, 
several union leaders vacillated under the pressure of
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Kirkland and the Cold Warriors. Other leaders and lower 
officials who openly sympathised with anti-interventionism 
were often subjected to attacks and accusations not that 
dissimilar to those aimed against trade unionists during the 
McCarthy period. Therefore official endorsements that would 
have strengthened and invigorated these efforts were either 
not forthcoming or offered begrudgingly and without the 
necessary resources to take them forward.
Perhaps the most important contribution Cold War unionism 
has made to the crisis of U.S. labour lies in its active and 
implacable opposition to militant, class-struggle unionism 
throughout the world. This thesis has documented AIFLD*s 
considerable impact on working class politics in El Salvador 
and Nicaragua. This, I hope, should at this point require no 
further elaboration. AIFLD contributed to the downfall of the 
Sandinistas and to the containment and, the evidence suggests, 
repression of the Left in El Salvador. In so doing AIFLD 
helped defeat or weaken the very forces that another section 
of the U.S. labour movement had come to view as its allies. 
This, consequently, further stunted the development of a 
dissident movement in U.S. labour which had sought to generate 
some grass-roots resistance to the Reagan Administration's 
anti-union and pro-business agenda. As I suggested at the 
start, the extent to which U.S. labour assists or obstructs 
working class movements in other countries must be viewed as 
a factor that shapes working class politics in the U.S. 
Failure to consider the impact of U.S. labour's international
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activities must therefore appreciably distort any evaluation 
of the present crisis of U.S. labour. Furthermore, it has 
also retarded discussion on the issue of an alternative 
international policy for U.S. labour and the contribution such 
a policy might make to resolving this crisis.
2. International Labour and Trade Union Internationalism.
I stated in the Introduction that the foreign policy 
conflict in U.S. labour had broader implications for the 
future direction of the international labour movement. I 
noted that in recent years international union structures had 
come under increasing scrutiny due to changes in the world 
economy and the growing concern to inaugurate a more visible 
and vibrant trade union internationalism to respond to those 
changes. This increased scrutiny of international union 
structures prompted certain radical commentators to conclude 
that the principal bodies, namely the social democratic ICFTU 
and pro-Moscow WFTU, were more concerned with fighting the 
Cold War than with trying to engage the power of the 
multinationals. For a period radical treatments were largely 
confined to pointing to what they considered to be a 
scandalous parody of workers' internationalism wedded to 
superpower politics and imperialism. More recently scholars 
such as those associated with the New International Labour 
Studies (NILS) have taken the discussion further. Their 
concern has been to construct more theoretically developed
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analyses of international workers' organisations and 
international labour in general. The often-stated concern of 
NILS writers is to develop a theory snd practice for a "New 
Internationalism."
This thesis has made two distinct contributions to this 
debate. Firstly, I set out to demonstrate that the "political 
restructuring" of the relationship between the state and 
organised labour was, in terms of creating the conditions for 
a new internationalism, perhaps just as important as economic 
restructuring and the movement of capital. Secondly, the 
empirical character of this thesis has permitted a close—range 
exploration of the process of constructing a new trade union 
internationalism. Studies of the interrelationships between 
different national labour movements are extremely rare? this 
study is perhaps even more unusual in that it has been 
necessary to describe how fractions of those labour movements 
have politically related to each other. This has been more 
complicated and thus more challenging to the reader but 
reflects, I would argue, a more accurate picture.
Regarding the first contribution, I believe this thesis 
shows that the behaviour of international capital, and 
particularly the relocation of investment capital and 
production from one country to another, are clearly important 
in terms of creating an urgent and material need for trade 
union internationalism. However*/ I stated at the start that 
similar movements of capital in the past did not generate the 
same trade union concerns. in the 1950s and 1960s, the
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strength of the U.S. economy, prevailing Cold War tensions, 
the degree of acceptance U.S. labour had won from the U.S. 
Government and key sections of capital as a result of the 
postwar social pact and the purge of the CIO Left, as well as 
the relative success of the capitalist industrialization model 
in the third world; together these factors created an 
altogether different political framework for the 
internationalization of U.S. capital. During this period U.S. 
labour encouraged U.S. business to go forth into the world 
and multiply. (See Chapter One)
Present day trade union concern over changes in the world 
economy is in one sense a measure of the degree of trepidation 
fomented by the changes themselves and where such changes 
might ultimately lead, but it is also indicative of the new 
set of political relationships that have emerged following the 
end of the postwar consensus. Since the New Deal, the state 
had been seen as an (albeit inconsistent) co-defender of 
workers' political and economic rights. The Reagan era saw 
the partial eclipse of both New Deal industrial relations 
procedures and Great Society notions of a more equal America. 
As documented above, the new adversarial relations between 
U.S. labour, business, and government following the end of the 
postwar expansion stimulated a section of the labour movement, 
as well as other liberal political constituencies, to redefine 
their relationship to other social forces both within the U.S. 
and beyond. A section of the U.S. labour leadership shifted 
closer to the Socialist International, thus reversing the
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pattern of the early 1950s when the S. I. gravitated towards 
U.S. government and, by extension, AFL-CIO foreign policy. 
Underneath the U.S. labour leadership, a new generation of 
union activists came of age. Many of them had been part of 
the 1960s anti-war movements and supported national liberation 
struggles in the Third World.
This process of realignment was reinforced by the failure 
of liberal capitalist development in regions like Central 
America and the Caribbean and by concern regarding the 
direction of U.S. foreign policy after Vietnam. This process 
was further reinforced by the peculiar elan of the 
revolutionary movements in Central America as well as in other 
parts of the world (e.g. South Africa) and their relationships 
to international religious, environmental, feminist and 
indigenous peoples' movements. In the U.S. these movements 
converged into the broader anti-intervention movement which, 
in turn, penetrated the trade unions.
But not all trade unions. The traditional craft 
"brotherhood" unions, particularly in the building trades, as 
well as longshoremen (ILA) and the massive Teamsters union, 
were by and large impervious to these developments. There is 
no shortage of explanations as to why this is the case. 
Liberals are often quick to point out that these unions are 
predominantly white, well paid, and frequently racist? some 
openly endorse the Republican Party. Furthermore, many of 
these unions view political discussion to be antithetical to 
their stated adherence to "bread-and-butter" unionism. The
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conservative political stance and culture of this section of 
U.S. labour is not, however, fixed in stone. As Chapters 
Seven and Ten make clear, the foreign policy conflict revealed 
a noticeable leftward shift in several reputably conservative 
unions (e.g. CWA).
As I documented above, anti-intervention sentiment 
resonated most clearly in the white collar unions, 
particularly teachers (AFT, NEA) and government employees 
(AFGE, AFSCME). While this can partially be explained by the 
anxiety created as a result of cuts in public services and 
the increase in military spending, it also reflects the 
college-educated and middle class character of the self-named 
Central America or Anti-Intervention Movement (CA/AIM). 
However, the movement also made its mark on traditionally 
blue-collar unions such as the UAW, the steelworkers (USWA), 
machinists (IA'l) , and clothing and textile workers (ACTWU) , 
and it was in these unions that anti-intervention sentiment 
was reinforced by anxieties over jobs, plant closures and 
runaway shops. As Machinists' union leader William Winpisinger 
expressed it, "I'll be damned if workers should send their 
sons to support Texas Instruments in El Salvador..." [63] 
Unions with a proportionately high number of black and latino 
members (1199, HERE, SEIU) were also responsive to 
anti-intervention arguments.
In many uiions anti-intervention sentiment evolved into 
feelings of solidarity for the victims of intervention. 
Sandinista union officials and representatives of Left
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Salvadoran unions (e.g. ANDES, FENASTRAS) were featured in 
scores of meetings during the 1980s, much to the displeasure 
of Lane Kirkland. This in turn became converted into 
political and material support. Thus a dissident 
internationalism began to take root in U.S. labour. This 
internationalism, fragile as it was, did not emerge solely or 
even primarily as a result of changes in the behaviour of 
capital. It emerged as a result of several processes set in 
motion by the political restructuring that marked the end of 
the Keynesian accommodation, and was reinforced by another 
set of processes triggered by economic and political crises 
in other parts of the world.
The second contribution this thesis has made to the 
debate on international trade unionism and internationalism 
is that its close-range examination of the foreign policy 
conflict in U.S. labour has highlighted not just the potential 
for a qualitative shift in the international policies and 
practices of U.S. labour, it has also identified some of the 
obstacles that have so far caused this not to occur. I stated 
above that both economic and political factors and processes 
generated a nascent new internationalism in U.S. labour. Why, 
it seems pertinent to ask, has this new internationalism not 
grown from its present nascent condition into something more 
developed? It is tempting to attribute this to the seismic 
developments in the global political landscape following the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the defeat of the Sandinistas in 
1990, and the generally triumphal posture of pro-business and
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conservative forces internationally. However, it was clear 
during the late 1980s that many opportunities to seriously 
advance a new internationalism for U.S. labour had been 
missed. As noted throughout this work, the majority of the 
union leaders who challenged U.S. foreign policy and the 
multinationals were not prepared to openly criticise Kirkland 
and the Federation's international affairs apparatus. Neither 
were they prepared to be the. visible protagonists of a new 
internationalism which consciously forged alliances with 
militant trade union and political forces in other countries.
There are many reasons for this. Firstly, many of these 
leaders were only peripherally concerned with foreign policy 
and were not prepared to split the Federation on this issue. 
Secondly, to actively encourage links between U.S. labour and 
militant forces would have led to similar a similar outcome. 
Moreover, if a new internationalism entailed lending support 
for the existing Left in places like Central America, this 
too was unacceptable. These leaders feared the prospect of 
new regimes being established along the lines of Cuba or 
Nicaragua, for which they would certainly be castigated as 
accessories both before and after the fact. The only other 
option would be to seek to redefine the Left, to build support 
for a radical alternative both to the Cuban-Sandinista model 
and the stalled reformism of AIFLD and the Department of 
State. But, given the weak basis for reforms, this would have 
been tantamount to advocating an alternative revolutionary 
strategy or model. Even in the unlikely event that this was
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desired, it seems barely feasible that U.S. union leaders 
could seriously advance this option and simultaneously 
maintain their generally defencive and non-combative approach 
to capital in the U.S.
The prospects of constructing a fully developed new 
internationalism underneath the union leaders, a rank-and-file 
internationalism, were also not favourable. This is in part 
due to the political orientation of the solidarity wing of the 
anti-intervention movement, which viewed itself as an 
auxiliary to the revolutionary project of the FSLN and FMLN.
For these trade unionists, Managua in the 1980s was as
significant as Madrid was the radicals of the 193 0s? their 
priority was to build opposition to U.S. policy in the region 
- a priority encouraged by the FSLN and the Sandinista unions. 
Trade union tours and delegations to and from Nicaragua 
created a labour diplomacy designed to pressure the U.S.
Government. Indeed, as was discussed in Chapter Six, the 
FSLN1s foreign policy oriented toward the liberal forces in 
the U.S., the Socialist International, and the Communist
leaderships of the then Soviet bloc, as well as forums such 
as the United Nations and the World Court. A similar approach 
was adopted by the FDR in El Salvador. Therefore Sandinista 
and FDR policy sought to win some friends among the leadership 
of the labour movement. Therefore they, too, did not actively 
encourage an internationalism that union leaders might view 
as a challenge from below.
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The search for a "New Internationalism" will continue 
irrespective of the successes and limitations revealed by this 
short episode in the history of international workers' 
organisations. If one view has been strengthened by the 
evidence presented here, it is that which recognises the 
central importance of ideology in the development of workers' 
internationalism. The New International Labour Studies 
writers have displayed a tendency to try to reconstitute the 
notion of international solidarity as a guiding principle and 
objective of a new internationalism. Ideology appears to be 
discussed as a distraction, a contaminant. Perhaps this 
explains why these writers have focussed more on economic 
changes than on political changes and movements. To discuss 
in any meaningful way these movements raises the question of 
their goals and methods, in short, their ideologies.
The 1990s is likely to see enourmous changes in the 
ideological profile of the international labour movement. The 
growing interdependence of the world economy became a 
principal concern of trade unions in the capitalist world 
during the 1980s. This concern will surely increase with the 
changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, especially 
because of the anticipated penetration of those regions by 
capitalist enterprises. While the peculiarities of Cold War 
unionism may disappear with the passing of the Cold War 
itself, workers' organisations will be confronted with a new 
global situation that will bring with it new sources of 
conflict as well as new opportunities and reasons for cross­
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national unity. The evidence of history strongly suggests 
that ideology is an inseperable part of the practice of 
workers' internationalism, left or right, revolutionary, 
reformist, or conservative. A theory of internationalism that 
fails to recognise the central place of ideology will, I 
believe, be of little value to those for those it is intended 
to influence and assist.
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American Alliance for Labor & Democracy 
Association of Cooperatives of Integrated 
Agricultural Livestock Products (Asociacion de 
Cooperativas de Produccion Agropecuaria 
Integradas)
Association of Catholic Trade Unions 
Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union 
American Federation of Government Employees 
American Federation of Labor 
American Federation of Labor - Congress of 
Industrial Organizations
American Federation of State, County & Municipal 
Employees
American Federation of Teachers 
General Association of Treasury Ministry 
Employees (Asociacion General de Empleados del 
Ministerio de Hacienda)
Amnesty International
American Institute For Free Labor Development 
African National Congress
National Association of Nicaraguan Educators 
(Asociacion Nacional de la Educadores 
Nicaraguenses)
National Association of Salvadoran Teachers 
(Asociacion Nacional de Educadores Salvadorenos) 
National Association of Salvadoran Indians 
(Asociacion Nacional Indigena Salvadorena) 
Nationalist Republican Alliance (Alianza 
Republicana Nacionalista)
Association of ANTEL Workers of El Salvador 
(Asociacion Salvadorena de Trabajadores de ANTEL) 
Salvadoran Telecommunications Workers Association 
(Asociacion Salvadorena de Trabajadores de 
Telecomunicaciones)
ANTEL Workers National Associaiton (Asociacion 
Nacional de Trabajadores de ANTEL) ATC 
Association of Rural Workers (Asociacion de 
Trabajadores del Campo)
Santa Ana Municipal Workers Association 
(Asociacion de Trabajadores Municipales de Santa 
Ana)
(USSR) All Russian Central Council of Trade Unions 
International Union of Bricklayers & Allied 
Craftsmen







































Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship 
Clerks, Freight Handlers, Express & Station 
Employees
Central America/Anti-Intervention Movement 
Central America Development Organization 
Central America Historical Institute 
Confederation of Action and Labor Union 
Unification (Central de Accion y Unidad Sindical) 
Canadian Congress of Labor
Coordinating Council of State & Municipal Workers 
(Consejo Coordinador de Trabajadores Estata las 
y Municipales)
Coalition for a Democratic Majority
Democratic Coordinator of Nicaragua (Coordinadora
Democratica de Nicaragua)
California Federation of Teachers (CFT)
Genral Federation of Italian Workers 
(Confederazione Generale de Italiane del Laroro) 
General Confederation of Workers (Central General 
dos Trabalhadores)
General Confederation of Workers 
Generale du Travail)
General Confederation of Workers 
General de Trabajadores)
General Confederation of Workers 
General de Trabajadores - Independiente)
Central Intelligence Agency
Congress of Industrial Organizations
Center for International Private Enterprise
Information Center for Salvadoran Trade Unionists
(Chicago)
Committee in Support of the People of El Salvador 
Committee in Support of Trade Union Rights 
Latin American Workers
Federation (Confederacion Latinamericana de 
Trabajo)
National Centre of United Unions (Central 
Nacional de Unidad Sindicatos)
Confederation of Cooperative Associations of El 
Salvador (Confederacion de Asociaciones 
Cooperativas de El Salvador)
(Colegio Profesional Superior Magisterial 
Hondureno)
National Federation of Free Workers 
(Confederacion Nacional de Trabajadores Libres) 
Committee on Political Education, AFL-CIO 
Confederation of South African Trade Unions 
Superior Council of Private Enterprise 
(Council Superior de Empresa Privada)
Permanent Commission on Human Rights (Comision 
Permanente de Derechos Humanos)
Civil & Public Services Association (UK)
Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
Communist Party of the United States of America
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CPUSTAL Permanent Congress of Trade Union Unity of Latin
America (Congreso Permanente de Unidad Sindical 
de los Trabajadores de America Latina)
CSN Nicaraguan Trade Union Coordinating Council
(Coordinadora Sindical de Nicaragua)
CST (Nicaragua)Sandinista Workers Central (Central Sandinista
de Trabajadores)
CST (El Sal.) Workers Solidarity Coordinating Council
(Coordinadora de Solidaridad de Trabajadores)
Latin American Workers Federation (Confederacion 
de Trabajadores de America Latina)
Cuban Workers' Federation (Confederacion de 
Trabajadores Cubanos)
Confederation of Democratic Workers 
(Confederacion de Trabajadores Democatica)
Workers' Central of Nicaragua (Central de 
Trabajadores de Nicaragua)
Republic of Panama Workers' Federation 
(Confederacion de Trabajadores de Republica de 
Panama)
Salvadoran Workers Central (Central de 
Trabajadores de Salvadorneno)
Confederation of Venezuelan Workers 
(Confederacion de Trabajadores Venezuela)
CWA Communication Workers of America
CUPROCH Confederation of Chilean Professions
CUS Council for Union Unification (Consejo de
Unificacion Sindical)
CUS Committee for Trade Union Unity (Comite de Unidad
Sindical Salvadorenos)
CUT (Brazil) Primary Workers Central (Central Unica dos
Trabalhadores)
CUT United Workers' Central (Central Unica
de Trabajadores) Chile 
CUTS United Confederation of Workers (Confederacion
Unitaria de Trabajadores Salvadorenos)
DIA Department of International Affairs (AFL-CIO)
DSA Democratic Socialists of America
EC Executive Council (AFL-CIO)
ENC Emergency National Council
ERP Popular Revolutionary Army (Ejercito
Revolucionario del Pueblo)
FAO Broad Opposition Front (Frente Amplio)
FAPU United Popular Action Front (Frente de Accion
Popular Unida)
FDN Nicaraguan Democratic Force (Fuerza Democratica
Nicaraguense)
FDR Revolutionary Democratic Front (Frente
Democratico Revolucionario)
FENASTRAS National Federation of Salvadoran Workers
(Federacion Nacional de Trabajadores 
Salvadorenos)
FESINCONSTRANS Federation of Construction, Transportation &
Related Industries (Federacion de Sindicatos de 









FESTIAVTSES Salvadoran National Trade Union Federation of
Workers of the Food, Clothing, Textile, & Related 
Industries (Federacion Nacional de Sindicatos de 
Trabajadores de la Industria del Alimento,
Vestido, Textil, Similares y Conexos de El 
Salvador)
FETSALUD Federation of Health Workers (Federacion de
Trabajadores de la Salud)
FKTU Federation of Korean Trade Unions
FMLN Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation
(Farabundo Marti de Liberacion Nacional)
FO (France) Workers' Force (Force Ouvriere)
FO (Nicaragua) Workers' Front (Frente Obrero)
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
FOMCA Federation of Central American Teachers
(Federacion Obreros de Magistariales de 
Centroamerica)
FPL Popular Liberation Forces (Fuerzas Populares de
Liberacion)
FSLN Sandinista National Liberation Front (Frente
Sandinista de Liberacion Nacional)
FSR Revolutionary Trade Union Federation (Federacion
Sindical Revolucionario)
FTUC Free Trade Union Committee
FTUI Free Trade Union Institute
FUSS Unifying Federation of Salvadoran Trade Union
(Federacion Unitaria de Sindicatos Salvadorenos) 
FUTH United Federation of Honduran Workers
(Federacion Unidad de Trabajadores Hondorenos)
GAO Government Accounting Office
GCIU Graphic Communications International Union
HERE Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees
IAM International Association of Machinists
ICFTU International Confederation of Free Trade Unions
ICWU International Chemical Workers Union
ILA International Longshoremen's Association
ILGWU International Ladie's & Garment Workers' Union
ILO International Labour Organization
ILWU International Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's
Union
IMAWU International Molders & Allied Workers Union
IMF International Monetary Fund
IFTU International Federation of Trade Unions
IRD Institute for Religion & Democracy
ISTA Salvadorena Institute of Agrarian Transformation
(Instituto Slavadoreno de Transformacion Agraria) 
ITS International Trade Secretariat/s
IUD Industrial Union Dept. (AFL-CIO)
IUE International Union of Electrical Workers
IWA International Woodworkers of America
IWW Industrial Workers of the World
KMU(Philippines) May First Movement (Kilusang de Mayo Uno)
MAES Medical Aid to El Salvador







































National Revolutionary Movement (Movimiento
Nacional Revolucionario)
United People's Movement (Movimiento Pueblo 
Unido)
Labour Unity Movement of El Salvador (Movimiento 
Unitario Sindicalista y Gremail de El Salvador) 
National Association of Local Governement 
Officers (UK)
North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
National Council of Churches 
National Education Association 
National Endowment for Democracy
National Labor Committee (in Support of Democracy 
& Human Rights in El Salvador)
National Labor Relations Board 
New International Economic Order 
National Security Council 
National Union of Hospital & Health Care 
Employees (National 1199)
Oil Chemical & Atomic Workers
Office for Public Diplomacy for Latin America and 
the Caribbean
Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
Nationalist Democratic Organization (Organizacion 
Democratica Nacionalista)
Inter-American Regional Organization of Labor 
(Organizacion Regionales Inter-americana de 
Trabajado)
Pan American Federation of Labor
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization 
Communist Party of El Salvador (Partido Comunista 
de El Salvador)
Communist Party of France 
Communist Party of Italy
National Conciliation Party (Partido Conciliacion 
de Nacional) El Salvador
Christian Democratic Party (Partido Democratico 
Cristiano) El Salvador
Friends of the Democratic Center in Central 
America
Central America Revolutionary Workers Party 
(Partido Revolucionario de Trabajadores 
Centroamerica)
Nicaraguan Socialist Party (Partido Socialista 
de Nicaragua)
International Federation of Postal, Telephone &
Telegraph Workers
Roman Catholic Church
Red International of Labor Unions
National Resistence (Resistencia Nacional)
Screen Actors Guild
Social Democrats of the United States of America
Service Employees International Union

































(Sindicato Empresa de Trabajadores de ANDA) 
Socialist International
Electrical Industry Workers Union (Sindicato de 
la Industria Electrica de El Salvador)
Banking & Savings & Loan General Industry 
Employees Union (Sindicato de la Industria 
General de Empleados Bancarios y Asociaciones de 
Ahorro y Prestamo)
Confederation of Cooperative Associations of El 
Salvador (Sindicato de Trabajadores Agricultura, 
Simitares y Conexos Salvadorenos)
Seafarers International Union of North America 
Salvadoran Labor Defense Network 
Union of Electrical Workers of the Lempa River 
(Sindical de Trabajadores de la Comision 
Ejecutivo Electrico de Rio Lempa)
Hospital Workers Union (Sinicato de Trabajadores 
de I.S.S)
Salvadoran Union of Workers of the Textile & 
Cotton Industry (Sindicato de Empleados y 
Trabajadores de la Industria Textil y Algodon 
Salvadorena)
Urtion of University Workers (Sindicato de 
Trabajadores de Universitarios)
Letter Carrier & Postal Employees Union Society 
of El Salvador (Sociedad Union de Carteros y 
Empleados Postales de El Salvador)
Construction Workers Union (Sindicato Union de 
Trabajadores de Constuccion)
South West Africa Peoples Association 
Seamen & Waterfront Workers Union (Grenada)
Trades Union Congress 
Trades Union Council (Guiana)
Trades Union Congress of the Philippines 
Trade Unionists in Support of El Salvador 
Trade Union Education League 
United Auto Workers
Salvadoran Communal Union (Union Comunal 
Salvadorena)
Democratic Union of Liberation (Union Democratica 
de Liberacion)
United Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers of 
America
United Food & Commercial Workers 
United Farm Workers of America 
United Furniture Workers of America 
General Workers Union (Union General dos 
Trabalhadores)
United Mine Workers of America
National Union of Farmers and Cattlemen (Union 
Nacional de Agricultores y Ganaderos 
National Union of (Public) Employees (Union 
Nacional Empleados)












National Worker Peasant Union (Unidad Nacional 
Obreros y Campesinos)
National Union of Salvadoran Workers (Unidad 
Nacional de Trabajadores Salvadorenos)
Popular Democratic Unity (Unidad Popular 
Democratica)
Nicaraguan Press Union (Union de Periodistas 
Nicaraguenses)
United States Agency For International 
Development
United Steel Workers of America
World Confederation of Labor
World Confederation of Organizations of the
Teaching Profession
World Federation of Trade Unions
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